[Cite as State v. Craig,
2025-Ohio-5035.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
MAHONING COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
GARRETT CHARLES CRAIG,
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Case No. 25 MA 0038
Criminal Appeal from the
Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio
Case No. 2024 CR 00371
BEFORE:
Carol Ann Robb, Mark A. Hanni, Katelyn Dickey, Judges.
JUDGMENT:
Affirmed.
Atty. Lynn Maro, Mahoning County Prosecutor, Atty. Kristie M. Weibling, Assistant
Mahoning County Prosecutor, for Plaintiff-Appellee and
Atty. Donald K. Pond, for Defendant-Appellant.
Dated: November 5, 2025
–2–
Robb, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant, Garrett Charles Craig, appeals the April 15, 2025 judgment
sentencing him to thirty months in prison. Craig entered a guilty plea to a third-degree
felony, failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer in violation of R.C.
2921.331(B)(C)(5)(a)(ii). He now argues his plea agreement was invalid. For the
following reasons, we affirm.
Statement of the Case
{¶2} Craig was initially charged via two criminal complaints in Youngstown
Municipal Court. He was charged with failure to comply with an order or signal of an
officer by operating a vehicle so as to willfully elude or evade police, and the operation of
the vehicle caused substantial risk of harm. (May 15, 2024 Complaint.) On that same
date, Craig was also charged with possession of crack cocaine, a fifth-degree felony in
violation of R.C. 2925.11(C)(4)(a) and possession of drug paraphernalia. The incident
report attached to the complaints states Craig was traveling 65 miles per hour in a 25 mile
per hour zone after ignoring an officer’s signal to pull over. When stopped, officers found
several containers on Craig containing crack cocaine, as well as a used crack pipe. (May
15, 2024 Complaint.)
{¶3} Craig failed to appear for his initial hearing, and a warrant was issued for
his arrest. He was appointed counsel. The matter was bound over to the Mahoning
County Court of Common Pleas.
{¶4} Craig was subsequently indicted by the Mahoning County Grand Jury and
charged with three counts: failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer in
violation of R.C. 2921.331(B) and (C)(5)(a)(ii), a third-degree felony; possession of a
controlled substance containing cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(4)(a), a
fifth-degree felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of R.C. 2925.13, a
fourth-degree misdemeanor. (July 11, 2024 Indictment.)
{¶5} The parties exchanged discovery, and the case was set for trial.
{¶6} The state moved to dismiss counts two and three in exchange for Craig’s
guilty plea to count one. The state also agreed to recommend two alternate sentencing
options. The agreement states: “The State of Ohio . . . has agreed to recommend the
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following: A. Agreed 9 months [in] prison OR B. State argues 18 months, Defense argues
probation.” (February 12, 2025 Guilty Plea.) The next paragraph of the agreement states
in bold:
Please note that any recommendation offered by the State is expressly
contingent upon the Defendant appearing timely at his/her sentencing
hearing and not committing any new crimes pending sentencing. In
the event that the Defendant fails to appear for sentencing or is
charged with or convicted of any crimes following his/her plea, the
State shall be relieved of its obligation with regard to its
recommendation.
The plea agreement also states in all caps and bold: “SENTENCING LIES SOLELY
WITH THE DISCRETION OF THE COURT AND THAT ANY AGREEMENT BETWEEN
COUNSEL FOR THE STATE AND MY ATTORNEY IS MERELY A
RECOMMENDATION.” Each page is initialed by Craig, and the last page is signed by
defense counsel, the prosecution, and the defendant. (February 12, 2025 Guilty Plea.)
{¶7} The plea hearing reflects Craig was present and represented by counsel.
The court reviewed the terms of the plea agreement and advised Craig in part that it could
sentence him to up to 36 months in prison and fine him up to $10,000. (February 12,
2025 Plea Hearing.) The court accepted the guilty plea, ordered a presentence
investigation, and set the matter for sentencing in April of 2025. (February 12, 2025
Judgment.)
{¶8} The state moved to revoke Craig’s bond on February 24, 2025. For cause,
the state alleged Craig was arrested on February 23, 2025 for possession of drugs and
drug paraphernalia and resisting arrest, all in violation of his bond conditions. A
Boardman Township Police report is attached to the motion as exhibit A. (February 24,
2025 Motion to Revoke.) The court found Craig was in violation and revoked his bond.
(February 24, 2025 Judgment.)
{¶9} The presentence investigation report shows there were two active warrants
for Craig’s arrest in two other Ohio counties. He also had charges pending in Monongalia
County, West Virgina. Craig was 32 years old at the time of the report, and it reflects he
had incurred numerous other criminal charges in varying counties. (PSI Report.)
Case No. 25 MA 0038
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{¶10} In August of 2010, Craig was charged as an adult with possession of drug
paraphernalia and possession of marijuana. He was ordered to pay a fine and court
costs. In November of 2011, he was charged with possession of drugs and drug
trafficking in Logan County. He was given five years of community control and placed at
a residential facility for up to six months. Three months later, the PSI shows he violated
his conditions and was sentenced to 27 months in prison. Additionally, Craig had been
convicted of possession of drug paraphernalia in 2013 in Delaware County; drug
trafficking in 2015 in Logan County; trafficking heroin in Hardin County in 2015; and
attempted possession of drugs and drug abuse in 2021 in Boardman, Ohio. (PSI Report.)
{¶11} In 2024, Craig was again convicted of possession of drug paraphernalia.
He spent three days in jail and was ordered to serve 12 months of probation. Craig
violated the terms of his probation. In 2024, he was also charged with disorderly conduct
and the instant offense, failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer. (PSI
Report.)
{¶12} Sentencing was held in April of 2025. The prosecution spoke at the
beginning of the hearing and explained the plea agreement and that Craig had “picked
up new charges” since entering the plea. Notwithstanding, the state then expounded that
it offered an 18-month agreed sentence, which the defendant declined. The prosecutor
urged the court to impose a term of 36 months in light of the fact that Craig was charged
with additional offenses after pleading guilty in this case and based on his extensive
criminal history outlined in the PSI.
{¶13} Defense counsel agreed with the veracity of the prosecutor’s recitation of
the plea negotiations. The defense acknowledged Craig obtained additional charges after
his plea agreement, but said Craig had accepted responsibility for his conduct and spent
30 days in the county jail as a result. The defense further emphasized that Craig suffered
from a severe drug problem and that his prior prison terms were unhelpful in his
rehabilitation. The defense asked the court to allow Craig to secure “legitimate treatment”
for his addiction. Thus, the defense asked the court to impose community control to allow
him to continue ongoing substance abuse treatment. (April 11, 2025 Sentencing Tr.)
{¶14} Craig spoke on his own behalf. He said he needed help. He also stressed
he is the financial provider for his children and his involvement in his church. Craig asked
Case No. 25 MA 0038
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the court to give him a chance to obtain drug treatment and counseling instead of prison.
In response, the court asked about the warrants for his arrests in two other counties. The
defense confirmed there were two outstanding warrants, one in Marysville and one in
Trumbull County. Defense counsel stated the warrant in Trumbull County was a result of
the defendant’s failure to appear while he was in jail and the official’s failure to transport
him for a hearing. Defense counsel also verified that Craig’s partner had a baby on the
way and that Craig’s employer was present at the hearing and was willing to keep his job
open for him.
{¶15} The court found Craig was not amenable to community control and prison
is consistent with the principles and purposes of sentencing. The court ordered Craig to
serve 30 months in prison with credit for time served. The court suspended all costs and
fines. (April 11, 2025 Sentencing Tr.; April 15, 2025 Judgment.)
{¶16} Craig appeals the trial court’s April 15, 2025 decision and raises one
assignment of error.
Assignment of Error: Validity of Plea Agreement
{¶17} Craig’s sole assignment of error asserts:
“The trial court erred by finding Appellant guilty based on an invalid plea agreement
and thereby an involuntary guilty plea.”
{¶18} Craig argues his plea was not valid or enforceable since it was based on an
illusory promise, i.e., the state’s authority to revoke its promise to make one of the two
agreed upon sentencing recommendations if Craig sustained additional criminal charges
pending sentencing. Craig avers the state had the power or discretion over whether this
revocation provision applied, and as such, it was an illusory promise. Thus, he claims the
plea agreement was illegal, unenforceable, and did not comport with due process in
violation of the Ohio and United States Constitutions. For the following reasons, we
disagree.
{¶19} “Plea agreements are an essential and necessary part of the administration
of justice.” State v. Carpenter, 68 Ohio St.3d 59, 61 (1993), quoting Santobello v. New
York,
404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).
{¶20} Contract law principles generally govern and dictate the interpretation and
enforcement of plea agreements. State v. Bethel, 2006-Ohio-4853, ¶ 50. The “essential
Case No. 25 MA 0038
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elements of a contract include an offer, acceptance, contractual capacity, consideration
(the bargained for legal benefit and/or detriment), a manifestation of mutual assent and
legality of object and of consideration.” Kostelnik v. Helper, 2002-Ohio-2985, ¶ 16,
quoting Perlmuter Printing Co. v. Strome, Inc.,
436 F.Supp. 409, 414 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
Whether there is consideration is a question of law for the court to decide. Williams v.
Ormsby,
2012-Ohio-690, ¶ 17.
{¶21} A guilty plea that is not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary does not comport
with due process and violates the Ohio and United States Constitutions. State v. Engle,
74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527 (1996), citing Kercheval v. United States,
274 U.S. 220 (1927).
“Because the defendant's constitutional rights are at stake in the plea process, the
concerns underlying a plea agreement differ from and go beyond those of commercial
contract law.” State v. Dye,
2010-Ohio-5728, ¶ 21, citing Carpenter,
68 Ohio St.3d at 61.
{¶22} “[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement
of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration,
such promise must be fulfilled.” Koresjza v. Harry, 2017 WL 6375583, *3 (6th Cir. Dec.12,
2017), quoting Santobello v. New York,
404 U.S. 257, 261-62 (1971).
{¶23} Generally, a contract is improperly based on an “illusory promise” when one
party, particularly the state, retains “an unlimited right to determine the nature or extent
of [the defendant’s] performance.” State v. Aponte, 145 Ohio App.3d 607, 612-613 (10th
Dist. 2001). “A guilty plea induced by ‘unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises,’ made by either
the prosecution, the court, or defendant's counsel is not voluntary.” State v. Aponte,
145
Ohio App.3d 607, 614 (10th Dist. 2001).
{¶24} “[A] contract is illusory . . . when by its terms the promisor retains an
unlimited right to determine the nature or extent of his performance; the unlimited right, in
effect, destroys his promise and thus makes it merely illusory. 1 Williston on Contracts (3
Ed. 1957) 140, Section 43.” Century 21 Am. Landmark, Inc. v. McIntyre, 68 Ohio App.2d
126, 129-30 (1st Dist. 1980).
{¶25} In State v. Johnson, 2023-Ohio-2282, ¶ 39 (7th Dist.), we found the plea
agreement in that case contained an illusory promise. In Johnson, the agreement
contained language stating the defendant was to cooperate with police for three weeks,
and if the state was satisfied with the defendant’s cooperation efforts, then the defendant
Case No. 25 MA 0038
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could withdraw his guilty plea. We concluded the plea agreement was invalid in part
because the language it contained made it unclear what the defendant was required to
do to satisfy the cooperation agreement. The lack of clarity afforded the state with
discretion over whether the contingency was satisfied such that the state’s promise was
illusory. Id. at ¶ 51.
{¶26} In the instant matter, the at-issue provision relieves the state of its obligation
to make the agreed upon sentencing recommendation if the defendant sustained new
criminal charges after the plea and before sentencing. Here, the provision prohibiting
Craig from incurring additional charges pending sentencing was triggered based on his
conduct. Thus, we disagree that the state retained power or discretion to determine
whether this provision of the plea agreement was satisfied. Instead, the agreement made
it clear what the defendant had to do to comply—not incur additional charges after the
plea agreement was entered before sentencing. Unlike Johnson, the state in this case
did not have power or discretion to determine whether the defendant satisfied this
provision.
{¶27} Moreover, Craig was out on bond pending sentencing. Ohio appellate
courts, including this one, have held a defendant's violation of bond conditions, such as
committing another crime while awaiting sentencing or failing to appear at sentencing,
constitutes a breach of a plea agreement and relieves the state of its obligation to
recommend the sentence described in the agreement. State v. Gutierres, 2024-Ohio-
2767, ¶ 34 (7th Dist.), citing State v. Bembry, 2014-Ohio-5498, ¶ 22 (7th Dist.); accord
State v. Hill,
2013-Ohio-674, ¶ 20 (10th Dist.); State v. Cox,
1993 WL 548082 (11th Dist.
Dec. 10, 1993); and State v. Payton,
2010-Ohio-5178, ¶ 11 (6th Dist.). “[T]here is an
implied condition that the circumstances surrounding the bargain will remain substantially
the same; a substantial change in the circumstances is sufficient to relieve the state of its
obligation.” Gutierres at ¶ 31, quoting
Bembry at ¶ 22.
{¶28} Unlike the provision in Johnson, the contingency in Craig’s plea agreement
was well defined and did not allow the state to determine whether it was satisfied. Craig
failed to satisfy his responsibility not to incur additional criminal charges before
sentencing; there was no illusory promise or unsatisfied bargain by the state. This
assigned error lacks merit.
Case No. 25 MA 0038
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Conclusion
{¶29} Craig’s sole assignment of error lacks merit. The trial court’s judgment is
affirmed.
Hanni, J., concurs.
Dickey, J., concurs.
Case No. 25 MA 0038
[Cite as State v. Craig, 2025-Ohio-5035.]
For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignment of error is
overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the Court
of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs waived.
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in
this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a
certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
This document constitutes a final judgment entry.
