[Cite as State v. McAllister,
2025-Ohio-4834.]
COURT OF APPEALS
STARK COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO, Case No. 2024CA00193
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Stark County Court of
Common Pleas, Case No. 2024-CR-0741
MAXIMILLION SHROB
MCALLISTER, Judgment: Affirmed
Defendant – Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: October 22, 2025
BEFORE: Craig R. Baldwin; Andrew J. King; Kevin W. Popham, Judges
APPEARANCES: KYLE STONE, Prosecuting Attorney, CHRISTOPHER A.
PIEKARSKI, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee; D. COLEMAN BOND,
for Defendant-Appellant.
Baldwin, P.J.
{¶1} The appellant, Maxamillion Shrob McAllister, appeals his conviction and
sentence of attempted murder with a firearm specification, discharge of a firearm on or
near prohibited premises with a firearm specification, felonious assault with a firearm
specification, and having weapons while under disability in the Stark County Court of
Common Pleas. The appellee is the State of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND THE CASE
{¶2} On April 11, 2024, the Stark County Grand Jury indicted the appellant on
one count of Attempted Murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A) with a firearm specification
in violation of R.C. 2941.145(A), one count of Discharge of Firearm on or near Prohibited
Premises in violation of R.C. 2923.162(A)(3) with a firearm specification in violation of
R.C. 2941.145(A), one count of Felonious Assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A) with a
firearm specification in violation of R.C. 2941.145(A), and one count of Having Weapons
while under Disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(3).
{¶3} On April 19, 2024, the appellant pled not guilty to the indictment.
{¶4} On August 7, 2024, the appellant waived his right to a jury trial solely on the
charge of Having Weapons while under Disability.
{¶5} On August 12, 2024, the matter proceeded to trial; however, the trial court
declared a mistrial after the appellant appeared to be under the influence of drugs and/or
alcohol.
{¶6} On October 28, 2024, a new trial commenced.
{¶7} At trial, Patrolman Andrew Cook testified that on March 29, 2024, he
responded to a shooting in Canton, Ohio, around 8:00 p.m. Upon arrival, another cruiser
was already on the scene. The victim was lying in the front yard and had visible injuries
to his mouth, back, and two wounds to his legs. Initially, the victim did not identify his
assailant.
{¶8} Detective Brandon Shackle testified that he later interviewed the victim,
R.M., at the hospital. R.M. said he had arranged to meet an acquaintance, J.M., for a
drug deal. He did not identify his shooter at that time. J.M. corroborated that he and R.M.
had gone to the location to conduct a drug transaction.
{¶9} After speaking with R.M. and R.M.’s mother, Detective Shackle learned the
appellant may have been R.M.’s assailant. R.M. had first met the appellant at a gas
station, which was captured on surveillance footage. The State entered still photographs
into evidence showing the two men together and shaking hands, appearing to be on
friendly terms.
{¶10} Detective Shackle obtained other footage showing the appellant’s vehicle
leaving the scene shortly after the shooting. Surveillance captured the appellant’s vehicle
traveling to a Dollar General Store. Additional surveillance video captured R.M. and J.M.
walking toward R.M.’s vehicle shortly before the appellant crossed the street and began
shooting at R.M.
{¶11} Detective Shackle also obtained security footage of the appellant taking
several plastic bags from the Dollar General store. The footage shows the appellant
wearing the same clothing as R.M.’s shooter. Officers recovered Dollar general plastic
bags from the appellant’s vehicle when they later took him into custody.
{¶12} R.M. testified that J.M. contacted him about acquiring cocaine, and they
agreed to meet in Canton. R.M. arrived with an acquaintance, O.K., and his girlfriend.
J.M. claimed he needed to retrieve his wallet and asked R.M. to take him to an ATM.
R.M.’s girlfriend became suspicious and asked to leave, but R.M. insisted on staying. At
that moment, the appellant approached and demanded the money R.M. owed him. R.M.
offered cocaine as payment, which the appellant declined, then began shooting. The
appellant allegedly shouted to J.M., “I got him.”
{¶13} R.M. testified that he had obtained drugs from the appellant earlier but could
not repay him, which prompted the shooting. On cross-examination, R.M. admitted he
initially lied to police out of fear the appellant would harm him or his family.
{¶14} After the trial, the appellant was found guilty of Attempted Murder in violation
of R.C. 2903.02(A) with a firearm specification in violation of R.C. 2941.145(A), one count
of Discharge of Firearm on or near Prohibited Premises in violation of R.C.
2923.162(A)(3) with a firearm specification in violation of R.C. 2941.145(A), one count of
Felonious Assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A) with a firearm specification in violation
of R.C. 2941.145(A), and one count of Having Weapons while under Disability in violation
of R.C. 2923.13(A)(3).
{¶15} At sentencing, the trial court merged the appellant’s conviction for Felonious
Assault (with its firearm specification) into his conviction for Attempted Murder (with its
firearm specification). The trial court sentenced the appellant to an aggregate indefinite
prison term of twenty-eight years to thirty-three and a half years.
{¶16} The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and herein raises the following
three assignments of error:
{¶17} “I. THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
SUSTAIN A CONVICTION AGAINST APPELLANT, AND THE CONVICTION MUST BE
REVERSED.”
{¶18} “II. THE APPELLANT’S CONVICTION IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AND MUST BE REVERSED.”
{¶19} “III. THE TRIAL COURT’S IMPOSITION OF CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES
WAS NOT CLEARLY AND CONVINGLY (sic) SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD, AND
THERE WERE NO FINDINGS INCORPORATED INTO THE TRIAL COURT’S
SENTENCING JUDGMENT ENTRY.”
I., II.
{¶20} In the appellant’s first and second assignments of error, the appellant
argues that his convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence and were against
the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶21} The appellant challenges his convictions on both manifest weight and
sufficiency of the evidence grounds. Sufficiency of the evidence was addressed by the
Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Worley, 2021-Ohio-2207, ¶57:
The test for sufficiency of the evidence is “whether, after viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259,
574 N.E.2d 492
(1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by constitutional
amendment on grounds as stated in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 102,
684 N.E.2d 668 (1997), fn. 4, and following Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S.
307,
99 S.Ct. 2781,
61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). “ ‘Proof beyond a reasonable
doubt’ is proof of such character that an ordinary person would be willing to
rely and act upon it in the most important of the person’s own affairs” R.C.
2901.05(E). A sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge asks whether the
evidence adduced at trial “is legally sufficient to support the jury verdict as
a matter of law.” State v. Lang, 129 Ohio St.3d 512,
2011-Ohio-4215,
954
N.E.2d 596, ¶219.
{¶22} Thus, a review of the constitutional sufficiency of the evidence to support a
criminal conviction requires a court of appeals to determine whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
{¶23} Manifest weight of the evidence, on the other hand, addresses the
evidence’s effect of inducing belief. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St. 3d 380 (1997). The
Court stated:
Weight of the evidence concerns “the inclination of the greater
amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the
issue rather than the other. It indicates clearly to the jury that the party
having the burden of proof will be entitled to their verdict, if, on weighing the
evidence in their minds, they shall find the greater amount of credible
evidence sustains the issue which is to be established before them. Weight
is not a question of mathematics, but depends on its effect in inducing
belief.” (Emphasis added.) Black’s, supra, at 1594.
Id. at 387.
{¶24} The Court stated further:
When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the
basis that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the
appellate court sits as a “ ‘thirteenth juror’ ” and disagrees with the fact
finder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony. Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 42, 102
S.Ct. at 2218, 72 L.Ed.2d at 661. See, also, State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio
App.3d 172, 175, 20 OBR 215, 219,
485 N.E.2d 717, 720-721 (“The court,
reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable
inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether
in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created
such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed
and a new trial ordered. The discretionary power to grant a new trial should
be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs
heavily against the conviction.”).
Id.
“…[I]n determining whether the judgment below is manifestly against the
weight of the evidence, every reasonable intendment and every reasonable
presumption must be made in favor of the judgment and the finding of facts.
…
“If the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, the reviewing
court is bound to give it that interpretation which is consistent with the
verdict and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the verdict and
judgment.”
Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984), fn. 3, quoting 5 Ohio
Jurisprudence 3d, Appellate Review Section 60, at 191-192 (1978).
ANALYSIS
{¶25} In the appellant’s first and second assignments of error, the appellant
challenges the State’s evidence identifying the appellant as insufficient and against the
manifest weight. We disagree.
{¶26} At trial, the victim identified the appellant as the individual who shot him five
times over a debt the victim owed. On multiple prior occasions, the victim told law
enforcement and testified that he did not know who the shooter was. However, on the
witness stand, the victim explained this discrepancy, stating that he had been afraid to
identify the appellant because he was not in custody and feared for his own safety and
that of his family. Considering all the evidence in the record, and being mindful that “the
original trier of fact was in the best position to judge the credibility of witnesses and
determine the weight to be given to the evidence,” we find that the appellant’s convictions
were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the
evidence. State v. King, 2023-Ohio-875, ¶36 (12th Dist.).
{¶27} The appellant’s first and second assignments of error are overruled.
III.
{¶28} In the appellant’s third assignment of error, the appellant argues that the
trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences because the trial court’s findings were
not supported by the record. We disagree. The appellant also argues that the trial court
failed to incorporate its findings into its sentencing entry. We agree.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶29} An appellate court may vacate or modify any sentence that is not clearly
and convincingly contrary to law only if the appellate court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that the record does not support the sentence. State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-
1002, ¶23. “Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is
more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of such certainty
as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in
the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be
established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, paragraph three of the syllabus (1954).,
Thus, we may vacate or modify the appellant’s sentence only if we find by clear and
convincing evidence that the record does not support it.
{¶30} The issue of consecutive sentences was discussed by the Supreme Court
of Ohio in the seminal case of State v Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-3177:
On appeals involving the imposition of consecutive sentences, R.C.
2953.08(G)(2)(a) directs the appellate court “to review the record, including
the findings underlying the sentence” and to modify or vacate the sentence
“if it clearly and convincingly finds … [t]hat the record does not support the
sentencing court’s findings under division … (C)(4) of section 2929.14 …
* of the Revised Code.” But that statute does not specify where the findings
are to be made. Thus, the record must contain a basis upon which a
reviewing court can determine that the trial court made the findings required
by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) before it imposed consecutive sentences.
Id. at ¶28. The issue was subsequently addressed by this Court in State v. Corbett, 2023-
Ohio-556 (5th Dist.):
We review felony sentences using the standard of review set forth in
R.C. 2953.08. State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516,
2016-Ohio-1002,
59
N.E.3d 1231, ¶22. In State v. Gwynne, a plurality of the Supreme Court of
Ohio held that an appellate court may only review individual felony
sentences under R.C. 2929.1 and R.C. 2929.12, while R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)
is the exclusive means of appellate review of consecutive felony sentences.
158 Ohio St.3d 279, ¶2019-Ohio-4761,
141 N.E.3d 169, ¶16-18.
R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) provides we may either increase, reduce,
modify, or vacate a sentence and remand for resentencing where we clearly
and convincingly find that either the record does not support the sentencing
court’s findings under R.C. 2929.13(B) or (D), 2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4), or
2929.20(I), or the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. See, also, State v.
Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209,
2014-Ohio-3177,
16 N.E.2d 659, ¶28;
Gwynne, supra, ¶16.
Clear and convincing evidence is that evidence “which will provide in
the mind of the trier off acts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought
to be established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St.469, 120 N.E.2d 118
(1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. “Where the degree of proof required
to sustain an issue must be clear and convincing, a reviewing court will
examine the record to determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient
evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of proof.” Cross, 161 Ohio
St. at 477, 120 N.E.2d 118.
Id. at ¶24-26.
ANALYSIS
{¶31} The appellant first argues that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive
sentences, as its findings were not supported by the record. We disagree.
{¶32} The trial court made the appropriate findings for imposing consecutive
sentences during the sentencing hearing:
The Court has ordered that consecutive sentences be served in this
case, and further finds that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect
the public from future crime by the Defendant; that consecutive sentences
are necessary to punish the Defendant and they are not disproportionate to
the seriousness of the Defendant’s conduct and the danger that he poses
to the public; that two or more of the offenses were committed as a course
of conduct and that the harm caused by those offenses was so great that
no single prison term for any such offenses is adequate to reflect the
seriousness of the Defendant’s conduct; and that the Defendant’s criminal
history demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect
the public from future crime by the Defendant.
{¶33} At trial, evidence established that the appellant approached the victim and
shot him five times across a public roadway in a residential neighborhood, in connection
with a debt the victim owed him. He shot the victim once in each leg, once in the buttocks,
once in the back, and once in the face. The record further reflects that the appellant had
prior convictions for two counts of aggravated trafficking in drugs and fourteen counts of
trafficking in drugs. Based on our review of the record, we find that the record supports
the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences.
{¶34} The appellant also argues that the trial court failed to properly incorporate
its consecutive-sentence findings into the sentencing entry dated November 5, 2024, as
required. The State conceded this issue. A trial court’s failure to incorporate the statutory
findings into the sentencing entry, after properly making them at the sentencing hearing,
constitutes clerical error that may be corrected through a nunc pro tunc entry. Bonnell at
¶30. Accordingly, we remand the matter to the trial court for the limited purpose of issuing
a nunc pro tunc entry that incorporates the consecutive sentencing findings made at the
sentencing hearing into the journalized entry.
CONCLUSION
{¶35} Based upon the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Common Pleas of
Stark County, Ohio, is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
{¶36} Costs to the appellant.
By: Baldwin, P.J.
King, J. and
Popham, J. concur.
