[Cite as State v. Rivera,
2025-Ohio-4881.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
CHAMPAIGN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
: C.A. No. 2025-CA-10
Appellee :
: Trial Court Case No. 2021 CR 125
v. :
: (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
DAWN ELIZABETH RIVERA : Court)
:
Appellant : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY &
: OPINION
...........
Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on October 24, 2025, the judgment of
the trial court is affirmed.
Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.
Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately
serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.
Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified
copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note
the service on the appellate docket.
For the court,
MARY K. HUFFMAN, JUDGE
EPLEY, P.J., and TUCKER, J., concur.
OPINION
CHAMPAIGN C.A. No. 2025-CA-10
STEVEN H. ECKSTEIN, Attorney for Appellant
JANE A. NAPIER, Attorney for Appellee
HUFFMAN, J.
{¶ 1} Dawn Elizabeth Rivera appeals from her conviction on one count each of
operating a vehicle while under the influence (“OVI”), endangering children, tampering with
evidence, and possession of a fentanyl-related compound. For the following reasons, the
judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} The events giving rise to this matter occurred on June 24, 2021, when Rivera
was observed driving erratically, nearly striking multiple vehicles and hitting a mailbox. She
stopped in a Dollar General parking lot in the Village of St. Paris where she was
subsequently arrested. Rivera’s young child was in her vehicle at the time. When Rivera was
first confronted by police officers at the scene, Rivera raised her voice and threw a cigarette
pack containing a fentanyl-related compound to her child.
{¶ 3} Rivera was indicted on August 2, 2021, on the above counts, as well an
additional count of endangering children and two additional counts of possession of a
fentanyl-related compound.
{¶ 4} On October 19, 2021, Rivera withdrew her not guilty pleas and pled guilty to
OVI, endangering children, tampering with evidence, and possession of a fentanyl-related
compound, and the State dismissed the remaining counts. Sentencing initially occurred on
November 18, 2021, via Zoom, and Rivera appeared from a drug treatment facility. The
court orally imposed a term of six months in the Tri-County Jail for OVI, and prison terms of
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12 months for endangering children, 36 months for tampering with evidence, and 12 months
for possession of a fentanyl-related compound, all to run concurrently for an aggregate
prison term of 36 months. The court advised Rivera that the sentence would not become
effective until journalized. Rivera indicated that her treatment was scheduled to end in
January 2022, but the court stated that it could not delay the imposition of her sentence until
then. The court ordered Rivera to report to the Tri-County Regional Jail the following day,
no later than 11:00 a.m. The court admonished Rivera that it would issue a warrant for her
arrest if she failed to appear at the jail, and that it could “potentially change your sentence
to something more severe” if she did not report as ordered. Rivera acknowledged her
understanding.
{¶ 5} On November 19, 2021, after Rivera failed to report to the jail as ordered, the
court issued a capias warrant for her arrest. The entry repeated the court’s admonishment
that if Rivera failed to appear, the court could hold another sentencing hearing and
potentially increase Rivera’s sentence because the court’s sentencing order would not be
final until journalized. The entry further indicated that court staff had contacted Rivera’s
caseworker at the treatment facility and learned that she had left the facility with her girlfriend
at 8:30 p.m. on November 18, 2021, against the advice of staff, and that her whereabouts
were unknown. The entry stated that the court had contacted the jail again at 1:22 p.m. and
learned that Rivera still had not reported. The court indicated that a journal entry of
conviction would not be filed until Rivera was placed in custody. On December 9, 2021, the
court issued a journal entry memorializing Rivera’s failure to report to the Tri-County
Regional Jail as ordered.
{¶ 6} Rivera was arrested on her capias, and on February 3, 2025, the court held a
second sentencing hearing and issued the judgment entry of conviction from which this
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appeal arose. The court sentenced Rivera to 6 months in jail for OVI (Count 1) and to prison
terms of 12 months for endangering children (Count 2), 36 months for tampering with
evidence (Count 4), and 12 months for possession of a fentanyl-related compound (Count
5). The court ordered the sentences imposed for Counts 1, 2, and 4 to be served
concurrently to each other but consecutively to the term imposed for Count 5, for an
aggregate term of 48 months.
Assignment of Error and Analysis
{¶ 7} Rivera’s assignment of error asserts that her 48-month sentence is contrary to
law because the “unreasonable delay” in sentencing divested the court of jurisdiction
pursuant to Crim.R. 32. She cites State v. Pete, 2023-Ohio-4406 (7th Dist.), and directs our
attention to multiple cases discussed therein. Rivera argues that “Ohio authorities knew her
whereabouts,” namely “rehab,” that in issuing the capias warrant the court “took only one
step to secure” her appearance and then remained idle, that she had been living near the
courthouse in Champaign County, and that the court “could have simply filed the sentencing
entry the same day as the first sentencing hearing.” In her reply brief, Rivera argues that the
delay is a “bad practice for trial courts to implement,” and her conviction should be reversed
and the case dismissed.
{¶ 8} It is well-settled that “[a] court speaks only through its journal entries.” State v.
Inscho, 2019-Ohio-809, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Ellington,
36 Ohio App.3d 76, 77-78
(9th Dist. 1987). “Absent statutory authority, a trial court is generally not empowered to
modify a criminal sentence by reconsidering its own final judgment.” State v. Carlisle, 2011-
Ohio-6553, ¶ 1. “A criminal sentence is final upon issuance of a final order.” Id. at ¶ 11. “A
judgment of conviction is a final order subject to appeal under R.C. 2505.02 when it sets
forth (1) the fact of the conviction, (2) the sentence, (3) the judge’s signature, and (4) the
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time stamp indicating the entry upon the journal by the clerk.” State v. Lester, 2011-Ohio-
5204, paragraph one of the syllabus, citing Crim.R. 32(C). The Ninth District has emphasized
that “‘[w]here there has been no journalization of [a criminal] sentence, a sentence
announced in open court may be amended without formal judgment entry.’” State v. Hensley,
2023-Ohio-2910, ¶ 12 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Overstreet,
2003-Ohio-4530, ¶ 8
(9th Dist.). See also State v. McLaughlin,
2004-Ohio-1780, ¶ 7 (10th Dist.) (“a
pronouncement of sentence does not become the official action of the court unless and until
it is entered upon the court’s journal.”) “Courts may increase sentences when the sentence
does not constitute a final order.”
Overstreet at ¶ 8. In Hensley, the court affirmed a trial
court’s authority to increase the defendant’s sentence after the oral pronouncement because
no final sentencing entry had been issued. Id. at ¶ 15 (“because the sentence originally
pronounced was not a final order, the trial court did not err when it subsequently entered a
final sentencing order that increased Hensley’s sentence.”)
{¶ 9} Crim.R 32(A), to which Rivera directs our attention, states that a “[s]entence
shall be imposed without unnecessary delay.” Pete noted that Ohio courts of appeal have
held that “‘[a]n unreasonable delay between a plea and a sentencing, which cannot be
attributed to the defendant, will invalidate that sentence.’” (Bracketed text in original.) Id. at
¶ 18, quoting State v. Martinez, 2010-Ohio-2007, ¶ 6 (6th Dist.).1
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As the State asserts, Rivera mischaracterizes the holding in Martinez when she argues
that the Sixth District “concluded the trial court’s two-year delay in sentencing Martinez was
unreasonable and the trial court was divested of jurisdiction to sentence him.” Although
Martinez argued that his sentence should be vacated because the delay of two years and
four months between his guilty plea and sentencing divested the court of jurisdiction to
sentence him, the court concluded that “appellant’s delay in sentencing [was] solely
attributable to his failure to appear at his initial sentencing date” and affirmed the judgment
of the trial court. Id. at ¶ 17.
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{¶ 10} The cases in Pete upon which Rivera relies are distinct from the facts of her
case. For example, in State v. Brown, 2003-Ohio-1218 (7th Dist.), the defendant, Brown,
pled guilty to charges in one county, but prior to sentencing, he was arrested and detained
in another county pursuant to a request for extradition to Colorado. Id. at ¶ 4. Brown was
extradited to Colorado, and when he failed to appear at his scheduled sentencing, the trial
court ordered the sheriff to retrieve Brown from Colorado and issued a bench warrant for his
arrest. Id. at ¶ 5-6. Brown, however, was not returned to Ohio, and neither the State nor the
court made any effort to facilitate a sentencing hearing. Id. at ¶ 7, 29. Finally, three years
after Brown entered his guilty pleas, he was sentenced via video conference. Id. at ¶ 10.
The Seventh District Court of Appeals found that Brown’s extradition was involuntary and
that he had asked the trial court presiding over the extradition request to facilitate his
sentencing in Ohio, which did not happen. Id. at ¶ 22-23. The Seventh District concluded
that “the delay in sentencing caused by the extradition must be attributed to the state and
cannot be attributed to appellant.” Id. at ¶ 23. The court determined that the “trial court [had]
no jurisdiction to render a sentence in this matter” and reversed the judgment of the trial
court. Id. at ¶ 31.
{¶ 11} In State v. Johnson, 2003-Ohio-6261 (12th Dist.), after pleading guilty to
several felony charges, the defendant, Johnson, failed to appear at sentencing. Id. at ¶ 2.
Shortly after the date of the sentencing hearing, Johnson was arrested in Kentucky. Id.
Johnson was eventually convicted in connection with the arrest and sentenced to a ten-year
prison sentence. Id. Over a three-year span, Johnson and his counsel sent correspondence
to the trial court requesting final disposition of his Ohio case. Id. at ¶ 4-7. But the trial court
did not sentence Johnson until he was released from prison in Kentucky over six years after
the date of his original sentencing hearing. Id. at ¶ 9. Following the principles articulated in
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Brown, the Seventh District Court of Appeals held that the six-year delay in Johnson’s
sentencing was unreasonable. Id. at ¶ 14-18. The court determined that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to render a sentence in Johnson’s case. Id. at ¶ 18.
{¶ 12} Finally, in State v. Owens, 2009-Ohio-1508 (7th Dist.), the Seventh District
found a 13-month period between the guilty plea and sentencing of a defendant, Owens, to
be unreasonable. The court considered the following circumstances: (1) Ohio authorities
knew Owens’s whereabouts in Pennsylvania; (2) Owens had waived extradition; (3) the
State took no action for thirteen months; (4) Owens was jailed not far from the trial court
(located in a county bordering Pennsylvania); and (5) alternative methods were available to
sentence Owens absent extradition. Id. at ¶ 34. The court concluded that the “state and the
trial court had several methods to effectuate a valid sentence upon Owens within a
reasonable time, and they failed to do so,” and it vacated Owens’s sentence.
Owens at ¶ 38.
{¶ 13} Rivera overlooks the fact that the trial court orally pronounced her sentence on
November 18, 2021, but did not journalize the entry. At that time, she was ordered to report
to the Tri-County Jail on November 19, 2021, at 11:00 a.m. and was told that her judgment
entry of conviction would not be filed until then. Rivera agreed to those terms. The court
made clear to Rivera that “any failure to report could cause the court to . . . issue a capias
for your arrest [and] bring you back and potentially change your sentence to something more
severe.” Rivera specifically acknowledged that she understood the court’s admonishment.
{¶ 14} At the February 3, 2025 sentencing hearing, the court noted that Rivera had
been advised that a court speaks only through its journal entries and not by oral
pronouncement. The court indicated that it modified Rivera’s sentence “for [her] continued
failure to appear” and that it learned she was being held in jail on January 31, 2025. The
court stated it had continued to “check the jail rosters” in Rivera’s absence. Contrary to
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Rivera’s suggestion, the court did not know of her location. It knew only that she had left the
facility of her treatment program the night before she was originally scheduled to report to
jail in 2021. Counsel for Rivera advised the court that she had failed to appear at jail because
she was “scared,” she did not want to be away from her child, her girlfriend had passed
away, and Rivera’s mother had dementia. Rivera stated that after she left the treatment
facility, she went to her home in Miami County and was not in Champaign County, as she
suggests in her brief. Any delay in Rivera’s sentencing was attributable to her conduct only.
{¶ 15} As in Hensley, the sentence originally pronounced by the trial court was not a
final order. The trial court did not err when it subsequently entered the final judgment entry
of conviction that increased Rivera’s sentence by requiring that Counts 1, 2, and 4 be served
consecutively to Count 5 (without altering the original sentences imposed on each count).
We find no basis to conclude that Rivera’s case should have been dismissed. Accordingly,
her sole assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶ 16} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
.............
EPLEY, P.J., and TUCKER, J., concur.
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