[Cite as State v. Crawford,
2025-Ohio-4892.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
CLERMONT COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
CASE NO. CA2025-02-010
Appellee, :
OPINION AND
vs. : JUDGMENT ENTRY
10/27/2025
CODY AUSTIN CRAWFORD, :
Appellant. :
:
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM CLERMONT COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Case No. 2021 CR 0147
Mark J. Tekulve, Clermont County Prosecuting Attorney, and Nicholas A. Horton,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Paul Croushore, for appellant.
____________
OPINION
SIEBERT, J.
{¶ 1} Cody A. Crawford appeals the trial court's denial of his postconviction
petition for relief alleging ineffective counsel. Crawford's arguments on appeal are framed
exclusively in terms of the scope, process, and purpose of postconviction petition
Clermont CA2025-02-010
proceedings and do not challenge the trial court's conclusions regarding ineffective
assistance of counsel. In his three assignments of error, Crawford argues the trial court
improperly denied his petition without first appointing him counsel or giving Crawford an
opportunity to address evidence and arguments presented by the State in response to
the petition. Crawford also asserts Ohio's postconviction statute violates the state and
federal constitutions by requiring development of evidence of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel during the pendency of the direct appeal.
{¶ 2} We overrule each assignment of error. Upon review, we conclude the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it found Crawford's petition did not contain
substantive grounds for relief that required the trial court to appoint counsel or hold a
hearing. Crawford also had the statutory authority to respond to the State's evidence but
did not do so. Finally, although Crawford did not raise his constitutional arguments at the
trial level, we conclude binding precedent supports the trial court's application of res
judicata to much of Crawford's petition. We affirm the decision of the trial court.
Background
{¶ 3} In February of 2021, Crawford shot and killed John Smith.1 Before the
shooting, Crawford went to his girlfriend's apartment. In the parking lot, Crawford
observed Smith engaged in a verbal and physical altercation with another individual.
According to Crawford, they appeared to be arguing about drinking and driving. Due to
the physical nature of the argument, Crawford retrieved his semiautomatic pistol before
proceeding to his girlfriend's apartment.
{¶ 4} The argument continued to boil when Crawford returned to his vehicle.
1. John Smith is a pseudonym adopted for this opinion to protect the privacy of the victim and his family.
See State v. Cansler, 2025-Ohio-2558, ¶ 1, fn. 1 (12th Dist.); Supreme Court of Ohio Writing Manual 115
(3rd Ed. 2024).
-2-
Clermont CA2025-02-010
Before Crawford began driving, his truck was struck by Smith's own vehicle which
subsequently hit a nearby curb and stopped. The two exited their vehicles, and Crawford
approached Smith's vehicle. The two began yelling at each other, and when Smith later
attempted to turn away, Crawford grabbed Smith's arm. A struggle ensued. Crawford
testified at trial that during the altercation, Crawford fell onto his back, and Smith drew a
knife and began approaching Crawford. At that point, Crawford drew his pistol and shot
Smith four times. Crawford then cleared his pistol of an unspent bullet and waited for
police to arrive. Smith later died from his injuries.
{¶ 5} At trial, the jury found Crawford guilty of both purposeful murder and felony
murder as well as accompanying firearm specifications. The trial court refused to instruct
the jury on self-defense, finding the evidence presented at trial demonstrated that
Crawford was responsible for creating the situation giving rise to the affray. Under Ohio
law, when a defendant is found to have created such a situation, he is precluded from
asserting self-defense as a justification for the force underlying the criminal charge.
Crawford appealed with new counsel, but this court upheld Crawford's conviction. See
generally, State v. Crawford, 2024-Ohio-691 (12th Dist.).
{¶ 6} Crawford subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief with the trial
court. Generally speaking, Crawford's petition argued his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance by failing to call certain lay and expert witnesses and by failing to more
thoroughly cross-examine State witnesses to support instructing the jury on self-defense.
More specifically, Crawford asserts that his trial counsel should have:
1. Called multiple, identified expert witnesses to testify on
various grounds he claims would have supported a self-defense jury instruction, including gunshot residue tests,
bullet trajectory, memory issues, and alcohol and cocaine
found in Smith's system.
-3-
Clermont CA2025-02-010
2. More thoroughly questioned the State's witnesses on
cross-examination about the knife and unspent round
recovered from the crime scene. At trial, the State's
witnesses testified to their belief that the knife (which had
only Smith's DNA on it) was planted there. The knife was
also found in its "closed" position, leading law enforcement
to believe Smtih could not have opened it before being
shot. Crawford asserted the knife and the fact he
unchambered a round after shooting Smith demonstrated
he acted in self-defense.
3. Called multiple lay witnesses, including Crawford's
girlfriend and several eyewitnesses.
{¶ 7} The trial court found the testimony of one potential expert, Christopher
Robinson, "did not differ materially from that of the coroner." Therefore, the trial court
found "the decision not to call Robinson and to instead rely on cross-examination [was]
not unreasonable." The trial court also found Crawford's argument that his trial counsel
should have further questioned the State's witnesses was largely a matter of trial strategy.
{¶ 8} As to the purported failure to call various lay witnesses, the trial court found:
(1) Crawford offered nothing as to what their purported testimony would have been; (2)
the State established in its response to Crawford's petition that multiple witnesses
Crawford mentioned were subpoenaed for trial but could not be located; and (3) the
decision to not call witnesses whose testimony was "inconsistent with the established
evidence . . . was rooted in trial strategy and was a reasonable, professional judgment."
{¶ 9} In addition to these reasons, the trial court repeatedly stressed many of
Crawford's arguments were barred by res judicata because they could have been raised
on direct appeal. These barred arguments included the failure to challenge the ruling that
two of Crawford's potential experts were inadmissible, the failure to call various lay
witnesses, and the assertions of inadequate cross-examination.
{¶ 10} The trial court found Crawford's petition not well-taken and denied it without
-4-
Clermont CA2025-02-010
a hearing.
{¶ 11} This appeal followed.
Applicable Law, Generally
Postconviction Petition Proceedings
{¶ 12} After directly appealing a conviction, a criminal defendant may file a petition
for postconviction relief. R.C. 2953.21(A)(1). "A postconviction proceeding is not an
appeal of a criminal conviction, but rather, a collateral civil attack on a criminal judgment."
State v. Johnson, 2023-Ohio-879, ¶ 1 (12th Dist.). These petitions frequently assert "a
denial or infringement of the person's rights [that] render the judgment void or voidable
under [the state and federal constitutions] . . . stat[e] the grounds for relief relied upon,
and ask[] the court to vacate or set aside the judgment or sentence . . ." or issue any other
appropriate form of relief. R.C. 2953.21(A)(1). We review a trial court's dismissal of a
postconviction petition for an abuse of discretion, and the decision will be upheld where
it is not "unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable." (Cleaned up.), State v. Davis, 2013-
Ohio-3878, ¶ 14 (12th Dist.).
{¶ 13} Related statutes, discussed more thoroughly below, set the procedures
applicable to a petition for postconviction relief, including the timing of the petition, what
evidence the trial court must consider upon receiving such a petition, and under what
circumstances an indigent defendant is entitled to representation by counsel. See
generally R.C. 2953.21; R.C. 120.16.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
{¶ 14} Although not critical to our holdings herein, a review of the ineffective
assistance of counsel standards provides helpful context. While the conduct of counsel
is presumed to be effective, ineffective assistance of counsel can be established if a
-5-
Clermont CA2025-02-010
defendant shows (1) that counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) that counsel's
deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687-688 (1984). Courts determine deficient performance by asking whether counsel's
conduct "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" based on "the facts of the
particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct."
Id. at 688, 690. In turn,
prejudice is shown where "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."
Id. at 694.
A defendant's failure to sufficiently show either Strickland prong is fatal to a claim of
ineffective assistance. State v. Lloyd,
2022-Ohio-4259, ¶ 31, citing
Strickland at 697.
First Assignment of Error – Do You Have the Right to Counsel?
{¶ 15} Crawford asserts the trial court erred in denying his postconviction petition
for relief without appointing him counsel.
{¶ 16} Criminal defendants do not have any state or federal constitutional right to
representation in postconviction proceedings. State v. Boles, 2017-Ohio-786, ¶ 31 (12th
Dist.), citing State v. Crowder,
60 Ohio St.3d 151, 152 (1991). Moreover, a defendant is
not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on their postconviction petition if he fails "to establish
substantive grounds for relief." State v. Davis,
2013-Ohio-3878, ¶ 12 (12th Dist.).
{¶ 17} Postconviction relief representation is mandatory only if the following five
steps are satisfied:
1. The trial court must review the petition, supporting
affidavits, record, and files pertaining to the petition to
determine if "substantive grounds for relief" exist. R.C.
2953.21 (D), (F).
2. If such substantive grounds exist, the trial court "shall"
schedule an evidentiary hearing. Id.; see also Crowder at
153.
3. If the trial court orders an evidentiary hearing, the trial court
-6-
Clermont CA2025-02-010
must notice the public defender of the hearing. Crowder at
153; see also R.C. 120.16(A)(1), (D); R.C. 2953.21(D),
(E).
4. The public defender will then review the issues raised by
the petitioner to determine if the petitioner's issues "have
arguable merit." Id.
5. Finally, if, after reviewing the petition, the public defender
determines the issues raised by the petitioner have
arguable merit, the petitioner is entitled to representation
at postconviction proceedings. Id.
{¶ 18} Crawford argues the trial court abused its discretion by not appointing him
a public defender for postconviction proceedings, regardless of showing substantive
grounds for relief. Crawford asserts Ohio law creates a "circular syllogism" because a
public defender reviews a postconviction motion only when appointed by the trial court,
but the trial court only appoints a public defender if it has already determined sufficient
facts exist to have a hearing.
{¶ 19} Crawford's arguments fail as a matter of logic. The relevant statutes do not
create a circular syllogism—rather they create a linear procedure with the trial court and
public defender fulfilling different, but complementary roles. The trial court reviews the
petition and evidence as a threshold matter. This statutory duty aligns with the trial court's
overall role in Ohio's judicial system as it is the first court charged with the responsibility
to determine the admissibility of evidence, which often requires an analysis of the
relevancy and prejudicial nature of that evidence. See Ohio Const., art. IV, § 4; Evid.R.
104. Only if the trial court determines the petition and evidence cross the "substantive
grounds for relief" threshold does the issue of representation come into question.
Because the public defender would have to expend resources to represent an indigent
defendant in this civil proceeding for postconviction relief, it is logical for the public
-7-
Clermont CA2025-02-010
defender to determine whether the issues raised by the petitioner have "arguable merit"
before doing so. See Crowder 60 Ohio St.3d at 153, citing R.C. 120.16(A)(1), (D); R.C.
2953.21(D), (E).
{¶ 20} In this civil proceeding, Crawford only had a right to representation by
counsel if these five statutory conditions were satisfied. Here, the process began and
ended after the trial court completed its first obligation—to review the petition and relevant
record. The trial court completed this mandatory review and determined Crawford's
petition asserted no substantial grounds for relief and did not require an evidentiary
hearing. The trial court offered an opinion rooted in reason and law regarding whether
Crawford showed substantial grounds for relief and did not act unreasonably, arbitrarily,
or unconscionably. See below. Because the trial court found the petition did not support
ordering an evidentiary hearing, the public defender's office did not have the statutory
authority to review the petition for arguable merit, and Crawford was not entitled to
representation.
{¶ 21} Neither the federal nor state constitutions require a petitioner to receive
representation in a civil proceeding involving a petition for postconviction relief, and the
General Assembly defined under what process and circumstances an indigent petitioner
is entitled to representation in that context. See R.C. 2593.21; R.C. 120.16. The General
Assembly could have granted a petitioner the absolute right to counsel at all stages of
postconviction relief proceedings, but it chose not to do so. This court cannot (and will
not) override the General Assembly's legislative choice by "judicial fiat." 2 (Cleaned up.)
2. Crawford invites this court to "make a rule" requiring trial courts to appoint counsel and hold a hearing in
postconviction petition proceedings. This proposal ignores the basic civics principle of the separation of
powers. Crawford's invitation is better addressed to members of the General Assembly, as it is the branch
of Ohio's government that writes laws whereas the judicial branch must steadfastly exercise restraint and
refuse to interfere with the legislative branch's exclusive authority.
-8-
Clermont CA2025-02-010
See State ex rel. Mobley v. Franklin Cnty. Bd. of Commrs., 2023-Ohio-3993, ¶ 13.
Second Assignment of Error – What Evidence Can Be Considered?
{¶ 22} Next, Crawford faults the trial court for "accepting the truth and implications"
of the State's exhibits submitted with its response to Crawford's petition. Crawford
complains that he "never had an opportunity to address" them. Once again, Crawford's
arguments have no merit.
{¶ 23} Crawford's complaints ignore that the trial court must consider "the entirety
of the record from the trial proceedings as well as any evidence filed by the parties in
postconviction proceedings." (Emphasis added.) State v. Bunch, 2022-Ohio-4723, ¶ 24,
citing R.C. 2953.21(D). The evidence the trial court "shall" consider includes, but is not
limited to, "the petition, the supporting affidavits, [ ] the documentary evidence . . . the
indictment, the court's journal entries, the journalized records of the clerk of the court, and
the court reporter's transcript." R.C. 2953.21(D).
{¶ 24} The trial court fulfilled these statutory mandates to the fullest extent possible
given that, as previously mentioned, Crawford submitted almost no substantive evidence
to support his petition that was not already in the record on direct appeal. Crawford's
petition provided no sworn affidavits as to what the various lay witnesses he believes his
trial attorney should have called would have testified to at trial. In contrast, the State's
answer to Crawford's petition contained exhibits which demonstrated multiple lay
witnesses Crawford mentioned were subpoenaed for trial but could not be located.
{¶ 25} Crawford could have asked the trial court for leave to amend his petition in
response to the State's arguments and evidence, but he forfeited this opportunity. R.C.
2953.21(G)(3). We find no issue with the trial court "accepting the truth and implications"
of the State's exhibits when it concluded it was "not unreasonable to fail to call witnesses
-9-
Clermont CA2025-02-010
who were unavailable" because Crawford provided no reason for the court to conclude
otherwise. Likewise, the decision not to call lay witnesses who would testify in a manner
"inconsistent with the established evidence" was "rooted in trial strategy and was a
reasonable, professional judgment."
{¶ 26} The trial court's decision shows it carefully considered all the relevant
evidence and reached a rational judgment when denying Crawford's petition for
postconviction relief. Its decision was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.
{¶ 27} We overrule Crawford's first two assignments of error.
Third Assignment of Error – Does the Postconviction Relief Statute Violate Due
Process?
{¶ 28} Finally, Crawford argues that he had to "develop evidence of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel during the pendency of the direct appeal," which "impose[d] an
unreasonable procedural burden" on him and undermined his constitutional rights to due
process. Crawford did not raise this constitutional argument to the trial court.3
{¶ 29} Generally, an appellate court will not consider any error that was not raised
before the trial court. State v. Quarterman, 2014-Ohio-4034, ¶ 15. However, the decision
to apply this "waiver doctrine" to errors not raised below is discretionary. See In re M.D.,
38 Ohio St.3d 149, 151 (1988). A forfeited constitutional challenge to a statute is subject
to review "where the rights and interests may warrant it."
Quarterman at ¶ 16, quoting In
re M.D. at syllabus.
3. Crawford also argues that the deadline for his petition for postconviction relief prevented him from
"securing justice" because federal habeas can be barred if state habeas is decided on an independent and
adequate state procedural ground, such as res judicata. Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722, 735 (1991).
But he does not explain the alleged connection between federal habeas and his constitutional claim, nor
does he distinguish between Ohio's habeas statutes, R.C. 2725.01, et seq., and Ohio's postconviction
statute. This court will not analyze undeveloped or unclear arguments, nor will it make any possible statutory
distinguishments. See App.R. 12(A)(2) and 16(A)(7).
- 10 -
Clermont CA2025-02-010
{¶ 30} This court could properly overrule Crawford's constitutional challenge based
on his forfeiture. But we address the substance of his challenge briefly for two reasons:
(1) the legal merits of applying res judicata to postconviction relief claims in Ohio has
been decided by the State's highest court; and (2) Crawford's arguments related to the
relevant timeline lack merit.
{¶ 31} First, binding precedent supports the trial court's application of res judicata
to much of Crawford's petition. Federal courts permit a defendant to bring an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim in a collateral proceeding, regardless of whether the claim
could have been brought on direct appeal. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 505
(2003).4 Crawford urges this court to "adopt a similar rule." But the Supreme Court of Ohio
has already rejected the federal approach. See State v. Blanton,
2022-Ohio-3985, ¶ 43
(affirming application of res judicata to postconviction relief claims). Blanton also held that
"claims that rely on evidence outside the record may be heard on postconviction review
even if similar claims have been previously raised and adjudicated against the petitioner
in his direct appeal." Id. at ¶ 41. Rather than placing an unconstitutional burden on a
defendant, Ohio permits a petitioner who demonstrates "through evidence outside of the
trial record that their claim either was not or could not have been fairly adjudicated in a
direct appeal to have a second opportunity to litigate the claim." Id. at ¶ 38.
{¶ 32} Second, Crawford's argument that the "short deadline under Ohio law"
prevented him from securing evidence to support his petition for postconviction relief is
unpersuasive. The trial court issued its final judgment entry on April 13, 2023. At that
4. Crawford also cites United States v. Cook, 124 Fed.Appx. 367, 375 (6th Cir. 2005) as persuasive
authority. Cook essentially affirms the general federal rule rejecting the application of res judicata to
ineffective assistance of counsel claims; these same concerns are analyzed in State v. Blanton, 2022-Ohio-
3985. Martinez v. Ryan,
566 U.S. 1 (2012), is likewise unpersuasive here as it only applies when a state
requires a prisoner to raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims in a collateral proceeding (which Ohio
does not) or when defendant asserts the counsel in that collateral proceeding was ineffective (which is not
at issue here).
- 11 -
Clermont CA2025-02-010
point, the record this court could consider on direct appeal was closed. But he had from
that date until the deadline for his petition for postconviction relief (approximately 15
months) to develop evidence outside of the trial record to support claims that could not
have been raised on direct appeal (e.g., supporting evidence related to his trial counsel's
failure to proffer Robinson's expert testimony). He also had that same 15 months to
develop additional evidence sufficient to overcome any res judicata bar on claims that
were, or could have been raised on direct appeal (e.g., additional evidence related to his
trial counsel's cross-examination of witnesses).
{¶ 33} This final assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 34} Judgment affirmed.
BYRNE, P.J., and PIPER, J., concur.
- 12 -
Clermont CA2025-02-010
JUDGMENT ENTRY
The assignments of error properly before this court having been ruled upon, it is
the order of this court that the judgment or final order appealed from be, and the same
hereby is, affirmed.
It is further ordered that a mandate be sent to the Clermont County Court of
Common Pleas for execution upon this judgment and that a certified copy of this Opinion
and Judgment Entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
Costs to be taxed in compliance with App.R. 24.
/s/ Matthew R. Byrne, Presiding Judge
/s/ Robin N. Piper, Judge
/s/ Melena S. Siebert, Judge
- 13 -
