[Cite as State v. Clark,
2025-Ohio-4992.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2025-L-006
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Criminal Appeal from the
- vs - Court of Common Pleas
ROBERT G. CLARK,
Trial Court No. 2024 CR 000507
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Decided: November 3, 2025
Judgment: Affirmed
Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, and Teri R. Daniel, Assistant Prosecutor,
Lake County Administration Building, 105 Main Street, P.O. Box 490, Painesville, OH
44077 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Cory R. Hinton, Hanahan & Hinton, L.L.C., 7351 Center Street, Suite 1, Mentor, OH
44060 (For Defendant-Appellant).
ROBERT J. PATTON, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Robert G. Clark (“Clark”), appeals from the judgment
of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas sentencing him to a mandatory indefinite
prison term of a minimum of two years to a maximum of three years as a result of his
conviction of aggravated trafficking in drugs, a felony of the second degree, and
aggravated trafficking in drugs, a felony of the third degree. Both trafficking offenses had
accompanying forfeiture specifications pursuant to R.C. 2941.1417 and 2981.04. For the
following reasons, we affirm.
{¶2} On appeal, Clark asserts that insufficient evidence was presented to
support his convictions and that his convictions are against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
{¶3} Upon review, we conclude that Clark’s convictions are not against the
manifest weight of the evidence. As such, Clark’s convictions are necessarily supported
by sufficient evidence. Two controlled buys were conducted wherein drugs were
purchased from Clark. Both transactions involved methamphetamine which were over the
bulk amount but less than five times the bulk amount. The second controlled buy occurred
within the vicinity of a school.
{¶4} Clark also contends that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
Upon review, we conclude that defense counsel’s decisions were debatable trial strategy.
Clark has not demonstrated that defense counsel’s performance was either deficient or
prejudicial.
{¶5} Finally, Clark claims that the sentences imposed by the trial court are
contrary to law. We disagree. The court below expressly stated that it considered the
purposes and principles of sentencing and the recidivism and seriousness factors. Clark’s
sentences are within the statutory guidelines. The sentence imposed on Count 2 was the
minimum mandatory sentence available. Thus, Clark’s sentences are consistent with, and
not contrary to, law.
{¶6} As none of Clark’s assignments of error are meritorious, the judgment of the
Lake County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
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Case No. 2025-L-006
Substantive and Procedural Facts
{¶7} On August 2, 2024, the Lake County Grand Jury returned a two-count
indictment charging Clark with aggravated trafficking in drugs, a felony of the third degree,
in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) (“Count 1”) and aggravated trafficking in drugs, a felony
of the second degree, in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) (“Count 2”). 1 Both counts
contained forfeiture specifications pursuant to R.C. 2941.1417 and R.C. 2981.04.
{¶8} Clark waived his right to be present at arraignment and entered a plea of
not guilty. Bond was continued at $5,000 cash/surety or 10 percent.
{¶9} On November 5, 2024, the eve of trial, Clark filed a motion to continue the
trial and sought the appointment of new counsel. The case proceeded to a jury trial the
following day, on November 6, 2024. Prior to the start of trial, the trial court denied both
of Clark’s requests.
{¶10} The following testimony was presented at trial:
{¶11} Reggie Davis (“Davis”) was charged with a drug trafficking offense in an
unrelated case in December 2023. The charges carried a mandatory prison sentence if
Davis were convicted. In January 2024, agents from the Lake County Narcotics Agency
(“LCNA”) approached Davis and inquired if he would be interested in serving as a
confidential informant. In exchange, the State agreed to recommend a lesser sentence.
Davis ultimately pleaded guilty to a drug trafficking offense and was placed on community
control sanctions.
1. This case was bound over from the Conneaut Municipal Court on April 17, 2024.
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{¶12} At trial in the underlying case, Davis testified that he knew Clark for
approximately five or six years. When Davis became aware that he could get
methamphetamine from Clark, he informed LCNA agents.
{¶13} On March 8, 2024, Davis met with Special Agent 92 at an undisclosed
location prior to conducting a controlled buy of narcotics from Clark. Davis contacted Clark
to arrange the buy. Davis and his vehicle were searched prior to the transaction to ensure
that he was not in possession of drugs, weapons, or money. None were found. Davis was
provided $160 to purchase the drugs and a recording device was placed in his vehicle.
{¶14} Immediately after law enforcement searched Davis and his vehicle, Davis
met Clark at 101 Morse Avenue in Painesville, Lake County, Ohio. Surveillance was set
up in the area. Davis honked the horn to signal to Clark. Clark subsequently approached
the passenger side of Davis’s vehicle and got inside. Once inside the vehicle, Clark asked
Davis to back out of the driveway and drive a short distance due to nearby cameras. On
the short drive to 82 Chester Street, Davis gave the $160 provided by LCNA agents to
Clark. Clark then gave Davis two baggies of methamphetamine.
{¶15} Davis dropped Clark off at a nearby location identified as 82 Chester Street.
Davis then immediately proceeded to a predetermined location to meet with LCNA
agents. The controlled buy was captured on video and introduced as State’s Exhibit 2.
{¶16} Special Agent 92 followed Davis from the initial meeting location, during the
buy, and until Davis returned to the meeting location. When Davis returned to the meeting
location, Davis and his vehicle were searched again. Two bags of suspected drugs
purchased from Clark were turned over to law enforcement. The drugs were admitted as
State’s Exhibit 4. The two baggies of substance were later tested by James Zachary
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Case No. 2025-L-006
Dawson (“Mr. Dawson”), a forensic scientist at the Lake County Crime Lab, and were
determined to be 3.39 grams of methamphetamine, and 3.32 grams of
methamphetamine. Mr. Dawson testified that the bulk amount for methamphetamine is 3
grams.
{¶17} A second controlled buy took place one week later, on March 15, 2024.
Davis again contacted Clark and arranged to purchase methamphetamine. Davis
returned to the same predetermined meeting location prior to the controlled buy. Once
again, Davis and his vehicle were searched for money, weapons, and drugs, and none
were found. Similarly to the prior controlled buy, Davis was provided $160 and a recording
device was placed in his vehicle.
{¶18} Immediately after law enforcement searched Davis and his vehicle, Davis
proceeded to 101 Morse Avenue to meet Clark. Upon arrival, Davis honked the horn.
After waiting for nearly 15 minutes, Davis exited the vehicle to try to contact Clark. Davis
and the vehicle were always under surveillance. Davis returned to the vehicle to wait for
Clark.
{¶19} Approximately 20 to 30 minutes after Davis arrived, Clark approached and
entered Davis’s vehicle. Clark and Davis drove to 616 Joughin Street in Fairport Harbor,
Lake County, Ohio. Clark exited the vehicle and entered the residence at 616 Joughin
Street. Davis remained in the vehicle. According to Davis, upon returning to the vehicle,
he provided Clark the $160 for drugs.
{¶20} Davis and Clark then proceeded back to the Morse Avenue residence. After
Clark was dropped off, Davis then immediately proceeded to a predetermined location to
meet with LCNA agents. Davis was again followed by LCNA agents from the initial
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Case No. 2025-L-006
meeting location, during the buy, and until Davis returned to the meeting location. The
controlled buy was captured on video and introduced as State’s Exhibit 3.
{¶21} When Davis returned to the meeting location, he and his vehicle were
searched. The drugs purchased from Clark were turned over to law enforcement. The
drugs were admitted as State’s Exhibit 5. The substance was later tested by Mr. Dawson
at the Lake County Crime Lab and determined to be 6.99 grams of methamphetamine.
{¶22} The residence at 616 Joughin Street is near Fairport Highschool. David
Phares (“Mr. Phares”), a senior GIS application specialist from the Lake County GIS
Department, utilized software to create a map of the area to determine the distance
between the residence and the school.2 Mr. Phares calculated the distance between the
boundary lines of Fairport Highschool and 616 Joughin Street to be 948.8 feet. The map
created by Mr. Phares was admitted as State’s Exhibit 1.
{¶23} Special Agent 92 also testified that he used Google Maps to approximate
the distance reaching a similar calculation and estimated that the distance between the
school property and the Joughin Street residence was “around . . . nine hundred and
seventy some feet.”
{¶24} After the State’s case-in-chief, defense counsel moved for dismissal
pursuant to Crim.R. 29. The motion was denied. The defense did not call any witness or
present any evidence and subsequently rested. After the defense rested, defense counsel
renewed the Crim.R. 29 motion. Defense counsel’s motion was overruled again.
{¶25} The jury began their deliberations on the evening of November 6, 2024.
Deliberations resumed November 7, 2024. The jury found Clark guilty of both charges.
2. “GIS” refers to Geographic Information Systems.
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As to both counts, the jury found the amount of methamphetamine was equal to or more
than the bulk amount. As to Count 2, the jury also found that the offense was committed
in the vicinity of a school. The trial court ordered a presentence investigation (“PSI”) and
a drug and alcohol evaluation. Clark’s bond was revoked.
{¶26} On December 16, 2024, the trial court sentenced Clark to 18 months on
Count 1 which was ordered to be served concurrently to Count 2. The trial court imposed
an indefinite mandatory prison term of a minimum of two years and a maximum of three
years on Count 2. The trial court waived the mandatory fines and ordered the forfeiture
of the methamphetamine. Clark now appeals.
The Appeal
{¶27} Clark appeals and raises four assignments of error for review:
[1.] The jury’s finding of guilty and Clark’s subsequent
convictions for aggravated trafficking in drugs were contrary
to the manifest weight of the evidence; therefore, Clark’s
conviction for said counts should be overturned, and Clark
should be remanded to the trial court for a new trial.
[2.] Clark’s trial counsel was ineffective in Clark’s defense as
a result of not calling any witnesses and failing to adequately
select an impartial jury.
[3.] The Court’s denial of Defendant’s Rule 29 Motion should
be overturned, and Clark should be remanded to the trial court
for a new trial.
[4.] The trial court erred on December 16, 2024 because its
sentence was contrary to law and an abuse of discretion.
{¶28} We address Clark’s assignments of error out of order, beginning with his
first and third assignments of error as they are interrelated.
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Crim.R. 29 - Sufficiency of Evidence & Manifest Weight
{¶29} In his first assignment of error, Clark asserts that his convictions are against
the manifest weight of the evidence. Clark also argues, in his third assignment of error
that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29
finding that the State presented sufficient evidence to support his convictions.
{¶30} On appeal, where an appellant challenges both the sufficiency and the
manifest weight of the state’s evidence, the appellate court need only address the
manifest weight argument. See State v. Dykes, 2023-Ohio-4378, ¶ 6 (11th Dist.), quoting
State v. Masters,
2020-Ohio-864, ¶ 17 (11th Dist.). The determination that a verdict is not
against the manifest weight necessarily includes a finding that the conviction was
supported by sufficient evidence.
Id.
{¶31} “[W]eight of the evidence addresses the evidence’s effect of inducing
belief.” State v. Wilson, 2007-Ohio-2202, ¶ 25, citing State v. Thompkins,
1997-Ohio-52,
¶ 24. “In other words, a reviewing court asks whose evidence is more persuasive—the
state’s or the defendant’s?”
Id. “‘The court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the
evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and
determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [factfinder] clearly lost its
way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
reversed and a new trial ordered.’”
Thompkins at ¶ 25, quoting State v. Martin,
20 Ohio
App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). “When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial
court on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the appellate
court sits as a ‘“thirteenth juror”’ and disagrees with the factfinder’s resolution of the
conflicting testimony.”
Id., quoting Tibbs v. Florida,
457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982). “‘The
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discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case
in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’” Id., quoting
Martin at 175.
{¶32} Clark was convicted of two counts of aggravated trafficking in drugs,
specifically methamphetamine, a schedule II substance, in violation of R.C.
2925.03(A)(1).
{¶33} R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) provides that “[n]o person shall knowingly do any of the
following: (1) Sell or offer to sell a controlled substance or a controlled substance analog.”
The offense involved drugs equal to or in excess of the bulk amount but was less than
five times the bulk amount. Thus, the offense constituted a felony of the third degree. R.C.
2925.03(C)(1)(c). The second charged offense was elevated to a second-degree felony
because the transaction occurred in the vicinity of a school. Id.
“An offense is ‘committed in the vicinity of a school’ if the
offender commits the offense on school premises, in a school
building, or within one thousand feet of the boundaries of any
school premises, regardless of whether the offender knows
the offense is being committed on school premises, in a
school building, or within one thousand feet of the boundaries
of any school premises.”
R.C.2925.01(P).R.C 2925.01(R)(1) defines “[s]chool premises” in relevant part as “[t]he
parcel of real property on which any school is situated, whether or not any instruction,
extracurricular activities, or training provided by the school is being conducted on the
premises at the time a criminal offense is committed.”
{¶34} Clark argues on appeal that Davis was biased and that his testimony was
not credible. Clark further asserts that the video did not capture the drug transaction as
Davis’s arm blocked the camera lens and the camera was angled toward the roof of a
vehicle. Clark further alleges that officers did not conduct a thorough search of Davis prior
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Case No. 2025-L-006
to the controlled buys, and that Davis had the drugs prior to meeting with Clark. Clark
asserts that Davis was dishonest about what really occurred to receive a favorable
recommendation in Davis’s pending criminal case. Clark also claims that the lack of DNA
evidence tying him to the drugs illustrates that the State did not meet its burden of
persuasion or its burden of production. We disagree.
{¶35} After viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we
conclude that any rational trier of fact could have found Clark knowingly trafficked
methamphetamine. We further find that any rational trier of fact could have found Clark
knowingly trafficked methamphetamine in the vicinity of a school. After reviewing the
records and considering the evidence adduced at trial, and all reasonable inferences
therefrom, witness credibility, and the conflicts in the evidence or lack thereof, we do not
believe that the jury clearly lost its way so as to create a manifest miscarriage of justice.
{¶36} Despite the lack of DNA evidence and the video not capturing the exchange
of drugs between Clark and Davis, the evidence and testimony were sufficient to support
a conviction and were consistent with the manifest weight of the evidence. Both Davis
and Special Agent 92 testified that Davis and his vehicle were searched prior to the
controlled buys. Officers indicated that Davis did not have any drugs on his person, and
that no drugs were inside of his vehicle. Law enforcement had a line of sight on Davis
immediately after the search and maintained that line of sight on him and his vehicle for
the entirety of the transactions, until Davis returned to the predetermined meeting
location. After meeting with Clark on both occasions, Davis no longer had the $160 dollars
provided to him, and instead, he had methamphetamine. Special Agent 92 and Mr.
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Case No. 2025-L-006
Phares testified that the second buy at the 616 Joughin Street, the residence was within
1,000 feet of the boundaries of the school.
{¶37} The jury was aware that Davis had made a deal with law enforcement to
serve as a confidential informant in exchange for a favorable recommendation in Davis’s
pending criminal case. The jury could decide how much weight to give Davis’s testimony.
We conclude that the State met its burden of persuasion as to the trafficking charges. As
Clark’s convictions are not against the weight of the evidence, the convictions are
necessarily supported by sufficient evidence.
{¶38} As such, Clark’s first and third assignments of error are meritless.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
{¶39} In his second assignment of error, Clark alleges that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, he asserts that defense counsel failed to
present any witnesses on his behalf and failed to adequately conduct jury selection. We
disagree.
{¶40} In order to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the
defendant must satisfy the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, (1984). “[A] defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel ‘must show that
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’
Id. at 687-
688. ‘He must also show that the ineffective representation prejudiced his case: “The
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.”’” State v. Burke,
2002-Ohio-5310, ¶ 6, quoting
Strickland at 694. “Under
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Strickland, a court must apply ‘a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments,’
[Strickland at] 691, and ‘indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.’ Id. at 689.”
Burke at ¶ 7. Because
a defendant must satisfy both prongs, failure to demonstrate either prong of Strickland
can be dispositive.
{¶41} “‘The decision to call witnesses is within the province of counsel’s trial
tactics.’” State v. Smith, 2023-Ohio-1533, ¶ 23 (11th Dist.), quoting State v. McKay, 2002-
Ohio-3960, ¶ 43 (11th Dist.). Even if a better strategy is available, debatable strategic and
tactical decisions will not form the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Id., quoting State v. Phillips,
74 Ohio St.3d 72, 85. Unless prejudice is shown, the failure
to call a witness will not be grounds for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.,
citing McKay at ¶ 42, citing State v. Williams,
74 Ohio App.3d 686, 695 (8th Dist. 1991).
{¶42} Clark’s argument that trial counsel should have called unidentified
witnesses to testify on his behalf presumes facts that are not in the record. We cannot
assume these unidentified individuals could testify to a material fact in this case. The
videos of the controlled buys do not show any other individual present except for Clark
and Davis. It is unclear what, if anything, any other witness could have provided. Because
the record does not contain any evidence to suggest that additional witnesses could or
would have testified to any fact inconsistent with the State’s evidence, trial counsel’s
failure to call such unidentified witnesses, if they exist, amounts to a matter of trial tactics.
“We will not second guess debatable trial tactics when determining whether trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.” State v. Perez, 2025-Ohio-509, ¶ 60 (11th
Dist.).
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Case No. 2025-L-006
{¶43} Clark also argues that he could have testified on his own behalf. Clark had
the opportunity to be a witness in his own defense. Without any indication in the record
to the contrary, we must assume that Clark knowingly exercised his privilege against self-
incrimination. Anything Clark could have testified to at trial is pure speculation and cannot
serve as a basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See State v. Carter, 115
Ohio App.3d 770, 776 (7th Dist. 1996); see also State v. Weatherspoon,
2008-Ohio-2345,
¶ 17 (8th Dist.) (concluding that where the appellant failed to state what testimony he
would have provided and did not show that trial counsel’s advice was flawed and
prejudicial, appellant cannot prove his counsel was ineffective).
{¶44} Clark next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
adequately conduct jury selection. Specifically, Clark argues that his counsel “waived one
of his peremptory challenges instead of using it to excuse a potential biased juror.”
{¶45} Clark’s reliance on State v. Martin, 2017-Ohio-7556, is misplaced. In Martin,
the Supreme Court of Ohio concluded that Martin did not meet his burden under
Strickland and failed to establish that his trial counsel was ineffective. The Court
concluded:
“Decisions on the exercise of peremptory challenges are a
part of trial strategy ….” State v. Goodwin, 84 Ohio St.3d
331, 341,
703 N.E.2d 1251 (1999). These are judgment
calls—subjective by nature, often based on intuition and
firsthand observation by trial counsel that a reviewing court
cannot replicate. Hence, it is seldom possible to find that
counsel’s decision to exercise or not exercise peremptory
challenges falls below an objective standard of reasonable
representation. Mundt, 115 Ohio St.3d 22,
2007-Ohio-4836,
873 N.E.2d 828, at ¶ 83; State v. Pickens,
141 Ohio St.3d 462,
2014-Ohio-5445,
25 N.E.3d 1023, ¶ 214, 216. Martin makes
no such showing here.
Id. at ¶ 73.
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{¶46} Here, Clark asserts that his defense counsel should have used the
remaining peremptory challenge during voir dire. Clark does not identify any juror in his
brief that he believes counsel should have sought to remove. Thus, Clark’s broad
assertion does not meet the prongs of Strickland, and Clark has failed to establish that
his trial counsel was ineffective.
{¶47} During oral arguments, Clark argued, for the first time, that he should have
been advised of his right to represent himself when he requested that new counsel be
appointed to represent him. In State v. Knuff, 2024-Ohio-902, the Supreme Court of Ohio
has recognized that:
‘[A] defendant in a state criminal trial has an independent
constitutional right of self-representation and … may
proceed to defend himself without counsel when he
voluntarily, and knowingly and intelligently elects to do so.’
State v. Gibson, 45 Ohio St.2d 366, (1976), paragraph one of
the syllabus, citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
But this right—called a Faretta right—must be “‘timely and
unequivocally asserted’” or else it is waived. State v. Cassano,
96 Ohio St.3d 94,
2002-Ohio-3751,
772 N.E.3d 81, ¶ 38,
quoting Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 888 (9th Cir.1990).
State v. Knuff,
2024-Ohio-902, ¶ 54.
{¶48} There is nothing in the record to indicate that Clark requested to proceed
pro se. Clark did not direct this court to any authority to support the position that a trial
court is required to advise a defendant, upon a request for new counsel, that he can assert
his right to self-representation instead.
{¶49} As such, Clark’s second assignment of error is without merit.
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Sentencing
{¶50} In his fourth and final assignment of error, Clark argues that his sentence
is contrary to law. Specifically, Clark asserts that the trial court did not consider the factors
enumerated in R.C. 2929.12. We disagree.
{¶51} We review felony sentencing pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). See State v.
Lamb, 2023-Ohio-2834, ¶ 9 (11th Dist.); State v. Meeks,
2023-Ohio-988, ¶ 11 (11th Dist.);
State v. Glover,
2024-Ohio-5195. After an appellate court reviews the record and
sentence on appeal, the court “may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence
that is appealed under this section or may vacate the sentence and remand . . . if it clearly
and convincingly finds . . . [t]hat the sentence is . . . contrary to law.” R.C.
2953.08(G)(2)(b). “‘[A] sentence is contrary to law when it does not fall within the statutory
range for the offense or if the trial court fails to consider the purposes and principles of
felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors set forth in R.C.
2929.12.’”
Lamb at ¶ 10, quoting State v. Shannon,
2021-Ohio-789, ¶ 11 (11th Dist.).
{¶52} “The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that while ‘R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a)
permits an appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence if it clearly and convincingly
finds that “the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under” certain
specified statutory provisions. But, R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 are not among the statutory
provisions listed in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a). Only R.C. 2929.13(B) and (D),
2929.14(B)(2)(e) and (C)(4), and 2929.20(I) are specified.’” State v. Feidler, 2024-Ohio-
2040, ¶ 10 (11th Dist.), appeal not accepted, 2024-Ohio-4501, quoting State v. Jones,
2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 28.
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{¶53} Clark was convicted of aggravated trafficking in drugs, a felony of the third
degree, and aggravated trafficking in drugs, a felony of the second degree. R.C.
2925.03(C)(1)(c).
{¶54} The statutory terms are outlined as follows:
For a felony of the second degree committed on or after March
22, 2019, the prison term shall be an indefinite prison term
with a stated minimum term selected by the court of two,
three, four, five, six, seven, or eight years and a maximum
term that is determined pursuant to section 2929.144 of the
Revised Code. . . .
R.C. 2929.14(A)(2)(a).
For a felony of the third degree that is not an offense for which
division (A)(3)(a) of this section applies, the prison term shall
be a definite term of nine, twelve, eighteen, twenty-four, thirty,
or thirty-six months.
R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b).
{¶55} It is clear from our review of the record that Clark’s sentence is within the
statutory range for the offense. Clark does not dispute that the trial court specifically
mentioned both R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. Indeed, the trial court stated both at the
sentencing hearing and in its judgment entry that it considered the purposes and
principles of sentencing and the recidivism and seriousness factors. The trial court
specifically stated at the sentencing hearing that “[a]s for the factors in [R.C.] 2929.12
[sic], nothing stands out factually about the case based on my consideration of the
evidence at trial that makes the offense any more or less serious than what would
normally constitute these two offenses of the degrees for which the Defendant is
charged.”
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{¶56} Clark also argues that the trial court should have considered that the State
induced the offense, and that Clark was acting under strong provocation which the
confidential informant and/or the State created, factors that are enumerated in
R.C.2929.12(C)(1)&(2). Clark essentially asks this Court to reweigh the evidence and
determine that his sentences are inconsistent with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Pursuant
to Jones, this court is not permitted to do so. “A ‘trial court is not required to give any
particular weight or emphasis to a given set of circumstances; it is merely required to
consider the statutory factors in exercising its discretion.’ State v. DelManzo, 2008-Ohio-
5856, ¶ 23 (11th Dist.). A sentencing court fulfills its duties under R.C. 2929.11 and
2929.12 by stating that it considered them. State v. DeLuca, 2021-Ohio-1007, ¶ 18 (11th
Dist.).” State v. Miller,
2025-Ohio-339, ¶ 21 (11th Dist.).
{¶57} Here, the trial court imposed the minimum mandatory sentence available to
it on Count 2. The court below expressly stated that it considered the purposes and
principles of sentencing and the recidivism and seriousness factors. Although not
required, the trial court discussed several recidivism factors. Specifically, the trial court
noted that Clark had a prior criminal history but had led a law-abiding life for a significant
period of time. The court below also noted that Clark violated the conditions of his bond
throughout the pendency of the case by continually using drugs. Thus, Clark’s sentences
are not clearly and convincingly contrary to law.
{¶58} Clark’s fourth and final assignment of error is also meritless.
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Conclusion
{¶59} For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the Lake County
Court of Common Pleas.
MATT LYNCH, J.,
JOHN J. EKLUND, J.,
concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, appellant’s assignments of
error are without merit. It is the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of
the Lake County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Costs to be taxed against appellant.
PRESIDING JUDGE ROBERT J. PATTON
JUDGE MATT LYNCH,
concurs
JUDGE JOHN J. EKLUND,
concurs
THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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