State v. Martin

[Cite as State v. Martin, 

.]


                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                     :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,               :
                                                            No. 114834
                 v.                                :

JOJWAN MARTIN,                                     :

                 Defendant-Appellant.              :


                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 30, 2025


          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                             Case No. CR-06-490688-A


                                             Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Sarah E. Hutnik, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Patituce & Associates, LLC, Megan M. Patituce, and
                 Joseph C. Patituce, for appellant.


EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:

                Defendant-appellant Jojwan Martin (“Martin”) appeals the denial of his

motion for new trial and claims the following errors:

        1. The trial court abused its discretion in failing to conduct an
        independent review of the record.
      2. The trial court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Martin’s motion
      for new trial.

             We find that the trial court conducted an independent review of the

record and reasonably concluded that the recantation testimony of a key eyewitness

at Martin’s trial was not credible. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                        I. Facts and Procedural History

             In January 2007, Martin was charged with one count of aggravated

murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A), in connection with the shooting death of

Antonio Williams (“Williams”) that occurred on November 11, 2006. The charge

included one- and three-year firearm specifications.

             Joseph and Janet Oberstar testified at a jury trial that on November 11,

2006, at approximately 2:45 p.m., a car crashed into their home on Hecker Avenue

in Cleveland. The driver, later identified as Williams, was in the driver’s seat, injured

but still breathing.    Joseph Oberstar called 911, and Williams was taken to

MetroHealth Medical Center where he remained for the next five weeks. Williams

had sustained a gunshot wound to his spine that rendered him a quadriplegic. He

was eventually transferred to a nursing home where he died from bronchial

pneumonia, a complication of quadriplegia.

             Dr. Dan Galita, a Deputy Coroner with the Cuyahoga County Medical

Examiner’s Office, testified that the bullet entered the left side of Williams’s neck

and traveled through his spine. In his expert opinion, the gunshot wound to the

spine caused the bronchial pneumonia that ultimately caused Williams’s death.
             Nine witnesses testified at the trial, including two eyewitnesses, Earwin

Watters (“Watters”) and Debby Crayton (“Crayton”). Watters testified that on the

day of the shooting, he went to Papi’s, a convenience store on the corner of East 71st

and Hecker Avenue, to buy cigarettes. As he was walking to the store, Watters

observed Martin talking to a man in a nearby vehicle. Watters testified that he had

known Martin for seven years at the time of the shooting because they used to deal

drugs to each other. (Trial tr. 198-199 and 623.)

             As Watters was paying for the cigarettes, he heard a gunshot and the

sound of a car “pulling off real fast.” (Trial tr. 616.) He looked outside and saw a car

turning the corner. Martin, who was chasing the car, fired “two more gunshots” at

the car. (Trial tr. 197-200 and 617.) In response to more specific questioning,

Watters testified as follows:

      Q: Who was chasing the car?

      A: Jojwan.

      Q: All right. Now, what exactly did you see him doing, be specific,
      please?

      A: Chasing a car, pointing his hand towards the car, chasing it.

      Q: Okay. Did you see anything else with respect to his hand?

      A: Flashes. When I looked out the door he was chasing the car.

      Q: So you were able to see flashes. Were there any noises that you heard
      at the time of those flashes?

      A: Yeah.

      Q: What did you hear?
        A: Gunshot.

(Trial tr. 617.)

              Watters did not report what he had seen to police. However, he

eventually told police what he had witnessed after he had been charged with a major

drug offense in federal court, and the FBI asked him if he knew anything about any

murders. (Trial tr. 621.) Watters acknowledged during his trial testimony that he

cooperated with the homicide investigation with the hope that he might receive a

reduced sentence in his federal drug case. (Trial tr. 627.) However, he also stated

that the State did not promise him anything in exchange for his testimony and that

no one told him what to say in court. (Trial tr. 623.) Watters stated that he did not

want to testify at Martin’s trial, and he acknowledged that he could still go to prison

despite his testimony. (Trial tr. 623.)

              As part of the homicide investigation, Detective Timothy Entenok

(“Det. Entenok”) presented Watters with a photo array of suspects and asked

Watters to identify the shooter. (Trial tr. 901-903.) Watters identified Martin as the

shooter in January 2007, approximately two months after the shooting. (Trial tr.

903.)

               Cleveland police investigating the shooting recovered a firearm at the

crime scene. They later discovered that the firearm belonged to Martin. (Trial tr.

898.) Sergeant Nate Wilson (“Sgt. Wilson”) of the Cleveland Police Department

testified that because the bullet recovered from Williams’s body was damaged, it
could not be matched to the recovered firearm. However, Sgt. Wilson compared a

shell casing found at the crime scene on Hecker Avenue with other shell casings fired

from Martin’s gun and determined it was a match. (Trial tr. 822-823, 826, 876-880,

and 899.)

             Crayton testified that on the day of the shooting, she was in the

bathroom of her upstairs second-floor apartment doing her hair when she heard a

gunshot coming from Hecker Avenue. (Trial tr. 742.) It was a warm day, and she

had the bathroom window open. (Trial tr. 780.) Crayton’s son had just left the house

moments before the shooting so Crayton was concerned for his safety and looked

out the window. (Trial tr. 742 and 757.) Crayton testified that when she looked out

the window, she saw Martin running in the street. (Trial tr. 743, 748, and 750.) She

heard three gunshots and the sound of a car accelerating. (Trial tr. 751-752.) She

also heard Martin’s voice say, “That’s what you do for mother-fuckas.” (Trial tr.

754.)

             Crayton immediately called 911, and police responded to her

apartment. She told police that she had seen Martin running with the gun. Crayton

testified that she had known Martin for ten years prior to the shooting because

Crayton was close with Martin’s aunt. (Trial tr. 738-739.) Crayton identified Martin

in a photo array as the person she observed with the gun at the time of the shooting

on November 11, 2006. (Trial tr. 760.)

             At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Martin not guilty of

aggravated murder but guilty of murder, a lesser included offense, along with the
one- and three-year firearm specifications. The court sentenced Martin to 18 years

to life in prison, with credit for time served, and a $20,000 fine. Martin appealed,

and this court affirmed his convictions. State v. Martin, 

 (8th

Dist.) (“Martin I”).

               In July 2020, Martin filed a motion for leave to file a motion for new

trial.1 The trial court denied the motion, and Martin appealed. This court reversed

the trial court’s decision and remanded the case to the trial court to allow Martin to

file a motion for new trial. State v. Martin, 

 (8th Dist.).

              Martin filed the motion for new trial on remand, arguing he was

entitled to a new trial because newly discovered evidence indicated that Watters had

fabricated his trial testimony. Watters testified at a hearing on the motion and

insisted that he knew nothing about the murder.             According to Watters, the

detectives told him that Martin had something to do with a murder and the police

wanted “to put Jojwan Martin behind bars.” (New trial tr. 18.) He asserted that the

police wanted him to testify that he witnessed the murder, but he did not actually

see anything. (New trial tr. 18.) He testified that he had made up every detail in his

trial testimony. (New trial tr. 34.)



      1 In May 2016, Martin, through different counsel, filed a petition for postconviction

relief. The attorney submitted an unsigned affidavit purportedly from Watters in support
of the petition. The affidavit stated that he, Watters, had given false testimony against
Martin at his trial. It further stated that Watters felt pressured from police and
prosecutors to fabricate testimony at Martin’s trial and that he did not actually witness
Martin shoot anyone. The trial court denied the petition for postconviction relief, and the
attorney who filed it was later subjected to disciplinary action related to it. See
Disciplinary Counsel v. Cheselka, 

.
                 Watters explained that he only testified at trial because the federal

agents told him they would do everything to keep him behind bars if he did not

comply with their requests. Watters stated that he was facing 235 to 239 months in

prison on the federal drug charges at the time of Martin’s trial. When he was later

sentenced after Martin’s trial, he received a 60-month sentence, but he only served

36 months of the sentence. Watters testified that he completed the affidavits

wherein he recanted his trial testimony because he wanted to come forward and “set

this man free for something that he — he didn’t do.” (New trial tr. 25.) Watters

maintained that he was not present at the time of the shooting that resulted in

Williams’s death and that his entire trial testimony was a lie. (New trial tr. 31-33.)

                 Det. Entenok, who also testified at the hearing, explained that he was

notified by Special Agent Doug Williams (“Special Agent Williams”) of the FBI, that

an inmate had information about Williams’s murder. (New trial tr. 41-42.) Det.

Entenok testified that he did not provide Watters with any information about the

murder, that the information provided by Watters was consistent with the

information provided by Special Agent Williams, and that he (Det. Entenok) did not

threaten or make any promises to Watters in exchange for his trial testimony. (New

trial tr. 47.)

                 After the hearing, the trial court denied Martin’s request for a new

trial. In its judgment entry, the court stated, in relevant part:

       The Court finds that Detective Entenok’s affidavit and hearing
       testimony were credible. Watters’ story requires multiple law
       enforcement agencies, including the Cleveland Police, the Cuyahoga
      County Prosecutor’s Office, and the FBI, conspire together to convict
      Defendant. The FBI, especially, had no reason or incentive to go along
      with such a plan. Watters’ affidavit and his hearing testimony stated
      that Cleveland detectives approached him first. While the FBI reports,
      Detective Entenok’s trial testimony, affidavit, and hearing testimony
      indicate that the FBI spoke with Watters first and based on that
      conversation contacted Cleveland Police, not the other way around.
      Defendant’s own motion stated “It is without dispute that neither the
      Cleveland Police nor the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office could, in
      actuality, offer any promises, as they do not control federal
      prosecutions. There is, in fact, no accusation here that the Cuyahoga
      County Prosecutor’s Office knowingly or intentionally induced Mr.
      Watters to lie.”

             Having found that Watters’s affidavits and hearing testimony were not

credible, the court concluded that Watters’s testimony would not have materially

affected the outcome of the trial. The trial court denied the motion for new trial

accordingly. Martin now appeals the trial court’s judgment.

                              II. Law and Analysis

                            A. Standard of Review

              Motions for new trial are governed by Crim.R. 33. We review a trial

court’s judgment denying a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion. State v.

Apanovitch, 

 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Hawkins, 

 (1993). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court exercises

“its judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it has

discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah, 

.

             However, “a trial ‘court does not have discretion to misapply the law.’”

Morgan v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 

, citing

. Thus, an abuse of discretion also occurs when a court “‘“applies
the wrong legal standard, misapplies the correct legal standard, or relies on clearly

erroneous findings of fact.”’” 

 quoting Thomas v. Cleveland, 

 (8th Dist.), quoting Berger v. Mayfield, 

 (6th Cir. 2001).

                    B. Independent Review of the Record

              In the first assignment of error, Martin argues the trial court abused

its discretion in failing to properly review the record. He contends the court adopted

the State’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law without conducting its

own independent review of the record. He cites State v. Riley, 

, in

support of his argument.

              In Riley, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in

summarily denying the defendant’s application for postconviction DNA testing

because it adopted the State’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law

without independently reviewing the record. 

 at ¶ 1 and 20. In reaching this

conclusion, the Court identified certain errors in the State’s proposed findings of fact

and conclusions of law that the trial court mindlessly included in its judgment entry

without correction. For example, the conclusions of law included a finding that a

prior DNA test of the six shell casings at issue in the case were “definitive” when in

fact the prior attempt to perform DNA testing resulted in “insufficient quantity of

human DNA.” Id. at ¶ 16.

              The Court also noted the adopted findings of fact and conclusions of

law included at least one typographical error that was in the State’s findings of fact

and conclusions of law. Id. at ¶ 18. The Court also observed that the judge who
adopted the State’s findings of fact and conclusions of law was a newly appointed

judge who did not preside over the trial and, therefore, did not have the same

familiarity with the prior DNA testing as the judge who conducted the bench trial.

Id. at ¶ 17.

               However, the Riley Court further stated that a “‘trial court’s verbatim

adoption of the [S]tate’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, in an entry

journalized the next business day after the [S]tate’s filing, is not in and of itself

erroneous.’” Id. at ¶ 14, quoting State v. Bunch, 

, citing

Jefferson v. Upton, 

 (2010). And, the Court acknowledged that

“no procedural rules prohibits ‘trial courts from adopting a party’s proposed

findings of fact and conclusions of law.’” Id. at ¶ 15, quoting the amicus brief of the

Ohio Attorney General.

               Indeed, it is well established that “a trial court does not err when it

adopts a party’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law as its own if it has

thoroughly read the document to ensure that it is completely accurate in fact and

law.” State v. Cody, 

, ¶ 37, citing State v. Williams, 2013-Ohio-

2706, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Thomas, 

 (8th Dist.);

Anderson v. Bessemer, 

 (1985) (where a trial court adopts proposed

findings verbatim, the adopted findings may only be reversed if they are clearly

erroneous).

               Although the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in this

case tracked the language in the State’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law, the trial court added some additional text regarding its conclusions that

demonstrated a synthesis and understanding of the issues. Moreover, as explained

in further detail in the next assignment of error, there was nothing clearly erroneous

about the findings of fact and conclusions. Unlike the trial court’s judgment in Riley,

, there is nothing in the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions

of law to suggest that it rubber-stamped the State’s proposed findings of fact and

conclusions of law.

               Therefore, the first assignment of error is overruled.

                             C. Watters’s Credibility

               In the second assignment of error, Martin argues the trial court erred

in denying his motion for new trial. He contends the court abused its discretion in

finding that Watters’s recantation testimony and affidavits were not credible.

               A criminal defendant seeking a new trial based on newly discovered

evidence bears the burden of demonstrating that the new evidence (1) discloses a

strong probability that it will change the result if a new trial is granted, (2) has been

discovered since the trial, (3) could not in the exercise of due diligence have been

discovered before the trial, (4) is material to the issues, (5) is not merely cumulative

to former evidence, and (6) does not merely impeach or contradict the former

evidence. State v. Parker, 

 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Petro, 

 (1947); State v. Hawkins, 

 (1993).

              Newly discovered evidence in the form of testimony that purportedly

recants the witness’s prior trial testimony is viewed with the utmost caution. State
v. Dew, 

 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Nash, 

(8th Dist.). “‘Recanting affidavits and witnesses are viewed with extreme suspicion

because the witness, by making contradictory statements, either lied at trial, or in

the current testimony, or both times.’” State v. Nunez, 

, ¶ 35 (8th

Dist.), quoting State v. Gray, 

, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.).

      Nevertheless, when a defendant seeks a new trial based on a witness’s
      recanted testimony, the trial court must evaluate the credibility of the
      recanting witness. Id. at ¶ 36, citing Toledo v. Easterling, 

, 

 (6th Dist.1985). The court must
      determine whether the recanting witness told the truth at trial or if the
      witness’s recantation is true. 

 If the trial court determines the
      recantation is believable, the trial court must then determine whether
      the recanted testimony would have materially affected the outcome of
      trial. State v. Brown, 

, 

, 

, ¶ 47 (7th Dist.).

Id.; see also State v. Gilbert, 

 (8th Dist.). If the newly

discovered evidence is not credible, the motion for new trial should be denied. State

v. Tucker, 

 (8th Dist.).

              Watters executed three affidavits in support of Martin’s motion for

new trial. He states in each of them that he had no personal knowledge of the

murder and that detectives asked him to provide false testimony designed to convict

Martin. He also states that prosecutors pressured and threatened him to provide

the false testimony. He explains that he was facing considerable prison time in his

federal drug case and that they would “cut him loose” if he helped to convict Martin.

              Det. Entenok and the two assistant county prosecutors who

represented the State in its prosecution against Martin also provided affidavits. Det.
Entenok averred in his affidavit that FBI Special Agent Williams informed him that

when they were questioning Watters about his federal drug charges, Watters

disclosed that he had information about Williams’s murder. Det. Entenok and

Special Agent Williams questioned Watters regarding his knowledge of the murder

and neither he nor Special Agent Williams provided any information about the

homicide investigation during the questioning. Det. Entenok further averred that at

no point during his interactions with Watters did he threaten Watters or tell him

what to say regarding the shooting of Williams.

              Blaise Thomas (“Thomas”), the lead prosecutor at Martin’s trial,

stated in his affidavit that he learned from federal authorities that Watters made a

proffer relative to his federal charges and that Watters provided information about

Williams’s murder. According to Thomas, Watters’s attorney was present during

the proffer. Thomas also questioned Watters during a voir dire identification of

witnesses to Williams’s murder at a pretrial hearing, and Watters’s attorney was also

present at that hearing. Thomas stated that he did not threaten or coerce Watters

to testify, did not tell Watters what to say at trial, and did not promise or recommend

any particular sentence in Watters’s federal case in exchange for information

regarding Williams’s murder.

              Michael Graham (“Graham”), the second prosecutor at Martin’s trial,

stated in his affidavit that he made no promises, threats, or other inducements to

Watters in exchange for his testimony. He also stated that he did not see anyone
else make any promises, threats, or inducement to Watters either. Finally, Graham

averred that he did not instruct Watters on what to say during his testimony.

               If Watters’s affidavits are to be believed, at least five separate

individuals representing three different law enforcement agencies, including

Watters’s criminal defense attorney, would have had to conspire to pressure Watters

to provide false testimony.     And in Watters’s proffer, he stated that the FBI

approached him and that he told the FBI what he witnessed. Thereafter, the FBI

contacted the Cleveland police. There is no evidence that the Cleveland police knew

that Watters was a witness to the murder until the FBI notified them about him.

And, the FBI would have no reason or incentive to fabricate evidence in a state

murder case.

               Watters’s testimony at the hearing on Martin’s motion for new trial

also contradicts the statements in his affidavits. The affidavits, which were executed

in 2011, 2015, and 2016, stated that detectives and prosecutors instructed him on

what to say. But at the hearing, Watters claimed he made up his trial testimony on

his own. Referring to his trial testimony, Watters testified, in relevant part:

      Q: Now, with these answers that you gave quite specifically with great
      detail, who gave you that detail? If it’s all a lie, who gave you the detail
      to say these things?

      ...

      A: I don’t. — no one. No one. They just — I haven’t — this — I lied
      about everything.

      Q: So did you make it up or did somebody tell you to say these words?
      A: I made it up. I made up everything.

(New trial tr. 34.)

               It is unlikely that Watters could have made up very detailed testimony

that matched the testimony of Crayton, the other eyewitness to the murder. Both

Watters and Crayton, who had known Martin for several years prior to the shooting,

independently identified him as the shooter in separate photo arrays. And, Sgt.

Wilson compared a shell casing found at the crime scene with the recovered firearm

that belonged to Martin and determined it was a match. (Trial tr. 880.) Martin’s

argument would require us to believe the matching shell casing was also just a

coincidence.

               Considering the inconsistencies between Watters’s affidavits and his

hearing testimony together with the affidavits of Det. Entenok, Thomas, and

Graham and the detailed trial testimony of Watters and Crayton, we can only

conclude that Watters’s recantation testimony is not credible.         His recanted

testimony would not have materially affected the outcome of the trial. Indeed,

Crayton’s eyewitness testimony and the matching shell casing would have provided

conclusive evidence of Martin’s guilt regardless of Watters’s testimony.         We,

therefore, cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied

Martin’s motion for new trial.

               The second assignment of error is overruled.

               Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.



EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

LISA B. FORBES, P.J., and
WILLIAM A. KLATT, J.,* CONCUR

(*Sitting by assignment: William A. Klatt, J., retired, of the Tenth District Court of
Appeals.)