[Cite as State v. Short,
2025-Ohio-5014.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAWRENCE COUNTY
State of Ohio, : Case No. 24CA17
Plaintiff-Appellee, : DECISION AND
JUDGMENT ENTRY
v. :
Melissa D. Short, : RELEASED 10/30/2025
Defendant-Appellant. :
______________________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Karyn Justice, Esq., The Law Office of Karyn Justice, LLC, Portsmouth, Ohio, for
appellant.
Brigham M. Anderson, Lawrence County Prosecuting Attorney, and Andrea M.
Kratzenberg, Lawrence County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Ironton, Ohio, for
appellee.
______________________________________________________________________
Hess, J.
{¶1} Melissa D. Short appeals from a judgment of the Lawrence County
Common Pleas Court convicting her, following a jury trial, of kidnapping and burglary.
Short presents three assignments of error asserting that her convictions are not supported
by the manifest weight of sufficient evidence, that the trial court erred when it did not
merge her convictions at sentencing, and that her sentence is contrary to law. For the
reasons which follow, we overrule the assignments of error and affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
Lawrence App. No. 24CA17 2
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶2} Short was indicted on one count of kidnapping in violation of R.C.
2905.01(A)(2), a first-degree felony, and one count of burglary in violation of R.C.
2911.12(A)(2), a second-degree felony. The matter proceeded to a jury trial at which the
victim testified that on September 7, 2023, around 5:00 p.m., he picked up Short at the
Kroger in Proctorville, took her to his home in Willow Wood, and gave her $50 for sex.
Short spent about an hour at his home, and he dropped her off in Huntington around 7:30
p.m. Around midnight, the victim awoke to knocking on his door. When he answered it,
a man in a ski mask pulled a gun on him and entered the home with three other masked
men. They made him lie down on the floor. His billfold, debit card, watch, car keys, two
cell phones (only one of which had service), and $500 in his pocket and billfold were
taken. The men wanted his debit card PIN so they could go to the bank, and the victim
gave it to them. Two men went to the bank while two men stayed with him. One of the
men who stayed held him at gunpoint while the other man took almost a dozen of the
victim’s firearms out of the home.
{¶3} Later, the other two men returned with Short. When asked if Short had a
mask on, the victim testified, “She had her-- tried to cover up, but she-- I seen her, and
she looked right straight at me when I’m laying there in the floor [sic].” When asked,
“What happened when the two males and Ms. Short came back to your residence?” the
victim testified, “They tied me up and then left after.” The victim testified that his legs
were tied to a kitchen chair in the living room, but his hands were not tied. The victim
freed himself. The intruders took his vehicle, so he rode his four-wheeler to his daughter’s
Lawrence App. No. 24CA17 3
home, had her call 911, and had her track his cell phone. The victim recovered his guns
and vehicle, and his bank reimbursed him for the roughly $1660 taken with his debit card.
{¶4} Deputy Wes Barker of the Lawrence County Sheriff’s Office was dispatched
to the daughter’s home. The victim told Deputy Barker that he brought a prostitute named
Melissa to his home earlier, and later that evening, “he received a knock on his door who,
they [sic] had mentioned that they were the police,” and when he opened the door, “they
forced their way in.” They “all had masks on and held him at gun point.” There were two
black males, a white male, and a female. The victim went back and forth about whether
there was a fourth male; “he wasn’t for certain.” The victim told Deputy Barker that he
heard one of the men call the female Melissa. The victim did not tell Deputy Barker that
he recognized the female. Deputy Barker testified that the victim “suspected” the female
was the prostitute he had hired, but Deputy Barker did not believe the victim told him it
was her. Deputy Barker testified that the victim said that at one point, two males left while
other people stayed with him, but the victim was “not very specific on when [the female]
came and left and such of that thing [sic].” The victim said that his vehicle, cell phone,
wallet, $500, debit cards, multiple firearms, and multiple jewelry items were taken. The
victim also said that “they tied him loosely to a chair” and that he was “tied up for about
an hour or over an hour.” Deputy Barker did not notice any marks on the victim but
observed that “[h]e seemed to be very shaken up.” Deputy Barker tracked the victim’s
phone, which was moving in Huntington, using the Find My iPhone feature on the
daughter’s phone. He had dispatch contact the Huntington Police Department (“HPD”)
to see if it could stop the vehicle the phone was in, and the HPD did.
Lawrence App. No. 24CA17 4
{¶5} Sergeant Steven Sisler of the Lawrence County Sheriff’s Office gave
testimony indicating he was dispatched to the victim’s home, though he could not recall
the address and did not know who resided there. He saw a kitchen chair in the middle of
the living room with a green paracord around it.
{¶6} Detective Sergeant Brad Layman of the Lawrence County Sheriff’s Office
testified that the morning of September 8, 2023, he got a call from Sergeant Sisler about
a home invasion. Dispatch informed Detective Layman that Short had been stopped in
Huntington driving the victim’s vehicle. He went to the scene and saw the victim’s vehicle
and Short in the back of a cruiser. Detective Layman photographed the victim’s vehicle
and items inside it, which included 10-12 firearms and 2 debit cards which belonged to
the victim. Detective Layman testified that he had “never seen that many guns transported
like that.” He went to the HPD to interview Short, and she told him that the victim “let her
borrow the vehicle, and that he had dropped everything off to her that way.” A few days
later, Detective Layman spoke to the victim, who said that he and Short “made an
arrangement for sex and that people would’ve came back with ski masks and entered his
home, and Ms. Short was one of them there and she-- he had heard one of the males call
her by Melissa and they stole everything from him.” Detective Layman was not sure if the
victim provided bank statements but testified that there were text messages from the bank
with fraud alerts.
{¶7} The jury found Short guilty on both counts. During sentencing, the court
read aloud a victim impact statement in which the victim asked the court to impose the
maximum penalty allowed by law and said that Short’s actions had “traumatized” him,
that he fears for his life “on a daily basis,” and that he “can no longer sleep at night.” The
Lawrence App. No. 24CA17 5
State asked for maximum consecutive sentences. The defense asserted that the offenses
should merge and asked for a 6 to 9 year sentence. The court did not merge the offenses,
emphasizing that the purpose of the burglary was to commit theft and that the restraint
continued after the burglary and theft were complete, and the intruders had left. The court
sentenced Short to 11 to 16.5 years in prison on the kidnapping count and 8 to 12 years
in prison on the burglary count. The court ordered that the sentences run consecutive to
one another.
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶8} Short presents three assignments of error:
I. Ms. Short’s convictions are not supported by the manifest weight of
sufficient evidence.
II. The court erred when it did not merge Ms. Short’s convictions at
sentencing.
III. Ms. Short’s sentence is contrary to law.
III. SUFFICIENCY AND MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE
{¶9} In the first assignment of error, Short contends her convictions are not
supported by the manifest weight of sufficient evidence. Short does not dispute that there
is evidence that a burglary and kidnapping occurred. However, she maintains that the
evidence does not show that she committed those offenses or aided or abetted the
unknown intruders. Short asserts that the State’s case relied primarily on the victim’s
inconsistent statements and that neither version of events he gave supports her
convictions. Short asserts that her presence at the scene is insufficient to prove that she
was an aider or abettor and that while there was evidence that she was stopped by police
in Huntington while driving the victim’s vehicle with his property inside, none of the
Lawrence App. No. 24CA17 6
witnesses saw her take the vehicle from his home, and the record does not show that she
“acted in any way or shared the criminal intent of the principal offenders.”
A. Standards of Review
{¶10} In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, “[t]he
relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph
two of the syllabus, superseded by state constitutional amendment on other grounds as
stated in State v. Smith,
80 Ohio St.3d 89, 102, fn. 4 (1997), and following Jackson v.
Virginia,
443 U.S. 307 (1979). “A sufficiency assignment of error challenges the legal
adequacy of the state’s prima facie case, not its rational persuasiveness.” State v.
Anderson,
2019-Ohio-395, ¶ 13 (4th Dist.). “That limited review does not intrude on the
jury’s role ‘to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’” Musacchio v. United States,
577 U.S. 237, 243 (2016), quoting
Jackson at 319. We will not overturn a conviction
based on insufficient evidence “‘unless reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion
that the trier of fact did.’” State v. Cook,
2019-Ohio-4745, ¶ 15 (4th Dist.), quoting State
v. Bradshaw,
2018-Ohio-1105, ¶ 15 (4th Dist.)
{¶11} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, an appellate court
must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable
inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine whether, in
resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and
created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that reversal of the conviction
is necessary. In order to satisfy this test, the state must introduce
Lawrence App. No. 24CA17 7
substantial evidence on all the elements of an offense, so that the jury can
find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Although a court of appeals may determine that a judgment of a trial court
is sustained by sufficient evidence, that court may nevertheless conclude
that the judgment is against the weight of the evidence. However, we are
reminded that generally, it is the role of the jury to determine the weight and
credibility of evidence. “ ‘A jury, sitting as the trier of fact, is free to believe
all, part or none of the testimony of any witness who appears before it.’
” State v. Reyes-Rosales, 4th Dist. Adams No. 15CA1010, 2016-Ohio-
3338, ¶ 17, quoting State v. West, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 12CA3507, 2014-
Ohio-1941, ¶ 23. We defer to the trier of fact on these evidentiary weight
and credibility issues because it is in the best position to gauge the
witnesses’ demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections, and to use these
observations to weigh their credibility.
(Citations omitted.) Anderson at ¶ 14-15.
B. Relevant Statutes
{¶12} Short was charged with burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(2) and
kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(2). R.C. 2911.12(A)(2) states:
(A) No person, by force, stealth, or deception, shall do any of the following:
...
(2) Trespass in an occupied structure or in a separately secured or
separately occupied portion of an occupied structure that is a permanent or
temporary habitation of any person when any person other than an
accomplice of the offender is present or likely to be present, with purpose
to commit in the habitation any criminal offense[.]
{¶13} R.C. 2905.01(A)(2) states:
(A) No person, by force, threat, or deception, . . . shall remove another from
the place where the other person is found or restrain the liberty of the other
person, for any of the following purposes:
...
(2) To facilitate the commission of any felony or flight thereafter[.]”
{¶14} “A person acts purposely when it is the person’s specific intention to cause
a certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against conduct of a certain
Lawrence App. No. 24CA17 8
nature, regardless of what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is the offender’s
specific intention to engage in conduct of that nature.” R.C. 2901.22(A).
{¶15} Although Short was charged in terms of the principal offenses, at trial, the
State asserted that Short was also guilty as an aider and abettor, and the trial court gave
the jury complicity instructions. See generally R.C. 2923.03(F) (“A charge of complicity
may be stated in terms of this section, or in terms of the principal offense”). R.C. 2923.03
is Ohio’s complicity statute. R.C. 2923.03(A)(2) states: “No person, acting with the kind
of culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall . . . [a]id or abet another in
committing the offense[.]” “Whoever violates this section is guilty of complicity in the
commission of an offense, and shall be prosecuted and punished as if he were a principal
offender.” R.C. 2923.03(F).
{¶16} The trial court instructed the jury that to find Short guilty of complicitly by
aiding and abetting
you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant supported,
assisted, encouraged, cooperated with, advised, solicited, procured or
incited the principal offender in the commission of the offense and that the
defendant shared the criminal intent of the principal offender. Such intent
may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the offense, including,
but not limited to, presence, companionship and conduct before and after
the offense was committed. The mere presence of the defendant at the
scene of the offense is not sufficient to prove in and of itself that the
defendant was an aider or abettor.
C. Analysis
{¶17} The jury could conclude that Short supported, assisted, encouraged,
cooperated with, advised, solicited, procured or incited the principal offenders in the
commission of the burglary and kidnapping and that she shared their criminal intent.
Short was not merely present at the crime scene. A few hours before the home invasion,
Lawrence App. No. 24CA17 9
Short spent about an hour in the victim’s home and rode in his vehicle twice, which gave
her access to information about his home and possessions. Later, masked men entered
the home and took the victim’s property at gunpoint. There is evidence that Short
reentered the home with two of the masked men after the victim’s debit card was used to
take money from his bank account. When asked, “What happened when the two males
and Ms. Short came back to your residence?” the victim testified, “They tied me up and
then left after,” indicating Short participated in tying him up. Even if the jury did not believe
the victim’s testimony that he recognized Short during the home invasion, the jury could
still infer that Short was the female intruder the victim reported to law enforcement from
other facts, including that the victim told law enforcement that he heard a male intruder
call the female intruder “Melissa” and tracking of the victim’s cell phone resulted in Short
being stopped by police while driving the victim’s vehicle containing his debit cards and
firearms. In addition, there is evidence that instead of reporting what happened to law
enforcement, Short lied about the victim lending her his vehicle with his possessions
already inside it.
{¶18} Any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
offenses proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and in resolving conflicts in the evidence,
the jury did not clearly lose its way and create such a manifest miscarriage of justice that
reversal of the convictions is necessary. Sufficient evidence supports the convictions,
and the convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly,
we overrule the first assignment of error.
Lawrence App. No. 24CA17 10
IV. MERGER
{¶19} In the second assignment of error, Short contends the trial court erred when
it did not merge her convictions at sentencing. Short maintains that the restraint of the
victim was merely incidental to the burglary. She asserts that the victim was not moved
from his home, was not harmed while restrained, and “testified he was able to free himself
and go to his daughter’s house shortly after [the intruders] left.” Thus, “[t]he record does
not show there was separate animus or intent to kidnap or retrain [sic] [the victim] except
as part of the commission of the burglary.”
{¶20} “R.C. 2941.25 codifies the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 10, Article I of the Ohio
Constitution, which prohibits multiple punishments for the same offense.” State v.
Underwood, 2010-Ohio-1, ¶ 23. The statute states:
(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to constitute
two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or information
may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may be
convicted of only one.
(B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more offenses of
dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses of
the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus as
to each, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such
offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of all of them.
“We review de novo whether certain offenses should be merged as allied offenses
under R.C. 2941.25.” State v. Sines-Riley, 2024-Ohio-2860, ¶ 57 (4th Dist.), citing State
v. Bailey,
2022-Ohio-4407, ¶ 6, 13.
{¶21} “In determining whether offenses are allied offenses of similar import within
the meaning of R.C. 2941.25, courts must evaluate three separate factors—the conduct,
the animus, and the import.” State v. Ruff, 2015-Ohio-995, paragraph one of the syllabus.
Lawrence App. No. 24CA17 11
“Under R.C. 2941.25(B), a defendant whose conduct supports multiple offenses may be
convicted of all the offenses if any one of the following is true: (1) the conduct constitutes
offenses of dissimilar import, (2) the conduct shows that the offenses were committed
separately, or (3) the conduct shows that the offenses were committed with separate
animus.”
Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus. “Two or more offenses of dissimilar
import exist within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25(B) when the defendant’s conduct
constitutes offenses involving separate victims or if the harm that results from each
offense is separate and identifiable.”
Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶22} In State v. Logan, 60 Ohio St.2d 126 (1979), the Supreme Court stated:
In establishing whether kidnapping and another offense of the same or
similar kind are committed with a separate animus as to each pursuant to
R.C. 2941.25(B), this court adopts the following guidelines:
(a) Where the restraint or movement of the victim is merely incidental to a
separate underlying crime, there exists no separate animus sufficient to
sustain separate convictions; however, where the restraint is prolonged, the
confinement is secretive, or the movement is substantial so as to
demonstrate a significance independent of the other offense, there exists a
separate animus as to each offense sufficient to support separate
convictions;
(b) Where the asportation or restraint of the victim subjects the victim to a
substantial increase in risk of harm separate and apart from that involved in
the underlying crime, there exists a separate animus as to each offense
sufficient to support separate convictions.
Logan at syllabus. “The primary issue . . . is whether the restraint or movement of the
victim is merely incidental to a separate underlying crime or, instead, whether it has a
significance independent of the other offense.” Id. at 135. Although Logan predates Ruff,
we continue to use Logan’s guidelines in determining whether kidnapping and similar
offenses were committed with the same animus. See State v. Jones,
2021-Ohio-2601, ¶
30 (4th Dist.).
Lawrence App. No. 24CA17 12
{¶23} In the case, the offenses were committed with separate animus. The
conduct shows the animus for the burglary was theft. The restraint of the victim was not
merely incidental to the burglary and had significance independent of it. Although there
was no substantial movement of the victim, the confinement was secretive as it happened
in the victim’s house in the middle of the night. See State v. Ramirez, 2011-Ohio-6531,
¶ 60 (12th Dist.) (finding confinement secretive because crimes occurred in victim’s house
in middle of night). The restraint was also prolonged. Contrary to what Short asserts, the
victim did not testify that he freed himself “shortly” after the intruders left. And Deputy
Barker testified that the victim told him that he was “tied up for about an hour or over an
hour.” Even if the victim freed himself shortly after the intruders left, the duration of the
restraint exceeded that necessary to complete the theft. The victim was tied to the chair
after his car keys and other possessions were taken at gunpoint and right before the
intruders left. Thus, the conduct shows that the animus for kidnapping the victim by tying
him to the chair was to facilitate escape. See generally State v. Brown,
12 Ohio St.3d
147, 151 (1984) (fact that defendant bound and gagged victim upon completion of sexual
attacks indicated that particular restraint was performed to facilitate his escape, not to
facilitate a sexual attack); State v. Killingsworth,
2020-Ohio-724, ¶ 18 (3d Dist.)
(kidnapping and robbery committed with separate animus because instead of fleeing
immediately after robbery, defendant continued to hold victim at gunpoint for at least a
few more minutes, so duration of restraint “clearly exceeded that necessary to complete
the robbery,” and “the restraint was not merely incidental to the robbery”). Thus, Short
could be convicted of both offenses. Accordingly, we overrule the second assignment of
error.
Lawrence App. No. 24CA17 13
V. SENTENCING
{¶24} In the third assignment of error, Short contends her sentence is contrary to
law. Short maintains the trial court erred when it imposed maximum sentences for each
offense. Short asserts that R.C. 2929.11(A) requires that a court use the minimum
sanctions necessary to protect the public from future crime, punish the offender, and
promote the effective rehabilitation of the offender and that R.C. 2929.11(B) requires that
a sentence be commensurate with the seriousness of the offense. She claims “[t]he
record does not support the court’s finding that [her] sentence is commensurate with the
offense or is the minimum sanction necessary to achieve the purposes of felony
sentencing.” Short also asserts that consecutive sentences are improper because the
record does not support the court’s finding that multiple offenses were committed that
caused harm that was great or unusual. Short maintains that the victim was not physically
harmed, his items were recovered, he did not provide bank statements to show what
money was taken with his debit card, and “[h]e was not restrained for a prolonged period
of time apart from what was intrinsic to effectuate the burglary.”
A. R.C. 2953.08
{¶25} R.C. 2953.08(A) authorizes a defendant who is convicted of a felony to
appeal as a matter of right the sentence imposed on the defendant on various grounds,
including that the sentence is “contrary to law.” R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) states:
The court hearing an appeal under division (A), (B), or (C) of this section
shall review the record, including the findings underlying the sentence or
modification given by the sentencing court.
The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence
that is appealed under this section or may vacate the sentence and remand
the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing. The appellate court’s
standard for review is not whether the sentencing court abused its
Lawrence App. No. 24CA17 14
discretion. The appellate court may take any action authorized by this
division if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the following:
(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under
division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section
2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever,
if any, is relevant;
(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
{¶26} “Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is
more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of such certainty
as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in
the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be
established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.
B. Maximum Sentences
{¶27} Short’s suggestion that her sentence is contrary to law because the
imposition of maximum sentences is not supported under R.C. 2929.11 is not well taken.
“R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) permits an appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence if it
clearly and convincingly finds that ‘the record does not support the sentencing court’s
findings under’ certain specified statutory provisions.” State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶
28. “But R.C. 2929.11 . . . [is] not among the statutory provisions listed in R.C.
2953.08(G)(2)(a).”
Id. Moreover, “an appellate court’s conclusion that the record does
not support a sentence under R.C. 2929.11 . . . is not the equivalent of a conclusion that
the sentence is ‘otherwise contrary to law’ as that term is used in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b).”
Id. at ¶ 34. Thus “R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) does not allow an appellate court to modify or
vacate a sentence based on its view that the sentence is not supported by the record
under R.C. 2929.11 . . . .” State v. Bryant,
2022-Ohio-1878, ¶ 22, citing Jones at ¶ 31,
Lawrence App. No. 24CA17 15
39. Thus, we overrule the third assignment of error to the extent it challenges the
imposition of maximum sentences.
C. Consecutive Sentences
{¶28} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) states:
If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions of
multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the prison
terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is
necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender
and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness
of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public,
and if the court also finds any of the following:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the
offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed
pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or
was under post-release control for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or
more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the
multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single
prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses
of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.
(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive
sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the
offender.
{¶29} Short challenges whether the record supports the court’s R.C.
2929.14(C)(4)(b) finding, but after reviewing the entire record, we do not clearly and
convincingly find that the record does not support this finding. The record shows that the
kidnapping and burglary were committed as part of a course of conduct. The victim’s
statements that he was traumatized, fears for his life on a daily basis, and can no longer
sleep at night support a finding that the harm caused by Short’s offenses was so great
that no single prison term for any of the offenses adequately reflects the seriousness of
Lawrence App. No. 24CA17 16
her conduct. Accordingly, we overrule the remainder of the third assignment of error to
the extent it challenges the imposition of consecutive sentences.
VI. CONCLUSION
{¶30} Having overruled the assignments of error, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Lawrence App. No. 24CA17 17
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that appellant shall pay the
costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Lawrence
County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS
BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is
temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the bail previously posted.
The purpose of a continued stay is to allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of
Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay
is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day
period, or the failure of the appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of
Ohio in the 45-day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of
the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the
appeal prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such
dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Abele, J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court
BY: ________________________
Michael D. Hess, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment
entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with
the clerk.
