[Cite as State v. Adams,
2025-Ohio-483.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Appellant : C.A. No. 30234
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. 2022-TR-1369
:
MARK ADAMS : (Criminal Appeal from Municipal Court)
:
Appellee :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on February 14, 2025
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ASHLEY THOMAS, Attorney for Appellant
ARVIN S. MILLER, Attorney for Appellee
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TUCKER, J.
{¶ 1} The State of Ohio appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of misdemeanor
charges against defendant-appellee Mark Adams for operating a vehicle while
intoxicated. The trial court dismissed the charges based on a speedy-trial violation.
{¶ 2} The State challenges the trial court’s determination that a 513-day delay
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between a hearing on Adams’ pretrial suppression motion and a decision on the motion
was unreasonable and resulted in a speedy-trial violation. The State also contends the
trial court erred in allowing Adams to file the suppression motion out of time.
{¶ 3} We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting
Adams to file his suppression motion. We also agree with the trial court’s finding of a
speedy-trial violation. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.
I. Background
{¶ 4} On March 22, 2022, Adams received two first-degree misdemeanor citations
for operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in violation of R.C. 4511.19.
The charges stemmed from a traffic stop, his performance on field-sobriety tests, and the
results of a chemical test. After his arraignment, Adams sought discovery and obtained
continuances of several pretrial conferences. Discovery disputes and delays also resulted
in a continuance of a scheduled October 3, 2022 trial date.
{¶ 5} Adams later filed a November 30, 2022 suppression motion. He argued that
video evidence demonstrated his satisfactory performance on the field-sobriety tests,
meaning that police had lacked probable cause to arrest him or to administer a chemical
test. On December 21, 2022, the State opposed the suppression motion, seeking to have
it overruled based on untimeliness. The suppression issue proceeded to a January 10,
2023 hearing. The next entry in the trial court’s docket was a June 6, 2024 decision
overruling the motion. Based on the evidence presented, the trial court found that police
had possessed probable cause to arrest Adams.
{¶ 6} Following the suppression ruling, Adams filed a July 10, 2024 motion for
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discharge. Based on a 513-day delay between the suppression hearing and the trial
court’s ruling on his suppression motion, Adams primarily asserted a violation of his
statutory right to a speedy trial. The trial court sustained the motion for discharge on July
23, 2024. After reciting the standards governing both statutory and constitutional speedy-
trial issues, the trial court found no justification for the 513-day delay and dismissed the
charges against Adams. The State timely appealed, advancing two assignments of error.
II. Analysis
{¶ 7} The State’s first assignment of error states:
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE APPELLEE TO FILE HIS
MOTION TO SUPPRESS GROSSLY OUT OF TIME.
{¶ 8} Citing Crim.R. 12, the State contends Adams was required to file his
suppression motion within 35 days after arraignment or seven days before trial, whichever
was earlier. Although that deadline may be extended in the interest of justice or
overlooked for good cause, the State argues that Adams never requested additional time
or showed good cause for filing his motion roughly eight months after arraignment. As a
result, the State claims he waived his right to seek suppression. The State suggests that
the trial court had “zero jurisdiction” to consider Adams’ suppression motion.
{¶ 9} Upon review, we find the State’s argument to be unpersuasive. Absent a
suppression-hearing transcript, which the State has not provided, we do not know
whether the trial court found good cause for Adams’ late filing or found that the interest of
justice warranted a time extension. Given that the trial court proceeded to hold a hearing
on Adams’ motion, it apparently exercised its discretion and permitted the filing. We note
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too that during a hearing on Adams’ motion for discharge alleging a speedy-trial violation,
defense counsel represented that the trial court previously had given him time to conduct
discovery and “collect all of what [he] needed before [filing] the motion to suppress.” See
July 18, 2023 Transcript of Hearing on Speedy-Trial Issue at p. 12. Under these
circumstances, we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to hear Adams’
suppression motion.
{¶ 10} In any event, we note too that the trial court’s failure to overrule the motion
as untimely did not prejudice the State. The trial court ultimately overruled the motion on
the merits, finding that police possessed probable cause to arrest Adams. Therefore, we
fail to see how the State was harmed by the trial court’s failure to overrule the motion
based on untimeliness assuming, purely arguendo, that the interest of justice or good
cause did not justify the trial court’s consideration of the motion.
{¶ 11} On appeal, the State seems to suggest that an untimely suppression motion
is a nullity and that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider it. Where waiver exists, the
State implies that the pendency of a suppression motion cannot cause a speedy-trial
violation. We disagree. Under Crim.R. 12, the failure to file a timely suppression motion
may result in waiver of the issue. The possibility of waiver, however, does not render a
facially untimely motion a nullity or deprive a trial court of jurisdiction to act. In its
discretion, a trial court may grant relief from waiver and decide an otherwise-untimely
motion. State v. Harrell, 2024-Ohio-981, ¶ 62 (2d Dist.). It logically follows that waiver
under Crim.R. 12 does not deprive a trial court of jurisdiction.
{¶ 12} In the present case, the trial court waited until 513 days after a suppression
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hearing to overrule Adams’ motion. The lengthy delay created a viable speedy-trial issue
that we will address below. But the trial court’s eventual overruling of the motion on the
merits rendered moot whether the motion also could have been overruled based on
waiver. For each of the foregoing reasons, the State’s first assignment of error is
overruled.
{¶ 13} The State’s second assignment of error states:
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPELLEE’S MOTION TO
DISCHARGE.
{¶ 14} The State contends the trial court erred in dismissing the charges against
Adams based on a speedy-trial violation. The State analyzes the issue solely by applying
the four-factor balancing test from Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), to determine
whether a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated. The four
factors are “[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his
right, and prejudice to the defendant.”
Id. at 530. Applying those factors here, the State
contends no constitutional speedy-trial violation occurred.
{¶ 15} We note, however, that Adams’ motion for discharge primarily alleged a
violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial. Ohio’s speedy-trial statute, R.C. 2945.71,
et seq., “was implemented to incorporate the constitutional protection of the right to a
speedy trial.” Brecksville v. Cook, 75 Ohio St.3d 53, 55 (1996). The statute represents “ ‘a
rational effort to implement the constitutional right to a speedy trial and will be strictly
enforced.’ ” State v. McClain,
2015-Ohio-3691, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Pachay,
64 Ohio St.2d 218 (1980).
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{¶ 16} Under R.C. 2945.71(B)(2), a defendant charged with a first-degree
misdemeanor must be tried within 90 days of arrest. “A defendant can establish a prima
facie case for a speedy-trial violation by demonstrating that the trial was held past the
time limit set by statute[.]” State v. Kendall, 2025-Ohio-10, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.). The burden
then shifts to the State to show that some event tolled speedy-trial time.
Id. Absent such
a showing, the defendant must be discharged.
Id.
{¶ 17} “The time within which a defendant must be brought to trial may be
extended only for reasons specifically enumerated in R.C. 2945.72.” Id. at ¶ 12. Those
reasons include “[a]ny period of delay necessitated by reason of a . . . motion . . . made
or instituted by the accused[.]” R.C. 2945.72(E). The issue before us is whether Adams’
suppression motion tolled speedy-trial time during the 513 days between the hearing on
his motion and the trial court’s disposition of it. Although the record contains other
continuances and tolling events, statutory speedy-trial time unquestionably expired if it
ran during any significant portion of the 513 days at issue.
{¶ 18} While a defendant’s motion generally tolls the speedy-trial clock, a delay
must be “necessitated” by the motion for tolling to apply. Kendall at ¶ 21. This means a
trial court must resolve a defendant’s motion within a reasonable time. Otherwise, tolling
ceases.
Id. As this court recently recognized in Kendall:
A trial court does not have “unbridled discretion concerning the
amount of time it takes to rule on a defense motion.” State v. Martin, 56
Ohio St.2d 289, 297,
384 N.E.2d 239 (1978); State v. Wood, 2024-Ohio-
5597, ¶ 41 (2d Dist.). “A strict adherence to the spirit of the speedy trial
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statutes requires a trial judge, in the sound exercise of his judicial discretion,
to rule on these motions in as expeditious a manner as possible.” Id. The
amount of time taken to render a decision on a defendant’s motion must be
reasonable considering the facts and circumstances of the case. Accord
State v. Boyd, 2023-Ohio-2079,
218 N.E.3d 998, ¶ 21 (2d Dist.) (addressing
timeliness of trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress). “The complexity
of the facts and the difficulty of the legal issues, in addition to the constraints
of a trial judge's docket, must be considered.” Id.
Id. at ¶ 19.
{¶ 19} Allowing a defendant’s motion to toll speedy-trial time without limit would
undermine the policy behind the speedy-trial statute. State v. Owens, 1992 WL 142681,
*2 (2d Dist. June 26, 1992). “Therefore, to find that a plea, motion, or other proceeding
instituted by the defendant has created an extension of his speedy trial date, the court
must find that a period of delay resulted and that the delay was necessary.”
Id. “The
‘necessity’ element permits an extension only for the duration of a period reasonably
required to adjudicate the defendant’s plea, motion, or other action. Any additional delay
before adjudication, though it occurred, is not chargeable to the defendant.”
Id.
{¶ 20} Here nothing suggests that a delay anywhere near 513 days was
reasonable or necessary for the trial court to resolve Adams’ suppression motion after the
hearing. The three-page motion alleged that police had arrested him without probable
cause because field-sobriety tests did not show impairment. Although we do not have a
transcript of the suppression hearing, the trial court’s four-page entry overruling Adams’
motion states that three witnesses testified at the hearing. Those witnesses—two police
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officers and a detective—testified about their observations of Adams during a traffic stop
and his performance on field-sobriety tests. Based on that testimony, the trial court found
probable cause for Adams’ arrest and overruled his suppression motion.
{¶ 21} Adams’ motion raised a routine suppression issue. We see no legal or
factual complexity. The record also does not suggest that the trial court’s docket
necessitated a lengthy delay. In its order and entry sustaining Adams’ motion for
discharge, the trial court did not even attempt to justify the delay. To the contrary, it
explicitly found that there was “no just reason for the delay.” We agree. We see no
conceivable justification for a delay anywhere near the 513 days at issue. Compare State
v. Reppucci, 2017-Ohio-1313, ¶ 14 (9th Dist.) (“The 535 days that are at issue here far
exceeded the 90-day statutory time period within which Mr. Reppucci was to be brought
to trial. Even taking into consideration that some portion of this time may have been
reasonable, Mr. Reppucci’s speedy trial rights were clearly violated under the facts of this
case.”); State v. Mullins,
2003-Ohio-477, ¶ 12 (3d Dist.) (“A total of 832 days elapsed
between appellant’s arraignment and the filing of his motion to dismiss. Of those days,
635 were apparently devoted to ruling on appellant’s suppression motion. The trial court
failed to journalize an explanation for the delay. Accordingly, we find that the trial court’s
delay in considering appellant’s motion violated his right to a speedy trial.”); see also State
v. Morgan,
2017-Ohio-9142, ¶ 49-50 (5th Dist.) (finding that a delay of 168 days to decide
the defendant’s suppression motion was unreasonable given the lack of legal or factual
complexity).
{¶ 22} For the reasons set forth above, the trial court did not err in dismissing the
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charges against Adams. The second assignment of error is overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 23} The judgment of the Dayton Municipal Court is affirmed.
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LEWIS, J. and HUFFMAN, J., concur.
