[Cite as Molnar v. Molnar,
2025-Ohio-5114.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
MEIGS COUNTY
HOLLIS MOLNAR, :
: Case No. 24CA5
Plaintiff-Appellant, :
:
v. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT
: ENTRY
STANLEY MOLNAR, :
:
Defendant-Appellee. : RELEASED: 11/05/2025
________________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Sierra Meek, Nolan & Meek Co., LPA, Nelsonville, Ohio, for appellant.
Adam Salisbury, Pomeroy, Ohio, for appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Wilkin, J.
{¶1} This is an appeal by Hollis Molnar (“Wife”) of a Meigs County Court of
Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, judgment entry that granted her
complaint for divorce. On appeal, Wife asserts four assignments of error.
{¶2} In her first assignment of error, Wife claims that the trial court erred
by failing to determine the date of the termination of the parties’ marriage and by
failing to value marital assets accordingly. Because the court did not determine
the duration of the marriage, which is per se an abuse of discretion, we sustain
Wife’s first assignment of error.
{¶3} In her second assignment of error, Wife argues that the trial court
erred by finding that Husband satisfied his burden of tracing comingled assets to
pre-marital property. Because the duration of the marriage, which the court has
yet to determine, is critical in distinguishing marital, separate, and post-
Meigs App. No. 24CA5 2
separation assets and liabilities, and determining appropriate dates for valuation
of property, Wife’s second assignment of error is not ripe for review.
{¶4} In her third assignment of error, Wife asserts that the trial court erred
by awarding Husband reimbursement for a marital loan in contravention of former
R.C. 3103.06. We find no law that prevents spouses from making loans to one
another and there is a law to support such conduct. Therefore, we overrule
Wife’s third assignment of error.
{¶5} In her fourth assignment of error, Wife asserts that the court erred in
refusing to award her spousal support. Because the court is required to consider
the duration of the marriage in determining a spousal support award, if any, we
find this assignment is not ripe for review.
{¶6} Therefore, we sustain Wife’s first assignment of error, overrule her
third assignment of error, and find that her second and fourth assignments of
error are not yet ripe for review. Accordingly, we reverse in part the trial court’s
judgment and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with the court’s decision.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
{¶7} The parties were married on April 16, 2003. Husband had worked for
the New Jersey State Police for 30 years. Wife had worked for Levi Strauss prior
to the marriage. Each party owned a home in New Jersey at the time of their
marriage. Husband’s home was unencumbered, but Wife’s had a mortgage.
Husband also owned an 81.5-acre property in Meigs County, Ohio that he had
acquired in 1991.
Meigs App. No. 24CA5 3
{¶8} Husband retired on July 1, 2004, and the parties planned to move to
Ohio and build a home on the 81.5-acre parcel. Husband began receiving
payments from his pension and from his deferred compensation (retirement
funds). The estimated value of Husband’s deferred compensation fund was
$140,000. Husband’s deferred compensation was exhausted by June 2013.
Wife testified that in 2013, she received $19,000 in retirement funds from Levi
Strauss.
{¶9} The parties sold their New Jersey homes and the house in Ohio was
completed before Christmas 2004, when the parties moved in. Husband also
purchased a 55-acre property in 2010 and in 2016 he purchased a 10-acre
property. Both properties were adjacent to the 81.5-acre property.
{¶10} In September 2016, Texas Eastern Transmission Company (TETC)
acquired an easement across the 81.5- and 55-acre properties. TETC paid the
parties $350,000 for the easement. Subsequently, the parties were paid
$125,000 for damages caused by the easement to their property.
{¶11} On November 3, 2022, Wife filed a complaint for divorce in Meigs
County, Ohio. After a four-day final hearing, the trial court issued an amended
final order that made numerous findings and conclusions.
{¶12} Relying on Husband’s appraisal, the court valued the marital
residence at $438,520.1 The court calculated the financial contribution that each
party made in constructing the residence. The court determined that Husband
1
The appraiser valued the residence and an imaginary three acres of property upon which it was
built at $450,000. The court found that the three-acre lot was worth $11,480 and subtracted that
from $450,000 to find that the value of the residence was $438,520.
Meigs App. No. 24CA5 4
contributed $293,000 and the wife contributed $102,000. The court found that
$120,000 of Husband’s $293,000 contribution originated from his retirement
funds and therefore required an “adjustment.” To determine what portion of the
$120,000 was his separate property, if any, the trial court applied the “coverture
fraction” devised by the Supreme Court in Hoyt v. Hoyt. 53 Ohio St. 3d 177, 182
(1990). This method “comput[es] the ratio of the number of years of employment
of the employed spouse during marriage to the total years of his or her
employment” to determine what percentage of retirement was marital property.
Id. Husband worked for 15 months while married and worked a total of 300
months prior to his marriage. Dividing 15 by 300 indicated that .05 or 5% of
Husband’s retirement income was marital. The remaining 95% of the retirement
funds were his separate property. The 5% marital portion of the property is
divided in half, providing 2.5% to each party.
{¶13} Applying the coverture fraction to the $120,000 of retirement funds
in question, the court determined $6,000 was marital property, which was divided
equally, with $3,000 going to each party. The court then adjusted the parties’
contribution accordingly by reducing the Husband’s contribution by $3000
(making it $290,000) and increasing Wife’s contribution by $3,000 (making it
$105,000). Converting those numbers to percentages, the court found that the
Wife contributed 27% and Husband 73% of the funding, and multiplying those
percentages by $438,520 (appraised value of the home), the court determined
that Wife was entitled to receive $118,400.40 and Husband $320,119.60 for their
respective contributions in constructing the home.
Meigs App. No. 24CA5 5
{¶14} The court then determined that the 81.5 acres - that Husband had
purchased prior to the marriage and upon which the residence was constructed -
was Husband’s separate property without analysis.
{¶15} The court then considered the 55 and 10-acre properties that
Husband had purchased during the marriage. The court again adopted
Husband’s appraisal, which value both properties together at $163,000. The
court found that both properties were purchased using funds from Husband’s
pension. The court found that at the time these properties were purchased
neither party had reportable taxable employment income. Therefore, the court
determined that the funds used to purchase these properties were traceable to
Husband’s pension, which was his separate property. However, the court again
applied the coverture fraction to the $163,000 property value and found 5% of the
value was marital property, so Wife was entitled to 2.5% of the $163,000, which
is $4,075.
{¶16} The court also found that Husband “loaned” Wife $42,000 for her
business. The court found that the monies loaned were from Husband’s pension;
therefore, Wife was ordered to reimburse Husband $42,000 less the coverture
fraction of 2.5% or $1,050, which equals $40,950.
{¶17} The court also ordered Husband to pay Wife $146.46 of spousal
support for 60 months. The court calculated this amount based on Husband’s
monthly retirement income, which is $5,858.33. Because the proceeds for the
spousal support would come from Husband’s retirement funds, the court again
Meigs App. No. 24CA5 6
applied the coverture fraction to find that the monthly support payment would be
2.5% of $5,858.33 or $146.46.
{¶18} In sum the court ordered Husband to pay Wife $126,892.32 for her
interest in certain assets of the parties, including $118,400.40 her interest in the
residence, $4,075.00 her interest in the 55 and 10-acre properties, $3,113.38 her
interest in Husband’s 6695 account, $253.54 her interest in Husband’s Baird IRA,
$1,050.00 her interest in the $42,000 loan from Husband. The court ordered Wife
to pay Husband $40,000 for his interest in the loan of $42,000 he made to Wife.
{¶19} Husband was awarded $2,169.69 of the parties’ joint account at
Hocking Valley Bank with the remaining balance to be divided equally and the
parties were ordered to split equally the joint Baird account (ending 4665).
{¶20} Wife was awarded as her separate property the three Baird
accounts (ending in 0519, 0929, and 8328) totaling approximately $359,098.49.
Husband was to receive free and clear his IRA (0450), his pension from the New
Jersey State Police except for spousal support payments. And Wife retained her
company, Austin Molnar, and all its inventory free and clear of any claims from
Husband.
{¶21} It is this judgment that Wife appeals.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO DETERMINE
THE DATE OF TERMINATION OF THE MARRIAGE AND
BY FAILING TO VALUE THE MARITAL ASSETS
ACCORDINGLY.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FINDING THAT HUSBAND
SATISFIED HIS BURDEN OF TRACING COMINGLED
ASSETS TO PRE-MARITAL PROPERTY.
Meigs App. No. 24CA5 7
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY AWARDING HUSBAND
REIMBURSEMENT FOR A MARITAL LOAN IN
CONTRAVENTION OF R.C. 3103.06.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO AWARD
WIFE SPOUSAL SUPPORT.
FIRST ASSIGMENT OF ERROR
{¶22} In her first assignment of error, Wife asserts that the trial court erred
by failing to determine the date of termination of the marriage for purpose of
determining the duration of the marriage, and by failing to value the marital
assets accordingly. She claims that “the duration of the marriage is critical in
distinguishing marital, separate, and post-separation assets and liabilities, and
determining the appropriate dates for valuation.” Wife claims that absent an
explanation, a court should use the same dates when valuing marital property.
{¶23} Wife argues that the marriage effectively ended on April 6, 2023,
when the court issued temporary orders requiring her to vacate the marital home,
both parties to cover separate expenses, and Husband to pay support to her.
{¶24} Wife claims that she provided an appraisal of the marital property
effective April 6, 2023, while Husband’s appraisal was dated July 14, 2023, which
was approximately three months after the proposed de facto termination date of
the marriage. Notably, it contained three comparable sales that occurred after
April 6, 2023, the de facto termination of the marriage.
{¶25} Wife also claims that Husband’s appraiser, at Husband’s request,
did not value the 81.5 acres of property that Husband alleged was his separate
property. Wife claims that without any analysis of the appreciation and labor
Meigs App. No. 24CA5 8
pertaining to this property during their 19-year marriage, the trial court summarily
determined the property was Husband’s separate property and never determined
the value of the property.
{¶26} Finally, Wife claims that the parties’ financial accounts, which
“heavily fluctuated” during their marriage, were valued on September 30, 2022
(Husband’s Business HVB account), on November 18, 2022 (Husband’s
Personal Acct. 6695), on June 30, 2023 (Husband’s Baird IRA), and on October
6, 2023 (parties’ joint HVB and Baird Accounts) without regard to possible
changes of the values of these assets and all after the de facto termination date
of the marriage.
{¶27} In response, Husband maintains that an appellant must affirmatively
show that the trial court committed an error and resulting prejudice to be a
reversible error. Husband claims that the standard of review in this case is
whether the trial court abused its discretion. Under this standard, a reviewing
court should defer to the trial court’s factual findings. Husband argues that an
abuse of discretion is more than error of law. Abuse of discretion occurs only
when the trial court’s decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.
{¶28} Husband claims the trial court’s finding that the 81.5, 55, and 10-
acre properties were Husband’s separate property has nothing to do with the
dates of the competing appraisals.
{¶29} Husband also claims that Wife fails to provide any accounting or
suggestion of what she believed was the correct calculation of distribution and
Meigs App. No. 24CA5 9
provided “no description of any serious prejudicial injury.” Thus, even if an error
occurred, it was harmless.
Law
{¶30} “Domestic relations courts must have discretion to do what is
equitable upon the facts and circumstances of each divorce case.” Cochran v.
Cochran, 2025-Ohio-2565, ¶ 17 (4th Dist.), citing Booth v. Booth,
44 Ohio St.3d
142, 144 (1989). We have recognized “ ‘the familiar maxim that a trial court in
any domestic relations action has broad discretion in fashioning an equitable
division of marital property.’ ” Id. at ¶ 19, quoting Liming v. Damos, 2009-Ohio-
6490, ¶ 25-26 (4th Dist.). “However, the trial court's discretion is not unlimited.”
Id. “ ‘[I]n making any division of marital property the court must comply with
statutory mandates concerning the procedure and analysis it uses in making its
distribution. A failure to do so amounts to per se abuse of discretion.’ ”
(Emphasis added) Id. quoting Damos at ¶ 25.
{¶31} “Before characterizing property as marital or separate and then
distributing it accordingly, the court must determine the termination date of the
marriage. R.C. 3105.171(G).” Eddy v. Eddy, 2002-Ohio-4345 ¶ 21 (4th Dist.).
“The duration of the marriage is critical in distinguishing marital, separate, and
post-separation assets and liabilities, and determining appropriate dates for
valuation.” Id. at ¶ 23, citing Berish v. Berish,
69 Ohio St.2d 318. R.C. 3105.171
addresses the division of separate and marital property:
(A) As used in this section: ...
(2) “During the marriage” means whichever of the following is
applicable:
Meigs App. No. 24CA5 10
(a) Except as provided in division (A)(2)(b) of this section, the
period of time from the date of the marriage through the date of
the final hearing in an action for divorce or in an action for legal
separation;
(b) If the court determines that the use of either or both of the dates
specified in division (A)(2)(a) of this section would be inequitable,
the court may select dates that it considers equitable in
determining marital property. If the court selects dates that it
considers equitable in determining marital property, “during the
marriage” means the period of time between those dates selected
and specified by the court....
...
(G) In any order for the division or disbursement of property or a
distributive award made pursuant to this section, the court shall
make written findings of fact that support the determination that
the marital property has been equitably divided and shall specify
the dates it used in determining the meaning of “during the
marriage.”
(Emphasis added.)
{¶32} Thus, in determining the date that a marriage ends, a court can
choose the date of the final hearing, or a de facto ending date. “Generally, [if]
trial courts use a de facto termination of marriage date [its] when the parties
separate, make no attempt at reconciliation, continually maintain separate
residences, separate business activities and/or separate bank accounts.” Eddy,
2002-Ohio-4345 at ¶ 24 (4th Dist.), citing Gullia v. Gullia,
93 Ohio App.3d 653,
666 (8th Dist. 1994). “[A] trial court may use a de facto termination of marriage
date when the evidence clearly and bilaterally shows that it is appropriate based
upon the totality of the circumstances.”
Id., citing Day v. Day,
40 Ohio App.3d
155, 158 (10th Dist. 1988).
Meigs App. No. 24CA5 11
{¶33} “A court must specify the dates it uses in determining the beginning
and ending of the marriage in order to appropriately value each asset and to
determine whether it is marital or separate in nature.” Cochran at ¶ 19.
Failing to specify the precise dates that are used in valuing assets
constitutes error on the part of the trial court. “Given the broad
discretion a trial court has in determining the duration of the
marriage, the trial court must clearly identify the date up on which
the marriage was terminated for the purpose of valuing marital
assets.” Moreover, “[a]n appellate court cannot undertake a
review of whether marital assets have been accurately valued and
divided until the specific valuation dates used by the trial court
have been clearly identified.”
Id., quoting Damos at ¶ 29.
Furthermore, “the provisions of R.C. 3105.171 require that a
monetary value be placed on every contested asset of the parties
in a divorce proceeding.” Thus, “the trial court is under a
mandatory duty to value and classify the contested property as
either marital or separate before distributing it.” Finally, the trial
court must make findings under R.C. 3105.171(G) “in sufficient
detail to allow for meaningful appellate review of its decision.”
(Citations omitted.)
Id., quoting Damos at 3.
{¶34} The selection of a valuation date other than the actual date of
divorce is within the discretion of the trial court. Hall v. Bricker, 2024-Ohio-1339,
¶ 131 (10th Dist.), citing O'Brien v. O’Brian,
1999 WL 355836, * 3 (10th Dist.
June 3, 1999). “ ‘ “The choice of a date as of which assets available for equitable
distribution should be identified and valued must be dictated by pragmatic
considerations.” ’ ” Pottmeyer v. Pottmeyer,
2004-Ohio-3709, ¶ 17 (4th Dist.),
quoting Bowen v. Bowen, 132 Ohio App.3d. 616, 630 (9th Dist. 1999), quoting
Berish v. Berish,
69 Ohio St. 2d 318, 320. The trial court, however, “must
adequately explain its reasons for choosing a different valuation date for certain
Meigs App. No. 24CA5 12
marital assets.” Coble v. Gilanyi,
1999 WL 1313617, *3 (11th Dist.) Dec. 23,
1999).
Analysis
{¶35} The parties were married on April 16, 2003. Wife filed her complaint
for divorce on November 3, 2022. On April 6, 2023, the court issued temporary
orders that provided Husband exclusive use of the marital residence, required
Wife to remove her possessions from the residence, and ordered Husband to
pay Wife spousal support of $1,000 per month. The final hearing occurred over
four dates, September 22 and 26, 2023, and October 5 and 6, 2023. Wife
asserted that April 6, 2023, was the de facto date of the divorce because of the
court’s temporary orders.
{¶36} The court can rely on the date of the final hearing as the date a
marriage ends, or it can choose a de facto date that the marriage ends, but as
we recognized in Cochran, the court must determine the duration of the
marriage, i.e., it must determine the beginning and ending dates of the marriage.
The amended divorce decree states that the partes were married on April 16,
2003, but it failed to identify when the marriage ended or otherwise failed to
determine the duration of the marriage.
{¶37} Husband claims that even if the court erred by failing to determine
the duration of the marriage, Wife cannot show harm, so the error was harmless
and consequently is not reversible error. We disagree. In Cochran, we
recognized that failing to comply with the statutory mandates regarding division
of property, which includes needing to determine the duration of the marriage,
Meigs App. No. 24CA5 13
“amounts to per se abuse of discretion.” Cochran at ¶ 19. Moreover, the
duration of the marriage is critical component in “distinguishing marital, separate,
and post-separation assets and liabilities, and determining appropriate dates for
valuation.” Id. at ¶ 18. Therefore, at this time we cannot properly analyze the
court’s classification or valuation of the property herein, or even the court’s award
of spousal support, because all require consideration of the duration of the
marriage, which the trial court failed to determine.
{¶38} Therefore, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in failing
to comply with R.C. 3105.171 (A) and (G) to determine the duration of the
parties’ marriage. Accordingly, we sustain Wife’s first assignment of error,
reverse the trial court’s judgment, and remand the matter for the trial court to
determine the duration of the marriage.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶39} In her third assignment of error, Wife asserts that the trial court
erred by requiring her to reimburse Husband for a loan in contravention of R.C
3103.06. Wife claims that the version of R.C. 3103.06 in effect at the time of
Husband’s loan stated that “ ‘[a] husband and wife cannot, by any contract with
each other, alter their legal relationships, except that they may agree to an
immediate separation and make provisions for the support of either of them and
their children during their separation.” Wife claims that the loan was a contract
that “altered” her and her Husband’s “legal relations” in violation of former R.C.
3103.06.
Meigs App. No. 24CA5 14
{¶40} In response, Husband maintains that the trial court had discretion to
divide marital assets. Husband claims that although the trial court used the word
“loan” to understand the intent of the parties at the time Husband wrote Wife the
$40,000 check for her to start her business, it awarded Wife all the “machinery,
stock in trade, and intangible business assets associated with Austin Molnar
LLC.” Thus, here the court did nothing more than equitably divide the
assets/debt and did not abuse its discretion in doing so. Therefore, the court
should overrule Wife’s third assignment of error.
Law
{¶41} We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. State v.
Erskine, 2015-Ohio-710, ¶ 22 (4th Dist.), citing In the Matter of O.H., 2010-Ohio-
1244, ¶ 8 (4th Dist.). “[A]n appellate court conducts a de novo review, without
deference to the trial court's determination.” State v. Blanton,
2018-Ohio-1278, ¶
50 (4th Dist.).
{¶42} The dispute here is whether Husband could loan money to Wife. We
find that R.C. 3103.05 and R.C. 3103.06, which address contracts in the
domestic relations space are pertinent in resolving Wife’s third assignment of
error. The trial court found that this loan occurred during 2017 and/or 2018.
Therefore, we consider the version of R.C. 3103.05 and R.C. 3103.06 in effect at
that time.
Analysis
{¶43} Former R.C. 3103.05 provided that “[a] husband or wife may enter
into any engagement or transaction with the other, or with any other person,
Meigs App. No. 24CA5 15
which either might if unmarried; subject, in transactions between themselves, to
the general rules which control the actions of persons occupying confidential
relations with each other.” (Emphasis added.). “ ‘Any’ is a word of flexible
meaning, and must be interpreted in the light of the context. In construing
statutes, the word ‘any’ is equivalent and has the force of ‘every’ or ‘all.’ ” Motor
Cargo, Inc. v. Bd. of Twp. Trs. of Richfield Twp., 67 Ohio Law Abs. 315, 320,
117
N.E.2d 224, 227 (C.P. 1953), citing held Roedler v. Vandalia Bus Lines,
1935 WL
3686, *1 (Ill. App. Ct. 1935). Finally, “[w]hen a statute is clear and unambiguous
in its terms, we apply it, not interpret it.” Specialty Restaurants Corp. v.
Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision,
2002-Ohio-4032, ¶ 11, citing Soltesiz v. Tracy,
75 Ohio St.3d 477, 479, (1996). We find that former R.C. 3103.05
unambiguously permits spouses to enter any agreement with each other that
they could enter on their own, which we find would include a loan.
{¶44} Nevertheless, Wife claims that R.C. 3103.06 prohibited husband
from making a loan to her. At the time of the loan, R.C. 3103.06 stated that “[a]
husband and wife cannot, by any contract with each other, alter their legal
relations, except that they may agree to an immediate separation and make
provisions for the support of either of them and their children during the
separation.” Unlike R.C. 3103.05, we find that the Supreme Court of Ohio has
construed the meaning of R.C. 3103.06 in Coen v. Du Bois, 100 Ohio St. 17 (The
court construed G.C. 8000, but its language is identical to the language in R.C.
3103.06 that was in effect at the time of the Huband’s loan).
Meigs App. No. 24CA5 16
{¶45} In Coen, husband and wife, while still married, “each released to the
other all claims of dower, distributive share, or other statutory allowance, which
one might derive from the other under the laws of this or any other state.” Id. at
20. The question before the court was “[c]an a husband and wife, during [their
marriage] and without contemplating separation, enter into a valid legal contract
whereby one releases to the other all claims in the other's property, during lifetime
or after death, in consideration of money paid or promised to be paid therefor?” Id.
{¶46} The court looked to G.C. 8000, which stated that “[a] husband and
wife cannot by any contract with each other alter their legal relations, except that
they may agree to an immediate separation, and make provisions for the support
of either of them and their children during the separation.” (Emphasis added.) Id.
23. The court found that the phrase “legal relations” within G.C. 8000 indicated
that the General Assembly intended to limit not only alteration of marital relations,
but also “that there should be no alteration either of marital or property relations in
the nature of expectancies, except in case of immediate separation.” Id. at 23-24.
Thus, the court found that G.C. 8000 prevented a husband and wife, during their
marriage, from agreeing to alter their marriage or alter their expectancies in each
other’s estate, unless there was an immediate separation.
{¶47} Applying that interpretation, the court held that agreement between
the husband and wife therein was prohibited because it altered their marriage and
each other’s property rights without an immediate separation. Therefore, the court
reversed the judgment in favor of the agreement.
Meigs App. No. 24CA5 17
{¶48} Based on Coen’s interpretation of G.C. 8000, which was identical to
R.C. 3103.06 in effect at the time of the loan herein, in this case we find that former
R.C. 3103.06 did not prohibit the agreement between Husband and Wife because
it was merely a loan; it did not alter their marital status or their “expectancies in
each other’s estate.” See Coen at 24.
{¶49} Therefore, we find that former R.C. 3103.06 did not prohibit
Husband’s loan. Accordingly, we overrule Wife’s third assignment of error.
SECOND AND FOURTH ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶50} In her second assignment of error, Wife argues that the trial court
erred by finding that Husband satisfied his burden of tracing comingled assets to
pre-marital property. In her fourth assignment of error, Wife asserts that the trial
court erred in refusing to award her spousal support. Because the duration of the
marriage is a consideration in determining the classification and valuation of
property, as well as an element to consider for determining whether spousal
support should be awarded, the trial court’s determination of the duration of the
marriage on remand may affect these issues. Therefore, we find that Wife’s
second and fourth assignments of error are not yet ripe for review.
CONCLUSION
{¶51} We sustain Wife’s first assignments of error, overrule her third
assignment of error, and find that her second and fourth assignments of error are
not yet ripe for review. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand
the matter to the trial court to address the remaining issues consistent with the
court’s decision.
Meigs App. No. 24CA5 18
JUDGMENT REVERSED IN PART AND CAUSE REMANDED FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS.
Meigs App. No. 24CA5 19
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS REVERSED IN PART AND CAUSE
REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS and that the parties shall equally
split the costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
Meigs County Common Pleas Court, Domestic Relations Division, to carry this
judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Smith, P.J. and Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court,
BY: ____________________________
Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the
date of filing with the clerk.
