State v. Singleton

[Cite as State v. Singleton, 

.]


                              COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                        :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,                  :
                                                               No. 114841
                 v.                                   :

JASON SINGLETON,                                      :

                 Defendant-Appellant.                 :


                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: VACATED AND REMANDED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 23, 2025


         Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                             Case No. CR-24-695795-A


                                                Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Nora Bryan, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Scott J. Friedman, for appellant.


SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J.:

                   Jason Singleton appeals the imposition of a no-contact order

attendant to a 54-month aggregate term of imprisonment, which resulted from his

guilty pleas to unlawful sexual conduct with a minor and strangulation. For the

following reasons, we vacate the imposition of the no-contact order and remand
for that portion of the sentence to be deleted from the final sentencing entry.

Because no other aspect of the sentences or convictions were challenged in this

appeal, they remain in effect.

              The victim was a 14-year-old female attempting to run away from

her family. Singleton, then 41 years old, allowed her to stay with him for about a

week. During that time, Singleton engaged in sexual conduct with the minor

victim. According to the State, in exchange for pleading guilty to the unlawful

sexual conduct and strangulation, Singleton agreed to a no-contact order

precluding contact with the victim. Although Singleton’s trial counsel “believed”

that Singleton would agree to the State’s plea offer, Singleton was never asked

whether he agreed to any sentencing arrangement for the third- and fifth-degree

felony offenses. The trial court accepted Singleton’s guilty pleas.

              It must be noted that even if Singleton agreed to the no-contact

order as part of the plea negotiations, there was no agreed sentencing

recommendation beyond that. See State v. Reeder, 

 (8th Dist.)

(S. Gallagher, J., dissenting) (noting that the agreement to the no-contact order

during the plea colloquy occurred while community-control sanctions were

available as a sentencing option).     His agreement occurred at the time that

community-control sanctions (which a no-contact order is undoubtedly

considered) were available as a sentencing option in light of the downgraded
charges.1 At sentencing, the trial court found Singleton was not amenable to

community-control sanctions, and an aggregate 54-month term of imprisonment

was imposed. At the close of the hearing, the trial court tacked on the disputed no-

contact order at the State’s urging.

               The State concedes that a no-contact order cannot be imposed

attendant to a prison term on a single felony offense. See Anderson at ¶ 31.2 Thus,

the sole issue in this appeal focuses on whether the offender can agree to an

unauthorized, hybrid sentence. Unfortunately, this district’s resolution of this

question is, at best, muddled.

               The State maintains that any error in the imposition of a no-contact

order attendant to a prison term for a single felony offense was invited by

Singleton, citing State v. Smith, 

 (8th Dist.). The State’s

argument is understandable. The panel in Smith indeed concluded that if the State



       1 As the Ohio Supreme Court noted, a no-contact order is a community-control

sanction, authorized under R.C. 2929.16, 2929.17, and 2929.18. State v. Anderson, 2015-
Ohio-2089, ¶ 20.
       2 Although Anderson concluded that there was no authority to impose a no-contact

order along with a mandatory or discretionary prison sentence for a felony offense, it did
so based on the general notion that the General Assembly “intended prison and
community-control sanctions as alternative sentences.” 

 According to Anderson,
absent an express statutory exception to that general rule, it was an either-or proposition.
R.C. 2929.13(A), however, authorizes the sentencing court, in its discretion, to “impose
any sanction or combination of sanctions on the offender that are provided in sections
2929.14 to 2929.18 of the Revised Code.” Thus, the legislature appears to have authorized
the imposition of a combination of sanctions to include a prison term and some form of
community-control sanctions on a single felony offense. For whatever reason, R.C.
2929.13(A) was not included in Anderson’s discussion of the statutes authorizing felony
sentences.
includes a no-contact order as part of an accepted plea deal, the defendant invites

any error in the imposition of that no-contact order when imposed attendant to a

prison term on the same count even if there is no jointly recommended prison

sentence. Id. at ¶ 27, citing State v. Clark, 

 (2d Dist.), and

State v. Marcum, 

 (4th Dist.). Smith’s conclusion, however,

directly contradicted binding precedent in this district — that a defendant’s

agreement to a no-contact order as part of a plea deal does “not vest the [trial]

court with authority to sentence” the offender to both a prison term and a term of

community control for the same felony count irrespective of the agreement. State

v. Nelson, 

 (8th Dist.), citing Anderson at ¶ 10-12 and State

v. Cody, 

 (8th Dist.). Nelson reasoned that a trial court may

only impose sentences that are statutorily authorized so that the defendant’s

agreement to a hybrid sentence cannot override the lack of statutory authorization

to impose that sentence. Id.; see also State v. Underwood, 

 (“[A]

sentence is authorized by law only if it comports with all mandatory sentencing

provisions.”).

                 Smith and Nelson cannot be reconciled. One case holds that a

defendant invites any error with the trial court imposing a no-contact order and a

prison term for the same offense, and the other says that it cannot be deemed

invited error and the illegal portion of the sentence must be vacated. See, e.g.,

State v. Amos, 

 (chastising the appellate court for permitting

irreconcilable cases reaching dichotomous conclusions to coexist).
              Compounding the confusion, a divided panel recently concluded

that any error in the imposition of a hybrid sentence is not invited error, but

instead is subject to plain-error analysis if the offender fails to object to the

unauthorized sentence. See generally Reeder, 

. In Reeder, the lead

opinion applied Smith’s invited-error holding, but in the alternative found that

because the offender failed to object to the no-contact order, which was part of the

plea agreement, he waived all but plain error. Id. at ¶ 14. The concurrence

disagreed with the invited-error approach, but agreed that an offender must

demonstrate prejudice from the imposition of a hybrid sentence, even though that

sentence is expressly precluded under binding precedent. Id. at ¶ 32-33 (Keough,

J., concurring in judgment only). Thus, a plurality agreed that plain-error analysis

applies when an offender fails to object to an unauthorized, hybrid sentence.

Notwithstanding the disagreement with the invited-error approach, the separate

concurring opinion in Reeder agreed that because the offender “received the

sentence that he and his counsel specifically bargained for, including the no-

contact order[,]” that no plain error existed because the defendant was not

prejudiced by the additional sanction.      Both the lead and separate analysis

incorporated the invited-error doctrine into the plain-error standard despite

Nelson.

              Further complicating matters is the Reeder plurality’s handling of

another decision from this district.      The plurality in Reeder attempted to

distinguish State v. Dowdell, 

, on the issue of whether a trial
court plainly errs by imposing jointly recommended sentences that are not

authorized by statute. In Dowdell, the divided majority concluded that although

the State agreed to a definite sentence under R.C. 2929.14 for a qualifying felony

offense as part of the plea deal with the defendant, despite the offense being subject

to the Reagan Tokes Law that requires a non-life indefinite sentence under R.C.

2929.144, the definite sentence was nonetheless contrary to law and resentencing

was required. In other words, despite the State inviting the error and failing to

discuss, much less demonstrate, prejudice under the plain-error standard, the

Dowdell panel nonetheless reversed, concluding that plain error existed based on

the imposition of an unauthorized sentence, and the matter was remanded for a

new sentencing to incorporate the non-life indefinite sentences contrary to the

State’s prior agreement. 

              In essence, Dowdell concluded that the State is not required to abide

by the terms of its plea agreement. Reeder concluded the opposite and held that

the defendant is required to adhere to his plea agreement regardless of whether

the trial court has authorization to impose the disputed sentence. Id. at ¶ 18, 33.

Once again, those two decisions are irreconcilable. See Amos, 

.

              Reeder disregarded Smith’s invited-error approach and established

that in situations in which a defendant (not the State) agrees to a no-contact order

as part of the plea deal and a prison sentence is imposed, the plain-error standard

applies but a defendant will be unable to demonstrate prejudice based on his
agreement to the sanction. If the State agrees to an unauthorized sentence as part

of the plea deal, however, the standard is not plain error but de novo statutory

review. See 

 (overruling the defendant’s argument that the State

waived the right to challenge the definite sentence not authorized by R.C. 2929.144

concluding that any error in imposing an unauthorized sentence is plain error).

That conflict in application between those two cases need not be resolved in this

appeal. Because Smith conflicts with Nelson and the Reeder plurality applied the

plain-error standard of review, Reeder controls.

               Plain error is a well-established standard.         An offender must

demonstrate both an obvious error and prejudice caused by that error. State v.

Rogers, 

, ¶ 22-23; State v. Mosby, 

 (8th

Dist.), citing State v. Payne, 

, ¶ 17 (“To prevail under a plain error

analysis, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that, but for the error, the

outcome of the trial would clearly have been different.”). In this case there is little

doubt that error occurred. The trial court imposed a hybrid sentence that is not

authorized under Anderson, 

, at ¶ 31.

               The tension between Reeder and Dowdell cannot be ignored for the

purposes of the plain-error analysis. The disparate outcome in cases with identical

procedural histories creates precedent permitting panels to disregard the parties’

agreement if the State benefits. Consistency in the application of legal doctrine is

just as crucial to the perception of the judiciary as an unbiased arbitrator of disputes

as is the uniform recitation of the legal standards. See Amos, 

. Because the fractured majority in Reeder established that plain error applies

in this situation, this panel has discretion to recognize and remediate the error.

              The imposition of the no-contact order attendant to the prison

sentence on the same felony offense is not authorized by statute and constitutes

plain error. 

. It would be a manifest miscarriage of justice to once

again deny the defendant the relief granted to the State in Dowdell. Consistent with

Nelson and Dowdell, the no-contact order imposed in this case cannot stand and is

hereby vacated.

              Based on the foregoing, the imposition of the no-contact order is

reversed and vacated. The matter is remanded solely for the purpose of removing

the no-contact order as a condition of the final sentence. All other aspects of the

convictions and sentences remain in effect.

              Vacated and remanded.

      It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.


_______________________________
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., and
WILLIAM A. KLATT, J.,* CONCUR

(*Sitting by assignment: William A. Klatt, J., retired, of the Tenth District Court of
Appeals.)