[Cite as State v. Whitfield,
2025-Ohio-4957.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
State of Ohio, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 24AP-325
(M.C. No. 2023 ERB 71891)
v. :
(REGULAR CALENDAR)
Larisa Whitfield, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
D E C I S I O N
Rendered on October 30, 2025
On brief: Zachary M. Klein, City Attorney, Melanie R.
Tobias-Hunter, Orly Ahroni, Dave Pelletier, and Ryan M.
Pelfrey, for appellee. Argued: Ryan M. Pelfrey.
On brief: Reckard Law LLC, and Collin P. Finn, for
appellant. Argued: Collin P. Finn.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Municipal Court
JAMISON, P.J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Larisa Whitfield, appeals a judgment of the Franklin
County Municipal Court convicting and sentencing her for one count of violating R.C.
959.131(D)(3). For the following reasons, we affirm that judgment.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 2} On June 14, 2023, Columbus Humane received a complaint that two dogs
had been left outside of the residence at 24 South Princeton Avenue (“Princeton Avenue
residence”) without adequate shelter. Hailee Walker, a humane agent employed by
Columbus Humane, visited the Princeton Avenue residence on June 18, 2023 to investigate
the complaint. Agent Walker described the Princeton Avenue residence as a single unit in
a brick, multi-unit building. In the back of the residence, Agent Walker found two pit bull-
No. 24AP-325 2
type dogs on an eight-foot by ten-foot, partially fenced patio. Both dogs were tethered to a
spindle of the stairs leading to the backdoor of the residence. The tethers were tangled
around the spindle. A flimsy plastic blue tarp was draped over the fence surrounding one
side of the patio, apparently in an attempt to give the dogs some kind of shelter. After
examining the blue tarp, Agent Walker determined that it was inadequate to protect the
dogs from heat, rain, snow, wind, or excessive sunlight.
{¶ 3} Agent Walker knocked on the front door of the Princeton Avenue residence,
but no one answered. She placed a notice on the front door that requested the dogs’ owner
and/or caretaker contact Columbus Humane to discuss the June 14, 2023 complaint and
the inadequate shelter provided for the dogs. No one responded to Columbus Humane
regarding the notice. About six hours after Agent Walker left the Princeton Avenue
residence on June 18, 2023, Columbus Humane received a complaint that the dogs
remained outside.
{¶ 4} Sean Dundar, the senior humane agent for Columbus Humane, visited the
Princeton Avenue residence on June 20, 2023 to follow up on both the June 14 and 18,
2023 complaints. When Agent Dundar initially drove up to the residence, he saw the dogs
outside. Whitfield, however, brought the dogs inside as Agent Dundar parked the
Columbus Humane van.
{¶ 5} On June 30, 2023, Columbus Humane received another complaint that the
dogs were outside of the Princeton Avenue residence without adequate shelter. Humane
Agent Emily Nelson responded to that complaint on July 1, 2023. Agent Nelson found the
two dogs on the back patio, tethered to a stair spindle, with only the blue tarp for shelter.
At that time, the temperature was 82 degrees Fahrenheit. Although the dogs had access to
food, they did not have any water. One of the dogs was panting, which Agent Nelson
attributed to heat exhaustion. Because it was hot and one dog was panting, Agent Nelson
gave both dogs water. The dogs drank the water quickly, which indicated that they were
thirsty.
{¶ 6} Agent Nelson knocked on the front door of the Princeton Avenue residence,
but no one answered. Agent Nelson posted a notice on the front door requesting the dogs’
owner and/or caretaker contact Columbus Humane to discuss the July 1, 2023 complaint
and the failure to provide adequate shelter and water. No one responded to the notice.
No. 24AP-325 3
{¶ 7} Agent Dundar returned to the Princeton Avenue residence on July 2, 2023 to
ensure that the dogs were not confined outside without adequate shelter. As Agent Dundar
arrived at the residence, he saw the dogs outside. Whitfield then exited the residence and
brought the dogs inside. Agent Dundar stopped Whitfield and spoke with her. Agent
Dundar explained his “concerns for the animals being left outside habitually without access
to shelter,” and he told Whitfield that “under Ohio law, animals are required to be afforded
. . . shelter from the elements.” (Tr. Vol. II at 199.) According to Agent Dundar, Whitfield
stated that “she would try to get doghouses for [the dogs] so that they would have adequate
shelter out there.” Id. at 200.
{¶ 8} Agent Nelson visited the Princeton Avenue residence again on July 11, 2023.
Agent Nelson found the dogs outside on the back patio “with the same type of a setup” that
she saw on July 1, 2023, except they had access to water. Id. at 179-180. During this visit,
Agent Nelson spoke with Whitfield’s son and told him that Columbus Humane would be
following up to ensure that the dogs had adequate shelter when confined outside.
{¶ 9} On July 13, 2023, Columbus Humane received a complaint stating that a
vehicle had hit and injured one of the dogs. Agent Nelson returned to the Princeton Avenue
residence on July 14, 2023 to investigate that complaint. On that visit, the dogs were not
outside. Agent Nelson knocked on the front door of the residence, but no one answered.
Agent Nelson did not see or hear any dogs inside the residence. Agent Nelson left a notice
on the front door requesting the dogs’ owner and/or caretaker contact Columbus Humane,
but no one responded.
{¶ 10} On August 8, 2023, Columbus Humane received a complaint stating the dogs
were abandoned. The next day, Columbus Humane received a complaint stating the dogs’
owner had been evicted and left the dogs at the Princeton Avenue residence. Agent Walker
visited the residence on August 9, 2023 to assess the situation.
{¶ 11} When Agent Walker arrived at the Princeton Avenue residence, she found the
dogs on the back patio, tethered to a stair spindle, with only the blue tarp for a shelter. On
August 9, 2023, it “was extremely hot outside,” specifically, 83 degrees Fahrenheit. (Tr.
Vol. II at 158.) Due to the scant shelter provided by the tarp, the dogs were “exposed to the
elements,” which affected the dogs’ safety and well-being. Id.
No. 24AP-325 4
{¶ 12} Agent Walker knocked on the front door of the Princeton Avenue residence,
but no one answered. A notice Columbus Humane had posted on August 8, 2023 about the
dogs remained on the front door. At that point, Agent Walker decided to remove the dogs.
Agent Walker left a notice that she had seized and impounded the dogs on the front door of
the Princeton Avenue residence.
{¶ 13} Whitfield called Columbus Humane on August 10, 2023. Whitfield’s
conversation with Jessica Scott, chief humane agent of Columbus Humane, was recorded.
During this telephone conversation, Whitfield admitted that she owned the two dogs
removed from the Princeton Avenue residence.
{¶ 14} On August 23, 2023, the state charged Whitfield with violating R.C.
959.131(D)(3), a second-degree misdemeanor. R.C. 959.131(D)(3) provides:
No person who confines or who is the custodian or caretaker of
a companion animal shall negligently . . . [i]mpound or confine
the companion animal without affording it, during the
impoundment or confinement, with access to shelter from
heat, cold, wind, rain, snow, or excessive direct sunlight if it can
reasonably be expected that the companion animal would
become sick or suffer in any other way as a result of or due to
the lack of adequate shelter.
Whitfield pleaded not guilty.
{¶ 15} At a jury trial, the state called as witnesses Agents Walker, Nelson, Dundar,
and Scott, who testified to the facts set forth above. The defense called as witnesses
Whitfield, as well as Whitfield’s daughter, Marisa Whitfield, and Whitfield’s son, Raymond
Whitfield.
{¶ 16} Whitfield testified that she put her dogs on her back patio when they needed
fresh air. She stated that she did not let her dogs outside in bad weather, and the dogs
usually stayed outside for no more than one hour. When the dogs were outside, someone
was always at home to monitor the dogs. Whitfield explained that a nearby business that
she had issues with made baseless complaints about her care and treatment of her dogs in
retaliation against her.
{¶ 17} On August 9, 2023, Whitfield was in the process of moving out of the
Princeton Avenue residence. Whitfield did not see the Columbus Humane agents remove
the dogs because she had gone to the store with her daughter. According to Whitfield, her
No. 24AP-325 5
neighbor was supposed to watch the dogs while she was at the store, but the neighbor
“probably didn’t pay no attention then.” (Tr. Vol. II at 246.) Whitfield, consequently, did
not know Columbus Humane had custody of the dogs until she found the notice Agent
Walker had left.
{¶ 18} Marisa, Whitfield’s daughter, testified that she and her brother were living at
the Princeton Avenue residence during the summer of 2023. According to Marisa, the dogs
were usually outside for two hours at a time. Marisa did not see the Columbus Humane
agents remove the dogs on August 9, 2023 because she was at the store. Originally, Marisa
stated she was at the store alone, and her mother was at work. On redirect examination,
Marisa said her mother was at the store with her.
{¶ 19} Raymond, Whitfield’s son, testified that the dogs were not often outside and
usually stayed outside for “a[n] hour or less than a[n] hour.” (Tr. Vol. III at 275.) Raymond,
however, admitted that he did not live at the Princeton Avenue residence during the
summer of 2023 and, instead, stayed at his girlfriend’s home “a lot.” Id. at 289. Raymond
was not at the Princeton Avenue residence on August 9, 2023.
{¶ 20} The jury returned a verdict finding Whitfield guilty of violating R.C.
959.131(D)(3). In a judgment entered on April 25, 2024, the trial court convicted Whitfield
of that violation and sentenced her to (1) pay a $75 fine and court costs, and (2) serve a 90-
day jail term, with 90 days suspended, provided that Whitfield have no new convictions for
serious traffic offenses, criminal offenses, or the same or similar offenses for five years.
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶ 21} Whitfield now appeals the April 25, 2024 judgment, and she assigns the
following two assignments of error for our review:
[1.] APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF THE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF
APPELLANT’S RIGHTS UNDER THE SIXTH AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION, AND SECTION[S] 10 AND 16, ARTICLE I
OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.
[2.] THE ADMISSION OF OTHER ACTS TESTIMONY AND
EVIDENCE VIOLATED EVIDENCE RULE 404 AND
APPELLANT’S RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND TO A FAIR
TRIAL AS GUARANTEED BY THE UNITED STATES AND
OHIO CONSTITUTIONS.
No. 24AP-325 6
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
{¶ 22} By her first assignment of error, Whitfield argues that she did not receive
effective assistance of trial counsel. Specifically, Whitfield contends that her trial counsel
was ineffective because she (1) failed to object to the Columbus Humane agents’ testimony
regarding their visits to the Princeton Avenue residence prior to August 9, 2023, and (2)
failed to object to Exhibit No. 10, a photograph of the back patio of the Princeton Avenue
residence taken by Agent Nelson on July 1, 2023.
{¶ 23} To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must meet the twoprong test set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, the defendant
must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.
Id. at 687. To meet that requirement,
the defendant must demonstrate that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
Id. Counsel’s conduct is deficient if it falls below an objective standard of
reasonable representation.
Id. at 688.
{¶ 24} If the defendant shows that counsel’s performance was deficient, then the
second prong of the Strickland test requires the defendant to prove prejudice to prevail.
Strickland at 687. To demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must show that there is a
“reasonable probability” that counsel’s deficiency affected the outcome of the proceedings.
Id. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.”
Id. “When a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether there
is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a
reasonable doubt respecting guilt.”
Id. at 695.
{¶ 25} For a court to conclude trial counsel has provided ineffective assistance, the
defendant must overcome a strong presumption that the challenged action might constitute
sound trial strategy. State v. Mohamed, 2017-Ohio-7468, ¶ 18. Even questionable trial
strategies do not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.; accord State v.
Cepec,
2016-Ohio-8076, ¶ 111, quoting State v. Leonard,
2004-Ohio-6235, ¶ 146
(“ ‘[D]ebatable trial tactics do not establish ineffective assistance of counsel.’ ”). The
decision to withhold an objection may fall within the realm of trial strategy. State v.
Robinson,
2021-Ohio-3496, ¶ 53 (10th Dist.); State v. R.I.H.,
2019-Ohio-2189, ¶ 60 (10th
Dist.). Experienced trial counsel understand that objecting to each potentially
No. 24AP-325 7
objectionable event could actually act to their client’s detriment. State v. Johnson, 2006-
Ohio-6404, ¶ 140. Consequently, a single failure to object generally does not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel “ ‘unless the evidence sought is so prejudicial . . . that failure
to object essentially defaults the case to the state.’ ”
Id., quoting Lundgren v. Mitchell,
440
F.3d 754, 774 (6th Cir. 2006). Alternatively, “ ‘defense counsel must so consistently fail to
use objections, despite numerous and clear reasons for doing so, that counsel’s failure
cannot reasonably have been said to have been part of a trial strategy or tactical choice.’ ”
Id., quoting
Lundgren at 774.
{¶ 26} The four Columbus Humane agents testified about seven visits to the
Princeton Avenue residence between June 18 and August 9, 2023. Whitfield contends that
her trial counsel should have objected to testimony regarding the first six visits on the
grounds that the testimony was irrelevant and constituted impermissible other-acts
evidence. Essentially, Whitfield asserts her counsel fell below the objective standard of
reasonable representation by allowing the state to introduce evidence of violations of R.C.
959.131(D)(3) other than the one that occurred on August 9, 2023. Whitfield also faults her
trial counsel for not objecting when Agents Nelson and Dundar testified that they could
have filed charges against her for those violations.
{¶ 27} As we set forth above, R.C. 959.131(D)(3) states:
No person who confines or who is the custodian or caretaker of
a companion animal shall negligently . . . [i]mpound or confine
the companion animal without affording it, during the
impoundment or confinement, with access to shelter from
heat, cold, wind, rain, snow, or excessive direct sunlight if it can
reasonably be expected that the companion animal would
become sick or suffer in any other way as a result of or due to
the lack of adequate shelter.
Thus, to establish a violation of R.C. 959.131(D)(3), the state must prove that (1) a person
who confined a companion animal, or a custodian or caretaker of a companion animal; (2)
negligently impounded or confined the companion animal; (3) without affording the
companion animal access to shelter from heat, cold, wind, rain, snow, or excessive direct
sunlight; and (4) it can reasonably be expected that the companion animal would become
sick or suffer in any other way as a result of or due to the lack of adequate shelter.
No. 24AP-325 8
{¶ 28} The definition of “companion animal” includes “any dog or cat regardless of
where it is kept.” R.C. 959.131(A)(1). Although R.C. 959.131 does not define “confine,” the
ordinary, plain meaning of “confine” is “ ‘to hold within bounds’ or ‘to keep to a certain
place or to a limited area.’ ” State v. Sullivan, 2014-Ohio-1687, ¶ 14 (12th Dist.), quoting
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1993). “A person acts negligently when,
because of a substantial lapse from due care, the person fails to perceive or avoid a risk that
the person’s conduct may cause a certain result or may be of a certain nature.” R.C.
2901.22(D).
{¶ 29} The state’s witnesses testified to six visits between June 18 and August 8,
2023, but only Agent Nelson provided evidence from which a trier of fact could conclude a
violation of R.C. 959.131(D)(3) had occurred during that period. According to Agent
Nelson, when she arrived at the Princeton Avenue residence on July 1, 2023, the
temperature was 82 degrees Fahrenheit. Agent Nelson found the two dogs tethered to a
stair spindle on the back patio, with only the blue tarp for a shelter. When Agent Nelson
knocked on the front door of the residence, no one answered.
{¶ 30} Given this evidence, a trier of fact could find that the dogs were negligently
confined on the back patio without a shelter that could protect them from heat, cold, wind,
rain, snow, or excessive direct sunlight. Due to the high heat, it could be reasonably
expected that the dogs would suffer from prolonged exposure to the elements. Because no
one answered Agent Nelson’s knock, a trier of fact could infer that no one was at the
residence to monitor the dogs’ condition and allow them inside before the heat adversely
affected them.
{¶ 31} During every other visit described in the testimony, the Columbus Humane
agents did not testify to circumstances that amounted to a violation of R.C. 959.131(D)(3).
Agent Walker could not testify to the weather conditions during her June 18, 2023 visit, so
a trier of fact could not determine whether it could be reasonably expected that the dogs
would suffer due to lack of an adequate shelter on that day. When Agent Nelson visited on
July 11, 2023, the dogs were outside with Raymond Whitfield. Raymond could bring the
dogs inside if inclement weather developed, thus negating any reasonable expectation that
the dogs might suffer due to lack of adequate shelter. On July 14, 2023, Agent Nelson did
not see the dogs at all when she visited the Princeton Avenue residence. Although Agent
No. 24AP-325 9
Dundar testified that he saw the dogs outside when he arrived at the Princeton Avenue
residence on June 20 and July 2, 2023, he did not testify that the dogs were confined on
those days. Thus, none of these visits resulted in violations of R.C. 959.131(D)(3) that the
state could introduce as potential other-acts evidence.
{¶ 32} During direct examination, Agent Nelson stated that she could have filed
charges against Whitfield based on her observations. Agent Dundar testified that he could
have filed charges against Whitfield “for the dogs not having shelter” at the time he spoke
with Whitfield on July 2, 2023. (Tr. Vol. II at 204.) Based on what occurred during the
agents’ visits between June 18 and August 8, 2023, we conclude that both agents would
have premised the charges on the circumstances Agent Nelson encountered during the
July 1, 2023 visit.
{¶ 33} Therefore, the question before this court is whether Whitfield’s trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to object to testimony regarding Agent Nelson’s July 1, 2023 visit,
including Agents Nelson’s and Dundar’s testimony that they could have filed charges for
the confinement of the dogs on July 1, 2023. We find it reasonable to conclude that defense
counsel may have refrained from objecting because she was pursuing an alternative
strategy. Defense counsel attempted to convince the jury that Whitfield took good care of
her dogs throughout the time she owned them, and the charge against her only arose
because a disgruntled neighbor complained unfairly about the dogs in retaliation against
her. Whitfield testified that, in fact, the dogs were never outside when no one was at home;
someone was always monitoring the dogs. Defense counsel obtained a concession from
Agent Nelson that “[i]f someone is home and monitoring the dogs to be able to bring them
in if needed, then” no outside shelter is required to comply with R.C. 959.131(D)(3). (Tr.
Vol. II at 187.) Based on this evidence, defense counsel argued that Whitfield could not
violate R.C. 959.131(D)(3), despite the lack of an outside shelter from heat, cold, wind, rain,
snow, or excessive direct sunlight.
{¶ 34} Because strategy may have motivated defense counsel’s decision not to
object, Whitfield cannot satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test. See State v. Rister,
2023-Ohio-1284, ¶ 21 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Watts,
2021-Ohio-4548, ¶ 10 (12th Dist.)
(“A ‘strategy, even if debatable, does not establish deficient performance or serve as the
basis for an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.’ ”). Nevertheless, even if we assume
No. 24AP-325 10
that defense counsel was deficient by not objecting, Whitfield cannot prevail on her
ineffective assistance claim because she fails to demonstrate prejudice.
{¶ 35} On August 9, 2023, Agent Walker found the two dogs tethered to a stair
spindle on the back patio, with only the blue tarp providing shelter. Agent Walker testified
that the blue tarp could not protect the dogs from heat, cold, wind, rain, snow, or excessive
direct sunlight. Given the “extremely hot” temperature on August 9, 2023, it could be
reasonably expected that the dogs would suffer due to lack of an adequate shelter. (Tr. Vol.
II at 158.) Neither Whitfield nor her children were at the Princeton Avenue residence to
monitor the dogs’ condition. In light of this evidence establishing Whitfield’s guilt, there is
not a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s failure to object the outcome of the trial
would have been different. See State v. Trimble, 2009-Ohio-2961, ¶ 175 (“there is no
likelihood that [the defendant] was prejudiced by the mention of his prior conviction
because of the overwhelming evidence establishing his guilt”); R.I.H.,
2019-Ohio-2189, at
¶ 61 (10th Dist.) (concluding the defendant did not suffer prejudice as a result of his
counsel’s failure to object to other-acts evidence because “there [was] not a reasonable
probability that but for counsel’s failure to object the outcome of the trial would have been
different”). Consequently, defense counsel’s failure to object to evidence regarding the
July 1, 2023 visit does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
{¶ 36} Whitfield next argues that her trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting
to Exhibit No. 10, a photograph of the back patio of the Princeton Avenue residence taken
by Agent Nelson on July 1, 2023. Whitfield, however, fails to explicitly identify the
evidentiary grounds on which her trial counsel should have objected. Whitfield only argues
that “Exhibit [No.] 10 helped establish a pattern that Appellant habitually failed to maintain
an adequate space for her dogs, despite the fact that a pattern is not required by O.R.C.
959.131(D)(3).” (Appellant’s Brief at 13.) From this argument, we infer that Whitfield
believes her trial counsel should have objected to Exhibit No. 10 on the basis of relevancy.
{¶ 37} We need not decide whether defense counsel was deficient in failing to object
based on relevancy because Whitfield cannot show that Exhibit No. 10 prejudiced her.
Exhibit No. 10 depicts essentially the same scene as Exhibits Nos. 11 and 12, which Whitfield
does not challenge on appeal. Exhibits Nos. 11 and 12 are also photographs of the back patio
of the Princeton Avenue residence taken on July 1, 2023 by Agent Nelson. Given the
No. 24AP-325 11
similarity between Exhibits Nos. 10, 11, and 12, there is not a reasonable probability that
the outcome of the trial would have been different if defense counsel objected to Exhibit
No. 10. In the absence of prejudice, we conclude that Whitfield has not established that the
failure to object to Exhibit No. 10 constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.
{¶ 38} In sum, we conclude that Whitfield failed to prove that her trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we overrule the first assignment of
error.
{¶ 39} By her second assignment of error, Whitfield argues that the trial court
committed plain error by admitting into evidence other-acts evidence. We disagree.
{¶ 40} To prevail under the plain-error standard, an appellant must show that an
error occurred, the error was obvious, and the error affected the appellant’s substantial
rights. State v. Drain, 2022-Ohio-3697, ¶ 52. “To show that an error affected an appellant’s
substantial rights, he or she must show ‘a reasonable probability that the error resulted in
prejudice—the same deferential standard for reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel
claims.’ ” (Emphasis in original.)
Id., quoting State v. Rogers,
2015-Ohio-2459, ¶ 22. The
appellant, therefore, must establish “ ‘that the probability of a different result is “sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome” of the proceeding.’ ”
Id., quoting United States
v. Dominguez Benitez,
542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004), quoting Strickland,
466 U.S. at 694. An
appellate court has discretion to notice plain error and will correct such error only under
exceptional circumstances to prevent injustice. State v. Jones,
2020-Ohio-3051, ¶ 17.
{¶ 41} As we stated above, the other-acts evidence at issue here is the alleged
violation of R.C. 959.131(D)(3) that occurred on July 1, 2023. Even if the trial court erred
in admitting testimony regarding the July 1, 2023 incident, we conclude that error did not
affect Whitfield’s substantial rights because Whitfield failed to show a reasonable
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different without that evidence.
Separate and apart from Agent Nelson’s testimony regarding her July 1, 2023 visit, the
record contains testimony from Agent Walker regarding the dogs’ lack of adequate shelter
on August 9, 2023. Whitfield, consequently, has not established the admission of evidence
about the July 1, 2023 incident constituted plain error. Accordingly, we overrule
Whitfield’s second assignment of error.
No. 24AP-325 12
IV. CONCLUSION
{¶ 42} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule Whitfield’s first and second
assignments of error, and we affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Municipal Court.
Judgment affirmed.
BEATTY BLUNT and DINGUS, JJ., concur.
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