Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

2025 Ohio 5125

State v. Dickerson

Ohio Court of Appeals

Decided November 12, 2025

Ohio Court of Appeals · decided 2025-11-12

Motion to dismiss, Quash detainer

Relies on Smith v. Hooey · Carchman v. Nash New Jersey Department of Corrections · State ex rel. Thomas v. Ghee

Decided 2025-11-12

[Cite as State v. Dickerson, 
2025-Ohio-5125
.]


                                        COURT OF APPEALS
                                    DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO
                                    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT


  STATE OF OHIO                                         Case No. 25 CAA 07 0059

           Plaintiff - Appellee                         Opinion And Judgment Entry

  -vs-                                                  Appeal from the Delaware County Court
                                                        of Common Pleas, Case No. 17 CRI 06
                                                        0374
  LARRY RICHARD DICKERSON
                                                        Judgment: Affirmed
           Defendant – Appellant
                                                        Date of Judgment Entry: November 13,
                                                        2025



BEFORE: WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN, P.J., ROBERT G. MONTGOMERY, J., KEVIN W.
POPHAM, J.; Appellate Judges

APPEARANCES: KATHERYN L. MUNGER for Plaintiff-Appellee; LARRY R.
DICKERSON, PRO SE, # 98423-71 for Defendant-Appellant


                                                OPINION

Popham, J.,

         {¶1}    Appellant Larry Dickerson appeals the judgment of the Delaware County

Court of Common Pleas denying his second “Motion to Dismiss, Quash, and/or Modify

Detainer” on July 14, 2025. Appellee is the State of Ohio. For the reasons below, we

affirm.

                                          Facts & Procedural History

         {¶2}    In 2017, appellant pled guilty to three counts of unlawful sexual conduct with

a minor, in violation of R.C. 2907.04(A), each a felony of the third degree. On January 8,
2018, the trial court sentenced appellant to five years of community control and ordered

him to register as a Tier II sex offender.

        {¶3}     On May 28, 2020, appellee moved to suspend appellant’s community

control, alleging multiple violations, including appellant’s attempt to solicit sex from an

undercover officer posing as a fifteen-year-old female, which resulted in federal criminal

charges.       On January 5, 2021, at a community-control-violation hearing, appellant

admitted the violations.      The trial court revoked appellant’s community control, and

imposed a prison term of sixty months on each count, to be served concurrently. The trial

court further informed appellant that a mandatory five-year term of post-release control

applied pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B) and R.C. 2967.28(B). Appellant did not appeal the

January 5, 2021, judgment entry revoking his community control and imposing sentence.

        {¶4}     Appellant was subsequently convicted in federal court and sentenced to

fifteen and one-half years in federal prison, to be served concurrently with his state prison

term.

        {¶5}     On May 20, 2025, appellant filed his first “Motion to Dismiss, Quash, and/or

Modify Detainer and/or Parole Term”. Appellee filed a response in opposition. On June

26, 2025, the trial court denied appellant’s motion.

        {¶6}     On July 9, 2025, appellant filed a second “Motion to Dismiss, Quash, and/or

Modify Detainer and Parole Term”. In this second motion, appellant explained that he

was not challenging his sentence, or the imposition of the five years of post-release

control, but instead he sought dismissal of the detainer because it allegedly prevented

him from applying for federal prison programming. On July 11, 2025, appellee filed a

response in opposition to appellant’s second motion.
      {¶7}    On July 14, 2025, the trial court issued a judgment entry denying appellant’s

second motion - finding that the five-year post-release control term was mandatory and

that the detainer issued by the Ohio Adult Parole Authority (“APA”) was a direct

consequence of that post-release control. Accordingly, the trial court concluded it lacked

authority to grant the requested relief.

      {¶8}    Appellant appeals the July 14, 2025, judgment entry of the Delaware County

Court of Common Pleas, and assigns the following as error:

      {¶9}    “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO QUASH OR DISMISS THE

DETAINTER ON GROUNDS THAT THE COURT LACKED THE LEGAL AUTHORITY

TO GRANT SUCH RELIEF AS REQUESTED. THE ERROR IS REFLECTED IN THE

JUDGMENT ENTRY OF JULY 14, 2025.”

                                                  I.

      {¶10}   In his assignment of error, appellant contends the trial court committed error

in denying his motion to quash and/or dismiss detainer. We disagree.

      {¶11}   Appellant maintains he is not contesting the sentence imposed by the court

but instead seeks removal of the detainer, which he claims prevents him from accessing

rehabilitative programming in federal prison. He asserts the detainer serves “no practical

purpose” because he will not be released from federal custody before completing his state

post-release control.

      {¶12}   A detainer is “a request filed by a criminal justice agency with the institution

in which a prisoner is incarcerated, asking the institution either to hold the prisoner for the

agency or to notify the agency when release of the prisoner is imminent.” State v.

Sanchez, 
2006-Ohio-4478
, ¶ 19, quoting Carchman v. Nash, 
473 U.S. 716, 719
 (1985).
A detainer “does not represent the basis upon which a prisoner is actually held in

confinement.” Curtis v. United States, 
123 Fed.Appx. 179, 183
 (6th Cir. 2005).

      {¶13}   Appellant alleges that the Delaware County Sheriff’s Office issued a

detainer to the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) on February 4, 2025. Appellee does

not dispute that a detainer exists, but asserts it was issued by the APA. The APA is a

bureau and “administrative unit” of the Division of Parole and Community Services of the

Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”). R.C. 5149.02; State ex rel.

Nesbitt v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 
2008-Ohio-192, ¶ 5
 (5th Dist.).

      {¶14}   Appellant has not provided either the trial court or this Court any documents

– whether from the APA, ODRC, the Delaware County Sheriff’s Office, or the BOP –

identifying the agency who issued the detainer or the date of issuance of the detainer.

Further, appellant has not provided the trial court or this Court any documents or evidence

from the BOP to support his assertion that he is currently being denied admittance into

federal prison programs due to a state-issued detainer.

      {¶15}   A request to remove or cancel an ODRC-issued detainer is not properly

brought by motion in the underlying criminal case. If the detainer was issued by the

ODRC, its cancellation or revocation lies within the discretion of the APA chief or

designee. Ohio Adm.Code 5120:1-1-31(D) states, “at any time after the filing of or

issuance of a detainer against an offender, the chief of the adult parole authority, or

designee, may, revoke and cancel such detainers, and take such other action as may be

deemed appropriate.” This Court has recognized that, “it is the department [ODRC] that

has the authority to place a detainer,” not the State of Ohio. Richards v. State, 2018-

Ohio-924, ¶ 6 (5th Dist.). Further, appellant remains under ODRC supervision until the
ODRC has issued a certificate of final release. R.C. 2967.02; State v. Bevington, 2012-

Ohio-6285, ¶ 21 (5th Dist.).

      {¶16}   The trial court properly concluded that it lacked the authority to grant

appellant’s requested relief. State ex rel. Thomas v. Ghee, 
81 Ohio St.3d 191
 (1998).

There is no evidence in the record that appellant has attempted to contact the ODRC, or

initiated legal proceedings in either state or federal court directly against either the ODRC

(who allegedly issued the detainer) or the BOP (the federal agency allegedly preventing

him from participating in certain federal prison programs).

      {¶17}   The cases cited by appellant in his brief are distinguishable from the instant

case. Smith v. Hooey, 
393 U.S. 374
 (1969), addressed speedy-trial concerns. Because

appellant challenges neither his conviction nor his sentence, his speedy trial rights are

not implicated in this case. United States v. Jackson, 
2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203642
 (4th

Cir. Nov. 2, 2020), involved a federal detainer, not a state detainer. Gilmore v. Ormond,

2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80066
 (E.D.Ky. May 25, 2017), concerned the Interstate

Agreement on Detainers, codified as R.C. 2963.30, which applies only to, “detainers

based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints ….” No untried indictments,

informations, or complaints exist in this case.

      {¶18}   Given the lack of information in the record to support appellant’s allegations

and the trial court’s lack of authority to grant relief, we find the trial court did not commit

error in denying appellant’s second motion to quash and/or dismiss detainer. Appellant’s

assignment of error is overruled.
      For the reasons stated in our Opinion, the judgment of the Delaware County Court

of Common Pleas is affirmed.

      Costs to Appellant.


By: Popham , J.

Hoffman, P.J. and

Montgomery, J.

/2025/ohio/5125 · .json · Public domain