[Cite as State v. Syph,
2025-Ohio-5075.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LUCAS COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-24-1155
Appellee Trial Court No. CR0202302084
v.
Brayon Syph DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: November 7, 2025
…
Julia R. Bates, Esq., Lucas County Prosecutor
and Brenda J. Majdalani, Assistant Prosecutor, for appellee.
Laurel A. Kendall, for appellant.
…
OSOWIK, J.
{¶ 1} This is an appeal of a May 21, 2024 judgment of the Lucas County Court of
Common Pleas, denying appellant’s Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal, and convicting
appellant on one count of trafficking in cocaine, in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), a
felony of the fourth degree, one count of possession of cocaine, in violation of R.C.
2925.11(A), a felony of the fourth degree, and one count of operation of a motor vehicle
without a valid driver’s license, in violation of R.C. 4510.12, a misdemeanor of the first
degree.
{¶ 2} On June 13, 2024, appellant was sentenced to a one-year term of
incarceration on Count 1, Counts 1 and 2 were found to be allied offenses of similar
import and were merged for sentencing, a 180-day term of incarceration on Count 3, and
a 30-day term of incarceration for a contempt offense committed by appellant during the
course of the trial proceedings, all sentences ordered to be served concurrently. For the
reasons set forth below, this court affirms the judgment of the trial court.
{¶ 3} Appellant, Brayon Syph, sets forth the following two assignments of error:
“I. The trial court erred when it denied appellant’s motion for acquittal pursuant
to Crim.R. 29 as to the offense of [operating a motor vehicle without a valid driver’s
license].
“II. Appellant’s conviction for trafficking in cocaine was not supported by the
manifest weight of the evidence.”
{¶ 4} The following undisputed facts are relevant to this appeal. On May 25,
2023, Detective Mugler of the Toledo Police Department narcotics division was on patrol
in central Toledo, working in collaboration with Trooper Boisel of the Ohio State
Highway Patrol. They were performing a joint gang activity sweep in an area prone to
high levels of criminal activity, particularly drug offenses.
2.
{¶ 5} Upon observing appellant fail to stop at a stop sign, the officers conducted a
traffic stop. Although appellant refused to provide the officers with his physical driver’s
license, he alternatively provided the number of his Georgia driver’s license. The license
number was then run through the LEADS computer system and shown to be under
suspension. During the course of the traffic stop, a canine drug sniffing unit trekked the
perimeter of appellant’s vehicle and alerted affirmatively to unlawful drugs inside the
vehicle.
{¶ 6} Following the drug detection alert by the canine unit, the officers searched
appellant’s vehicle and, in the space immediately adjacent to appellant’s seat, they
recovered one plastic baggie containing approximately 8g of cocaine, a second, smaller
plastic baggie containing less than 1g of crack cocaine, and a drug weighing scale
containing cocaine residue. In conjunction, they recovered $180 cash from appellant’s
person. The record shows that appellant possesses an extensive criminal history spanning
three states, including multiple prior felony drug offenses.
{¶ 7} On July 19, 2023, based upon the above-detailed events, appellant was
indicted on one count of trafficking in cocaine, in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), a
felony of the fourth degree, one count of possession of cocaine, in violation of R.C.
2925.11(A), a felony of the fourth degree, and one count of operation of a motor vehicle
without a valid driver’s license, in violation of R.C. 4510.12, a misdemeanor of the first
degree.
3.
{¶ 8} On May 21, 2024, appellant declined a plea agreement offer that would
have entailed a plea to an amended, lesser offense of possession of cocaine, as reduced to
a felony of the fifth degree, the dismissal of the remaining counts, credit for time served,
and placement on community control. However, appellant refused the above-detailed
plea offer, waived a jury trial, refused to execute the accompanying jury waiver, and
elected to proceed to a bench trial on all counts.
{¶ 9} Following the bench trial, appellant was convicted of all counts, as well as
a contempt offense committed by appellant during the course of the trial proceedings.
Appellant was sentenced to a one-year term of incarceration on Count 1, Counts 1 and 2
were merged for sentencing, a 180-day term of incarceration on Count 3, a 30-day term
of incarceration on the contempt offense, all ordered to be served concurrently. This
appeal ensued.
{¶ 10} In the first assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in
denying appellant’s Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal, as specifically pertaining to the
conviction of operating a motor vehicle without a valid driver’s license, in violation of
R.C. 4510.12. We do not concur.
{¶ 11} As this court held in State v. Cavin, 2025-Ohio-1578, ¶ 14 (6th Dist.),
[A] motion for acquittal under Crim.R. 29(A) is a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Daniel, 2023-Ohio-2800, ¶ 46 (6th
Dist.), citing State v. Messer, 2017-Ohio-1223, ¶ 16 (6th Dist.), citing State
v. Brinkley, 2005-Ohio-1507, ¶ 39. The trial court’s denial of a motion for
acquittal under Crim.R. 29(A) is governed by the same standard as the one
for determining whether a verdict is supported by sufficient evidence. Id.,
citing Messer at ¶ 16, quoting State v. Tenace,
2006-Ohio-2417, ¶ 37. In
4.
reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court
views the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and
determines whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., quoting
Messer at ¶ 16, quoting State v. Smith,
80 Ohio St.3d 89, 113 (1997). In
making that determination, the appellate court does not weigh the evidence
or assess the credibility of the witnesses. Id., citing
Messer at ¶ 16, citing
State v. Were, 2008-Ohio-2762, ¶ 132. The question of whether the
evidence is sufficient to support a conviction is a question of law. Id.,
citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997).
{¶ 12} In conjunction, Crim.R. 29(A) provides,
The court on a motion of the defendant or on its own motion, after the
evidence on either side is closed, shall order the entry of a judgment of
acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment, information, or
complaint, if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such
offense or offenses.
{¶ 13} Lastly, R.C. 4510.12(A)(1) establishes, in relevant part, “No person …
shall operate any motor vehicle upon a public road or highway or any public or private
property used by the public for purposes of vehicular travel are parking in the state unless
the person has a valid driver’s license.”
{¶ 14} At trial, as relevant to the first assignment of error, appellee presented the
testimony of Detective Mugler (“Mugler”), one of the two officers on patrol on May 25,
2023, who conducted the initial traffic stop of appellant, culminating in the offenses
underlying this appeal. Mugler first testified,
I’m a detective on the Toledo police gang task force … for about two and
one-half years now and a Toledo police officer coming up on 8 years …
[On May 25, 2023], I was working with OSP Trooper Boisel … we were
driving northbound on Junction … we observed a 1979 white Mercury
fail to stop at that intersection [Junction and Indiana].
5.
{¶ 15} As relevant to the operation of a motor vehicle without a valid license
conviction, Mugler next testified, “I asked [appellant] for his driver’s license. It appeared
like he was going to give it to me[,] then he stopped and said he would [alternatively]
give me his driver’s license number … but it was not valid.” Follow-up inquiry was
made, “[W]as [appellant’s license number] ever run through the computer?” Mugler
replied, “Yes, ma’am. [Appellant] did not have a valid [driver’s] license.”
{¶ 16} In applying the above-discussed governing legal framework to this case, we
find that the transcript of the bench trial proceedings clearly contains evidence that, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, reflects that a rational trier of fact
could have found that evidence was presented demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt
that when the traffic stop of appellant was made on May 25, 2023, appellant had been
operating a motor vehicle upon a public road without a valid driver’s license. The record
clearly shows that appellant solely possessed a Georgia’s operator’s license that, upon
investigation, was established to be under suspension. No valid operator’s license was
presented by appellant or determined to exist for appellant.
{¶ 17} Wherefore, in accord with Cavin, we find appellant’s first assignment of
error not well-taken.
{¶ 18} In appellant’s second assignment of error, appellant argues that his
conviction for trafficking in cocaine, in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) was against the
manifest weight of the evidence. We do not concur.
{¶ 19} As this court held in State v. Bleau, 2025-Ohio-1951, ¶ 19 (6th Dist.),
6.
In a bench trial, the court assumes the fact-finding function of the jury.
Accordingly, to warrant reversal from a bench trial under a manifest weight
of the evidence claim, it must be determined that the court clearly lost its
way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment
must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State v. Hayes, 2004-Ohio-6460,
¶ 18 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Thompkins,
78 Ohio St.3d 380 (1997). Due
deference must be accorded the findings of the trial court because the trial
judge is best able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor,
gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the
credibility of the proffered testimony. Id., citing State v. Archie, 2004-
Ohio-4844 (6th Dist.). Reversal on manifest weight grounds is reserved for
the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the
conviction. Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin,
20 Ohio App.3d
172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983).
{¶ 20} In conjunction, R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) establishes, in relevant part, “No person
shall knowingly … [p]repare for shipment, ship, transport, deliver, prepare for
distribution, or distribute a controlled substance or a controlled substance analog …
intended for sale or resale by the offender or another person.”
{¶ 21} As related to the disputed trafficking in cocaine conviction, Mugler first
testified that the, “Canine Unit [trekked the perimeter of the vehicle and affirmatively
alerted to] the possibility of narcotics.” Accordingly, Mugler then conducted a search of
the interior of the vehicle. Mugler testified that he discovered, “[T]ucked in between the
driver’s seat [where appellant had been seated] and the middle console there was a large
bag of white powder … a black and silver scale[,] and another smaller bag of hardened
white product.”
{¶ 22} In conjunction, appellee presented the testimony of Chadwyck Douglass
(“Douglass”), a senior criminalist with the Toledo Police Crime Lab. Douglass first
7.
testified in detail regarding his 22 years of relevant professional experience, including his
training, education, and his provision of expert testimony at the state and federal level in
numerous drug trafficking cases. Douglass next testified regarding his performance of
tests on the above-detailed items recovered from appellant’s vehicle, and his findings in
connection to same. Douglass testified, “State’s Exhibit 6 contains 7.70g of cocaine …
I determined that the residue on the scale contained cocaine … I was able to scrape
enough of the white residue off of the scale in order to identify the item as cocaine.”
{¶ 23} The record shows that when appellant was stopped on May 25, 2023, a
canine unit affirmatively alerted to the presence of drugs in appellant’s vehicle. The
record further shows that upon conducting a subsequent search of the vehicle, a plastic
bag containing 7.70g of cocaine [$800 in street value], a smaller plastic bag containing
less than 1g of crack cocaine, and a drug measuring scale containing cocaine residue
were found between the driver’s seat and the center console. In conjunction, appellant
was found with $180 in cash on his person. The record shows that appellant was stopped
upon running a stop sign in an area prone to drug activity during a multi-agency, law
enforcement crime sweep of the area. Appellant’s argument on appeal that the above-
enumerated items recovered from his vehicle, “fall within the realm of possession for
[appellant’s] personal use” is unsupported and unpersuasive. The manifest weight of the
evidence supported the trial court’s determination that appellant had been unlawfully
engaged in transporting and delivering cocaine for sale or resale.
8.
{¶ 24} Thus, we find that appellant has failed to demonstrate that the trial court
clearly lost its way, created a manifest miscarriage of justice, and that this case
constitutes an exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the disputed
cocaine trafficking conviction. We find appellant’s second assignment of error not well-
taken.
{¶ 25} On consideration whereof, the judgment of the Lucas County Court of
Common Pleas is hereby affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal
pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Thomas J. Osowik, J.
JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
JUDGE
Charles E. Sulek, P.J.
CONCUR. JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
9.
