[Cite as State v. Latham,
2025-Ohio-495.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LUCAS COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-24-1124
Appellant Trial Court No. CR0202302354
v.
David Latham DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellee Decided: February 14, 2025
…
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and
Evy M. Jarrett, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Sheldon S. Wittenberg, for appellant.
…
ZMUDA, J.
I. Introduction
{¶ 1} This matter is before the court on the state of Ohio’s appeal, pursuant to R.C.
2945.67, challenging the dismissal of the indictment by the Lucas County Court of
Common Pleas on April 30, 2024. Finding no error, we affirm.
II. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On May 3, 2023, police conducted a traffic stop of appellee, David Latham,
and he was later indicted on one count of improperly handling firearms in a motor
vehicle, in violation of R.C. 2923.16(B) and (I) and R.C. 2923.111, a felony of the fourth
degree. Latham filed a motion to acquit on April 1, 2024, which the trial court construed
as a motion to dismiss under Crim.R. 12(C).
{¶ 3} On April 23, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on the motion. The state
orally opposed the motion at hearing, having filed no brief in opposition. Prior to
argument, the parties stipulated to the underlying facts in the trial court, as follows:
THE COURT: It’s my understanding that the detective that would be
necessary for testimony is unavailable … this morning, however, the parties have
discussed some stipulations to the facts that would have been elicited through
testimony from the officer?
[PROSECUTOR]: Yes, Your honor. The parties, I believe, are prepared to
stipulate that Mr. Latham was stopped on May 3rd, 2023, at Avondale and
Brookley in Toledo, Lucas County. David Latham was driving his vehicle – or a
vehicle, a firearm and two rounds of 9-millimeter ammunition were on the front
passenger seat next to him.
Further, defendant has two previous convictions, both misdemeanors of the
first degree, representing an attempt – a lesser charge of attempt to commit a
felony offense of trafficking in cocaine. One of those convictions was on August
5th, 2021, in Toledo Municipal Court, CRA2107288. The other was on September
15th, 2017, in Toledo Municipal Court CRA17-112790101.
THE COURT: And anything related to whether or not the defendant was
intoxicated or under the influence at the time of this stop?
[PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, I did not see any indication of that in the
records related to this case.
THE COURT: So the parties are willing to stipulate that there’s no evidence
that he was under the influence at the time of the stop?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That’s correct, Judge.
THE COURT: Very well, [Defense], you’re in agreement with the
stipulations as read on the record by [the Prosecutor]?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It’s factually accurate, Your Honor.
2.
THE COURT: Very well. Given the stipulations by the parties, I find that
there’s no need for further testimony by the officer in this matter.
{¶ 4} In seeking dismissal, Latham cited to State v. Barber, 2023-Ohio-2991 (6th
Dist.), a case involving a similar constitutional challenge to R.C. 2923.16, but based on
distinguishing facts, including the defendant’s failure to assert the challenge in the trial
court and his admission that he was not a qualifying adult as defined under R.C. 2923.111
because of his marijuana possession at the time of the offense.
Barber at ¶ 27. The facts
in Latham’s case, therefore, presented a stronger constitutional challenge. As to the facts
in his own case, Latham argued that a prohibition against his right to open carry in Ohio
based on a misdemeanor drug conviction violated his Second Amendment rights, relying
on the authority of New York State Rifle & Pistol Assoc., Inc. v. Bruen,
597 U.S. 1 (2022)
and United States v. Daniels,
77 F.4th 337 (5th Cir.2023).
{¶ 5} The state argued that the prohibition at issue was specifically authorized by
Bruen and District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), as the United States
Supreme Court permitted restrictions on firearms that aligned with the historical tradition
of concealed carry restrictions. The state argued that the improper transport charge was “a
form of concealed carry,” and that there was historical precedent permitting states to
“eliminate one kind of public carry, concealed carry, so long as they left open the option
to carry openly.” The state further mentioned regulations “regarding the transportation of
firearms” as “historical analogue.” The state cited to no precedent beyond Bruen and
Heller, however, and provided no examples of “historical analogue” to the restriction it
wished to enforce against Latham, improperly transporting firearms based on Latham’s
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prior, misdemeanor convictions for attempted drug offenses. Furthermore, the state
argued Latham’s conduct was an impermissible “concealed carry,” without elaborating on
this argument.
{¶ 6} At the close of the hearing, the trial court entered findings on the record,
stating:
The motion that’s pending before the Court, which was captioned as a
motion to acquit, is being construed by the Court as a motion to dismiss under
Criminal Rule 12C. The Court makes a finding that defendant’s actions are those
covered under the protections provided by the Second Amendment, that he’s
included in the people that’s contemplated by that amendment.
In reviewing the US Supreme Court, [Bruen], the Court announced the test
that it would use to determine if a regulation violates the Second Amendment. To
pass muster, the State must show that the firearms regulation is part of historical
tradition and the limits and the outer bounds of the rights to keep and bear arms.
The Court finds that United States versus Daniels that was cited by defense
counsel’s motion out of the Fifth Circuit, 77 F.4th 337, is instructive in this case.
In that matter, the Fifth Circuit found that the founders were familiar with
intoxication via alcohol, but not familiar with intoxication through marijuana or
other controlled substances, and the Court must look to similar harm from alcohol
that the founding generation confronted through these regulations.
The Daniels Court analyzed that regarding alcohol and gun possession that
regulations fell into two tracts, one was the misuse of weapons while intoxicated,
and then the discipline of State militias, and the regulations against misuse of
weapons while intoxicated only applied to people while they were intoxicated, and
the discipline and regulation of militias only dealt with those people that were in
currently in active service.
The Court there did not find that there was a historical tradition to ban a
person from having a weapon unless they were currently intoxicated. The Daniels
Court found that the same was true during the reconstruction period and that the
regulations there only banned those that were currently intoxicated from
possessing weapons.
The Daniels Court finally concluded that 18 U.S.C. 922[(g)(3)] doesn’t fall
under the historical analogues that permits legislators to prohibit people that they
deem dangerous from possessing weapons because the laws didn’t protect people
from marijuana users or those who would occasionally use other substances.
Because the State hasn’t demonstrated that defendant was currently
intoxicated at the time of his arrest, I find that the motion to dismiss is well taken
under the findings of Daniels, and that 2923.16 and 2923.111 are found
4.
unconstitutional only as applied to the defendant in this case, and so I’ll grant the
motion to dismiss and release defendant from any further bond or obligation on
the case.
{¶ 7} After ordering dismissal on the record at hearing, the trial court filed a
written entry on April 30, 2024.
{¶ 8} The state filed a timely appeal of the judgment.
III. Assignments of Error
{¶ 9} The state asserts the following assignments of error on appeal:
Assignment of Error I: When the United States Supreme Court vacates judgment
relied upon by the trial court in dismissing a case, the dismissal should likewise be
vacated and remanded for further consideration.
Assignment of Error II: Restrictions on the concealed carry of firearms are
consistent with the historic tradition of firearms regulations. New York State Rifle &
Pistol Assn v. Bruen, [597 U.S. 1] (2022); District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 5570,
592 (2008); and United States v. Rahimi, [
602 U.S. 680] (2024), applied.
Assignment of Error III: Restrictions on the manner of transportation of firearms
are consistent with the historic tradition of firearm safety regulations.
IV. Analysis
{¶ 10} The state presents both procedural and substantive arguments in the
assignments of error. The state’s first assignment of error addresses a procedural issue,
and not Latham’s challenge to the constitutionality of R.C. 2923.16 and 2923.111 as
applied to his case. The state’s second and third assignments of error challenge the trial
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court’s substantive ruling, regarding the constitutionality of the charge against Latham.
We address each type of challenge in turn.
A. The trial court relied on the standard set forth in Bruen, and therefore
subsequent proceedings in Daniels do not require remand for
reconsideration of Latham’s constitutional challenge under Bruen.
{¶ 11} In the first assignment of error, the state argues that because the trial court’s
decision relied on the authority of United States v. Daniels, 77 F.4th 338 (5th Cir.2023),
the remand of Daniels by the United States Supreme Court requires remand of Latham’s
case back to the trial court for consideration of the decision in Rahimi. However, the state
fails to explain how Rahimi affects the trial court’s decision, aside from noting the
remand of Daniels. Significantly, the state fails to show that Rahimi would change the
trial court’s application of the test set forth in Bruen.
{¶ 12} In Daniels, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on its own precedent in
United States v. Rahimi, 61 F.4th 443 (5th Cir.2023). In Rahimi, the Fifth Circuit
addressed a facial challenge to the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8) and
determined that the government failed to demonstrate that the law restricting a citizen’s
right to bear arms “fits within our Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.”
Rahimi,
61 F.4th at 460. The Fifth Circuit determined 922(g)(8) was unconstitutional,
applying the test in Bruen. Applying similar reasoning in Daniels, the Fifth Circuit again
determined that 922(g)(8) was unconstitutional. Daniels,
77 F.4th at 355. In Rahimi, the
restriction against possessing a firearm was applied to an individual who had violated a
civil protection order, Rahimi at 449, and in Daniels, the restriction was applied to an
admitted marijuana user,
Daniels at 340.
6.
{¶ 13} The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Daniels, having
already accepted Rahimi. After the United States Supreme Court reversed the Fifth
Circuit in Rahimi, see United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), Daniels was
remanded to the Fifth Circuit to address that case based on the Supreme Court’s decision
in Rahimi, which included its clarification of the test articulated in Bruen.
{¶ 14} The state argues this court must also vacate the dismissal and remand the
present case, following the example of the United States Supreme Court. In support, the
state argues that the trial court relied on a decision that is no longer valid law. We
disagree with this characterization of the trial court’s reference to Daniels.
{¶ 15} In considering Latham’s motion and finding R.C. 2923.16 and 2923.111
“unconstitutional only as applied to the defendant in this case,” the trial court applied the
standard set forth in Bruen. The trial court’s reference to Daniels, moreover, was limited
to an example of “historical analogue” regarding laws that prohibited weapons possession
while intoxicated. The trial court noted that prohibitions addressing intoxication from
substances unknown to the founders, i.e. marijuana, were closely related to laws
addressing intoxication from alcohol, a substance recognized through history. Latham
argued that both Daniels and our own precedent in State v. Barber, 2023-Ohio-2991 (6th
Dist.) demonstrated a prohibition on possession of firearms by those under the influence
of drugs, facts not demonstrated in his case. The state, furthermore, presented no example
of precedent that identified historical prohibitions against firearm possession based on a
misdemeanor, attempted drug offense in the past, unrelated to contemporaneous facts.
7.
{¶ 16} Considering this record, the trial court’s reference to Daniels was limited to
consideration of historical regulations addressed in Daniels, with the trial court finding
no similarity between the Daniels regulation and the statutes at issue in Latham’s case.
The trial court applied the Bruen test in dismissing the charge, and the decision in Rahimi
did not overturn application of the Bruen test. Instead, the Rahimi decision applied Bruen,
reiterating that “the appropriate analysis involves considering whether the challenged
regulation is consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition.” Rahimi
at 692, citing Bruen at 26-41. Accordingly, we find the state’s first assignment of error,
seeking remand on a procedural issue, not well-taken.
B. The trial court properly dismissed the charge against Latham, as Latham
demonstrated he was “the people” protected by the Second Amendment
and there is no historical analogue to support a limitation to his rights
based on prior misdemeanor drug offenses.
{¶ 17} In the second and third assignments of error, the state challenges the trial
court’s determination that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to Latham, arguing
the charge against Latham was consistent with the historic tradition of firearms
regulations relative to concealed carry of firearms and the manner of transportation of
firearms, as addressed by Bruen, Heller, and Rahimi. The state’s argument on appeal is
based on the validity of gun regulations concerning concealed carry, and not the
application of these regulations based on Latham’s specific circumstances, to wit, his
prior, misdemeanor attempted drug offenses.
{¶ 18} The trial court dismissed the charge against Latham pursuant to Crim.R.
12(C).
8.
{¶ 19} “Crim.R. 12 empowers trial courts to rule on ‘any defense, objection,
evidentiary issue, or request that is capable of determination without the trial of the
general issue.’” State v. Palmer, 2012-Ohio-580, ¶ 22, quoting Crim.R. 12(C). In
considering dismissal, courts may consider “evidence beyond the face of the indictment.”
Palmer at ¶ 22, quoting State v. Brady,
2008-Ohio-4493, ¶ 18. Dismissal is proper if there
is “no set of circumstances” in which the defendant can violate the law’s requirements, or
if an “indictment depends on the unconstitutional application of law.”
Palmer at ¶ 23.
{¶ 20} We apply de novo review to the trial court’s decision and independently
consider whether the trial court correctly found the indictment is unconstitutional as
applied to Latham, meriting dismissal pursuant to Crim.R. 12(C). State v. Parker, 2023-
Ohio-2127, ¶ 20 (5th Dist.); see also State v. Owens, 2017-Ohio-2909, ¶ 11 (6th Dist.).
{¶ 21} Latham challenged the constitutionality of the charge based on the facts of
his case, and therefore, Latham was required to demonstrate that “application of the
statute in the particular context in which he has acted … would be unconstitutional.”
(Emphasis sic.) State v. White, 2013-Ohio-51, ¶ 151 (6th Dist.), quoting Yajnik v. Akron
Dept. of Health, Hous. Div.,
2004-Ohio-357, ¶ 14 (additional citations omitted.). In other
words, Latham pursued an “as applied” challenge and not a facial challenge to the
constitutionality of the charge at issue. Applying the test in Bruen, the trial court found
the charge unconstitutional only as it applied to Latham’s case.
{¶ 22} Latham was charged with improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle,
in violation of R.C. 2923.16(B) and R.C. 2923.111. R.C. 2923.16(B) provides: “No
person shall knowingly transport or have a loaded firearm in a motor vehicle in such a
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manner that the firearm is accessible to the operator or any passenger without leaving the
vehicle.” However, this statute does not apply to a person who “has been issued a
concealed handgun license that is valid at the time in question[.]” See R.C.
2923.16(F)(5)(a).
{¶ 23} R.C. 2923.111, effective June 13, 2022, governs carrying a concealed
handgun without a license and grants a qualifying adult the right to carry a concealed
handgun subject to the same restrictions that would apply to a person previously issued a
license to carry a concealed handgun. Barber, 2023-Ohio-2991, ¶ 20 (6th Dist.). A
“qualifying adult” means a person “who is all of the following: (a) Twenty-one years of
age or older; (b) Not legally prohibited from possessing or receiving a firearm under 18
U.S.C. 922(g)(1) to (9) or under section 2923.13 of the Revised Code or any other
Revised Code provision; [and] (c) Satisfies all of the criteria listed in divisions (D)(1)(a)
to (j), (m), (p), (q), and (s) of section 2923.125 of the Revised Code.” R.C.
2923.111(A)(2).
{¶ 24} The state appears to concede that Latham is a person protected by the
Second Amendment, focusing instead on whether Latham satisfied the requirements of a
“qualifying adult” as defined at R.C. 2923.111. Thus, the state’s argument presumes the
definition at R.C. 2923.111 is a valid regulation on Second Amendment rights without
applying the test set forth in Bruen. This is contrary to the mandate of Bruen.
{¶ 25} Pursuant to Bruen, “the Constitution presumptively protects” an
individual’s conduct, where the Second Amendment plainly applies. Bruen, 597 U.S. at
17. In failing to challenge that Latham is “the people” identified within the Second
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Amendment, the state concedes this presumptive protection and must justify its
regulation of Latham’s Second Amendment rights by demonstrating “that the regulation
is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Bruen at 17.
“Only if a firearm regulation is consistent with this Nation's historical tradition may a
court conclude that the individual's conduct falls outside the Second Amendment's
‘unqualified command.’” (Citation omitted) Id.
{¶ 26} In this case, the state argues its regulatory scheme is valid, and that Latham
is subject to prosecution under R.C. 2923.16(B) because of his misdemeanor convictions
for attempted drug offenses which remove him from the definition of a “qualifying
adult” under this scheme. The disqualifying factor for Latham, according to the state, is
that Latham would have been ineligible to obtain a license under prior law because he
was convicted of an offense under “Chapter 2925. … that involves the illegal possession,
use, sale, administration, or distribution of or trafficking in a drug of abuse.” See R.C.
2923.125(D)(1)(e).
{¶ 27} Revised Code Chapter 2925 codifies numerous drug offenses, ranging from
nonviolent regulatory infractions to aggravated trafficking. Pursuant to Chapter 2925,
disqualifying offenses include first degree felony offenses for trafficking in violation of
R.C. 2925.03(B) and (C), minor misdemeanor offenses for marijuana possession in
violation of R.C. 2925.11(C)(3)(a), and fourth or fifth degree felony offenses for selling
or using drugs not FDA approved in violation of R.C. 2925.09(A) or (B). Based on the
state’s argument, any of these offenses would disqualify an adult and criminalize
otherwise legal gun possession under R.C. 2923.111. Based on this specific requirement,
11.
having no offenses under Chapter 2925, the state contends Latham’s right to have his
firearm in a motor vehicle may be limited under R.C. 2923.111. Therefore, lacking status
as a “qualifying adult” under R.C. 2923.111, the state argues Latham’s transport of the
firearm violated R.C. 2923.16(B).
{¶ 28} As to historical precedent, the state cites to precedent that generally
recognizes the validity of restrictions on concealed carry of firearms, as referenced in
Heller, Bruen, and Rahimi. The state further argues that Rahimi expressly rejected the
argument that the Second Amendment prohibits laws banning possession of guns “by
categories of persons thought by a legislature to present a special danger of misuse.”
Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 698. The state, however, fails to recognize that these arguments
address separate issues.
{¶ 29} Latham does not challenge laws that generally ban gun possession by
dangerous individuals. In fact, the state does not dispute that Latham could legally
possess a firearm and does not fall within the category of a “felon in possession,” a
category of persons often prohibited from possessing weapons. The issue of whether
concealed carry restrictions are generally valid is also not at issue in this case. Instead,
regardless of whether Bruen and Rahimi permit regulations that govern who may carry a
concealed weapon, the limitation in this case concerns the regulation of Latham’s Second
Amendment rights based on the application of R.C. 2923.125 and based on his prior
convictions for misdemeanor drug offenses.
{¶ 30} The record demonstrates Latham could legally possess a firearm, and the
state limits its challenge to Latham’s legal status as an individual barred from having a
12.
handgun only in a vehicle, under Ohio’s current laws. As in the trial court, however, the
state cites to no precedent that demonstrates an historical tradition of prohibiting someone
with convictions for misdemeanor, attempted drug offenses from having a weapon in a
motor vehicle, the exact charge Latham faced. The most relevant case cited by the state,
furthermore, was factually distinguishable from Latham’s case and was resolved on the
validity of the licensing requirements governing the transport of firearms in National
Parks, with no discussion of the historical tradition of limiting Second Amendment rights
based on misdemeanor drug offenses. See, e.g., United States v. Tolmosoff, E. D. of Calif.
No. 6:23-po-00187-HBK-1, 2024 WL 1575071 (Apr. 11, 2024) (The Eastern District
Court of California found the challenged law was not a blanket ban of transportation of
weapons and only required a license to do so, which Tolmosoff lacked, and determined
the law was consistent “with the Nation’s historic tradition of firearm regulation” for
concealed weapons and for “carriage” to satisfy Bruen.).
{¶ 31} In the present case, the state references no statute that requires a special
license to transport a firearm. Also, in this instance, the application of R.C. 2923.111 and
R.C. 2923.125(D)(1)(e) represents an absolute disqualification of Latham only while he
is traveling in a motor vehicle, based on prior misdemeanor drug convictions alone. The
state provides no example of historical precedent that would support such an absolute, yet
limited disqualification, considering Latham lawfully possessed the firearm outside of his
vehicle.
{¶ 32} Latham’s lawful possession of a firearm, moreover, negates argument that
he belongs to a category of people who present “a special danger of misuse.”
13.
Furthermore, while the state proffered no historical precedent to support the
constitutionality of the firearms restriction imposed on Latham, based on his prior
misdemeanor drug offenses, other jurisdictions have concluded that historical restrictions
do not exist based only on drug use or a criminal record, without additional
considerations.
{¶ 33} First, there is historical precedent for disarming those under the influence
of drugs or alcohol, based on comparisons of a person’s capacity as affected by mental
illness and as affected by intoxication. However, in United States v. Connelly, 117 F.4th
269 (5th Cir.2024), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished restrictions on the
mentally ill from restrictions aimed at disarming a drug user who was not under the
influence at the time of possessing a firearm, finding, “[r]epeat marijuana users, like
repeat alcohol users, are of sound mind upon regaining sobriety, whereas those adjudged
severely mentally ill often require extensive treatment and follow-up examination before
they can be said to be of sound mind again.”
Connelly at 276-277. In comparing the
historical regulations for disarming the mentally ill, the Fifth District determined that
severely, mentally ill persons posed a threat of danger to themselves and others, while a
drug user, while sober, was no different than a drinker between periods of intoxication,
“whom the Founders would not disarm.” (Emphasis sic.)
Id. at 277. Additionally, the
Court noted a lack of precedent demonstrating a “non-violent marijuana user” fell into
the “dangerous” category for purposes of banning firearm possession or ownership.
Id. at
277-278.
14.
{¶ 34} Going further, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the presumption
upholding all “felon-in-possession” laws and instead determined that “[t]he law-abiding-
citizen-only theory… fails as a matter of history and tradition.” United States v. Williams,
113 F.4th 637, 647 (6th Cir.2024).1 The Sixth Circuit noted “it was common knowledge
at the founding that the Bill of Rights merely served to codify rights that existed long
before the ink dried on constitutional parchment.”
Williams at 649. Thus, “the people”
refers to “all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset.”
Williams at
649, quoting Heller,
554 U.S. at 580. Without a distinction between felons and non-felons
in the Second Amendment’s identification of “the people,” a felon, “as an American
citizen, is a member of this political community.”
Williams at 649.
{¶ 35} While noting the lack of distinction regarding felons and non-felons, the
Sixth Circuit addressed the history of law and practice that supported disarming those
who posed a danger of violence. Id. at 640-655. Finding a long history of disarming the
dangerous, the Sixth Circuit nonetheless considered that, historically, the disarming
official was empowered to determine whether the individual posed a danger prior to
imposing restrictions.
Williams at 657-658. While acknowledging that dangerousness can
be demonstrated by past criminal acts, the Sixth Circuit concluded that “courts – much
like the officials of old – must focus on each individual’s specific characteristics” by
addressing an individual’s “entire criminal record[.]”
Id. at 657. As support, the Sixth
Circuit noted that “the founders’ instinct that some crimes are more dangerous than others
1
The Sixth Circuit decided Williams after the state filed its appellate brief, but prior to the
state’s filing of a reply brief.
15.
maps well onto the Nation’s early 20th-century framework. (Citation omitted)
Williams at
658. Applying this reasoning to the case in Williams, the Sixth Circuit rejected the as-
applied challenge to the felon-in-possession charge, noting the defendant’s prior felony
convictions for crimes against the person, including robbing two people at gunpoint and
attempted murder, were sufficient to support the prohibition based on a danger of
violence.
Id. at 662.
{¶ 36} At issue in this case, Latham’s criminal record is limited to two
misdemeanor convictions for attempted drug offenses. Drug offenses are not “strictly
crimes against the person,” but involve conduct that, “in itself, poses a danger to the
community.” Williams at 659. However, applying the analysis of Williams, there must be
a demonstration that a person protected by the Second Amendment poses a danger to the
public to permit disarming or restricting the right to bear arms, even for a felon. Instead,
the state’s argument focuses on the applicability of its “qualifying adult” regulation
without any precedent to demonstrate that enforcing this regulation against Latham,
based on his prior convictions, is a regulation that has historical analogue, necessary to
restrict Latham’s Second Amendment rights.
{¶ 37} Latham demonstrated that he is part of “the people” for purposes of the
Second Amendment and argued facts that challenged the restriction the state sought to
impose, including his otherwise legal possession of a firearm under Ohio law. The state
failed to proffer any historical analogue that demonstrated a history and tradition of
limiting the Second Amendment rights for a person in Latham’s circumstances. We
therefore find the trial court did not err in finding R.C. 2923.16(B) and 2923.111
16.
unconstitutional as applied to the facts in Latham’s case. Accordingly, we find the state’s
second and third assignments of error not well-taken.
V. Conclusion
Finding substantial justice has been done, we affirm the judgment of the Lucas
County Court of Common Pleas. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal
pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Thomas J. Osowik, J. ____________________________
JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
____________________________
Myron C. Duhart, J. JUDGE
CONCUR.
____________________________
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
17.
