[Cite as State v. Bicker,
2025-Ohio-4934.]
COURT OF APPEALS
ASHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO Case No. 25-COA-002
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas,
Case No. 24-CRI-069
JORDAN BICKER
Judgment: Affirmed
Defendant – Appellant
Date of Judgment Entry: October 28, 2025
BEFORE: Andrew J. King; Robert G. Montgomery; David M. Gormley, Appellate
Judges
APPEARANCES: CHRISTOPHER R. TUNNELL, JAMES B. REESE III for
Plaintiff-Appellee; APRIL F. CAMPBELL, for Defendant-Appellant.
King, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Jordan Bicker appeals the January 7, 2025
judgment of conviction and sentence of the Ashland County Court of Common
Pleas. Plaintiff-Appellee is the State of Ohio. We affirm the trial court.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} In February, 2022, Ashland County Sheriff's Office Lieutenant Jason
Martin received tips from the Cleveland Ohio Internet Crimes Against Children
Task Force regarding downloads of child pornography involving a Verizon Wireless
account and phone number associated with Timothy Bonnell. Martin found the
information he received confusing and therefore recruited the assistance of Special
Agent John Saraya of the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation. Saraya
specializes in child exploitation cases. Saraya advised Martin to obtain account
information from Verizon and then assisted Martin in obtaining a search warrant
for the residence and electronic devices of Timothy Bonnell. The focus was on one
phone number which came back to Bonnell.
{¶ 3} When the search of Bonnell's devices and residence yielded none of
the suspected contraband, Bonnell told officers that the phone number they were
interested in belonged to his son, Jordon Bicker. He further advised Bicker was on
Bonnell's Verizon family phone plan. Bonnell advised Bicker had moved to an
address on Evergreen Street, which he provided to the officers.
{¶ 4} Using the same affidavit template he had used for the Bonnell
residence, Martin sought a second warrant, this time for Bicker's residence and
electronic devices. On the affidavit, Martin failed to change the person of interest
and the address from Bonnell to Bicker in several places, but a judge issued a
warrant. Upon executing the warrant, officers located the phone tied to the tips.
The phone contained child pornography.
{¶ 5} As a result of these events, on February 9, 2024, the Ashland County
Grand Jury returned an indictment charging Bicker with eleven counts of illegal
use of a minor or impaired person in nudity-oriented material or performance, and
four counts of pandering sexually oriented matter involving a minor or an impaired
person. Bicker entered pleas of not guilty and filed two motions to suppress the
evidence obtained in the search of his home and phone. Seizing upon the careless
drafting of the second affidavit, in his March 18, 2024 motion to suppress, Bicker
argued a nexus between himself and a fair probability that evidence of a crime
would be found on his person or property was absent. Bicker's second motion to
suppress, filed March 21, 2024, argued he was entitled to a hearing pursuant to
Franks v. Delaware, 328 U.S. 154 (1978) because Martin allegedly withheld
information about where Bicker was living and when and how many files Internet
Crimes Against Children had reviewed. He additionally argued the good faith
exception should not apply to the warrant.
{¶ 6} A hearing took place on Bicker's motions on May 20, 2024. The state
presented the testimony of Saraya and elicited the above outlined facts. Bicker
called Lieutenant Martin who testified he had drafted the second affidavit and made
some clerical errors in doing so by failing to change the name and address in some
places.
{¶ 7} By judgment entry filed June 21, 2024, the trial court denied Bicker's
motions. Bicker subsequently entered pleas of no contest to each count of the
indictment. The trial court accepted Bicker's pleas and convicted him. Following
the preparation of a presentence report, the trial court sentenced Bicker to an
aggregate prison term of six years.
{¶ 8} Bicker filed an appeal, and the matter is now before this court for
review. He raises two assignments of error as follows:
I
{¶ 9} "THE EVIDENCE AGAINST BICKER SHOULD HAVE BEEN
SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THE AFFIDAVIT SUPPORTING THE SEARCH OF
HIM AND HIS HOME WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE: THERE
WAS NO EVIDENCE OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY THERE."
II
{¶ 10} "THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY TO CURE
THE WARRANT'S LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH BICKER AND/OR
HIS HOME."
I, II
{¶ 11} In his first assignment of error, Bicker argues the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress because the warrant to search his home and
devices issued without probable cause. Specifically, he argues the drafting errors
in the affidavit created a lack of a factual link between criminal activity and the
place to be searched. In his second assignment of error, Bicker argues the good
faith exception is inapplicable in this case. We disagree.
{¶ 12} There certainly are serious questions about sufficiency of the second
warrant affidavit standing alone. Based on the entire sequence of events, however,
we conclude that there were indeed sufficient facts to establish probable cause to
issue the second warrant.
{¶ 13} The facts here tell us that child pornography was downloaded to a
device connected to a certain cell number that was connected to Bonnell’s
account. The phone officers sought to seize was on the cell phone plan of Bicker's
father Bonnell and thus was technically Bonnell's property. Bonnell, however, told
officers that the phone utilizing the phone number the officers were targeting was
in Bicker's possession. We know the officers had probable cause for connecting
the downloading of child pornography, the phone in Bicker's possession, and
Bicker's residence. As the trial court noted, Bicker could have downloaded the
pornography from anywhere, his home or Bonnell's due to the nature of cell
phones, making the particular address less significant here regarding the seizure
and search of the cell phone assigned to the phone number that was the target of
the investigation.
{¶ 14} Yet, within the four corners of the affidavit much of that information
is omitted. But for purposes of the good faith exception, we do not find this is so
lacking the indicia of probable cause as to render the belief in probable cause
unreasonable. So, we will proceed to consider the second assignment of error, as
it is dispositive.
The Affidavit
{¶ 15} During the suppression hearing, the affidavit for the search warrant
for Bicker's home and devices was marked as joint exhibit 3. On page one, the
second and third paragraphs indicated the affiant was seeking a warrant for "the
person of Jordan S. Bicker," on the premises of "515 Evergreen Street" which was
Bicker's address.
{¶ 16} The fourth paragraph on page one indicates the search will include
"any electronic devices . . . brought or transported by Timothy Bonnell."
{¶ 17} The fifth paragraph begins "Affiant has reason to believe that kept in
the custody and/or on the person of Timothy D. Bonnell . . . there is now being
unlawfully kept, concealed and possessed in said residence the following property
. . .."
{¶ 18} Page three of the affidavit, item 1b states the affiant reasonably
believes electronic devices "in the custody of Jordan S. Bicker, and under his
control in his residence at 515 Evergreen . . ." contained the electronic media the
officers sought. Item 3, beginning on the same page provides "law enforcement
personnel are authorized to press the fingers/thumbs of Timothy D. Bonnell to the
Touch ID and/or place the device in front of his face, of any locked cellular
device(s) of which he is a known or suspected user or owner . . ." in order to unlock
the same.
{¶ 19} Page five of the affidavit sets forth the facts of the investigation. The
fifth paragraph indicates "The illegal material returns to the phone and online
accounts coming back to the address of . . .Township Road 555 [Bonnell's
address]. Later learned from Tim [Bonnell] that his son Jordan S. Bicker now lives
at [Evergreen] St . . . and is on his cell phone plan."
{¶ 20} Page eight of the affidavit, item l states in relevant part ". . . Affiant
believes that there is probable cause to believe that an individual residing in the
residence has a sexual interest in children and that computers and/or electronic
devices located at . . .Township Road 555 . . . are likely storage locations for copies
of nude images and or videos of adults and/or children in various stages of undress
. . .."
{¶ 21} It is apparent that the names and addresses are correct on some
portions of the affidavit and incorrect in others. During the suppression hearing,
both Special Agent Saraya and Lieutenant Martin conceded there were drafting
errors in the affidavit. Transcript of suppression hearing (T.) 32, 40. Lieutenant
Martin admitted that he used the affidavit for Bonnell's address on Township Road
555, utilized copy/paste to create the affidavit for Bicker's address on Evergreen
Street, and made some errors in doing so. T. 40.
Analysis
{¶ 22} This is a case of sloppy drafting. But the application of the
exclusionary rule is meant to deter law enforcement conduct that "flagrantly,
deliberately, or recklessly violates the Fourth Amendment." State v. Hoffman,
2014-Ohio-4795, ¶ 46. The record before us contains no evidence of any such
conduct.
{¶ 23} As we discussed above, had the entire course of the investigation
been included in the affidavit, it would have certainly established probable cause.
And we know from the testimony that the officers were involved in the execution of
the prior warrant and thus aware of those facts. Moreover, the officers admitted
that the inaccuracies in the affidavit were their errors. The trial court appeared to
find this testimony credible in denying the motion to suppress. So, the situation
before us is one where the officers made mistakes in preparing the affidavit and
then relied on the subsequent warrant in good faith.
{¶ 24} Evidence recovered should be suppressed " 'only if it can be said
that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with
knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.' "
U.S. v Leon, 468 U.S. 897 at 919 (1984), quoting United States v. Peltier,
422 U.S.
531, 542 (1975). To be sure, errors were committed here in the effort to obtain the
warrant. Although one might characterize the officers’ preparation of the affidavit
as reckless, that is not enough. It must be a reckless disregard for the truth. United
States v. Hammond,
351 F.3d 765, 773 (6th Cir. 2003), citing U.S. v. Leon, at 922.
There is no argument before us that the affidavit was false, nor is that plain to our
eyes.
{¶ 25} Under Leon, we are to consider whether the affidavit is "so lacking in
indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely
unreasonable." Leon at 293. More specifically, our review of the affidavit is to
consider whether the affidavit was so conclusory and devoid of sufficient facts that
any reasonable person would conclude probable cause was not established. See
United States v. O'Neill,
94 F.4th 531, 541 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
145 S. Ct. 301
(2024). As discussed above, the affidavit did not completely lack the indicia of
probable cause as to bar the application of the good faith rule. Further, in State v.
Newman,
2017-Ohio-4047 (5th Dist.), we noted "it is well-established that
inadvertent clerical errors, unless they cause prejudice to the defendant, will not
invalidate an otherwise valid search warrant." Id. at ¶ 22. This warrant affidavit
contained technical violations which did not rise to the level of constitutional error.
{¶ 26} And whether we disagree with the magistrate’s decision is beside the
point. To that end we note that "any error in deciding whether probable cause
exists for the search warrant belongs primarily to the magistrate issuing
the warrant, not the officer seeking it." United States v. Baker, 976 F.3d 636, 647
(6th Cir. 2020), citing Davis v. United States,
564 U.S. 229, 239, (2011) (emphasis
original). The trial court may well have been justified in denying the application for
the warrant on this affidavit. That issue is not our focus; rather, our focus here is
whether the officers were justified in relying on the warrant that was issued. We
conclude that they were. There is no argument before us that the warrant itself was
facially deficient.
{¶ 27} Accordingly, irrespective of the deficiencies of the second affidavit,
we find the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies here, and the trial
court properly concluded the evidence seized from the warrant should not be
suppressed.
{¶ 28} For the reasons stated in our accompanying Opinion, the judgment
of the Ashland County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
{¶ 29} Costs to Appellant.
By: King, P.J.
Montgomery, J. and
Gormley, J. concur.
