[Cite as State v. Lytle,
2025-Ohio-4702.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ROSS COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
: Case No. 24CA30
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
:
v. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT
: ENTRY
JASON LYTLE, :
:
Defendant-Appellant. : RELEASED: 10/06/2025
APPEARANCES:
Karyn Justice, Portsmouth, Ohio, for appellant.
Jeffrey C. Marks, Ross County Prosecuting Attorney, and Alisa Turner, Assistant
Ross County Prosecutor, Chillicothe, Ohio, for appellee.
Wilkin, J.
{¶1} This is an appeal from a Ross County Court of Common Pleas
judgment of conviction in which appellant, Jason Lytle, pleaded guilty to one
count of attempted murder, a first-degree felony, and three counts of felonious
assault, second-degree felonies. As part of the plea agreement, two of the
felonious assault counts were merged. The trial court imposed an indefinite
prison term of a minimum of 8 years and a maximum prison term of 12 years on
the attempted murder conviction, and a prison term of 4 years on the remaining
felonious assault conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served
consecutively.
{¶2} In his sole assignment of error, Lytle challenges the trial court’s
decision to order the sentences to be served consecutively. Lytle argues that the
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trial court failed to make any findings in support of ordering the sentences to be
served consecutively and failed to incorporate any findings in the sentencing
entry. Accordingly, Lytle asserts that his sentence is contrary to law.
{¶3} Lytle is correct in that the trial court did not make any findings at the
sentencing hearing nor did it incorporate any findings in the sentencing entry in
support of imposing consecutive prison terms. But under the circumstances of
this case, the trial court was not required to make any findings before ordering
the prison terms to be served consecutively. This is because Lytle’s aggregate
prison term of a minimum of 12 years and a maximum of 16 years was a jointly-
recommended sentence.
{¶4} We must, however, remand the case for resentencing because
Lytle’s felonious assault definite prison sentence is contrary to law. Pursuant to
R.C. 2929.14(A)(2)(a), the trial court should have imposed an indefinite prison
sentence for the felonious assault conviction. But that did not occur here.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
{¶5} Lytle was indicted in July 2023 of committing one count of attempted
murder and three counts of felonious assault. At his arraignment, Lytle pleaded
not guilty to the charges and in a subsequent hearing, a jury trial date was set.
Lytle and the State, however, reached a plea agreement in May 2024. The plea
of guilty form, which was signed by Lytle, indicated that Lytle was pleading guilty
to the four indicted charges, and that the parties agreed to “12-16 years, forfeit
vehicle, class 2 license suspension[,] State to dismiss second case at
disposition[.]” The plea agreement was reiterated at the plea hearing
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held on May 20, 2024:
It will be a joint recommendation of a twelve to sixteen year
prison sentence in the original case containing attempted murder
charge. There would be an agreement that there will be merger –
that there would be a conviction on two of the four charges as
indicted. There will be a stipulated forfeiture of the vehicle as well as
a class two or class B license suspension of three to life. Further, the
State has agreed to dismiss the second case in full at disposition.
{¶6} And again, at disposition, the plea agreement was placed on the
record:
Your Honor just pursuant to the plea agreement, in return for
pleas of guilty to all counts of the indictment and the forfeiture of the
two thousand five Chevrolet Subaru, silver in color to the Chillicothe
Police Department, the State makes the recommendation of an
aggregate twelve to sixteen years in prison. That being broken down
as a recommendation of eight years on count one, consecutive to
four years on count four as well as the State agreed to dismiss case
number twenty four CR one seven one without prejudice. As well as
there would be a class two license suspension, that being three years
to life.
{¶7} The State also informed the trial court that count one, attempted
murder, merges with the third count, felonious assault, and that counts two and
four, both felonious assault, also merge. The State elected to proceed on counts
one and four.
{¶8} Lytle and his counsel both addressed the trial court at disposition.
Lytle’s counsel stated that “this was a negotiated for plea. We’d ask the court to
adopt the terms contained in the plea agreement.” Additionally, Lytle’s counsel
agreed about the merger of two of the felonious assault counts, and “we’d waive
the findings as far as the consecutive[.]” Lytle apologized for his conduct and
informed the trial court that he was remorseful.
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{¶9} The trial court, who had many interactions with Lytle due to his
extensive criminal history, informed him that “I’m telling you, Jason, you’re a
scary dude. . . . I think you’re getting a fair – you made a fair deal out of this. I
think everything in here is appropriate.” The trial court then imposed Lytle’s
sentence:
I’m going to honor the negotiations. I’m going to sentence the
defendant on count one to a minimum of eight years and a maximum
of twelve years.
On count [four], I’ll sentence the defendant to four years and
pursuant to the plea negotiations, I will run those two sentences
consecutive to each other.
That should get us to the agreed upon twelve to sixteen years.
{¶10} Lytle’s judgment of conviction entry is now before us for review.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE IMPOSITION OF CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD AND IS CONTRARY TO LAW.
{¶11} In his sole assignment of error, Lytle argues that the imposition of
his consecutive sentence is contrary to law and should be vacated because the
trial court failed to make the required findings pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).
Lytle maintains that the trial court failed to make any findings to overcome the
presumption of concurrent sentences at the disposition hearing and it failed to
incorporate any findings in the sentencing entry.
{¶12} The State opposes Lytle’s argument by citing to the Supreme Court
of Ohio’s decision in State v. Porterfield, 2005-Ohio-3095, and asserts that the
trial court was not required to make any findings before ordering Lytle’s two
sentences to be served consecutively because his sentence was jointly
recommended. The State requests that we affirm Lytle’s sentence and
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concludes that Lytle’s jointly-recommended sentence imposed by the trial court is
not subject for review.
{¶13} Lytle disagrees with the State’s reliance on Porterfield, and
distinguishes the case by asserting that in this case, his prison term for
attempted murder was a mandatory prison term while the sentence in Porterfield,
was non-mandatory. Additionally, he contends that issues of allied offenses of
similar import are reviewable on appeal even if the sentence was jointly
recommended.
Law and Analysis
{¶14} We review Lytle’s sentence pursuant to the dictates of R.C.
2953.08(G). See State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 16. Lytle maintains that
our review is pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), which provides that
[t]he court hearing an appeal under division (A), (B), or (C) of
this section shall review the record, including the findings underlying
the sentence or modification given by the sentencing court.
The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise
modify a sentence that is appealed under this section or may vacate
the sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court for
resentencing. The appellate court’s standard for review is not
whether the sentencing court abused its discretion. The appellate
court may take any action authorized by this division if it clearly and
convincingly finds either of the following:
(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s
findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division
(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of
section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is
relevant;
(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
{¶15} But prior to reaching R.C. 2953.08(G), there is R.C.
2953.08(D)(1) which states:
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A sentence imposed upon a defendant is not subject to review
under this section if the sentence is authorized by law, has been
recommended jointly by the defendant and the prosecution in the
case, and is imposed by a sentencing judge.
{¶16} The Supreme Court of Ohio held that
in the context of a jointly recommended sentence that includes
nonmandatory consecutive sentences, a trial court is not required to
make the consecutive-sentence findings set out in R.C.
2929.14(C)(4). Accordingly, when a trial judge imposes such an
agreed sentence without making those findings, the sentence is
nevertheless “authorized by law” and not reviewable on appeal
pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(D)(1).
State v. Sergent, 2016-Ohio-2696, ¶ 43.
{¶17} The policy behind R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) was previously outlined by the
Supreme Court of Ohio:
The General Assembly intended a jointly agreed-upon
sentence to be protected from review precisely because the parties
agreed that the sentence is appropriate. Once a defendant stipulates
that a particular sentence is justified, the sentencing judge no longer
needs to independently justify the sentence.
Porterfield, 2005-Ohio-3095, at ¶ 25.
{¶18} Lytle does not challenge the State’s assertion that his sentence was
a jointly-recommended sentence. He, however, argues that his mandatory
prison term sentence distinguishes his case and that when a sentence involves
allied offenses of similar import, it can be reviewed regardless. First, Lytle’s case
does not involve an allied offenses of similar import issue in which two of his
counts were merged as part of the plea agreement, and the attempted murder
conviction and felonious assault conviction involved separate victims. See State
v. Ruff, 2015-Ohio-995, ¶ 23 (“two or more offenses of dissimilar import exist
Ross App. No. 24CA30 7
within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25(B) when the defendant’s conduct constitutes
offenses involving separate victims.”).
{¶19} Second, by the plain language of R.C. 2953.08(D)(1), there is no
distinction between a mandatory prison term and a non-mandatory prison term.
See also State v. Thomas, 2019-Ohio-2654, ¶ 17 (6th Dist.) ( “We need not
address this issue because the parties presented a jointly-recommended
sentence at the sentencing hearing, which consisted of a three-year mandatory
prison term to be served consecutive to a three-year non-mandatory prison
term.”).
{¶20} What is required pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) is that in addition to
being a jointly-recommended sentence, it must be authorized by law and was
imposed by the trial court. Lytle was sentenced on two counts that he pleaded
guilty to: attempted murder and felonious assault. The attempted murder
conviction is a first-degree felony and pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(A)(1), the
sentence is an indefinite prison term ranging from a minimum prison term
between 3 years and 11 years, and a maximum prison term between 4.5 years
and 16.5 years. The trial court imposed a minimum prison term of 8 years and a
maximum prison term of 12 years. Thus, it is within the permissible sentencing
range and it is authorized by law.
{¶21} For the felonious assault conviction, a second-degree felony, the
trial court was required to impose an indefinite prison term ranging between a
minimum prison term from 2 years to 8 years, and a maximum prison term
between 3 years and 12 years. See R.C. 2929.14(A)(2)(a) (“For a felony of the
Ross App. No. 24CA30 8
second degree committed on or after March 22, 2019, the prison term shall be an
indefinite prison term with a stated minimum term selected by the court of two,
three, four, five, six, seven, or eight years and a maximum term that is
determined pursuant to section 2929.144 of the Revised Code[.]”).
{¶22} The trial court in Lytle’s case, however, imposed a definite prison
term of four years, which is contrary to the mandates of R.C. 2929.14(A)(2)(a).
Accordingly, Lytle’s sentence is contrary to law. See State v. Chambers, 2024-
Ohio-3341, ¶ 211 (6th Dist.) (“Because the trial court did not comply with the
mandatory requirements of R.C. 2929.14(A)(2)(a), Chambers’s sentence is
contrary to law.”).
{¶23} Because the felonious assault sentence is contrary to law, we must
remand the matter for resentencing.
CONCLUSION
{¶24} Lytle and the State reached a plea agreement that included a jointly-
recommended sentence. The trial court imposed the jointly-recommended
sentence, however, in doing so, it failed to impose an indefinite prison term
sentence as to Lytle’s felonious assault conviction pursuant to R.C.
2929.14(A)(2)(a). Because the felonious assault sentence is not authorized by
the statutory mandates, Lytle’s sentence is contrary to law. Therefore, we
remand the matter to the trial court for Lytle to be resentenced.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CAUSE REMANDED.
JUDGMENT ENTRY
Ross App. No. 24CA30 9
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS REVERSED and the CAUSE IS
REMANDED. Appellee shall pay the costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
Ross County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Smith, P.J. and Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court,
BY: ____________________________
Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the
date of filing with the clerk.
