[Cite as Edelstein v. Edelstein,
2025-Ohio-4686.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
ELIOTT EDELSTEIN, : APPEAL NO. C-240626
TRIAL NO. DV-2400381
Petitioner-Appellee, :
vs. : JUDGMENT ENTRY
KIMBERLY EDELSTEIN, :
Respondent-Appellant. :
This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, the briefs, and arguments.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed for the reasons set forth in the
Opinion filed this date.
Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal,
allows no penalty, and orders that costs are taxed under App.R. 24.
The court further orders that 1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the
Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and 2) the mandate be sent to the trial
court for execution under App.R. 27.
To The Clerk:
Enter upon the Journal of the Court on 10/10/2025 per Order of the Court.
By:________________________
Administrative Judge
[Cite as Edelstein v. Edelstein, 2025-Ohio-4686.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
ELIOTT EDELSTEIN, : APPEAL NO. C-240626
TRIAL NO. DV-2400381
Petitioner-Appellee, :
vs. :
OPINION
KIMBERLY EDELSTEIN, :
Respondent-Appellant. :
:
Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations
Division
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: October 10, 2025
Eliott Edelstein, pro se,
Kimberly Edelstein, pro se.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
NESTOR, Judge.
{¶1} This appeal stems from ongoing divorce litigation between respondent-
appellant Kimberly Edelstein and petitioner-appellee Eliott Edelstein. After Kimberly
repeatedly violated the trial court’s stay-away order and allegedly made Eliott fear for
his safety, Eliott petitioned the court for a Domestic Violence Civil Protection Order
(“DVCPO”). The court first issued an ex parte order and then a final order after an
evidentiary hearing.
{¶2} Kimberly maintains the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue the
DVCPO and, in granting the order, improperly weighed the evidence. However,
because Kimberly waived the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction and because the
trial court’s findings were supported by competent, credible evidence, we cannot say
the trial court erred by granting the DVCPO. Therefore, we overrule Kimberly’s eight
assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I. Factual and Procedural History
{¶3} The couple married in 2002. The parties later divorced, and Eliott
received sole custody of S.E., the couple’s son. As part of the divorce decree, the court
ordered Kimberly to stay away from S.E. until further order. Unfortunately, Kimberly
chose not to comply, leading to this case.
{¶4} The domestic relations court granted the first DVCPO on August 26,
2022, and it expired on February 26, 2024. After Eliott filed for another DVCPO, an
ex parte hearing was held on April 19, 2024, and the court granted the ex parte order.
There, the court found,
[Kimberly] is [Eliott’s] ex-wife. [Kimberly] has an order in their divorce
case prohibiting contact with the parties’ minor son, S.E. Since [the]
previous DVCPO expired in February, she has repeatedly contacted
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
[Eliott] in order to gain access to their son. She has sent many, many
messages, she has shown up unannounced where [S.E.] was or was
expected to be at least five times. This has all happened in just over six
weeks. This caus[ed] mental distress for [S.E.] and he is in therapy due
to the relationship with his mother and parental alienation. Both
[Eliott] and [S.E.] [a]re in therapy as a result of Kimberly’s actions and
the mental distress it causes.
The court ordered Kimberly to surrender (1) her weapons, (2) any access to the
Cincinnati residence, and (3) to stay away from and keep from having contact with
Eliott or S.E.
{¶5} Kimberly maintains that she did not receive proper service of the
petition and the ex parte order. But Eliott asserts that is because Kimberly
purposefully evades service of the court’s orders and other documents. On October 8,
2024, Kimberly appeared for the final hearing on the DVCPO and fully participated.
On October 21, 2024, the court issued the final DVCPO, finding,
[Kimberly] has committed acts of domestic violence by stalking [Eliott]
through the parties’ child. [Kimberly] was ordered to have no contact
with the parties’ minor child, [S.E.] . . . in the parties’ Decree of Divorce
[]. [Kimberly] repeatedly violates the Domestic Relations Court no-
contact order. She has shown up at Respondent’s [sic] home while he
had the child with him, has secretly met with the child at a religious
service, has sent dozens of letters and packages to the child at
Respondent’s [sic] address, has shown up at the child’s camps and
caregivers’ homes, has sent the child secret messages, and more. Each
of these acts causes [Eliott] to suffer emotional distress and causes him
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
to understandably fear for his safety because [Kimberly] continually
refuses to follow Court Orders, the parties’ marital relationship was
violent at times, and [Kimberly] previously stalked [Eliott] at his
workplace. In addition, he is fearful because [Kimberly] continues to
claim the no-contact order is not valid even though the validity of the
Decree of Divorce was confirmed by the First District Court of Appeals
in its Entry dated 03/25/24. [Kimberly] is an attorney who should be
cognizant of court rulings and her insistence on an alternate reality
where the orders do not exist causes grave concern for her mental
stability. Finally, [Eliott] believes that [Kimberly] ignored [the previous
DVCPO orders] and did not surrender her weapon as ordered.
Kimberly, offering what she believes are justifiable explanations for her actions,
disputes the court’s reasoning for issuing the final DVCPO.
{¶6} The court also reasoned that although S.E. testified that Kimberly did
not cause him mental distress, his testimony had little weight due to his “tender age”
and previous enmeshment with Kimberly. The court found by a preponderance of the
evidence that Eliott and Eliott’s family or household members are in danger and have
been victims of domestic violence as defined in R.C. 3113.31(A). The court echoed the
magistrate’s concerns in issuing the ex parte DVCPO, ordering Kimberly again to
surrender her weapon, relinquish any access to the Cincinnati residence, and stay
away from both Eliott and their minor child.
II. Analysis
A. First Assignment of Error
{¶7} In her first assignment of error, Kimberly asserts that the trial court
failed to obtain personal jurisdiction because she never received sufficient service of
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
process of the petition and orders. She argues that without proper service, both the ex
parte and final DVCPO are void. “[W]e review a trial court’s finding [regarding
whether] service of process was accomplished for an abuse of discretion. Berhane v.
Walmart, Inc., 2024-Ohio-3163, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.), quoting Simpson v. Simpson, 2024-
Ohio-4, ¶ 29 (1st Dist.), citing Belisle Constr. Inc. v. Perry,
2022-Ohio-239, ¶ 22 (3d
Dist.). An abuse of discretion occurs when a court “[exercises] its judgment, in an
unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it has discretionary authority.”
Johnson v. Abdullah,
2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35.
{¶8} The Ohio Supreme Court recently held that, “While Civ.R. 4.1(A)(1)(a)
focuses on ‘how service shall be made,’ the specifics of ‘where, or to whom[,] process
may be served’ are derived from due process guarantees.” (Emphasis omitted.) Hunt
v. Alderman, 2025-Ohio-2944, ¶ 13, citing Akron-Canton Regional Airport,
62 Ohio
St.2d 403, 405 (1980). The Ohio Supreme Court stated, “Because service under Civ.R.
4.1(A)(1)(a) must comport with due-process guarantees, sufficient service requires
using an address that is reasonably calculated to apprise the defendant of the lawsuit.”
Alderman at ¶ 16. We recognize, “It is rudimentary that in order to render a valid
personal judgment, a court must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant.”
Maryhew v. Yova,
11 Ohio St.3d 154, 156 (1984).
{¶9} A court may acquire personal jurisdiction by (1) service of process on
the defendant,1 (2) the voluntary appearance and submission of the defendant, or (3)
by certain acts of the defendant (or his counsel) which constitute an involuntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the court. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court describes the
1 When service cannot be perfected under Civ.R. 4.6(D), service by publication is appropriate.
Altman v. Parker,
2022-Ohio-142, ¶ 17 (1st Dist.). Because this is a proceeding for a protection
order, such publication could have been affected by posting at the courthouse.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
final of these options as a waiver of affirmative defenses, such as personal jurisdiction,
under the Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.
{¶10} Upon review, we conclude that Kimberly’s appearance and participation
in the final hearing constituted an involuntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
court and waived insufficient service as an affirmative defense. We hold that
Kimberly, by failing to raise the affirmative defense by motion prior to the hearing,
waived it.
{¶11} Civ.R. 12(B) states:
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading,
whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall
be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by
motion: (1) Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) Lack of
jurisdiction over the person, (3) Improper venue, (4) Insufficiency of
process, (5) Insufficiency of service of process, (6) Failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) Failure to join a party under
Rule 19 or Rule 19.1.
Rule 12(H)(1) governs the waiver of affirmative defenses. Under 12(H)(1), “service-
based affirmative defenses are waived ‘if a motion is made raising other Civ.R. 12(B)
defenses and [they are] not included in that motion or, if there is no such motion, if
[they are] not raised by separate motion or included in the responsive pleading.”
Ackman v. Mercy Health West Hosp., LLC, 2023-Ohio-2075, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.), quoting
Gliozzo v. Univ. Urologists of Cleveland, Inc.,
2007-Ohio-3762, ¶ 9.
{¶12} Kimberly participated in the final hearing and did not assert her defense
by way of motion as required by the rules. Kimberly cites the Ohio Supreme Court’s
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
holding in Gliozzo for the proposition that her participation in the proceeding does not
constitute a waiver. We disagree with Kimberly’s application of the Gliozzo holding to
the facts here. In Gliozzo, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “when the affirmative
defense of service of process is properly raised and properly preserved, a party’s active
participation in litigation of a case does not constitute waiver of that defense.” Gliozzo
at ¶ 11. This remains the law despite the procedural traps it creates. See
Ackman at ¶
9. While a party may waive insufficiency of process, the only way acknowledged by the
Ohio Supreme Court in which a party may involuntarily submit to the court’s
jurisdiction is “by failing to raise the defense of insufficiency of service of process in a
responsive pleading or by filing certain motions before any pleading.”
Id. In both
Ackman and Gliozzo, the defendant raised the affirmative defense of insufficiency of
service of process by including it in their answer.
Id. Upon review of the record,
Kimberly did not raise the defense in this case either by pleading or motion.
{¶13} In Ackman, we held that if a party makes a motion raising other Civ.R.
12(B) defenses and does not include the defense of insufficiency of process, then that
defense is deemed waived. Id. at ¶ 7. We also held that if no such motion to dismiss
exists, and the defenses are not raised by separate motion or responsive pleading,
service-based defenses are waived. Id.
{¶14} Here, on April 26, 2024, Kimberly moved for a continuance because the
final DVCPO hearing was scheduled during a religious holiday. She explained that she
did not have time to prepare and needed more time. In passing, she mentioned that
she did not receive proper service, but her motion to continue did not preserve the
defense or move the court to dismiss the case. Furthermore, while she objected to the
court’s jurisdiction during the final DVCPO hearing, she never moved for a dismissal,
and she actively participated in the hearing.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶15} We conclude that Kimberly failed to properly raise or preserve the
defense of insufficiency of process and actively participated in the case. This
constitutes a waiver of the defense. Kimberly fully participated in the final DVCPO
hearing by admitting exhibits, presenting witnesses, and offering evidence in support
of her case. Here, Kimberly did not properly preserve the service issue like in Ackman
and Gliozzo. Kimberly’s active participation in the proceedings constitutes waiver of
insufficiency service of process as an affirmative defense. Therefore, the court did not
err by failing to obtain personal jurisdiction and did not abuse its discretion in
proceeding to judgment. Accordingly, we overrule Kimberly’s first assignment of
error.
B. Second, Third, and Fourth Assignments of Error
{¶16} We consider Kimberly’s second, third, and fourth assignments of error
together as each relates to Kimberly’s argument that the trial court erred by issuing a
two-year DVCPO. When reviewing a trial court’s issuance of a DVCPO, the standard
of review depends on the nature of the challenge asserted. Denney v. Sanders, 2016-
Ohio-5113, ¶ 16 (1st Dist.) (citing cases). Where an appellant challenges the weight or
sufficiency of the evidence, we use a manifest-weight or a sufficiency standard of
review, respectively. Id. But when an appellant challenges the scope of the order, the
proper standard of review is an abuse of discretion. Id.
{¶17} Here, Kimberly challenges the weight and sufficiency of the evidence to
support the trial court’s issuance of the DVCPO. Thus, the proper standards of review
are manifest weight and sufficiency.
{¶18} R.C. 3113.31 governs the issuance of a DVCPO. To obtain a DVCPO, the
petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent has
engaged in an act of domestic violence against the petitioner, petitioner’s family, or
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
household members. R.C. 3113.31(A)(1) defines domestic violence as “placing another
person by the threat of force in fear of imminent serious physical harm or committing
a violation” of R.C. 2903.211 or R.C. 2911.211.
{¶19} R.C. 2903.211 is Ohio’s “menacing by stalking” statute and it states that,
[n]o person by engaging in a pattern of conduct shall knowingly cause
another person to believe that the offender will cause physical harm to
the other person or a family or household member of the other person
or cause mental distress to the other person or a family or household
member of the other person. In addition to any other basis for the other
person's belief that the offender will cause physical harm to the other
person or the other person’s family or household member or mental
distress to the other person or the other person’s family or household
member, the other person’s belief or mental distress may be based on
words or conduct of the offender that are directed at or identify a
corporation, association, or other organization that employs the other
person or to which the other person belongs.
R.C. 2903.211(A)(1). We previously held that it is sufficient under R.C. 2903.211(A)(1)
to demonstrate either that actual mental distress was caused or that “an offender, by
engaging in a pattern of conduct, knowingly caused the victim to believe that the
offender would cause the victim mental distress.” Griga v. Dibenedetto, 2012-Ohio-
6097, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.).
{¶20} In Mullen, we found that competent, credible evidence existed from
which the trial court could have determined that the respondent, Hobbs, had caused
the petitioner, Mullen, and her daughter to believe that they would suffer mental
distress. Mullen v. Hobbs, 2012-Ohio-6098, ¶ 19 (1st Dist.). In Mullen, Mullen
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
became the sole legal custodian and residential parent of the child. Id. at ¶ 20. Hobbs,
contrary to the custody order, maintained that she was the child’s mother and that
Mullen could not control when Hobbs got to see the child. Id.
{¶21} Mullen was afraid that Hobbs would take the child or would harm
Mullen or the child. Id. There was also testimony that Hobbs showed up
unannounced to the child’s school on the first day of school. Id. at ¶ 21. Even after
repeated attempts by Mullen to warn Hobbs that Hobbs’s behavior was unacceptable,
Hobbs contacted the child twice more within a couple of weeks. Id. at ¶ 22. We held
that this testimony was sufficient to determine that competent, credible evidence
supported the conclusion that Hobbs had caused Mullen and the child to believe that
they would suffer mental distress. Id. at ¶ 23.
{¶22} Similarly, in Griga, the respondent, DiBenedetto, made phone calls and
visits to Griga’s (the petitioner’s) place of employment. Griga, 2012-Ohio-6097, at ¶
17 (1st Dist.). Consequently, we held that there was sufficient evidence to hold that
DiBenedetto knowingly caused Griga to believe that DiBenedetto would cause him
mental distress.
Id.
{¶23} R.C. 2901.22(B) provides that “[a] person acts knowingly, regardless of
his purpose, when he is aware that his conduct will probably cause a certain result or
will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when
he is aware that such circumstances probably exist.” R.C. 2901.22(B). In Mullen,
Mullen testified that she made it clear to Hobbs that she did not want Hobbs to see or
speak to the child. Mullen at ¶ 25. Nonetheless, Hobbs showed up at the school on
multiple occasions and contacted Mullen by email stating that she “[did not] need
approval to visit the school” and would not abide by Mullen’s wishes.
Id. We held that
this evidence was sufficient to determine that Hobbs acted knowingly. Id. at ¶ 26.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶24} Here, evidence in the record demonstrates that Kimberly’s patterns of
conduct are similar to those of the respondents in both Mullen and Griga. Kimberly,
by engaging in a pattern of conduct, knowingly caused Eliott to believe that he would
suffer mental distress. The trial court heard testimony that Kimberly, through
numerous violations of the no-contact order, acted in ways that could be seen as a
violation of R.C. 2903.211(A)(1), which constitutes domestic violence under R.C.
3113.31(A). Like the respondent in Mullen, Kimberly was ordered to have no contact
with S.E., the couple’s minor child. Kimberly continually violated the stay-away order.
She showed up to Eliott’s home unannounced. On one occasion, Kimberly allegedly
snuck up from the side of the house and approached Eliott and S.E. Kimberly also
showed up to a synagogue and secretly met with the child, allegedly in a closet. She
also sent “dozens” of letters and packages to the child.
{¶25} Further, Kimberly also showed up to S.E.’s camps and S.E.’s caregivers’
homes, leaving Eliott stressed about Kimberly’s contact with caregivers. Kimberly also
attempted to send S.E. secret messages, some of which were hidden inside of items
given to S.E. The court also heard testimony that Kimberly previously stalked Eliott
at his workplace, similar to the respondent’s actions in Griga. Eliott testified that
because of Kimberly’s actions, and the fact that the parties’ relationship grew violent
at times, he feared for his safety.
{¶26} Consistent with our previous cases, the record supports the court’s
finding that Kimberly’s repeated behaviors towards Eliott caused Eliott to fear for his
and S.E.’s safety and that Eliott believed that he would suffer mental distress.
Accordingly, the court’s finding that Kimberly engaged in domestic violence is
supported by sufficient evidence.
{¶27} Kimberly next argues that the trial court disregarded S.E.’s testimony
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
and did not give it due weight because of S.E.’s age and enmeshment with Kimberly.
We defer to a trial court’s credibility determinations because “the trial judge is best
able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections,
and use [those] observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.”
Altman v. Parker, 2022-Ohio-142, ¶ 21 (1st Dist.), quoting Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v.
Cleveland,
10 Ohio St. 3d 77, 80 (1984).
{¶28} Kimberly conflates the idea of a child’s ability to testify with the court’s
decision to discount S.E.’s testimony because of his age and relationship with
Kimberly. She argues that the court wholly disregarded S.E.’s testimony. But that
argument is not supported by the record. The trial court allowed S.E. to testify, and
after Kimberly violated repeated admonishments to stop “coaching” him, the court
excused S.E. Furthermore, the court heard Eliott’s testimony about Kimberly’s actions
and the effects of those actions on him and the child. The trial court, after considering
both S.E.’s and Eliott’s testimony, determined S.E.’s age and previous enmeshment
with Kimberly justified discounting S.E.’s testimony. The weight to be given to a
witness’s testimony is well within the trial court’s discretion, and we see no reason to
disturb the court’s credibility determination here.
{¶29} The final issue Kimberly raises is that the trial court erred by
disregarding evidence of Eliott’s alleged false statements under oath and failing to
properly judge his credibility. Once more, credibility determinations are left to the
trier of fact. Kimberly’s arguments that the court improperly considered or lost its way
in weighing the testimony presented at the final hearing are unfounded. Accordingly,
we hold that the court’s issuance of the two-year DVCPO was supported by sufficient
evidence and not against the weight of the evidence. We therefore overrule Kimberly’s
second, third, and fourth assignments of error.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
C. Fifth Assignment of Error
{¶30} In her fifth assignment of error, Kimberly asserts that the trial court
erred in quashing a subpoena for S.E.’s school records. “We apply an abuse-of-
discretion standard to a trial court’s decision concerning a motion to quash a
subpoena.” State v. Findler, 2021-Ohio-449, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.), citing State v. Beck, 2016-
Ohio-8122, ¶ 23 (1st Dist.).
{¶31} On May 8, 2024, the trial court found that because Kimberly was a pro
se litigant, and not an attorney on behalf of a party in the action, she was responsible
for filing her subpoena with the clerk of courts. She failed to do so. Also, the court
found that Kimberly did not properly serve the subpoena pursuant to Civ.R. 45(B).
Because Kimberly did not follow the proper procedure in filing the subpoena, the court
granted the motion to quash. The trial court has broad discretion over the discovery
process. Accordingly, this was not an abuse of discretion, and we overrule her fifth
assignment of error.
D. Sixth Assignment of Error
{¶32} In her sixth assignment of error, Kimberly asserts that the trial judge
had an ex parte communication with Eliott and refused to recuse herself. Throughout
this appeal, Kimberly repeatedly challenges the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision not to
disqualify the assigned domestic relations judge and speculates that Eliott and the
judge have had several ex parte communications. As the Ohio Supreme Court has
held, an allegation that a judge participated in an improper ex parte communication
“must be substantiated and consist of something more than hearsay and speculation.”
In re Disqualification of Forsthoefel, 2013-Ohio-2292, ¶ 7, citing In re
Disqualification of Floyd,
2003-Ohio-7354, ¶ 7. We hold that Kimberly provided no
such evidence here to substantiate her claim.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶33} In refusing to disqualify the judge in this case, the Ohio Supreme Court
found that the judge, for purposes of consistency, presides over evidentiary hearings
for protection orders when she is the assigned judge. The audio recording referenced
by Kimberly in this case does not support a finding that Eliott improperly
communicated by telephone with the judge or anyone else from the judge’s office
regarding the hearing. Without substantiation from Kimberly to prove a claim of an
improper ex parte communication, we cannot conclude that Eliott had any improper
ex parte contact with either court staff or the judge. Accordingly, there is no error, and
we overrule Kimberly’s sixth assignment of error.
E. Seventh Assignment of Error
{¶34} In her seventh assignment of error, Kimberly asserts that the trial court
erred by reviewing exhibits that were not properly admitted into the record and by not
giving her an opportunity to object to those exhibits at the ex parte hearing. First,
Kimberly fails to acknowledge that the rules contemplate an initial ex parte hearing,
outside of the presence of the responding party. See R.C. 3113.31(D)(1). Kimberly
suffered no prejudice from not being able to object to the exhibits admitted at the ex
parte hearing, because within the proper time period, the trial court held a full
evidentiary hearing on Eliott’s application for a DVCPO.
{¶35} Second, with respect to Kimberly’s argument that the court reviewed
exhibits that were not properly admitted into evidence, we note that, in Ohio, relevant
evidence is generally admissible. Evid.R. 402. The exceptions to this general rule are
outlined in Evid.R. 403. Evidence is relevant “when it has ‘any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or
less probable than it would be without the evidence.’” State v. Fritsch, 2023-Ohio-
2676, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.), quoting Evid.R. 401. Moreover, “[r]elevant evidence is
15
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
admissible unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues, or of misleading the jury.” Fritsch at ¶ 11.,
citing State v. Brown, 2012-Ohio-1848, ¶ 31 (2d Dist.), citing Evid.R. 402 and 403.
{¶36} Here, Eliott’s testimony and exhibits were relevant to the DVCPO
proceeding. Further, Kimberly has not demonstrated that the trial court relied on any
exhibit admitted at the ex parte hearing to grant the final DVCPO. Accordingly, we
overrule the seventh assignment of error.
F. Eighth Assignment of Error
{¶37} In her eighth assignment of error, Kimberly asserts that the trial judge
acted in a prejudicial manner towards her. She cites to 12 “actions” allegedly
evidencing such behavior. This claim is baseless. Kimberly provides no evidence that
the domestic relations judge acted in a prejudicial manner towards her and merely
disagrees with the trial court’s disposition of the proceeding. Accordingly, we find no
error, and overrule Kimberly’s eighth and final assignment of error.
III. Conclusion
{¶38} Based on the foregoing, we overrule all eight assignments of error and
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment affirmed.
KINSLEY, P.J., and ZAYAS, J., concur.
16
