[Cite as State v. Maynard,
2025-Ohio-4943.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
SCIOTO COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
: Case No. 23CA4048
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
:
v. :
:
COLBY MAYNARD, : DECISION AND JUDGMENT
: ENTRY
Defendant-Appellant. : RELEASED: 10/21/2025
______________________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Karyn Justice, Portsmouth, Ohio, for appellant.
Shane A. Tieman, Scioto County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jay Willis, Scioto County
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Portsmouth, Ohio, for appellee.
______________________________________________________________________
Wilkin, J.
{¶1} This is an appeal of a Scioto County Court of Common Pleas judgment
entry in which Colby Maynard (“Maynard”) was convicted of one count of aggravated
trafficking in drugs (methamphetamine), one count of trafficking in heroin, and one count
of trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound. On appeal Maynard contends the trial
court erred when it denied his motion for mistrial. In addition, Maynard argues the
convictions are against the manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence. After
reviewing the parties’ arguments, the record, and the applicable law, we find no merit to
his assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
BACKGROUND
{¶2} On November 23, 2020, Sergeant Drew Kuehne (“Kuehne”) of the Ohio
State Highway Patrol was traveling southbound on U.S. 23, south of Lucasville, when
Scioto App. No. 23CA4048 2
he saw a silver vehicle make an unsafe lane change and also cross over the fog line on
the right side of the roadway. Kuehne noticed multiple people were in the car and that
the vehicle registration was from Kentucky. Kuehne stopped the car for the violation.
{¶3} When he approached the passenger side of the vehicle, Kuehne noticed
fairly quickly that the vehicle occupants seemed excessively nervous. Kuehne
observed that the driver, Jaime Young (“Young”), was breathing heavily and speaking
rapidly. Further, Young’s voice seemed to tremble at times. Justin Crum (“Crum”), who
was the front-seat passenger, made zero eye contact, which in Kuehne’s experience
was unusual behavior for a routine traffic stop. Kuehne also noticed Crum’s hands,
where the veins would be, had numerous cuts and sores. In Kuehne’s experience
these types of sores are associated with narcotics or meth use. Crum eventually
admitted to using drugs.
{¶4} Kuehne determined that the car belonged to Crum’s mother. When Kuehne
questioned Young about the other occupants of the car, she told him that Crum was her
boyfriend but she seemed slow to identify the backseat passengers, or that she was
unfamiliar with their names. She said that the passengers were friends of Crum and
identified them as Maynard and Brittany Collins (“Collins”). When Kuehne asked Young
about her destination, she indicated the group was returning from a trip to Columbus
from Kentucky. Young told Kuehne that she had to sign forms related to her recently
deceased father’s estate. Kuehne asked Young if there was anything illegal in the car,
and she said “I don’t think…uh…no, no.” Young later said that Crum could be a
“druggie” if he had a “secret life.” She also said that needles might be found in the car.
Scioto App. No. 23CA4048 3
{¶5} While Kuehne was questioning Young, Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper
and K-9 Handler Ryan Day (“Day”) arrived on the scene to assist Kuehne. When
approaching the vehicle, Day could see one of the rear passengers (Collins) moving
around a lot, including her head and shoulder area. He therefore went up to the vehicle,
opened the back seat passenger door, and saw that Collins had her hand completely
down her pants. Collins was removed from the car. When Collins was asked why her
hand was down her pants, she indicated that she had some type of surgery. The area
Collins pointed to was on the side of her body whereas Day saw that Collins’ hand was
in her groin area, like her crotch. Her pants were unsnapped and unzipped. Day also
noticed that the group provided conflicting stories about their trip – one said they were
just along for the ride, while Collins first said they were coming from Columbus, then
later said they were coming from Kentucky to visit family. The drive roundtrip was over
six hours long.
{¶6} Kuehne also saw a bulge down the front of Collins’ pants. Nevertheless,
Collins kept saying, “I don’t have anything, I don’t have anything.” Kuehne told Collins
he believed she did have something, and eventually Collins surrendered a package of
suspected drugs to him. When Day had first removed Collins from the car, Young
began crying in the backseat of Kuehne’s cruiser where she had been seated during the
stop.
{¶7} The troopers thoroughly searched the car and found no more contraband.
They submitted the package of contraband to the lab. The analysis revealed
methamphetamine exceeding 26 grams; heroin/fentanyl exceeding 1 gram, and fentanyl
exceeding 2 grams—the total amount exceeded personal use amounts.
Scioto App. No. 23CA4048 4
{¶8} On June 9, 2021, Maynard, along with his co-defendants (Collins, Crum,
and Young), were indicted with six counts: Count 1, aggravated trafficking in drugs
(methamphetamine), a second-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and
(C)(1)(d); Count 2, trafficking in heroin, a fourth-degree felony, in violation of R.C.
2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(6)(c); Count 3, trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound, a
fourth-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(9)(c), Count 4,
aggravated possession of drugs (methamphetamine), a second-degree felony, in
violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(1)(c); Count 5, possession of heroin, a fourth-
degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(a) and (C)(6)(b); and Count 6, possession of
a fentanyl-related compound, a fourth-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and
(C)(11)(b).
{¶9} At the trial with co-defendant Crum, the State called witnesses co-defendant
Young, Kuehne, Day, Sergeant Jodie Conkel, who authenticated certain jail phone calls
Maynard made, and the chemical laboratory supervisor who testified about the weight,
properties, and identity of the drugs.
{¶10} During the trial, the attorney for co-defendant Crum asked Young why she
was “let go” by the troopers instead of being arrested at the traffic stop. The State
asked to approach the bench, and a sidebar ensued. The following discussion took
place:
COURT: So, I’m getting a little nervous. Three of the four left, Maynard
didn’t. I’m going to assume Maynard had a warrant.
PROSECUTOR HUTCHISON: He did and we are staying away from that.
So, we need to stop talking about this at this point.
…
Scioto App. No. 23CA4048 5
PROSECUTOR HUTCHISON: And we have told our witnesses we’re not
talking about that.
COURT: And so, I need to be careful of why Maynard is the only one who
didn’t leave on his own.
…
COURT: So, I’m just saying we need to be careful as don’t, don’t, I don’t
want to get into why Maynard didn’t leave with everybody. Okay? So, if
you can, I don’t know where else you want to go with, I, I can’t have people
saying that I don’t know what Maynard’s going to do as far as testifying’s
concerned, but I can’t have. I don’t want to jeopardize Maynard’s case that
he had a warrant outstanding. Okay.
…
PROSECUTOR LOESCH: While we are talking about that, it’s probably a
good time to bring it up, we are not going to play the portion [of the video]
where they talk about they are taking a warrant. That’s at the end of the
video. However, at one point, you do see on this video for a period of time
that Maynard is handcuffed. Now, I don’t think it’s a big issue because
you also see Collins handcuffed in this video.
Again, at the end of witness Young’s testimony, without prompting by either defense
counsel, the State broaches the issue about the part of the video of the traffic stop
referencing the warrant not being played for the jury. A discussion ensues about the
warrant and Maynard being in handcuffs. After the discussion the trial court states,
“Um, I, if the state will cut off any mention of the warrant.” Prosecutor Loesch responds,
“We will do that.” And Maynard’s defense attorney says, “Then I’m satisfied.”
{¶11} Despite these discussions, Trooper Day referred to the warrant during his
testimony:
STATE: Okay. What else did you do with this matter before you cleared
the scene?
WITNESS DAY: I don’t recall doing much of anything after the drugs were
surrendered to Sergeant Kuehne and I’m, at this point I’m done because
there was one, Mr. Maynard had a warrant so he was placed
Scioto App. No. 23CA4048 6
At the time, Maynard’s trial counsel promptly objected, asked to approach the bench,
and stated, “[t]hat’s exactly what we’ve been trying to avoid this whole trial. I ask for a
mis-trial.” The State explained it had instructed the State’s witnesses not to mention the
warrant. The trial court denied the motion for mistrial, but instructed the jury, “[l]adies
and gentlemen, I’m going to order, instruct you that you’re not to consider for any
purpose the testimony of any warrant in this case. It’s totally irrelevant. It should not be
considered for any purpose.”
{¶12} After Day finished testifying, counsel for Maynard asked to approach the
bench and informed the trial court that, according to his client (Maynard), four jurors
were writing in their notebooks right after Day mentioned the warrant. The trial court
responded that he had already instructed the jury to disregard the remark. The trial
court mentioned that an additional instruction might highlight the testimony.
{¶13} When the State rested, the defense moved for a motion for acquittal which
was denied. Maynard, through counsel, renewed his motion for mistrial based on
Trooper Day’s testimony. The trial court overruled the motion again and stated it would
further instruct the jury to disregard the remark; however, the defense declined further
instructions regarding the warrant remark.
{¶14} After hearing the evidence and reviewing exhibits, including the dash-cam
video of Kuehne, the jury found Maynard guilty of all counts. The trial court merged
Counts 4, 5, and 6 with Counts 1, 2, and 3, respectively, and the State elected for the
trial court to sentence on Counts 1, 2, and 3 – the trafficking counts. The trial court
sentenced Maynard to six to nine years on Count 1, twelve months each on Counts 2
and 3. The trial court ran Counts 2 and 3 concurrently to one another. The trial court
Scioto App. No. 23CA4048 7
ran Count 1 consecutive to Count 3 for a total sentence of seven to ten years, six years
of which were mandatory. Maynard timely appealed the judgment entry of conviction
and sentencing.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
I. THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY DENIED APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR A
MISTRIAL.
II. APPELLANT’S CONVICTIONS ARE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT
AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE.
First Assignment of Error
{¶15} In his first assignment of error, Maynard contends that the trial court
abused its discretion when it denied his motion for mistrial after the State’s witness,
Day, referenced the fact that Maynard had a warrant. He reasons this evidence was
prejudicial because it violated Evid.R. 404(B), and that the curative instruction did not
remedy the error because the jurors, according to Maynard, took notes at the time Day
mentioned the warrant. The State responds that the trial court’s curative instruction
remedied any possible error. The State also points out that it had instructed its witness
not to reference the warrant. Further, the State highlights that defense counsel
acknowledged the State’s efforts to avoid the fact of a warrant being admitted into
evidence. The State also introduced evidence in its case that Maynard made certain
incriminating calls from jail, so the jury already knew, at least from that fact, that
Maynard had spent some time in jail.
A. Law.
{¶16} “In general, the grant or denial of a motion for a mistrial rests in a trial
court's sound discretion and should not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that
Scioto App. No. 23CA4048 8
discretion.” State v. Houk, 2020-Ohio-1547, ¶ 9 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Treesh,
90
Ohio St.3d 460, 480 (2001). “Trial courts are entitled to wide latitude when considering
motions for mistrial.” State v. Thacker,
2021-Ohio-2726, ¶ 46 (4th Dist.), citing State v.
Gunnell,
2012-Ohio-3236, ¶ 28. “A trial court must declare a mistrial only ‘when the
ends of justice so require and a fair trial is no longer possible.’ ” State v. Adams, 2015-
Ohio-3954, ¶ 198, quoting State v. Garner,
74 Ohio St.3d 49, 59 (1995); accord State v.
Conway,
2006-Ohio-791, ¶ 160 (“The granting of a mistrial is necessary only when a fair
trial is no longer possible”). Thus, “ ‘[a] mistrial should not be ordered in a cause simply
because some error has intervened. The error must prejudicially affect the merits of the
case and the substantial rights of one or both of the parties.’ ”
Thacker at ¶ 46, quoting
Tingue v. State,
90 Ohio St. 368 (1914), paragraph three of the syllabus.
B. Analysis
{¶17} Maynard argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his
motion for mistrial because the trial court had admonished the State throughout the
proceedings not to mention the warrant. Actually, the possibility of Maynard’s prior
warrant being brought before the jury came because co-defendant Crum’s counsel
began to inquire about the fact the other co-defendants were free to leave after the
traffic stop and it was the State that interjected before such testimony could be elicited
and brought up the issue of the warrant with the trial court. The State also mentioned
the issue of Maynard being in handcuffs in portions of the video but pointed out that co-
defendant Collins also had handcuffs on in the video. When Trooper Day did mention
the warrant, the State explained that the reference to the warrant was inadvertent and
Maynard’s counsel agreed. Maynard also asserts that the State introduced during trial
Scioto App. No. 23CA4048 9
certain jail phone calls he made, which referenced a different case. However, it
appears from the discussions at the bench that any irrelevant references were muted
when played before the jury.
{¶18} The State directs us to a Fifth District case, State v. Holmes, 2005-Ohio-
1481. In Holmes, a police officer mentioned a warrant for a criminal charge brought
against the defendant but for which he was not indicted, despite an order to preclude
such evidence. Holmes at ¶ 31. In that case, the defense counsel immediately
objected, and the trial court shortly after stated, “disregard,” to the jury. Holmes at ¶ 46.
The defense moved for a mistrial because the trial court specifically instructed the state
not to mention the warrant after the defense’s motion in limine had been granted. The
trial court overruled the motion for mistrial and instead gave a curative instruction to the
jury to disregard the evidence. Holmes at ¶ 46-47. The Fifth District held the trial court
did not abuse its discretion, explaining that “[a] curative instruction is an appropriate
remedy, rather than a mistrial, for inadvertent answers given by a witness to an
otherwise innocent question.” Holmes at ¶ 52, citing State v. Mobley,
2002-Ohio-1792
*2 (2d Dist.) The Fifth District also reasoned, “a jury is presumed to follow curative
instructions given by the trial court and therefore a trial court sustaining an objection and
giving a curative instruction has been held to be enough to cure the taint from an
improper statement.”
Id., citing State v. Garner,
74 Ohio St.3d 49, 59 (1995).
{¶19} Maynard contends that Holmes is distinguishable because there, the
remark was only one inadvertent comment, whereas the State in the instant case was
advised throughout the trial not to mention the warrant; however, it presented a video of
Maynard in handcuffs, phone calls when Maynard was obviously in jail, and some
Scioto App. No. 23CA4048 10
evidence that other co-defendants were allowed to leave the scene. He reasons in the
instant case, unlike Holmes, a mistrial should have been granted. We disagree.
{¶20} While we acknowledge that Evid.R. 404(B) provides that “evidence of
other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show that he acted in conformity therewith[,] this case at bar is actually quite
analogous to Holmes. In fact, in the instant case, there is some indication that the
State, and not the trial court or defense, initiated the sidebars about the possible
admission of this evidence, and attempted to avoid it. Further, in the instant case, like
Holmes, the trial court immediately gave a detailed instruction to disregard to the jury,
and the defense declined the trial court giving a further instruction at the close of
evidence. Finally, when defense counsel renewed his motion for mistrial at the close of
evidence, he cited only Day’s remark as objectionable.
{¶21} Even if the trial court abused its discretion by not declaring a mistrial,
Maynard has not demonstrated how he was so prejudiced that he did not receive a fair
trial. We find Trooper Day’s reference to the warrant was an inadvertent, isolated
reference. The trial court gave a short, authoritative instruction to the jury, and the jury
is presumed to follow it. Finally, we have determined as set forth in our discussion
regarding Maynard’s second assignment of error, that substantial evidence showed
Maynard’s guilt. Courts have held that inadvertent or brief references to warrants or
other incarceration does not warrant a mistrial if curative instructions are given and
other testimony and evidence shows a defendant’s guilt. See, e.g., State v. Milligan,
2021-Ohio-1071, ¶ 31 (6th Dist.) citing State v. Trimble,
2009-Ohio-2961, ¶ 175
(“[c]ourts do not declare a mistrial based on the mere mention of prison, rather, lacking
Scioto App. No. 23CA4048 11
demonstration of substantial prejudice, the error may be remedied with a curative
instruction.”); State v. Pryor,
2013-Ohio-5693, ¶ 45-49 (5th Dist.) (court did not abuse its
discretion in issuing curative instruction instead of granting mistrial when detective
referred to fact defendant had a warrant); State v. Southam,
2012-Ohio-5943, ¶ 12-13
(3d Dist.) (upholding denial of mistrial despite officer’s statement that defendant “ended
up having a couple of warrants,” when the statement was brief, objected to, and the trial
court issued a general instruction to disregard any statements for which the trial court
sustained objections); State. v. Sullivan,
2011-Ohio-6384, ¶77-82 (10th Dist.) (trial
counsel was not ineffective for not moving for a mistrial when a detective testified that
defendant had a warrant issued pursuant to a probation violation because the trial court
issued a curative instruction so a motion for mistrial would have been futile). We,
therefore, find Maynard’s first assignment of error to be without merit.
Second Assignment of Error
{¶22} In his second assignment of error, Maynard contends that the guilty
verdicts are against the manifest weight of evidence and the sufficiency of evidence.
Maynard asserts that the State relied primarily on Young’s testimony regarding
Maynard’s knowledge of the drugs, which he says is unreliable. He goes on to state
that the jail phone calls do not necessarily show he was aware that there were drugs in
the car on the day in question. The State responds that sufficient credible evidence
supports the verdict. The State also argues that Maynard was not only a principal actor,
but also complicit in the offenses.
Scioto App. No. 23CA4048 12
A. Law.
{¶23} When reviewing whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction,
the focus is on the adequacy of the evidence. See State v. Sims, 2023-Ohio-1179,
¶ 115 (4th Dist.). Thus, “[t]he standard of review is whether, after viewing the probative
evidence and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found all the essential elements of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Id.
{¶24} In determining whether a criminal conviction is against the manifest weight
of the evidence, an appellate court reviews the entire record, weighs the evidence and
all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses, and determines
whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created
such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed. State v.
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997), citing State v. Martin,
20 Ohio App.3d 172,
175 (1st Dist. 1983). “Judgments supported by some competent, credible evidence
going to all the essential elements of the case will not be reversed by a reviewing court
as being against the manifest weight of the evidence.” C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Const.
Co.,
54 Ohio St.2d 279 (1978), syllabus.
{¶25} The weight and credibility of evidence are to be determined by the trier of
fact. State v. Kirkland, 2014-Ohio-1966, ¶ 132. The trier of fact “is free to believe all,
part or none of the testimony of any witness,” and we “defer to the trier of fact on these
evidentiary weight and credibility issues because it is in the best position to gauge the
witnesses’ demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections, and to use these observations to
Scioto App. No. 23CA4048 13
weigh their credibility.” State v. Dillard,
2014-Ohio-4974, ¶ 28 (4th Dist.), citing State v.
West,
2014-Ohio-1941, ¶ 23 (4th Dist.).
{¶26} In addition, “[a] verdict is not against the manifest weight of the evidence
because the finder of fact chose to believe the State's witnesses.” State v. Chancey,
2015-Ohio-5585, ¶ 36 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Wilson,
2014-Ohio-3182, ¶ 24 (9th
Dist.), citing State v. Martinez,
2013-Ohio-3189, ¶ 16 (9th Dist.). Moreover, “ ‘[w]hile the
jury may take note of inconsistencies and resolve or discount them accordingly, …
such inconsistences (sic.) do not render defendant's conviction against the manifest
weight or sufficiency of the evidence.’ ” State v. Corson,
2015-Ohio-5332, ¶ 31 (4th
Dist.), quoting State v. Proby,
2015-Ohio-3364, ¶ 42 (10th Dist.), citing State v. Gullick,
2014-Ohio-1642, ¶ 10 (10th Dist.).
{¶27} A finding that a conviction is supported by the manifest weight of the
evidence is “also dispositive of the issue of sufficiency.” Sims, 2023-Ohio-1179, ¶ 120
(4th Dist.), citing State v. Waller,
2018-Ohio-2014, ¶ 30 (4th Dist.).
{¶28} We note at the outset that the trial court merged Maynard’s possession
convictions with the trafficking convictions, and the State elected that Maynard be
sentenced on the trafficking counts. So, here we concern ourselves with the trafficking
convictions. Even so, a trafficking conviction must consider the offender’s possession
of the drugs “because to sustain an R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) trafficking conviction as principal
offender, the state must also prove that the defendant had control over, i.e., possessed,
the illegal substance.” Foster at ¶ 22, citing State v. Cabrales, 2008-Ohio-1625, ¶ 40,
quoting R.C. 2925.01(K) (in order to ship, transport, deliver, distribute, etc., “the
Scioto App. No. 23CA4048 14
offender must ‘hav[e] control over’ ” the illegal substance); see also, State v. Jones,
2011-Ohio-1108, ¶ 11 (4th Dist.).
{¶29} R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) provides, in pertinent part, “(A) [n]o person shall
knowingly do any of the following … (2) [p]repare for shipment, ship, transport, deliver,
prepare for distribution, or distribute a controlled substance or a controlled substance
analog, when the offender knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the controlled
substance or a controlled substance analog is intended for sale or resale by the
offender or another person.”
{¶30} “Possession” is generally defined as “having control over a thing or
substance but may not be inferred solely from mere access to the thing or substance
through ownership or occupation of the premises upon which the thing or substance is
found.” R.C. 2925.01(K); State v. Bennett, 2024-Ohio-4557, ¶ 35, (4th Dist.).
“Possession may be actual or constructive.” Bennett at ¶ 35 citing State v. Gavin, 2015-
Ohio-2996, ¶ 35, (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Moon,
2009-Ohio-4830, ¶ 19, (4th Dist.).
“Actual possession exists when circumstances indicate that an individual has or had an
item within his immediate physical possession[.]”
Id. citing State v. Kingsland, 2008-
Ohio-4148, ¶ 13, (4th Dist.). Constructive possession, on the other hand, “exists when
an individual knowingly exercises dominion and control over an object, even though that
object may not be within his immediate physical possession.”
Id. citing Gavin at ¶ 35.
{¶31} In addition, R.C. 2901.22(B) provides:
A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware
that the person's conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably
be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when the
person is aware that such circumstances probably exist. When knowledge
of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such
knowledge is established if a person subjectively believes that there is a
Scioto App. No. 23CA4048 15
high probability of its existence and fails to make inquiry or acts with a
conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact.
State v. Crumpton, 2024-Ohio-5064, ¶ 28 (4th Dist.).
{¶32} In addition to arguing that Maynard was a principal offender, the State
contended at trial that Maynard is also guilty under a theory of complicity. As we have
observed, “[t]he complicity statute does not require the state to charge the defendant
with complicity.” State v. Whitehead, 2022-Ohio-479, ¶ 82 (4th Dist.). “Instead, R.C.
2923.03(F) allows the state to charge the defendant as a principal offender.”
Id. “The
statute provides that ‘[a] charge of complicity may be stated in terms of [the complicity
statute], or in terms of the principal offense.” ”
Id., quoting R.C. 2923.03(F).
{¶33} R.C. 2923.03(A)(2) provides, “[n]o person, acting with the kind of
culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall do any of the following:
… (2) [a]id or abet another in committing the offense.” “ ‘[T]o aid or abet is “ ‘ “[t]o
assist or facilitate the commission of a crime, or to promote its accomplishment.” ’ ” Id.
at ¶ 80, quoting State v. McFarland, 2020-Ohio-3343, ¶27, quoting State v. Johnson,
93
Ohio St.3d 240, 243 (2001), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (7th Ed. 1999).
“ ‘[P]articipation in criminal intent may be inferred from presence, companionship, and
conduct before and after the offense is committed.’ ” Id. at 81, quoting Johnson at 245,
quoting State v. Pruitt,
28 Ohio App. 2d 29, 34 (4th Dist. 1971). “However, ‘ “the mere
presence of an accused at the scene of a crime is not sufficient to prove, in and of itself,
that the accused was an aider and abettor.” ’ ”
Id. quoting Johnson at 243, quoting State
v. Widner,
69 Ohio St.2d 267, 269 (1982).
Scioto App. No. 23CA4048 16
B. Analysis
{¶34} On appeal, Maynard contends that Young’s testimony was not reliable and
the jail phone call statements are not specific and do not reference drugs. Maynard
asserts that the State failed to meet its burden to prove every essential element of the
case; however, he argues specifically that the State did not prove Maynard knew there
were drugs in the car on November 23, 2020. The State counters there was sufficient
competent, credible evidence to support the verdicts. The State also avers (as it did at
trial) that not only was Maynard a principal actor, he was also complicit in the offenses
committed by the other three occupants in the vehicle.
{¶35} It is true that Young’s testimony was significant at trial. She testified that
Maynard essentially supplied the funds for the trip. She explained that Crum was her
long-time boyfriend, and that she met Maynard and Collins through Crum. Crum knew
Maynard and Collins “through school.” Young was candid at trial about her and Crum’s
drug use. She stated neither Crum nor she had jobs, so they were unable to secure
drugs to “keep them well,” or in drug parlance, keep them from getting sick from drug
withdrawal. When she met up with Maynard and Collins, they promised to provide
Crum and her with drugs to “keep them well” in exchange for Young and Crum driving
the over three-hour drive from Kentucky to Columbus. Crum supplied his mother’s car,
and Young drove because she was the only licensed driver in the group. Maynard paid
for the gas in the car.
{¶36} When the group got to Columbus, Young dropped Maynard and Collins off
at a place that Young knew was a drug house, because she had dropped off people
there in the past to obtain drugs. Crum and Young went on to Young’s brother’s house
Scioto App. No. 23CA4048 17
and after a time picked Maynard and Collins back up. On their way back to Kentucky,
the couples stopped in Circleville, and Maynard paid for the room where the group
stayed. At the hotel, Maynard and Collins gave Young and Crum methamphetamine
and fentanyl, which the couple used. Both Young and Crum were doing drugs the night
before and morning of the traffic stop.
{¶37} The State asked Young what was going on inside the car when the group
was pulled over. Young testified that “Justin [Crum] and I are sitting in the front seats,
I’m driving. In the back seat, Colby [Maynard] and [Brittany Collins] are sitting and I
hear just a bunch of rustling and I can’t really tell what’s being said. Um, I remember
asking [Justin Crum], like what did they say? What’s going on back there? Um, and
you know later I found out that it was you know to put things in pants and um try to
conceal it. I don’t know if it was switched or whatever but it was, but that’s what it was.”
In addition, Young had a little bit of methamphetamine she put in the trunk of the car left
over from what Maynard and Collins had given her.
{¶38} On direct and during cross-examination, Young admitted that she lied in
several ways to the highway patrol during the traffic stop. In particular, she stated at
trial that she lied to the troopers about the fact the backseat occupants (Maynard and
Collins) were moving drugs around in the backseat. Young acknowledged she had also
been charged with the offenses. During cross-examination, Young was asked if she
had met with the State before testifying, and whether she had an agreement with the
State. She was also asked whether she believed her testimony would help her case.
Thus, the evidence at trial showed the jury was aware that Young might receive a
benefit for her testimony. Defense counsel also challenged Young about whether she
Scioto App. No. 23CA4048 18
was lying at the time of the traffic stop (when she said she had no knowledge of
anything) or lying at the time of trial.
{¶39} Thus, Young’s testimony showed that Maynard was a principal offender in
trafficking drugs. Young and Crum transported Crum’s acquaintances Maynard and
Collins to a drug house to procure drugs in exchange for drugs to “keep them well.”
Maynard and Collins secured the drugs and gave the drugs to Young and Crum. Young
testified that Maynard and Collins were in the backseat discussing Collins stuffing the
drugs down her pants to hide them from the troopers. Certainly, Maynard was complicit
in drug trafficking when he assisted and facilitated the offense by providing the gas
money for the vehicle to travel for over three hours in exchange for the drugs and he
also paid for the couples’ hotel room.
{¶40} Further, jail phone calls Maynard placed after the stop correlate with the
fact that the troopers seized the drugs, and Maynard financed the trip for drugs. For
example, in a call he placed to Collins’ number, eight to nine hours after the stop,
Maynard was asked, “[t] hey got everything though, didn’t they,” and he responded,
“yeah. Hell yeah. That’s everything.” Then he was asked, “[y]ou got any money or
anything?” and he responded, “[n]o, I don’t have nothing on me, I spent it, you know I
spent too much money.” Maynard also stated in that call to Collins that he could “write
a statement if you want me to.” Although Maynard denied to the trooper sometime
during the traffic stop that he even did drugs, during the jail phone call he indicated “I’m
going to be sicker than hell” presumably from drug withdrawals in the jail. He also said,
“I tried to bring some back.” In a later jail phone call to Collins, Maynard indicated that
Scioto App. No. 23CA4048 19
the others were on the run, would not show up for court, and that the State would not
get “none of them to testify.”
{¶41} Unlike what Maynard contends on appeal, Young’s testimony and his jail
phone calls are not the only evidence of his mental state that he knowingly transported
a controlled substance when he knew, or had reasonable cause to believe, that the
substance was intended for resale by the offender or another person. Rather, in
addition to Young’s testimony, there was circumstantial evidence that showed his
mental state and the other elements of the offense. “[D]rug trafficking may be proven by
circumstantial evidence.” State v. Mobley, 2023-Ohio-2229, ¶ 26 (9th Dist.), quoting
State v. Lopez-Olmedo, 2022-Ohio, 2817, ¶ 33. The direct evidence of mental state is
often not available, so proof of the culpable mental state must be derived from
circumstantial evidence.
Id., citing State v. Myers,
2022-Ohio-991, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.);
State v. Atkinson,
2020-Ohio-3522, ¶ 26 (9th Dist.). See also, State v. Hill, 2018-Ohio-
67, ¶ 32 (4th Dist.) quoting State v. Woodruff,
2008-Ohio-967, ¶ 9 (4th Dist.) (“ ‘[a]bsent
an admission by a defendant, the state must rely on circumstantial evidence to satisfy
the reasonable cause to believe element.’ ” which applies to both drug trafficking (Hill)
and receiving stolen property (Woodruff)).
{¶42} Independent evidence corroborated Young’s testimony. For example,
Kuehne noticed at the time of the stop that Maynard was excessively nervous. Day saw
Collins’ head and shoulders moving during the traffic stop, which supports Young’s
testimony that Collins, who was seated beside Maynard, stuffed the drugs once the car
was stopped.
Scioto App. No. 23CA4048 20
{¶43} The lab analyst testified that the methamphetamine weighed in excess of
26 grams, the heroin/fentanyl in excess of 1 gram, and the fentanyl in excess of 2
grams, which Trooper Kuehne explained exceeded the bulk amount. Kuehne further
testified the amount of drugs seized is not the amount you would see one keep for
personal use. Kuehne also testified about the DEA’s street value of meth and
heroin/fentanyl. In addition, Kuehne explained that in his experience and training in
drug interdiction, the route and length of route, paired with the dubious and conflicting
explanations for the trip at the time of the traffic stop, rendered the stop suspicious for
drug trafficking activity.
{¶44} Further, even if Young were the only witness the State presented to show
Maynard’s involvement, we have observed, “ ‘Ohio courts have held that the testimony
of one witness, if believed by the jury, is enough to support a conviction.’ ” State v.
Smith, 2020-Ohio-5316, ¶ 46 (4th Dist.) quoting State v. Strong,
2011-Ohio-1024, ¶ 42.
(10th Dist.) citing State v. Dunn,
2009-Ohio-1688, ¶ 133 (5th Dist.). See also, State v.
Mack,
2018-Ohio-5165, ¶ 15-16, (4th Dist.) citing State v. Haugh,
2016-Ohio-8008, ¶ 48
(6th Dist.) (rejecting manifest-weight challenge because the jury was free to assess the
credibility of co-defendants and inmates who had a motive to fabricate their testimony);
State v. Rankin,
2011-Ohio-5131, ¶ 30 (10th Dist.) (evidence not against the manifest
weight when jury was aware that a witness for the state had received a plea deal in an
unrelated case when the jury was aware she may receive favorable treatment on that
case).
{¶45} We have also held, “ ‘[t]he jury has the benefit of seeing witnesses testify,
observing facial expressions and body language, hearing voice inflections, and
Scioto App. No. 23CA4048 21
discerning qualities such as hesitancy, equivocation, and candor.’ ” State v. Myers,
2025-Ohio-1169, ¶ 59 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Gay,
2024-Ohio-1673, ¶ 45 (4th
Dist.), citing State v. Fell,
2012-Ohio-616, ¶ 14 (6th Dist.). As to Young’s testimony, the
trial court gave a detailed instruction to the jury regarding how to determine the
credibility of the witnesses. In addition, the trial court complied with R.C. 2923.03(D),
the complicity statute, by further instructing the jury in the following way:
You have heard testimony from Jaime Young, another person who is
accused of the same crime charged in this case and is said to be an
accomplice. An accomplice is one who knowingly assists another in the
commission of a crime. Whether Jaime Young was an accomplice and the
weight to give her testimonies [sic] are matters for you to determine from all
the facts and circumstances in evidence. The testimony of an accomplice
that is supported by other evidence does not become inadmissible because
of her complicity, moral turpitude or self-interest. But the admitted or
claimed complicity of a witness may affect her credibility and make her
testimony subject to great [sic] suspicion and require that it be weighed with
great caution. It is for you as jurors in light of all the facts presented to you
and from the witness stand to evaluate such testimony and determine its
quality and worth or its lack of quality and worth.
{¶46} For these reasons, we hold that the jury did not clearly lose its way. The
circumstantial evidence, Maynard’s behavior at the traffic stop, the phone call made
several hours later on the same day, and the phone call he made several months later,
corroborate Young’s testimony. In addition, the jury is in the best position to determine
credibility. This is especially true because the trial court gave the jury instructions
regarding witness credibility as well as the complicity instruction in accord with R.C.
2923.03(D).
{¶47} Further, the record shows that through cross-examination, the jury was
aware of Young’s pending charges and motivation to lie for her own benefit. “The fact
that the testimony of a co-defendant constituted the primary evidence against appellant
Scioto App. No. 23CA4048 22
does not, standing alone, render appellant's convictions against the manifest weight of
the evidence.” State v. Johnson, 2024-Ohio-2058, ¶ 20 (4th Dist.). See, e.g., State v.
Williams,
2023-Ohio-2296, ¶ 94 (8th Dist.) (co-defendant’s testimony was not “unworthy
of belief” simply because of involvement in offense, when jury knew of co-defendant
charges, defense counsel fully cross-examined co-defendant about motivation to testify,
and trial court gave the jury accomplice instructions); State v. Person,
2017-Ohio-2738,
¶ 51-53 (10th Dist.) (evidence was not against manifest weight when primary evidence
consisted of three co-defendants’ testimony where jury was made aware of plea
agreements, defense counsel cross-examined co-defendants about their motivations,
and trial court gave cautionary instruction regarding testimony of an alleged
accomplice). This is true particularly when the jury is aware of the co-defendant’s
involvement in the offense, the co-defendant’s cooperation for possible leniency, and
her attempt to minimize her role in the offense. See State v. Berry,
2011-Ohio-6452,
¶ 18 (10th Dist.).
{¶48} Young’s testimony was not so incredible as to render Maynard’s
convictions against the manifest weight of evidence. The circumstantial evidence that
Maynard picked up drugs in Columbus at a known drug house then distributed some of
the drugs to Young and Crum at the hotel in Circleville, then continued on with a great
amount of drugs through Scioto County in route to Kentucky (shown by his discussion
about stuffing the drugs with Collins), coupled with his jail phone calls, show that
Maynard was a principal or accomplice in trafficking drugs. Maynard was the one who
financed the trip. We therefore overrule Maynard’s second assignment of error.
Scioto App. No. 23CA4048 23
CONCLUSION
{¶49} The trial court did not abuse its discretion when denying Maynard’s motion
for mistrial as the State attempted to comply with the trial court’s order and the witness
reference to a warrant was inadvertent, fleeting, and remedied by a curative instruction.
The manifest weight of the evidence shows that Maynard is guilty of trafficking in
methamphetamine, heroin-fentanyl, and fentanyl. We therefore overrule the
assignments of error and affirm the trial court.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Scioto App. No. 23CA4048 24
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED. Appellant shall pay the costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Scioto
County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Abele, J. and Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court,
BY: ____________________________
Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment
entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing
with the clerk.
