In re E.W.

[Cite as In re E.W., 

.]


                                COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                               EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                  COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE E.W.                                    :
                                              :              No. 115323
A Minor Child                                 :
                                              :
[Appeal by Mother, M.W.]                      :


                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 6, 2025


            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                   Juvenile Division
                                Case No. AD24901638


                                        Appearances:

                Patrick S. Lavelle, for appellant.

                Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                Attorney, and Joseph C. Young, Assistant Prosecuting
                Attorney, for appellee.


WILLIAM A. KLATT, J.:

                   Appellant M.W. (“Mother”) appeals from the juvenile court’s July 3,

2025 judgment entry that terminated her parental rights and granted permanent

custody of her minor child, E.W. (“child”) (d.o.b. 2/16/2024), to the Cuyahoga

County Division of Children and Family Services (“the agency” or “CCDCFS”). After
reviewing the facts of the case and pertinent law, we affirm the juvenile court’s

judgment.

I. Factual and Procedural History

              Mother tested positive for illegal drugs while pregnant with E.W., and

Mother gave birth to E.W. on February 16, 2024. On February 20, 2024, the agency

filed a complaint for dependency and permanent custody to CCDCFS and a motion

for predispositional temporary custody. The complaint alleged that Mother was

unable to provide safe and appropriate care for the child because of concerns of

substance abuse and mental-health issues and lack of necessary judgment and

decision-making skills. On that same day, the juvenile court granted the agency

emergency temporary custody of E.W.

              At the time of E.W.’s birth, the agency had an existing case plan for

Mother and two of her sons — Ju.W. (d.o.b. 9/15/2008) and Ja.W. (d.o.b.

8/22/2009) — who had previously been adjudicated neglected and/or dependent.1

See Cuyahoga J.C. Nos. AD21907668 and AD23902856. On March 21, 2024, the

agency filed with the court an updated case plan that included E.W. The case plan

noted Mother’s history of substance abuse and mental-health concerns and

indicated Mother was to complete a drug and alcohol assessment and submit

random drug screens; complete a psychological evaluation; and attend a parenting




      1 Mother’s third son, L.W. (d.o.b. 10/16/2019), was in the temporary custody of his

Father and was not included in the case plan. See Cuyahoga J.C. No. AD23902857.
program. The agency placed E.W. in foster care and approved weekly supervised

visitation with Mother. E.W. remained in foster care for the duration of her case.

                At the time of E.W.’s birth, Mother had a pending criminal case. On

March 28, 2024, Mother was sentenced in that case to an aggregate prison term of

21 months on charges of attempted burglary, assault, criminal damaging, grand

theft, attempted having weapons while under disability, menacing by stalking, and

swatting. Mother was remanded to prison where she remained during the pendency

of the instant case.

                On May 24, 2024, the juvenile court conducted a hearing on the

agency’s amended complaint for dependency and temporary custody of E.W.

Mother admitted to the allegations of the amended complaint including that she

needed to maintain her sobriety and mental health to provide safe and appropriate

care for E.W. and engage in recommended substance-abuse services. Mother

admitted that her three older children had been adjudicated neglected and/or

dependent because of, in part, her lack of appropriate judgment and decision-

making skills and were in the agency’s temporary legal custody. Mother further

admitted there was a pending motion requesting legal custody of L.W. to his Father

and pending motions seeking permanent custody of Ju.W. and Ja.W. to the agency

because of Mother’s failure to alleviate the concerns that led to the initial removal of

the children.    Those concerns included substance abuse, mental health, and

parenting. The juvenile court journalized an entry on July 15, 2024, that adjudicated

E.W. dependent and committed her to the agency’s temporary custody.
               On February 4, 2025, the agency filed a motion for permanent

custody of E.W., and on February 11, 2025, the child’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”)

submitted a report that recommended permanent custody of E.W. to the agency.

               A February 28, 2015 semiannual review (“SAR”) noted Mother was

on a waitlist for alcohol or drug services in prison, but her progress with such

services was unknown. The SAR also noted E.W. had developed a strong and

healthy bond with her foster parents. The SAR indicated the case worker attempted

to obtain monthly updates from Mother’s case manager at the prison, but the case

manager had not returned his phone calls.

               On June 24, 2025, the juvenile court conducted trial on the agency’s

motion for permanent custody. Mother, the agency case worker, and E.W.’s GAL

participated in the hearing.

Mother’s Trial Testimony

               Mother conceded she had no relationship with E.W. Since the agency

was granted temporary custody four days after E.W.’s birth, Mother had seen the

child only once during a video telephone call between Mother and Ja.W.2 Mother

further testified that while incarcerated, she had unsuccessfully attempted to

arrange virtual visitation with E.W. It was Mother’s understanding that the agency

needed to complete paperwork to facilitate such visitations. Mother stated that her

case worker had not attempted to contact her during her incarceration.



      2 E.W. and Ja.W.’s foster parents facilitated visits between the siblings.   E.W.
coincidentally visited Ja.W. on a day he had a prearranged call with Mother.
              Mother testified that during her incarceration she completed classes

on parenting, domestic violence, and substance abuse. Mother stated she had been

unable to receive mental-health services because she missed her scheduled

appointments when she was transported from prison for court appearances in the

instant case. Mother testified that she had been sober for one and one-half years

during her incarceration. Mother further testified drugs were accessible in prison,

she was subject to monthly drug screens in prison, and those screens had all been

negative. Mother stated she currently attends AA classes, participates in peer

support groups, practices mindfulness, and is learning how to “control herself.”

              Mother agreed that she had completed recommended substance-

abuse programs in the past and had still experienced relapses including positive

drug testing when she was pregnant with E.W. To avoid relapse upon release from

prison, Mother stated she would continue to attend AA meetings and get a sponsor

and seek assistance from the Black Mental Health Corporation.

              Mother also testified that upon her release from prison, she intended

to participate in Edwin’s culinary arts program and the program would provide

housing for her and E.W. However, Mother’s release date was scheduled for

November 21, 2025, and if she was not released in time for Edwin’s start date of

November 10, 2025, she would be placed on the program’s waitlist.

Case Worker’s Trial Testimony

              The case worker stated the agency’s concerns for Mother — substance

abuse, mental health, and parenting — were the same during the prior cases with
her three sons and the instant case with E.W. The case worker testified that the

agency referred Mother for all relevant services prior to her incarceration.

              The case worker testified that Mother engaged in some classes during

her incarceration — and received certificates of completion — but Mother did not

complete a required parenting class because of a scheduling conflict.

              The case worker stated that Mother had completed substance abuse

services several times in the past without long-lasting change. Thus, the case worker

explained that the agency would need to document Mother’s maintained sobriety

while living in her community with free access to the abused substances rather than

rely on her sobriety during her incarceration. Additionally, upon release Mother

would need to have sustained housing, complete parenting classes, and participate

in mental-health services.

              In regard to E.W., the case worker stated the child was well-adjusted

and bonded with her foster parents. The agency considered three relatives with

whom they could place E.W., but it declined two relatives who did not pass the

necessary background check. The third relative lacked the financial means to foster

E.W. but could be considered in the future.

              According to the case worker, virtual visitation between Mother and

E.W. could occur upon the agency’s submission of a form. The case worker stated

he had not completed the form because he erroneously thought Mother engaged in

virtual visits simultaneously with E.W. and her son.
              The case worker testified that he did not believe Mother could provide

a safe, stable, and permanent home.

GAL’s Trial Testimony

              The GAL testified that she learned during the custody trial that

Mother completed various courses during her incarceration and that Mother

planned to participate in Edwin’s culinary arts program upon her release. While the

GAL commended Mother on her hard work, she recommended the court grant

permanent custody to the agency.       The GAL emphasized the absence of any

relationship between Mother and child and Mother’s chronic substance abuse that

had led to the removal of her three older children. The GAL voiced concern that if

Mother missed the start date for the Edwin’s program, both housing and

employment would be adversely impacted. The GAL stated that Mother had not

addressed her mental-health concerns. Further, the GAL testified that Mother’s

incarceration prevented Mother from demonstrating her ability to maintain

employment, housing, and sobriety while living in the community.

Grant of Permanent Custody

              In a journal entry dated June 24, 2025, the juvenile court granted the

agency’s motion for permanent custody. The juvenile court found, by clear and

convincing evidence, that a grant of permanent custody to the agency was in E.W.’s

best interests. The juvenile court also determined that pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E),

there was evidence that the child could not be placed with one of the child’s parents

within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.
              On July 10, 2025, Mother filed a timely appeal, presenting two

assignments of error for our review:

      Assignment of Error I: The trial court’s award of permanent custody to
      [CCDCFS], despite [CCDCFS]’s failure to make reasonable efforts to
      eliminate the continued removal of the child from her home and to
      return the child to her home, violated state law and appellant’s right to
      due process of the law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of
      the United States Constitution and Section 16, Article I of the Ohio
      Constitution.

      Assignment of Error II: The trial court’s decision to award permanent
      custody to [CCDCFS] was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

II. Legal Analysis

A. Reasonable Efforts

              In her first assignment of error, Mother argues that the juvenile court

failed to make findings of fact related to the agency’s reasonable efforts as required

under R.C. 2151.419, and that the agency failed to develop and implement sufficient

case-planning services for Mother.

              The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that

      [t]he right to parent one’s children is a fundamental right. Troxel v.
      Granville (2000), 

, 

, 

; In
      re Hayes (1997), 

, 

. However,
      government has broad authority to intervene to protect children from
      abuse and neglect. R.C. 2151.01. When the state intervenes to protect
      a child’s health or safety, “[t]he state’s efforts to resolve the threat to
      the child before removing the child or to permit the child to return
      home after the threat is removed are called ‘reasonable efforts.’ “Will
      L. Crossley, Defining Reasonable Efforts: Demystifying the State’s
      Burden Under Federal Child Protection Legislation (2003), 12
      B.U.Pub.Int.L.J. 259, 260.

In re C.F., 

, ¶ 28-29.
              R.C. 2151.419 requires the juvenile court to determine whether the

agency that filed the complaint has made reasonable efforts to prevent the child’s

removal or return the child safely home. “This court and the Supreme Court of Ohio

have held that R.C. 2151.419 does not apply to motions for permanent custody made

under R.C. 2151.413, among other provisions.” In re T.M., 

(8th Dist.). In the instant matter, the agency filed its motion for permanent custody

pursuant to R.C. 2151.413.

              Mother concedes that this district’s precedent does not require

findings of fact under R.C. 2151.419 in the context of a permanent-custody hearing

but contends this court has misinterpreted the statute. Mother’s appellate counsel

has previously raised this same argument before this court. See In re T.M.; In re

N.M., 

 (8th Dist.); In re B.B.C., 

 (8th

Dist.); In re B.P., 

 (8th Dist.); In re I.A.-W., 2022-Ohio-

1766, ¶ 14-21 (8th Dist.); In re D.P., 

 (8th Dist.); In re J.J.,

, ¶ 32-34 (8th Dist.); In re Z.R., 

, ¶ 15-19 (8th Dist.);

In re J.H., 

, ¶ 10-26 (8th Dist.); In re L.D., 

,

(8th Dist.). This court has consistently found the argument lacks merit and declined

to require findings that reasonable efforts were made to prevent removal or return

of a child safely home pursuant to R.C. 2151.419, and we continue to do so here.

              Nonetheless, the record demonstrates that the juvenile court made

reasonable-efforts findings and the agency made reasonable efforts pursuant to R.C.

2151.419. The juvenile court affirmatively found that the agency made reasonable
efforts in accordance with R.C. 2151.419 during the pendency of the case. See

Journal Entries dated Feb. 20, 2024; July 15, 2024; and Mar. 5, 2025. In the

juvenile court’s decision granting permanent custody to the agency, the court again

made a reasonable-efforts finding. See Journal Entry, July 3, 2025. Further,

Mother never challenged the reasonable-efforts findings during the pendency of the

case.

                 The record also demonstrates that Mother had an existing case plan

when the court granted temporary emergency custody of E.W. to the agency and the

agency added E.W. to the case plan. The agency exhibited reasonable efforts when

it referred Mother for parenting, mental-health, and substance-abuse services as

well as housing assistance. Mother’s incarceration, which began one month after

the agency was granted temporary-emergency custody, was an obstacle to both the

agency’s assistance with these services and Mother’s completion of the services in

the community.

                 “The issue in a reasonable-efforts determination is not whether the

agency could have done more, but whether the agency’s case planning and efforts

were reasonable and diligent under the circumstances of the case.” In re A.F., 2021-

Ohio-4519, ¶ 35, citing In re D.H., 

 (5th Dist.), citing In the

Matter of J.H., 

 (5th Dist.). We find under the circumstances

presented in this case, the agency made reasonable efforts toward family

reunification.

                 Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled.
B. Permanent Custody

                In her second assignment of error, Mother argues that the juvenile

court’s grant of permanent custody of E.W. to the agency was against the manifest

weight of the evidence. Specifically, Mother argues the juvenile court’s conclusions

that R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) and (2) established E.W. should not or could not be placed

with Mother was against the manifest weight of the evidence.3 Mother also contends

the agency failed to present any evidence at trial demonstrating permanent custody

to the agency was in the best interests of the child.

       1. Standard of Review

                A parent has a fundamental interest in the care and custody of her

child. In re L.W., 

 (8th Dist.). However, parental rights are

not absolute: “‘The natural rights of a parent are always subject to the ultimate

welfare of the child, which is the polestar or controlling principle to be observed.’”

In re L.D., 

 (8th Dist.), quoting In re Cunningham, 

 (1979). “By terminating parental rights, the goal is to create ‘a more

stable life’ for dependent children and to ‘facilitate adoption to foster permanency

for children.’” In re R.G., 

, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.), quoting In re N.B., 2015-

Ohio-314, ¶ 67 (8th Dist.), citing In re Howard, 

, *5 (5th

Dist. Aug. 1, 1986).


       3Mother erroneously argues the juvenile court relied on R.C. 2151.414(E)(2) when it
found E.W. could not or should not be placed with Mother within a reasonable time. The
juvenile court found the R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), (10), (11), and (16) factors were applicable in
this matter.
               “An appellate court will not reverse a juvenile court’s termination of

parental rights and award of permanent custody to an agency if the judgment is

supported by clear and convincing evidence.” In re M.J., 

 (8th

Dist.), citing In re A.S., 

, ¶ 40 (11th Dist.).

               In reviewing a juvenile court’s decision regarding permanent custody

on manifest weight-of-the-evidence grounds,

      the appellate court must weigh the evidence and all reasonable
      inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine
      whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the finder of fact clearly
      lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the
      judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered. [Eastley v.
      Volkman, 

,] ¶ 20. ‘In weighing the evidence, the court
      of appeals must always be mindful of the presumption in favor of the
      finder of fact.’ Id. at ¶ 21. ‘The underlying rationale of giving deference
      to the findings of the trial court rests with the knowledge that the trial
      judge is best able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor,
      gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing
      the credibility of the proffered testimony.’ Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v.
      Cleveland, 

, 

 (1984). ‘“If the
      evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, the reviewing
      court is bound to give it that interpretation which is consistent with the
      verdict and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the verdict and
      judgment.”’ Id. at fn. 3, quoting 5 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Appellate
      Review, Section 603, at 191-192 (1978).

In re Z.C., 

.

      2. R.C. 2151.414 Factors

               R.C. 2151.414 provides a two-prong analysis to be applied by a

juvenile court in adjudicating a motion for permanent custody. In re S.C., 2018-

Ohio-2523, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.), citing R.C. 2151.414(B). The first prong authorizes the

juvenile court to grant permanent custody of a child to the public agency if, after a
hearing, the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that any of the

following factors apply:

      (a) the child is not abandoned or orphaned, but the child cannot be
      placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be
      placed with the child’s parents;

      (b) the child is abandoned;

      (c) the child is orphaned, and there are no relatives of the child who are
      able to take permanent custody;

      (d) the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public
      children services agencies or private child placing agencies for 12 or
      more months of a consecutive 22-month period; or

      (e) the child or another child in the custody of the parent or parents
      from whose custody the child has been removed has been adjudicated
      an abused, neglected, or dependent child on three separate occasions
      by any court in this state or another state.

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e).

               In accordance with the second prong of R.C. 2151.414, when any one

of the above factors exists, the juvenile court must then analyze whether, by clear

and convincing evidence, it is in the best interests of the child to grant permanent

custody to the agency pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D). “[T]he best interests of the child

are paramount in any custody case[,]” and courts are to liberally interpret the

statutes under R.C. Ch. 2151 “to provide for the care and protection of the child . . .

.” In re A.B., 

, ¶ 32, citing R.C. 2151.01(A). Pursuant to R.C.

2151.414(D)(1), in determining the best interests of a child at a permanent-custody

hearing, a juvenile court “shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not

limited to,” the factors listed thereunder. “There is not one element that is given
greater weight than the others pursuant to the statute.” In re Schaefer, 2006-Ohio-

5513, ¶ 56.

      a. Findings Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e)

               In the instant case, the juvenile court addressed the first prong of the

statutory test by finding that, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), “the child cannot

be placed with either of the child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not

be placed with the child’s parents.” To support a finding that a child cannot or

should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time, the juvenile court looks

to R.C. 2151.414(E)’s 15 enumerated factors. The court in the instant case found the

presence of (E)(1), (11), and (16) factors supported its decision. R.C. 2151.414(E)(11)

reads as follows:

      (E) In determining at a hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this
      section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the
      Revised Code whether a child cannot be placed with either parent
      within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with the
      parents, the court shall consider all relevant evidence. If the court
      determines, by clear and convincing evidence, at a hearing held
      pursuant to division (A) of this section or for the purposes of division
      (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the Revised Code that one or more of the
      following exist as to each of the child’s parents, the court shall enter a
      finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a
      reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent:

      (11) The parent has had parental rights involuntarily terminated with
      respect to a sibling of the child pursuant to this section or section
      2151.353 or 2151.415 of the Revised Code, or under an existing or
      former law of this state, any other state, or the United States that is
      substantially equivalent to those sections, and the parent has failed to
      provide clear and convincing evidence to prove that, notwithstanding
      the prior termination, the parent can provide a legally secure
      permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and
      safety of the child.
              The record demonstrates that Mother’s son, Ja.W., was committed to

the agency’s permanent custody pursuant to a journal entry issued by the juvenile

court on July 11, 2024, in Cuyahoga J.C. No. AD23902856. Upon such a showing,

the burden shifted to Mother “to provide clear and convincing evidence to prove that

he or she can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for

the health, welfare, and safety of the child.” In re J.H., 

, ¶ 22 (8th

Dist.). Mother was incarcerated at the time of the custody trial, and while she

intended to participate in a culinary arts program upon release, she was not certain

the employment and related housing would be immediately available upon her

release from prison.    Mother had not addressed her mental-health concerns.

Mother had not demonstrated her ability to maintain sobriety, mental health, and

employment in the community. Additionally, Mother had no relationship with E.W.

Mother did not demonstrate her ability to provide a legally secure permanent

placement or adequate care for E.W.

              Since a court need only find that one of the R.C. 2151.414(E) factors

applies to support a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with her

parent, we need not analyze the remaining R.C. 2151.414(E) factors pertaining to

Mother. In re A.E., 

 (8th Dist.), citing In re L.V., 2024-Ohio-

5917, ¶ 53 (8th Dist.), citing In re Ky.D., 

 (8th Dist.). We note

that no one has been identified as E.W.’s father nor established paternity for the

child and the juvenile court found Father abandoned E.W. Thus, the juvenile court
satisfied the R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) findings — the first prong of the statutory test —

when it applied the (E) factors to support its conclusion that E.W. should not or

could not be placed in either parent’s care and custody within a reasonable time.

      b. R.C. 2151.414(D) — Best Interests of the Child

               Once the juvenile court found that one of the enumerated R.C.

2151.414(B)(1) factors was present, the court then moved to the second prong of the

test and conducted an analysis of the child’s best interests. The juvenile court had

to find by clear and convincing evidence that it was in E.W.’s best interests to grant

permanent custody to the agency. In re L.W., 

 (8th Dist.);

R.C. 2151.414(D). The focus of a best interests determination is the child, not the

parent. In re R.G., 

, at ¶ 28 (8th Dist.), citing In re N.B., 2015-Ohio-

314, at ¶ 59 (8th Dist.); In re Awkal, 

 (8th Dist. 1994). To

determine the best interests of a child, the juvenile court considers all relevant

factors including, but not limited to, those listed in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)-(e).

               The record demonstrates that the juvenile court considered the

factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)-(e) and found that the grant of

permanent custody to the agency was in the best interests of E.W. The evidence in

the record supports this finding where E.W. was removed from Mother’s care four

days after her birth because of Mother testing positive for PCP during her

pregnancy; E.W. had a strong bond with her foster parents and no preexisting

relationship with Mother; Mother’s history of substance abuse, mental-health

issues, and parenting concerns that had not been remedied despite Mother’s
participation in case-plan services; and the removal of other children from Mother’s

care and custody for similar reasons. Further, the GAL recommended the court

grant permanent custody, citing the fact that because of her incarceration, Mother

could not demonstrate her ability to maintain sobriety in the community; Mother

had shown chronic substance abuse; Mother had not addressed her mental-health

issues; and Mother’s employment and housing plans were tenuous.

              Accordingly, we cannot say the juvenile court clearly lost its way and

created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the grant of permanent custody

should be reversed. The second assignment of error is overruled.

              Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.



_____________________
WILLIAM A. KLATT, JUDGE*

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J., and
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR

(*Sitting by assignment: William A. Klatt, J., retired, of the Tenth District Court
of Appeals.)