[Cite as State v. Toliver,
2025-Ohio-4871.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
NOBLE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DECHAUN TOLIVER,
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Case No. 25 NO 0524
Criminal Appeal from the
Court of Common Pleas of Noble County, Ohio
Case No. 224-2015
BEFORE:
Katelyn Dickey, Cheryl L. Waite, Carol Ann Robb, Judges.
JUDGMENT:
Affirmed.
Atty. Jordan C. Croucher, Noble County Prosecutor, for Plaintiff-Appellee and
Dechaun Toliver, Defendant-Appellant.
Dated: October 23, 2025
̶ 2 ̶
DICKEY, J.
Pro se Appellant, Dechaun E. Toliver, appeals from the March 11, 2025
judgment of the Noble County Court of Common Pleas convicting him of illegal
conveyance of drugs of abuse onto grounds of a specified governmental facility (CH-PIATA, a Schedule I Substance) and sentencing him to 24 months in prison, consecutive
to an unrelated term of incarceration, following a jury trial. On appeal, Appellant raises
arguments involving sufficiency of the evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, and equal
protection. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 6, 2024, Appellant, while incarcerated at the Noble Correctional
Institution (“NCI”), Inmate No. A745714, was secretly indicted by the Noble County Grand
Jury on one count of illegal conveyance of drugs of abuse onto grounds of a specified
governmental facility (CH-PIATA, a Schedule I Substance), a felony of the third degree in
violation of R.C. 2921.36(A)(2) and (G)(2). Appellant was appointed counsel and pled
not guilty at his arraignment.
On August 9, 2024, Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment based
on three grounds: (1) Appellant believes that an essential element of the charge against
him is that the conveyance must be onto the grounds of a detention facility, to wit, NCI;
(2) that the conveyance was interrupted via interdiction by officers of NCI and/or the Ohio
State Highway Patrol (“Highway Patrol”); and (3) there is no evidence that he placed the
illicit drugs along the highway nor was the conveyance to NCI ever accomplished.
Appellee, the State of Ohio, filed a response one week later. On November 4, 2024, the
trial court overruled Appellant’s motion to dismiss and set the matter for a jury trial.
A jury trial was held on March 6-7, 2025. The State presented five
witnesses: (1) Jared McGilton, the Investigator Administrative Warden’s Assistant at NCI;
(2) Zachary Lee, a criminalist at the Highway Patrol Crime Lab; (3) Eric Mullins, a Parole
Officer for the State; (4) Trenas Weaver, a Highway Patrol Trooper; and (5) Catlin Cutlip,
who grew up together with Appellant, his co-defendant, and described him “[l]ike, [her]
brother[.]” (3/6-7/2025 Jury Trial Tr., p. 313). Numerous State Exhibits were admitted
into evidence including: Exhibit A (nine audio files); Exhibits B-1 to B-3 (videos); Exhibits
Case No. 25 NO 0524
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C-1 to C-21 (photographs); Exhibit D-1 (Highway Patrol Criminalist Lee’s report); and
Exhibit D-2 (packaging of substances analyzed).
NCI inmates, including Appellant, worked as part of a clean-up crew and
were permitted beyond the fence of NCI for the purpose of cleaning up trash and debris
along Interstate 77. Upon completion of their trash pickup, inmates were transported
back to NCI.
On August 28, 2022, Cutlip, Appellant’s co-defendant, traveled to Noble
County in possession of CH-PIATA, a Schedule I synthetic cannabinoid, concealed in
various balloons. Cutlip concealed the balloons containing the narcotics into a bag of
trash. She tossed the trash bag onto the side of Interstate 77 near a billboard just north
of Exit 25.
Before, during, and after Cutlip completed the narcotics drop, phone calls
between herself and Appellant were reviewed. Cutlip and Appellant engaged in several
discussions. Appellant initially advised Cutlip that he needed her assistance and that he
would pay her approximately $2,000 for her role. They discussed how to properly conceal
the narcotics in trash and where to deposit the concealed narcotics. Cutlip confirmed that
Appellant’s intention in hiring her was for her to assist him in bringing “papers” into NCI.
(3/6-7/2025 Jury Trial Tr., p. 313).
Cutlip and Appellant discussed items referred to as “suits” and “papers” in
reference to Suboxone strips and the paper that is soaked in synthetic drugs. (Id. at p.
143). Cutlip and Appellant further discussed utilizing a fast-food bag, packaging the
narcotics in a Ziploc baggy before depositing them in a fast-food bag, then into a large
garbage bag, and leaving the collection of items on Interstate 77 near a billboard just
north of Exit 25. Cutlip was to notify Appellant that the drop was successful. All of Cutlip’s
activities were found to be at Appellant’s direction.
During the narcotics drop, Appellant attempted to conceal his involvement
by switching to a separate phone PIN provided to another inmate. NCI Investigator
McGilton was able to positively identify the parties by the phone numbers involved, the
PIN numbers, and their voices. Members of the Highway Patrol and NCI Investigative
Unit were stationed in various locations around the suspected drop site. The Highway
Patrol visually observed and identified Cutlip and her vehicle.
Case No. 25 NO 0524
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After Cutlip deposited the narcotics in trash along Interstate 77, law
enforcement secured the narcotics and replaced them with a fictitious package so that
they could further observe the involvement of any other potential inmates. Inside the
large garbage bag was a series of balloons containing what was believed by law
enforcement personnel to be illegal narcotics. That suspicion was ultimately confirmed.
Highway Patrol Criminalist Lee testified that the substance provided to the lab was tested
by him and was found to contain CH-PIATA, a synthetic cannabinoid and a Schedule I
controlled substance. Upon retrieval of the illegal narcotics, a fictitious package was used
to replace the original.
The next day, members of the Highway Patrol and NCI Investigative Unit
were again stationed for observation. Law enforcement and investigators observed only
Appellant approach and retrieve the trash bag at issue, left by Cutlip the day before,
including the package of fictitious drugs.
At the conclusion of the State’s case, Appellant moved for an acquittal
pursuant to Crim.R. 29 which was overruled by the trial court. The defense rested without
presenting evidence.
The jury found Appellant guilty on the sole count of illegal conveyance of
drugs of abuse onto grounds of a specified governmental facility (CH-PIATA, a Schedule
I Substance) as contained in the indictment.
On March 11, 2025, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve 24 months
in prison, consecutive to an unrelated term of incarceration. The court also advised
Appellant that he may be subject to post-release control for up to two years.
Appellant filed a timely pro se appeal and raises four assignments of error.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION.
THE STATE DID NOT PROVE THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE
CRIME BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, INSTEAD RELIED ON
“SPECULATION & CONJECTURE” OF WHAT THEY BELIEVE WAS
GOING TO HAPPEN NEXT. THE STATE EVEN ALLEGES THAT
APPELLANT DID NOT COMMIT THE CRIME.
Case No. 25 NO 0524
̶ 5 ̶
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
THE CONVICTION IS BASED UPON A RECORD WHOLLY DEVOID OF
A CRUCIAL ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED, VIOLATING
APPELLANT’S FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS UNDER THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND OHIO
CONSTITUTION ART. I, SECTION 16.
In his first assignment of error, Appellant argues his conviction for illegal
conveyance of drugs of abuse onto grounds of a specified governmental facility (CH-PIATA, a Schedule I Substance) is not supported by sufficient evidence. Specifically,
Appellant claims the elements of “knowingly convey, or attempt to convey,” a “drug of
abuse,” and “onto the grounds of a detention facility” were not proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. See R.C. 2921.36(A)(2).
In his second assignment of error, Appellant contends his due process
rights were violated based on a belief that his conviction rests upon a record devoid of a
crucial element, i.e., the narcotics did not successfully reach the grounds of NCI.
Because Appellant’s first and second assignments of error involve
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we will consider them together for ease of
discussion.
“When a court reviews a record for sufficiency, ‘[t]he relevant inquiry is
whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v.
Maxwell, 139 Ohio St.3d 12,
2014-Ohio-1019,
9 N.E.3d 930, ¶ 146, quoting
State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259,
574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two
of the syllabus; Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
99 S.Ct. 2781,
61 L.Ed.2d
560 (1979).
State v. T.D.J.,
2018-Ohio-2766, ¶ 46 (7th Dist.).
Case No. 25 NO 0524
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“‘[C]ircumstantial evidence and direct evidence inherently possess the
same probative value.’” State v. Biros, 78 Ohio St.3d 426, 447 (1997), quoting Jenks at
paragraph one of the syllabus.
For the reasons addressed below, we determine the judgment is supported
by sufficient evidence.
Appellant takes issue with the guilty finding for illegal conveyance of drugs
of abuse onto grounds of a specified governmental facility (CH-PIATA, a Schedule I
Substance), a felony of the third degree in violation of R.C. 2921.36(A)(2) and (G)(2),
which states:
(A) No person shall knowingly convey, or attempt to convey, onto the
grounds of a detention facility or of an institution, office building, or other
place that is under the control of the department of mental health and
addiction services, the department of developmental disabilities, the
department of youth services, or the department of rehabilitation and
correction any of the following items:
...
(2) Any drug of abuse, as defined in section 3719.011 of the Revised
Code;
...
(G)(2) Whoever violates division (A)(2) of this section or commits a
violation of division (C) of this section involving any drug of abuse is guilty
of illegal conveyance of drugs of abuse onto the grounds of a specified
governmental facility, a felony of the third degree….
(Emphasis added). R.C. 2921.36(A)(2) and (G)(2).
The term “knowingly” is defined in R.C. 2901.22(B) as follows: “A person
acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the person’s
conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature.”
Case No. 25 NO 0524
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R.C. 2923.02, “Attempt,” provides in part: “(A) No person, purposely or
knowingly, and when purpose or knowledge is sufficient culpability for the commission of
an offense, shall engage in conduct that, if successful, would constitute or result in the
offense.”
R.C. 3719.011(A) states: “‘Drug of abuse’ means any controlled substance
as defined in section 3719.01 of the Revised Code, any harmful intoxicant as defined in
section 2925.01 of the Revised Code, and any dangerous drug as defined in section
4729.01 of the Revised Code.”
R.C. 3719.01(C) states: “‘Controlled substance’ means a drug, compound,
mixture, preparation, or substance included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V.”
In this case, the State presented sufficient evidence establishing
Appellant committed the charged offense of illegal conveyance of drugs of abuse onto
grounds of a specified governmental facility (CH-PIATA, a Schedule I Substance). The
Revised Code is clear that convictions under the principal statute are proper even for
attempted efforts at such conduct. See R.C. 2921.36(A)(2) and (G)(2).
As stated, before, during, and after Cutlip completed the narcotics drop,
phone calls between herself and Appellant were reviewed. Cutlip and Appellant engaged
in several discussions. Appellant initially advised Cutlip that he needed her assistance
and that he would pay her approximately $2,000 for her role. They discussed how to
properly conceal the narcotics in trash and where to deposit the concealed narcotics.
Cutlip confirmed that Appellant’s intention in hiring her was for her to assist him in bringing
“papers” into NCI. (3/6-7/2025 Jury Trial Tr., p. 313).
Cutlip and Appellant discussed items referred to as “suits” and “papers” in
reference to Suboxone strips and the paper that is soaked in synthetic drugs. (Id. at p.
143). Cutlip and Appellant further discussed utilizing a fast-food bag, packaging the
narcotics in a Ziploc baggy before depositing them in a fast-food bag, then into a large
garbage bag, and leaving the collection of items on Interstate 77 near a billboard just
north of Exit 25. Cutlip was to notify Appellant that the drop was successful. All of Cutlip’s
activities were found to be at Appellant’s direction.
During the narcotics drop, Appellant attempted to conceal his involvement
by switching to a separate phone PIN provided to another inmate. NCI Investigator
Case No. 25 NO 0524
̶ 8 ̶
McGilton was able to positively identify the parties by the phone numbers involved, the
PIN numbers, and their voices. Members of the Highway Patrol and NCI Investigative
Unit were stationed in various locations around the suspected drop site. The Highway
Patrol visually observed and identified Cutlip and her vehicle.
After Cutlip deposited the narcotics in trash along Interstate 77, law
enforcement secured the narcotics and replaced them with a fictitious package so that
they could further observe the involvement of any other potential inmates. Inside the
large garbage bag was a series of balloons containing what was believed by law
enforcement personnel to be illegal narcotics. That suspicion was ultimately confirmed.
Highway Patrol Criminalist Lee testified that the substance provided to the lab was tested
by him and was found to contain CH-PIATA, a synthetic cannabinoid and a Schedule I
controlled substance. Upon retrieval of the illegal narcotics, a fictitious package was used
to replace the original.
The next day, members of the Highway Patrol and NCI Investigative Unit
were again stationed for observation. Law enforcement and investigators observed only
Appellant approach and retrieve the trash bag at issue, left by Cutlip the day before,
including the package of fictitious drugs.
Contrary to Appellant’s position, this case is not based entirely upon
speculation and conjecture. Based on the facts presented, as addressed, Appellant did
more than merely solicit Cutlip. Rather, Appellant took all action within his power,
considering his incarceration, to ensure that the crime would be committed. See, e.g.,
State v. Group, 2002-Ohio-7247, ¶ 95-99. Appellant was the only inmate to approach
and retrieve the trash bag at issue. Because Appellant’s return destination was NCI it is
clear that he was acting with the intent to illegally convey a drug of abuse onto the grounds
of NCI. See R.C. 2921.36(A)(2) and (G)(2). All theories to the contrary are simply
unreasonable.
Pursuant to Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, there is sufficient evidence upon
which the jury could reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the elements
of illegal conveyance of drugs of abuse onto grounds of a specified governmental facility
(CH-PIATA, a Schedule I Substance) were proven. Thus, the trial court did not err in
overruling Appellant’s Crim.R. 29 motion.
Case No. 25 NO 0524
̶ 9 ̶
Appellant’s first and second assignments of error are without merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3
PROSECUTOR MISCONDUCT. PROSECUTORS’ COMMENTS
INFECTED THE TRIAL WITH UNFAIRNESS AS TO MAKE THE
RESULTING CONVICTION A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS. THE
PROSECUTOR ENGAGED IN MISLEADING CONDUCT BY
DELIBERATELY CHANGING THE THEORY OF THE PROSECUTION IN
THE MIDDLE OF THE TRIAL & TAKING INCONSISTENT POSITIONS ON
THE [APPELANT’S] ROLE IN THE SAME CRIME.
In his third assignment of error, Appellant alleges the prosecutor engaged
in misconduct. Specifically, Appellant believes the following comments made by the
prosecutor during closing arguments violated his due process rights: (1) “The statute
provides that the action must be to either convey or attempt to convey onto the grounds
of a specified government facility”; (2) “Item does not have to make its way onto the actual
grounds”; (3) “There is no dispute that the drugs didn’t make it onto the grounds of the
facility”; and (4) “Find Dechaun Toliver guilty of illegal conveyance of drugs of abuse onto
the grounds of Noble Correctional.” (7/3/2025 Appellant’s Brief, p. 19).
When reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct in closing
arguments, the reviewing court evaluates whether remarks were improper
and, if so, whether they prejudicially affected the defendant’s substantial
rights. State v. Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 165,
555 N.E.2d 293 (1990). The
prosecution is afforded wide latitude in summation. Id. Contested
statements made during closing arguments are not viewed in isolation but
are read in context of the entire argument and the entire case. State v.
Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 466,
739 N.E.2d 749 (2001); State v. Rahman,
23 Ohio St.3d 146, 154,
492 N.E.2d 401 (1986) (also noting if the Court
were to find “every remark made by counsel outside of the testimony were
grounds for a reversal, comparatively few verdicts would stand, since in the
Case No. 25 NO 0524
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ardor of advocacy, and in the excitement of trial, even the most experienced
of counsel are occasionally carried away by this temptation”).
State v. Browning, 2023-Ohio-890, ¶ 45 (7th Dist.), quoting State v. Hymes, 2021-Ohio-
3439, ¶ 82 (7th Dist.).
Appellant did not object to any of the prosecutor’s comments.
“A claim of prosecutorial misconduct is waived unless raised at trial, and if
so waived, can serve as the basis for relief only if the conduct constitutes
plain error.” State v. Franklin, 97 Ohio St.3d 1,
2002-Ohio-5304,
776 N.E.2d
26, ¶ 24. Plain error is a discretionary doctrine to be used with the utmost
care by the appellate court in exceptional circumstances to avoid a manifest
miscarriage of justice where an obvious error affected substantial rights,
meaning it was outcome determinative. State v. Noling, 98 Ohio St.3d 44,
2002-Ohio-7044,
781 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 62, applying Crim.R. 52(B).
Hymes at ¶ 83.
Upon review, the prosecutor’s first comment regarding the statute is simply
a proper, partial re-statement of R.C. 2921.36. See R.C. 2921.36(A)(2) (“No person shall
knowingly convey, or attempt to convey, onto the grounds of a detention facility or …
other place that is under the control of the . . . department of rehabilitation and correction
. . . [a]ny drug of abuse”).
The prosecutor’s second comment is in regard to the fact that the item does
not have to make its way onto the actual grounds. This comment is simply a statement
with respect to the evidentiary requirements of R.C. 2921.36 with regard to an attempted
conveyance of drugs of abuse onto the grounds of a specified governmental facility that
is in line with existing Ohio case law. Any alleged confusion or error was clarified and/or
cured by the trial court in its final jury instructions as follows:
Now, attempt. Attempt means to knowingly engage in conduct that if
successful would constitute or result in that offense.
Case No. 25 NO 0524
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A criminal attempt occurs when one purposely or knowingly does or
admits or fails to do anything that is an act or an admission or failure
constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate
in his commission of the offense.
To constitute a substantial step the conduct must be strongly
corroborative of the actor’s criminal purpose or knowledge.
Preparing, planning or arranging the means for the commission of
the crime does not constitute an attempt.
The act need not be the last proximate act prior to the commission
of the offense.
This properly directs attention to overt acts of the defendant which
convincingly demonstrate a firm purpose to commit a crime while allowing
police intervention based upon observation of such incriminating conduct in
order to prevent the crime when the criminal intent becomes apparent.
(3/6-7/2025 Jury Trial Tr., p. 349-350).
The prosecutor’s third comment that “[t]here is no dispute that the drugs
didn’t make it onto the grounds of the facility” has been argued by Appellant himself. See
(7/3/2025 Appellant’s Brief, p. 3, 19).
The prosecutor’s fourth comment regarding finding Appellant guilty simply
appears to be a proper final statement to the jury arguing in favor of a conviction based
upon the evidence presented.
Upon review, none of the above comments by the prosecutor during closing
arguments amounts to plain error.
Appellant’s third assignment of error is without merit.
Case No. 25 NO 0524
̶ 12 ̶
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 4
[APPELLANT’S] EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED BY
BATSON VIOLATION, BECAUSE AFRICAN AMERICANS WERE
TOTALLY EXCLUDED FROM THE JURY POOL.
In his fourth assignment of error, Appellant, a black male, claims error
because the entire jury pool in his trial was white. Appellant stresses that African
American men and African Americans in general were improperly excluded.
The racial makeup of a jury pool is contested through use of a
“Batson” challenge, which has its genesis from United States Supreme
Court law.
The Ohio Supreme Court has set out the steps for analyzing a racebased challenge pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
106 S.Ct.
1712,
90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), as follows:
First, the opponent of the peremptory strike must make a prima facie
case of racial discrimination. Second, if the trial court finds that the opponent
has fulfilled this requirement, then the proponent of the strike must come
forward with a racially neutral explanation for the strike. . . . The ‘explanation
need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause.’
(Batson, 476 U.S.) at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723,
90 L.Ed.2d at 88.
Third, if the proponent puts forward a racially neutral explanation, the
trial court must decide, on the basis of all the circumstances, whether the
opponent has proved purposeful racial discrimination. . . . The burden of
persuasion is on the opponent of the strike. (Internal citations omitted.)
State v. Herring, 94 Ohio St.3d 246, 255-256,
2002-Ohio-796,
762
N.E.2d 940; State v. Moore, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 22 MA 0013, 2023-
Ohio-1000, ¶ 14, appeal not allowed, 170 Ohio St.3d 1494, 2023-Ohio-
2407, 212 N.E.3d 951.
Case No. 25 NO 0524
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“An appellate court will not reverse the trial court’s decision of no
discrimination unless it is clearly erroneous.” Moore at ¶ 15, citing State v.
Hernandez, 63 Ohio St.3d 577, 583,
589 N.E.2d 1310 (1992).
State v. Hill,
2024-Ohio-1543, ¶ 21-22 (7th Dist.).
As Appellant concedes in his brief, no African Americans were present in
the jury panel called for trial in the case at bar. See (7/3/2025 Appellant’s Brief, p. 19).
No peremptory challenges were used by the State against African Americans and,
inherently, no objection was made on these grounds. The trial judge asked if the jury was
acceptable to Appellant and defense counsel answered, “Yes, Your Honor.” (3/6-7/2025
Jury Trial Tr., p. 87). Because there was no objection raised at any point, no prima facie
case of purposeful discrimination was established. Since Appellant’s claim fails to meet
the required burden, there is no equal protection violation. Hill at ¶ 21-22.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of a jury trial “contemplates a jury drawn from a fair
cross-section of the community.” Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527,
95
S.Ct. 692,
42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975).
While this is the ideal scenario, Ohio law provides:
[N]o requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the
community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population.
Defendants are not entitled to a jury of any particular composition, but the
jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from which juries are drawn
must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community and
thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof.
State v. Johnson, 88 Ohio St.3d 95, 117,
723 N.E.2d 1054, 1073
(2000), citing Taylor, supra, at 527.
Hill at ¶ 24-25.
Case No. 25 NO 0524
̶ 14 ̶
The State points out the following:
As an aside, the most recent available census data provides that
Noble County has a population of approximately 14,269 people. U.S.
Census Quick Facts, 2024. Of that population, an estimated 92% are white,
while an estimated 5% are black. U.S. Census Data, 2020. At the time of
Appellant’s trial, data provided by the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
Correction reveals that Eight Hundred Seventy-Three (873) inmates were
black. ODRC Monthly Population Count, by Institution, March 2025
(03/04/2025). As inmates are considered in census data at the location in
which they are housed rather than their home address, these inmates would
account for approximately 6% of Noble County’s population, effectively
accounting for the entirety of the black population in Noble County. As
inmates currently serving a prison term are ineligible for jury service, the
potential for black jurors to be available in Appellant’s jury pool is a virtual
impossibility. See State v. Frazier, 2007-Ohio-5048, ¶ 69, stating,
“‘[appellant’s] claims are also not supported by the ‘bare statistics.’ The
absence of African-Americans on [appellant’s] jury resulted from the few
African-Americans randomly selected for the original jury pool.’”
(8/25/2025 Appellee’s Brief, p. 18).
“While the ideal situation is to have every jury pool reflect the diversity of
the community, so long as the group at issue was not excluded based on race,” Appellant
in the instant case does not properly raise a Batson challenge. Hill at ¶ 25.
Appellant’s fourth assignment of error is without merit.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant’s assignments of error are not welltaken. The March 11, 2025 judgment of the Noble County Court of Common Pleas
convicting Appellant for illegal conveyance of drugs of abuse onto grounds of a specified
governmental facility (CH-PIATA, a Schedule I Substance) and sentencing him to 24
Case No. 25 NO 0524
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months in prison, consecutive to an unrelated term of incarceration, following a jury trial,
is affirmed.
Waite, J., concurs.
Robb, P.J., concurs.
Case No. 25 NO 0524
[Cite as State v. Toliver, 2025-Ohio-4871.]
For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignments of error
are overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of
the Court of Common Pleas of Noble County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs to be waived.
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
in this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that
a certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into
execution.
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
This document constitutes a final judgment entry.
