[Cite as State v. Goings,
2025-Ohio-485.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
GREENE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Appellee : C.A. No. 2024-CA-9
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. 23 CRB 01571
:
DASHAWN M. GOINGS : (Criminal Appeal from Municipal Court)
:
Appellant :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on February 14, 2025
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NICOLE K. DIETZ, Attorney for Appellant
DANIELLE E. SOLLARS, Attorney for Appellee
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EPLEY, P.J.
{¶ 1} DaShawn M. Goings appeals from his convictions in the Xenia Municipal
Court on two counts of aggravated menacing and one count each of menacing by stalking
and telecommunications harassment. He claims that the trial court erred by admitting
text messages as evidence during the bench trial and by overruling his Crim.R. 29(A)
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motion for acquittal. For the following reasons, the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} According to the State’s evidence at trial, the complainant, Alisha Willard,
met Goings approximately a week before Thanksgiving 2023 when she was trying to take
a drunk mutual friend home from a bar in Wilmington. Willard and Goings did not
become romantically involved, but Willard stated that she cared about him.
{¶ 3} A short time later, Goings became angry with Willard when she refused to
pick up 1,000 pressed pills for him. He later became more upset when she called the
police, asking them to perform a welfare check on him; Willard had believed that he was
overdosing and could not reach him to provide Narcan. Willard testified that Goings
ended up being arrested on an outstanding warrant that she did not know about.
{¶ 4} Their relationship further deteriorated on November 22, 2023. According to
Willard, Goings accused her of stealing marijuana from him, which escalated into
Goings’s searching and stealing some of Willard’s belongings and reportedly assaulting
her on and off for a couple of hours. Goings took Willard to a gas station, then a bar in
Wilmington. Willard sought help from two women at the bar and received aid from the
bartenders. Willard stated that “[i]t turned into a physical altercation in the way he was
shoving me out of the bar, trying to get me back into my car.” The Wilmington police
were called, but they have not pursued charges against Goings related to this incident.
{¶ 5} Willard then began receiving threatening and harassing messages, and she
believed they were coming from Goings. The messages promised to kill her, to “put me
in a field like they had planned to,” and to kill her six-year-old child. Willard testified that
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the sender knew she was providing information to the Wilmington police and that the
messages “were getting angrier and angrier every day so every day the messages got
worse. They became more consistent.” She said that every time she blocked the
number, she would get more texts and phone calls, sometimes five minutes later.
Williard testified that “it just consumed my life for a while of being threatened and just
berated by him.”
{¶ 6} On December 1, 2023, Willard sought and received an ex parte protection
order against Goings. Willard told Goings’s sister about it, believing that they were
friends and that she was a “safe” person with whom to talk. Afterwards, around 4:12
p.m., she received more messages, expressing anger about the protection order and
threatening to kill her and her child. The messages read:
When I find you I promise I will kill u u wack ass hoe. U will die a miserable
death by my hand I promise you that
U thinkin u safe an shit with those piggies
Deadass wrong hoe.
I hope you and that kid dies with holes bigger than shit in yo heads
Thinking this PO will save you HA
I’ll f*ckin drown you in yo own blood. Watch you gurgling on it an shit.
I’ll follow u till the end of the earth till I catch u ass slippin
Gettin my unc locked up
We all goin get yo fat ass and END it hoe.
Watch you’re back. I promise on my child and my life yo life is in my hands
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Period
I will find you and whip you off this earth. Time will tell who really plays. . .
(Misspellings in original.) State’s Ex. 1.
{¶ 7} At approximately 4:30 p.m. that same day, Willard went to the Xenia Police
Department and spoke with Officer Alexandria Mumpower. The officer described Willard
as very upset and afraid; Willard was shaking and her voice was cracking. Willard herself
testified that she was scared for her life and the lives of her mother and child.
{¶ 8} Willard told Officer Mumpower that she was receiving threatening text
messages and showed them to the officer. Willard said that an acquaintance, Goings,
had sent her multiple text messages that threatened to kill her. Willard explained that
she had been living at a residence in Wilmington with some people, that she had gone to
the police about illegal drug activities there, and that people had been arrested and
charged for some of those behaviors. Willard believed Goings was threatening her
because of this, specifically about his uncle, who was mentioned in the text messages.
{¶ 9} Willard emailed a screenshot of some of the messages to Officer Mumpower
so she could print them. The officer testified that the image was consistent with the text
messages she had seen on Willard’s phone.
{¶ 10} Willard informed Officer Mumpower that Goings had assaulted her and that
she had filed for a protection order against him. Mumpower communicated with dispatch
to determine whether it had been served on Goings. The dispatcher confirmed that they
had a paper copy of the protection order, but Goings had not yet been served with it, and
it had not yet been entered into LEADS. Officer Mumpower attempted to call Goings at
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the number from the text messages, but no one answered and she could not leave a
voicemail. She did not confirm whether Goings had an uncle who had recently been
arrested.
{¶ 11} Willard continued to receive more threatening messages, multiple times on
multiple days. The messages promised to kill her and indicated that he was following
her. She testified that, every time she received texts, she got them “the same way, the
same type of language, the same type of threats, the same type of sickening, twisted
ways.” The texts scared her, particularly when she realized that she and her child were
actually being followed.
{¶ 12} On December 4, 2023, Willard returned to the Xenia Police Department to
report that Goings had violated the protection order. She spoke with Officer Ryan Linnell
and showed him text messages that threatened to kill her and her son. Willard told the
officer that she had previously filed a report with Officer Mumpower. Officer Linnell
obtained a copy of the text messages and created a supplemental report. The messages
from 2:23 p.m. on December 4 read:
Ayo u keep running to them cops you gonna be dead before you know it
hoe
[Williard:] Who’s this?
Who do you think hoe
[Willard:] Chewy? Lmao please leave me alone
Of course it's chew bitch who else would it be. You ain’t gonna die by
anyone else but me I’ll tell you that
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It will be my pleasure to take yo life
Jeremy locked up because of U hoe
All my peoples being locked up now
U thinking u slick and shit
(Misspellings in original.) State’s Ex. 2.
{¶ 13} Officer Linnell also called the number that sent the text messages, and he
received no answer. When asked why there was no investigation to determine where
the text messages came from, Officer Linnell responded:
So this was a continuation of a report that had already been filed. This
victim had received hundreds of text messages and all of the text messages
that I had seen had a consistent story and theme. He also referenced his
uncle as Jeremy being locked up because of her actions, which leads into
it being Chew or Chewy because she said his uncle was named Jeremy.
Officer LInnell further indicated that the text messages had come from “a bunch of
different numbers that when you called them, they wouldn't come back to anything.”
{¶ 14} On December 8, 2023, Goings was charged by complaint with aggravated
menacing (Counts 1 and 2), menacing by stalking (Count 3), and telecommunications
harassment (Count 4), all misdemeanors of the first degree. The matter proceeded to a
bench trial during which the State presented the testimony of Willard and the two police
officers, as well as exhibits showing the quoted text messages.
{¶ 15} After Goings’s motion for an acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A) was denied,
Goings testified on his own behalf. He denied assaulting Willard and provided a different
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version of the events on November 22, 2023. He indicated that, although he had three
sisters, none of them had told him that Willard had gotten a protection order against him.
Goings further stated that he had an uncle, but the uncle had been incarcerated for the
past two and a half to three years. Finally, Goings acknowledged that most people know
him as Chewy, but he denied texting or trying to text Willard; he stated that he had blocked
her number and all forms of social media, and he did not know who had sent the texts.
{¶ 16} After closing arguments, the trial court found Goings guilty of all counts and
ordered a presentence investigation.
{¶ 17} On January 30, 2024, the trial court sentenced Goings on Count 1 to 180
days in jail, with 90 days suspended and credit for 53 days, plus a $250 fine. On the
remaining counts, the trial court imposed 180 days in jail, all of which were suspended,
and ordered Goings to pay fines of $200 (Count 2), $150 (Count 3), and $100 (Count 4).
On all counts, Goings was sentenced to two years of community control and ordered to
pay court costs. Goings was transported back to jail to serve the remaining 37 days of
his sentence on Count 1. Goings subsequently asked the trial court to stay his sentence
pending appeal, but the court denied the motion.
{¶ 18} Goings appeals from the trial court’s judgment, raising two assignments of
error, which we will address in reverse order.
II. Denial of Crim.R. 29 Motion
{¶ 19} In his second assignment of error, Goings claims that the trial court erred
by overruling his Crim.R. 29(A) motion for acquittal. He argues that the State failed to
present sufficient evidence that the text messages came from him.
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{¶ 20} When reviewing the denial of a Crim.R. 29(A) motion, an appellate court
applies the same standard as is used to review a claim based on the sufficiency of the
evidence. State v. Page, 2017-Ohio-568, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Sheppeard, 2013-
Ohio-812, ¶ 51 (2d Dist.). “A sufficiency of the evidence argument disputes whether the
State has presented adequate evidence on each element of the offense to allow the case
to go to the jury or sustain the verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Wilson,
2009-Ohio-525,
¶ 10 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Thompkins,
78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). The relevant
inquiry is whether any rational finder of fact, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable
to the State, could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Dennis,
79 Ohio St.3d 421, 430 (1997). A guilty verdict will
not be disturbed on appeal unless “reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion
reached by the trier-of-fact.”
Id.
{¶ 21} In reviewing the trial court’s denial of a Crim.R. 29(A) motion at the end of
the State’s case, we consider only the evidence that had been presented prior to the
motion. State v. Jackson, 2022-Ohio-2805, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.); State v. Powell, 2018-Ohio-
4693, ¶ 22 (2d Dist.), citing Sheppeard at ¶ 51. For Crim.R. 29(A) motions made after
the defense’s evidence, we consider all of the evidence admitted at trial. State v. Stone,
2024-Ohio-177, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 22} We note that, in his other assignment of error, Goings challenges the trial
court’s admission of the text messages. However, when reviewing claims based on the
sufficiency or manifest weight of the evidence, we are required to consider all the
evidence admitted at trial, regardless of whether it was admitted erroneously. See, e.g.,
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State v. Fleming, 2022-Ohio-1876, ¶ 27 (2d Dist.), citing, e.g., State v. Brewer, 2009-
Ohio-593. Accordingly, we must consider the disputed text messages in conducting our
analysis.
{¶ 23} The main issue at trial was the identity of the person sending the threatening
and harassing messages. During Willard’s direct examination, the prosecutor asked why
she believed the messages were coming from Goings. Willard responded with several
reasons. First, she stated that the messages “follows the pattern of messages I did
receive prior; and how he would talk in person, it follows his – his pattern.” Willard stated
that Goings had also texted the “exact same threats” that he had previously said to her in
person.
{¶ 24} Willard also testified that the messages made references to things that only
he would know, such as the plan he had and her getting his uncle locked up. When
asked if she knew who Jeremy was, Willard stated that he was the owner of the house
and that she knew he was currently incarcerated.
{¶ 25} Additionally, in the set of text messages shown to Officer Linnell (State’s
Exhibit 2), Willard had asked who was writing to her. The writer responded that it was
“Chew.” Willard testified that she knew Goings had used the nickname “Chewy” for a
long time; she indicated that everyone called him that, including herself, and that he used
that nickname on social media.
{¶ 26} Willard was not surprised to receive messages from multiple numbers.
She indicated that Goings had multiple phones and that it was easy and fast to make new
phone numbers on TextNow and Google. Willard acknowledged that Goings “could
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have had people [sending messages] for him but it was always coming from Dashawn.”
{¶ 27} Willard testified that she could not imagine anyone else sending her those
texts. She said that the other people in the house had stopped talking with her, whereas
Goings was “persistently talking to me. He was the only one that stayed talking to me.
Everyone else left me alone.” Finally, Willard testified that she had not received these
types of communications prior to meeting Goings and had not received them since Goings
was incarcerated.
{¶ 28} Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, there was
sufficient evidence to prove that Goings sent threatening and harassing text messages to
Willard. The trial court did not err in overruling Goings’s motion for acquittal pursuant to
Crim.R. 29(A).
{¶ 29} Goings’s second assignment of error is overruled.
III. Admission of Text Messages
{¶ 30} In his first assignment of error, Goings claims that the trial court’s admission
of the text messages was improper because the text messages were not properly
authenticated. He emphasizes that Williard had only known him for a short time before
receiving the text messages and she could not establish that he sent the messages.
{¶ 31} Authentication is governed by Evid.R. 901. “Evid.R. 901(A) requires, as a
condition precedent to the admissibility of evidence, a showing that the matter in question
is what it purports to be.” State v. Simmons, 2011-Ohio-2068, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.); State v.
Hatfield,
2022-Ohio-148, ¶ 84 (2d Dist.). “The threshold standard for authenticating
evidence is low, meaning that the party seeking to introduce the disputed evidence need
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only demonstrate ‘a reasonable likelihood that the evidence is authentic.’ ” (Citations
omitted.) State v. Shropshire, 2020-Ohio-6853, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 32} Evid.R. 901(B) provides examples of several ways that the authentication
requirement may be satisfied. The most common method is oral testimony that a matter
is what it is claimed to be under Evid.R. 901(B)(1). E.g., State v. Quarles, 2015-Ohio-
3050, ¶ 34 (2d Dist.); State v. Renner, 2013-Ohio-5463, ¶ 30 (2d Dist.). We have noted
that, “in most cases involving electronic print media, i.e., texts, instant messaging, and e-
mails, the photographs taken of the print media or the printouts of those conversations
are authenticated, introduced, and received into evidence through the testimony of the
recipient of the messages.” State v. Irwin,
2015-Ohio-195, ¶ 21 (2d Dist.), quoting State
v. Roseberry,
2011-Ohio-5921, ¶ 75 (8th Dist.).
{¶ 33} In this case, Willard testified that she went to the Xenia police multiple times
regarding the threatening and harassing text messages that she had received. She
indicated that the officers were only interested in having copies of the threatening
messages. Willard testified that she sent screenshots of text messages to the officers
via email.
{¶ 34} Officer Mumpower testified that she had viewed text messages on Willard’s
phone and that Willard had emailed her a photo of some messages. Without objection,
Officer Mumpower identified State’s Exhibit 1 as a true and accurate image of the text
messages that she had seen on Willard’s phone. Officer Linnell similarly testified that
he had viewed text messages that Willard had received and that he obtained a copy of
the messages. When asked about State’s Exhibit 2, Officer Linnell stated that the exhibit
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showed a text message that he had personally viewed. The officers’ testimony was
sufficient to establish that Exhibits 1 and 2 were authentic copies of the text messages
that Willard received.
{¶ 35} Goings argues that, for the messages to be admissible, the State was
required to establish the identity of the sender of the messages and it failed to do so.
However, Willard’s testimony demonstrated that Goings had texted the threatening and
harassing messages to her. See Ellis v. Skinner, 2022-Ohio-4793, ¶ 83 (11th Dist.)
(“Statements from text messages are properly authenticated and are admissible as a
party-opponent admission when the recipient of the messages identifies the messages
as coming from the defendant.”).
{¶ 36} Goings’s first assignment of error is overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 37} The trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.
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LEWIS, J. and HUFFMAN, J., concur.
