[Cite as State v. Gingerich,
2025-Ohio-4908.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
UNION COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
CASE NO. 14-25-10
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
MAXWELL D. GINGERICH, OPINION AND
JUDGMENT ENTRY
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Marysville Municipal Court
Trial Court No. TRD2500839
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: October 27, 2025
APPEARANCES:
Darren L. Meade and Jacob D. Becker for Appellant
Courtland A. Perry for Appellee
Case No. 14-25-10
ZIMMERMAN, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Maxwell D. Gingerich (“Gingerich”), appeals the
March 5, 2025 judgment of sentence of the Marysville Municipal Court. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} On February 24, 2025, Gingerich was charged with speeding in
violation of R.C. 4511.21(D)(1), a third-degree misdemeanor due to Gingerich
having been convicted of three speeding violations within one year of the instant
offense. See R.C. 4511.21(P)(1)(c).
{¶3} On March 5, 2025, Gingerich entered a plea of no contest. The trial
court found Gingerich guilty and sentenced him to 60 days in jail with 30 days
suspended, placed him on community control for three years, and fined him $500
plus costs. Gingerich was taken into custody to begin serving his jail term.
{¶4} On March 13, 2025, Gingerich filed a notice of appeal. Gingerich
moved the trial court for a stay of execution of the jail term pending this appeal, but
the trial court denied Gingerich’s request. On March 20, 2025, this court stayed the
execution of the jail term and released Gingerich on bond.
{¶5} Gingerich raises a single assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
The trial court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive and
disproportionate jail sentence in violation of Ohio’s misdemeanor
sentencing principles.
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{¶6} In his sole assignment of error, Gingerich argues that the trial court did
not consider the factors set forth in R.C. 2929.22 prior to imposing a jail term as
part of his misdemeanor sentence. According to Gingerich, the record “is silent not
only on the statutory framework, but also on any justification for why jail was
necessary in this case.” (Appellant’s Brief at 5). Gingerich requests that his
sentence be vacated and that we “remand the matter for resentencing with full and
proper consideration of all applicable sentencing factors.” (Id. at 7).
Standard of Review
{¶7} We review a trial court’s sentence on a misdemeanor violation under an
abuse-of-discretion standard. State v. Hittle, 2019-Ohio-5172, ¶ 8 (3d Dist.). An
abuse of discretion suggests that a decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unconscionable. State v. Adams,
62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157-158 (1980).
Analysis
{¶8} A trial court is required to consider the sentencing principles of R.C.
2929.21 and the criteria of R.C. 2929.22 before imposing a misdemeanor sentence.
Hittle at ¶ 9. Specifically, when imposing a sentence for a misdemeanor offense,
R.C. 2929.21(A) states that a trial court “shall be guided by the overriding purposes”
of “protect[ing] the public from future crime by the offender and others” and
“punish[ing] the offender.” This requires the trial court to
consider the impact of the offense upon the victim and the need for
changing the offender’s behavior, rehabilitating the offender, and
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making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, or the victim
and the public.
R.C. 2929.21(A). Further, R.C. 2929.21(B) states that the
sentence imposed for a misdemeanor . . . shall be reasonably
calculated to achieve the two overriding purposes of misdemeanor
sentencing . . . commensurate with and not demeaning to the
seriousness of the offender’s conduct and its impact upon the victim,
and consistent with sentences imposed for similar offenses committed
by similar offenders.
{¶9} In turn, R.C. 2929.22(B)(1) contains a list of factors the trial court is to
consider in determining the appropriate sentence for a misdemeanor.
Stated generally, those factors include the nature and circumstances
of the offense(s); whether the offender has a history of persistent
criminal activity and is likely to commit another offense; whether
there is a substantial risk that the offender will be a danger to others;
whether the victim’s circumstances made the victim particularly
vulnerable to the offense or made the impact of the offense more
serious; and factors relating to the offender’s military service, if any.
State v. Johnson, 2022-Ohio-1782, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.).
{¶10} “In following the provisions of R.C. 2929.22, a trial court is not
required to state its specific reasons for imposing a sentence for a misdemeanor
conviction.” State v. Wilson, 2018-Ohio-2805, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.). Instead, “this court
will presume the trial court considered the criteria set forth in R.C. 2929.22 when:
the sentence at issue is within the statutory limits; and there is no affirmative
showing that the trial court failed to consider the applicable statutory factors.” State
v. Urban,
2007-Ohio-4237, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.).
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{¶11} In this case, Gingerich argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by imposing a jail term for a “nonviolent and relatively minor” speeding offense.
(Appellant’s Brief at 5). Gingerich contends that the record “contains no indication
that the [t]rial [c]ourt reviewed or applied” the R.C. 2929.22 factors in fashioning
his misdemeanor sentence. (Id.). We disagree.
{¶12} The record shows that Gingerich entered a plea of no contest to the
instant offense after signing a statement of rights and waiver of counsel form.
Following the no-contest plea, the prosecutor informed the trial court that Gingerich
was cited for traveling 66 mph in a 55-mph zone and that he has been convicted of
three speeding violations within the past year. Based on the prosecutor’s statement
of facts, the trial court found Gingerich guilty.
{¶13} Before imposing a sentence, the trial court asked Gingerich about his
“repeated traffic violations” and stated, “You don’t seem like you’re going to follow
the speed limit at all.”1 (Mar. 5, 2025 Tr. at 6). Gingerich responded that he planned
to use cruise control in the future. The trial court asked, “So my question to you is,
why shouldn’t you do the sixty days? You have four speeds in a one-year period.”
(Id.). The prosecutor then informed the trial court that Gingerich has eleven prior
1
In addition to the three prior speeding convictions within a one-year period, the trial court addressed
Gingerich’s history of traffic violations as follows:
THE COURT: So you do have prior speeds. You’ve got a speed in 2020, a speed in 2019,
a speed in 2017, assured clear distance ahead, speed in 2010, stop sign violation, speed in
2009. I could keep going. But you just have repeated traffic violations.
(Mar. 5, 2025 Tr. at 6).
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speeding convictions, with the instant conviction being his “twelfth lifetime
speeding offense.” (Id. at 7). The trial court sentenced Gingerich to 60 days in jail
with 30 days suspended. One of the conditions of the suspended jail term is that
Gingerich not violate any traffic law while on three years of community control.
{¶14} Here, even though the sentence imposed seems harsh, there is no
question that Gingerich’s misdemeanor sentence falls within the statutory limits.
Three or more speeding convictions within a one-year period is a misdemeanor of
the third degree, and the maximum jail term a trial court can impose for a third-
degree misdemeanor is 60 days. See R.C. 4511.21(D)(1), (P)(1)(c); R.C.
2929.24(A)(3). Moreover, the record shows that the trial court addressed
Gingerich’s extensive history of traffic violations and his failure to conform his
conduct to the law. See R.C. 2929.22(B)(1)(a)-(c). The record further indicates that
the trial court considered the appropriateness of imposing a community control
sanction by suspending one-half of the jail term to deter Gingerich from committing
future traffic violations. See R.C. 2929.22(C). Thus, the trial court properly
considered the criteria of R.C. 2929.22 before imposing Gingerich’s misdemeanor
sentence.
{¶15} Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by imposing a jail term as part of Gingerich’s misdemeanor sentence.
{¶16} Gingerich’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
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{¶17} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Additionally, we terminate the stay on the balance of the jail term and revoke
appellant’s bond. However, the matter is remanded to the trial court to correct by
nunc pro tunc entry the degree of the misdemeanor set forth in the judgment entry
of conviction.
Judgment Affirmed
MILLER, J., concurs.
WALDICK, P.J., concurs separately.
{¶18} I concur with the majority in analysis and outcome. However, even
though the Appellant’s sentence falls within the statutory limits, a 30-day jail
sentence for a fully employed father of two young children who exceeded the posted
speed limit by 11 miles per hour is harsh, even in light of the Appellant’s prior traffic
record. The Appellant did not endanger anyone or cause any harm. The State only
recommended a three-day jail sentence, yet the court elected to impose 20 times that
amount, albeit, half of that being suspended. The disproportionate amount of
incarceration becomes glaring when compared to other vehicular offenses, OVI for
example. A first time OVI offender is generally sentenced to the minimum of three
days in jail and can attend an alcohol school in lieu jail time, a second time OVI
offender is generally sentenced to the minimum required ten-day jail sentence and
even a third time OVI offender is usually sentenced to the minimum 30-jail
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sentence. A 60-day suspended sentence with a period of probation or community
control would have achieved the same goal without the unnecessary economic
impact on the Appellant and his family. Just because a court can impose a certain
sentence, does not mean that it should. I find the sentence imposed in this case
grossly disproportionate to the conduct by the Appellant.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignment of error is
overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby
rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the
judgment for costs.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s
judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.
27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the
proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.
William R. Zimmerman, Judge
Mark C. Miller, Judge
Juergen A. Waldick, Judge
Concurs Separately
DATED:
/hls
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