[Cite as State v. Sullivan,
2025-Ohio-4987.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
CLERMONT COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2025-02-011
: OPINION AND
- vs - JUDGMENT ENTRY
: 11/3/2025
CHARLES L. SULLIVAN, :
Appellant. :
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM CLERMONT COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Case No. 2022 CR 0068
Mark J. Tekulve, Clermont County Prosecuting Attorney, and Nicholas A. Horton,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
W. Stephen Haynes, Clermont County Public Defender, and Robert F. Benintendi,
Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
OPINION
HENDRICKSON, P.J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Charles L. Sullivan, appeals the decision of the Clermont County
Court of Common Pleas revoking his community control and sentencing him to serve 18
months in prison. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the trial court's decision.
Clermont CA2025-02-011
{¶ 2} On February 22, 2022, Sullivan was indicted on one count of theft in
violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), a felony of the fifth degree, and one count of receiving
stolen property in violation of R.C. 2913.51(A), a felony of the fifth degree. The charges
in the indictment stemmed from allegations that Sullivan stole more than $1,700 worth of
merchandise from Kohls and was found in possession of approximately $2,000 worth of
stolen merchandise from Sunglass Hut.
{¶ 3} On April 11, 2023, Sullivan pled guilty as charged in the indictment. The
court ordered a presentence-investigative report and the matter proceeded to sentencing.
After a hearing, the court sentenced Sullivan to a two-year term of community control,
which included conditions that he avoid the premises of all Kohls and Sunglass Hut stores,
refrain from drug and alcohol use, submit to random drug screens, and report to and
comply with the directives of the probation department. The court advised Sullivan that
the failure to comply with the terms of his community control could result in the revocation
of his community control and the imposition of consecutive six- to twelve-month prison
terms on each count.
{¶ 4} On June 13, 2023, Sullivan's probation officer filed an affidavit of community
control violation, alleging that Sulivan violated his probation by failing to report as directed
and failing to follow the probation department's verbal and written instructions. Sullivan
entered an admission to the foregoing violations and, on September 21, 2023, the trial
court continued Sullivan on community control.
{¶ 5} Thereafter, on June 27, 2024, Sullivan's probation officer filed another
affidavit of community control violation, alleging that Sullivan had violated his probation
by (1) failing to abide by all federal, state, and local laws when he was convicted in
Hamilton County Municipal Court for obstructing official business, (2) failing to follow the
probation department's verbal or written instructions, (3) testing positive for
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methamphetamine and admitting to taking a pill "from the street," and (4) failing to pay
the supervision fee of $50 per month. Sullivan admitted to the foregoing violations. On
July 16, 2024, the trial court continued Sullivan on community control but added as an
additional term of his community control that Sullivan spend six months in jail or attend
the STAR Community Justice Program ("STAR Program") if a bed became available
sooner. Sullivan stated he began the STAR Program on October 1, 2024.
{¶ 6} On January 10, 2025, Sullivan's probation officer filed a third affidavit of
community control violation, alleging that Sullivan had violated his probation by failing to
follow his probation officer's verbal or written instructions and that he failed to participate
in, and successfully complete, the STAR Program. The affidavit alleged that Sullivan was
discharged from the STAR Program after engaging in a physical altercation on January
9, 2025. The court held a hearing regarding the affidavit, during which Sullivan admitted
the violations as alleged. As a result, the trial court found Sullivan guilty of the community
control violation and continued the matter for sentencing.
{¶ 7} On January 23, 2025, the trial court held a sentencing hearing regarding the
community control violation. At the hearing, Sullivan's counsel offered a statement in
mitigation and explained Sullivan's altercation at the STAR Program. Counsel stated
there was a "provocation with racial slurs" and that "somebody even spit on [Sullivan],"
which prompted a fistfight. Counsel claimed that, aside from the physical altercation,
Sullivan was doing "fairly well" in the program and had seven weeks remaining. Sullivan
also spoke at the hearing, during which he offered the same explanation for the
altercation, and apologized for his behavior. Sullivan informed the court that he had made
a mistake and "messed up."
{¶ 8} After considering the statements offered on Sullivan's behalf, the court
noted that, in addition to the physical altercation, there had been other disruptions during
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Sullivan's participation in the STAR Program, including two rule violations for gambling.
The trial court also discussed the history of the case, including Sullivan's underlying theft
crimes, his overall conduct while in the STAR Program, and his prior community control
violations. The court stated it had been "graceful and fair" to Sullivan by providing "flat
free breaks" in response to Sullivan's prior community control violations. The court asked
Sullivan to explain why he repeatedly violated his community control, to which Sullivan
stated, "[i]f I don't get spit on, I would not be in front of you." The court then clarified that
it did not "care about STAR," as Sullivan was only in the STAR Program as an "unintended
consequence" of his failure to listen to the court. The trial court then reiterated that
Sullivan had repeatedly promised to comply with his community control, but they were
"back here again," and the court was "not happy about it."
{¶ 9} The court proceeded to revoke Sullivan's community control. In so doing,
the trial court specifically referenced the principles and purposes of felony sentencing
under R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12.
After considering these statutes and the entirety of record, the trial court sentenced
Sullivan to an aggregate prison term of 18 months.1
{¶ 10} Sullivan now appeals, raising the following assignment of error for our
review:
{¶ 11} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REVOKING APPELLANT'S COMMUNITY
CONTROL AND IMPOSING A PRISON TERM.
{¶ 12} Sullivan argues on appeal that the trial court erred when it revoked his
community control and imposed a prison term. Specifically, Sullivan contends the trial
1. After revoking Sullivan's community control and imposing Sullivan's sentence, the trial court explained to
Sullivan that "what happened at STAR wasn't the problem. It's what happened that got you into STAR that
was the problem for me. I went to bat for you, and you let me down not once, but twice."
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court improperly revoked his community control based upon his prior community control
violations, not as punishment for his termination from the STAR Program.
{¶ 13} "[C]ommunity control revocation proceedings are not the same as a criminal
trial, and a revocation of community control punishes the failure to comply with the terms
and conditions of community control, not the specific conduct that led to the revocation."
State v. Davis, 2016-Ohio-879, ¶ 17 (12th Dist.). After finding an offender has violated the
terms and conditions of community control, the trial court may (1) lengthen the term of the
community control sanction; (2) impose a more restrictive community control sanction; or
(3) impose a prison term on the offender, provided that the prison term is within the range
of prison terms available for the offense for which community control had been imposed
and the term does not exceed the prison term specified in the notice provided to the
offender at the original sentencing hearing. R.C. 2929.15(B).
{¶ 14} A "trial court has significant discretion in sentencing a defendant for a
community control violation, so long as it is consistent with the purposes and principles
of sentencing and with notification provided by the trial court when imposing the
community control sanctions." Davis at ¶ 17; State v. Brooks,
2004-Ohio-4746, ¶ 20
(stating that a trial court has "a great deal of latitude in sentencing" an offender for a
community control violation). Thus, a trial court's decision revoking community control will
not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Smith, 2020-Ohio-
3235, ¶ 7 (12th Dist.), citing State v. Bishop,
2011-Ohio-3429, ¶ 11 (12th Dist.). An abuse
of discretion occurs when the trial court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unconscionable.
Id. "An abuse of discretion implies that a decision is both without a
reasonable basis and is clearly wrong." State v. Lavender,
2019-Ohio-5352, ¶ 10 (1st
Dist.)
{¶ 15} On appeal, Sullivan concedes that completion of the STAR Program was a
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term of his community control and that he failed to complete the treatment. This court has
previously determined that a trial court does not abuse its discretion by revoking an
offender's community control where the violation in question was one over which the
offender had control. State v. Smith, 2024-Ohio-2854, ¶ 25 (12th Dist.), citing State v.
Noonan,
2019-Ohio-2960, ¶ 19 (12th Dist.). We have further held that a trial court does
not abuse its discretion in revoking community control "when the offender is on notice that
successful participation in a particular program is a requirement of the community control
and the offender is unsuccessfully discharged from the program." Smith, 2020-Ohio-
3235, at ¶ 8, citing State v. Baldwin,
2016-Ohio-5476, ¶ 10 (12th Dist.).
{¶ 16} Notwithstanding the above, Sullivan argues the trial court abused its
discretion by revoking his community control because it improperly "focused on" his prior
community control violations instead of his termination from the STAR Program. Sullivan
contends that any penalty imposed at the revocation hearing should have been based
upon the community control violation at issue, i.e., his termination from the STAR
Program, not the prior community control violations for which he was already punished.
{¶ 17} After our review of the record, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by revoking Sullivan's community control and imposing a prison term. While
this court acknowledges the trial court's statement that it did not "care about STAR," the
court also stated it was "not happy" Sullivan had violated his community control for the
third time, despite the leniency it had shown him in the past. Notwithstanding the court's
comments regarding the STAR Program, it is undisputed that it found Sullivan's
incompletion of the program to be a violation of the terms of his community control.
Although the trial court may have accepted Sullivan's explanation for his early termination
from the program, such acceptance does not negate his admitted failure to comply with
the terms of his community control. A court's decision to revoke community control for
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even minor violations is not an abuse of discretion. State v. Solomon, 2019-Ohio-1841, ¶
21 (11th Dist.), citing State v. Herald,
2016-Ohio-7733, ¶ 28 (3rd Dist.) (finding no abuse
of discretion where an offender's community control was revoked for his general failure
to comply with the terms of community control). Consequently, even if the trial court did
not consider Sullivan's termination from the STAR Program to be an egregious or serious
violation, the trial court was not unreasonable in revoking his community control as a
result.
{¶ 18} Additionally, although Sullivan argues the trial court should have limited its
decision to revoke his community control to the conduct underlying his termination from
the STAR Program, we disagree. Instead, when deciding to revoke an offender's
community control and impose a prison term, "a trial court can take into consideration the
nature of the community control violation at issue, the manner in which the condition was
violated, as well as any other relevant circumstances in the case." State v. Osco, 2025-
Ohio-4532, ¶ 32 (11th Dist.), citing State v. Mehl, 2022-Ohio-1154, ¶ 18 (4th Dist.). As
such, a trial court is not limited to consideration of the specific violation at issue but instead
should "take into consideration a multitude of factors when making the determination
whether to revoke community control and thereafter, how to sentence."
Mehl at ¶ 19. This
necessarily includes consideration of an offender's criminal history and his likelihood of
recidivism in order to impose a sentence consistent with the purposes and principles of
sentencing as required by Ohio law. R.C. 2929.11; R.C. 2929.12.
{¶ 19} Considering the above, the trial court was permitted to consider any
"relevant circumstances in the case" when deciding to revoke Sullivan's community
control and impose a prison term. This includes Sullivan's proven inability to comply with
the court's orders, as well as his unexplainable misconduct throughout the case. After our
review of the entire record, when deciding to revoke Sullivan's community control, the
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court clearly gave more weight to Sullivan's repeated violations of his community control
and misconduct than it did to the nature of his termination from the STAR Program. Such
weighing of the facts is not unreasonable in this case.
{¶ 20} It is well settled that the privilege of community control rests upon a
defendant's compliance with the conditions of community control and any violation of
those conditions may properly be used to revoke the privilege. Smith, 2020-Ohio-3235,
at ¶ 8. The record reflects Sullivan has repeatedly failed to comply with the conditions of
his community control, including his unsuccessful completion of the STAR Program,
obtaining new criminal charges, using illicit drugs, and failing to report to his probation
officer. As such, based upon the facts of this case, we cannot say the trial court was
without "a reasonable basis" or "clearly wrong" when revoking Sullivan's community
control. Rather, the record supports that Sullivan is unable or unwilling to comply with the
terms and conditions of his community control.
{¶ 21} Based upon the above, we see nothing in the record to suggest that
Sullivan's violation does not warrant revocation. Therefore, we find it was within the trial
court's discretion to find that Sullivan had violated the conditions of his community control,
and to revoke his community control sanctions as a result. Finding no merit to any of the
arguments raised herein, Sullivan's assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 22} Judgment affirmed.
PIPER and BYRNE, JJ., concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
The assignment of error properly before this court having been ruled upon, it is the
order of this court that the judgment or final order appealed from be, and the same hereby
is, affirmed.
It is further ordered that a mandate be sent to the Clermont County Court of
Common Pleas for execution upon this judgment and that a certified copy of this Opinion
and Judgment Entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
Costs to be taxed in compliance with App.R. 24.
/s/ Robert A. Hendrickson, Presiding Judge
/s/ Robin N. Piper, Judge
/s/ Matthew R. Byrne, Judge
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