[Cite as State v. E.B.,
2025-Ohio-5142.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Nos. 114897, 114898, and
114900
v. :
E.B., :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 13, 2025
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case Nos. CR-24-694745-A, CR-24-694695-A, and CR-24-695810-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Gregory Ochocki, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.
Elizabeth Miller, Ohio Public Defender, and Lauren
Hammersmith, Assistant State Public Defender, for
appellant.
WILLIAM A. KLATT, J.:
Defendant-appellant E.B. appeals from his criminal sentencing in
adult court in violation of R.C. 2152.121. The State concedes this error. For the
following reasons, we reverse and remand.
Factual and Procedural History
The instant appeal arises from multiple juvenile court cases. On
January 17, 2024, in Cuyahoga J.C. No. DL-24-100365, the State of Ohio filed a
complaint in the Juvenile Division of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas.
The complaint alleged that E.B. had committed offenses that, if committed by an
adult, would constitute aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01, robbery in
violation of R.C. 2911.02, grand theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02, breaking and
entering in violation of R.C. 2911.13, and obstructing official business in violation of
R.C. 2921.31. The aggravated robbery and robbery charges carried firearm
specifications.
Pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(a) and 2152.10(A)(1)(a), the
aggravated robbery charge was subject to mandatory transfer to adult court.
Therefore, after finding probable cause, the juvenile court transferred the case to the
general division for prosecution.
On May 7, 2024, in Cuyahoga J.C. No. DL-24-105026, the State of
Ohio filed a complaint in the Juvenile Division of the Cuyahoga County Court of
Common Pleas. This complaint alleged that E.B. committed additional offenses of
aggravated robbery, robbery, grand theft, and breaking and entering. The
aggravated robbery charge was subject to mandatory transfer to adult court, and
therefore, after finding probable cause, the juvenile court transferred this case to the
general division for prosecution. The offenses in both cases took place when E.B.
was 17 years old.
On August 27, 2024, in adult court, the grand jury in both cases
returned indictments that mirrored the juvenile complaints. Cuyahoga J.C. No. DL-
24-100365 became Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-24-694695-A. Cuyahoga J.C. No. DL-24-
105026 became Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-24-694745-A.
On October 9, 2024, a grand jury indicted E.B. on two counts of
receiving stolen property in violation of R.C. 2913.51(A), one count of carrying a
concealed weapon in violation of R.C. 2923.12(A)(2), and one count of improperly
handing firearms in a motor vehicle in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-24-695810-A. The
alleged offenses in this case took place after E.B. turned 18, and therefore, E.B. was
directly indicted in the General Division.
On January 14, 2025, the court held a change-of-plea hearing in
which E.B. entered the following pleas to resolve all three cases. In Cuyahoga C.P.
No. CR-24-694695-A, E.B. pled guilty to one count of robbery in violation of R.C.
2911.02, a second-degree felony. In Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-24-694745-A, E.B. also
pled guilty to one count of robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.02, a second-degree
felony. Both counts carried three-year firearm specifications. In Cuyahoga C.P. No.
CR-24-695810-A, E.B. pled guilty to one count of receiving stolen property in
violation of R.C. 2913.51(A), a fourth-degree felony. The remaining counts and
specifications in all three cases were nolled.
On February 6, 2025, the court sentenced E.B. to two to three years
on each of the robbery offenses and 18 months on the receiving stolen property
offense, to be served concurrently, and three years on each of the firearm
specifications, to be served consecutively to each other and to the sentences in the
underlying offenses. The total aggregate sentence was eight to nine years.
E.B. appeals, raising the following assignments of error for our
review:
I. The Cuyahoga Court of Common Pleas erred as a matter of law when
it failed to sentence E.B. in accordance with R.C. 2152.121.
II. E.B. was denied the effective assistance of counsel.
Although E.B. filed a notice of appeal in all three cases, none of his arguments
pertain to his conviction or sentence in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-24-695810-A.
Law and Analysis
I. R.C. 2152.121 – Reverse Bindover
In his first assignment of error, E.B. argues that the trial court erred
when it failed to sentence him in accordance with R.C. 2152.121. Specifically, E.B.
argues that his convictions for nonmandatory transfer offenses triggered the reverse
bindover provision in R.C. 2152.121 and the trial court was therefore required to
remand his case to the juvenile court. The State concedes that the trial court erred
with respect to Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-24-694695-A and Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-24-
694745-A.
This court has consistently held that a trial court’s failure to follow
R.C. 2152.121 is plain error. State v. Abrams, 2020-Ohio-2729, ¶ 6 (8th Dist.), citing
State v. Murphy,
2012-Ohio-2924, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.).
In some cases, the juvenile court has no discretion to determine which
children can benefit from its rehabilitative services. Id. at ¶ 7, citing R.C. 2152.10(A)
and 2152.12(A). The bindover statutes require the juvenile court to transfer
jurisdiction if there is probable cause to believe that a 16- or 17-year-old child has
committed a certain type of offense. Id. After transfer and through the adversarial
process, the juvenile may be convicted of a lesser offense such that the juvenile court
would have retain jurisdiction of the juvenile, but for the initial mandatory transfer.
Id., citing R.C. 2152.12(A) and (B).
In 2011, the Ohio legislature created reverse bindover when it enacted
R.C. 2152.121. Subsection (B)(3) of this statute instructs courts:
(B) If a complaint is filed against a child alleging that the child is a
delinquent child, if the case is transferred pursuant to division
(A)(1)(a)(i)…of section 2152.12 of the Revised Code, and if the child
subsequently is convicted of or pleads guilty to an offense in that case,
the sentence to be imposed or disposition to be made of the child shall
be determined as follows:
(3) If the court in which the child is convicted of or pleads guilty to the
offense determines under (B)(1) of this section that, had a complaint
been filed in juvenile court alleging that the child was a delinquent child
for committing an act that would be that offense if committed by an
adult, division (A) of section 2152.12 of the Revised Code would not
have required mandatory transfer of the case but division (B) of that
section would have allowed discretionary transfer of the case, the court
shall determine the sentence it believes should be imposed upon the
child under Chapter 2929 of the Revised Code, shall impose that
sentence upon the child, and shall stay that sentence pending
completion of the procedures specified in this division.
Thus, pursuant to the process laid out above, at the criminal
sentencing hearing, “the trial court must consider and compare how a juvenile’s case
was transferred to its jurisdiction, and the resulting offense of conviction before the
court.” Abrams at ¶ 9. “‘In other words, the trial court must determine what the
juvenile court would have been required to do with the case if the juvenile had been
charged with only those offenses for which convictions were obtained.’”
Id., quoting
State v. D.B.,
2017-Ohio-6952, ¶ 12. If the resulting offense would have allowed for
discretionary transfer instead of mandatory transfer, the trial court “must impose a
sentence, stay the sentence, and return the case to juvenile court.” Id. This reverse
bindover process ensures that the juvenile court is afforded full discretion to
determine those children that will benefit from rehabilitative measures, even if the
juvenile court was not initially afforded that discretion. Id.
Here, both Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-24-694695-A and Cuyahoga C.P.
No. CR-24-694745-A originated in the juvenile court and were properly transferred
to adult court because the complaints included offenses subject to mandatory
transfer — aggravated robbery with attendant firearm specifications. In adult court,
however, both cases were resolved when E.B. pled guilty to offenses that would not
have required mandatory transfer, thus triggering the reverse bindover procedures
in R.C. 2152.121.
The trial court’s failure to follow the procedures laid out in R.C.
2152.121 with respect to Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-24-694695-A and Cuyahoga C.P. No.
CR-24-694745-A constituted plain error. Therefore, E.B.’s first assignment of error
is sustained as to these cases.1
1 E.B. does not extend his argument to Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-24-695810-A.
Because this case arose from offenses committed when E.B. was 18 years old, it originated
in adult court, and therefore the reverse bindover procedures outlined in R.C. 2152.121 do
not apply.
In E.B.’s second assignment of error, E.B. argues that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel when his counsel failed to raise the issue of reverse
bindover at his sentencing hearing.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, E.B. must demonstrate
that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) the deficient performance
prejudiced the defendant so as to deprive him of a fair trial. State v. Trimble, 2009-
Ohio-2961, ¶ 98, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The
failure to prove either prong of this two-part test makes it unnecessary for a court to
consider the other prong. State v. Madrigal,
2000-Ohio-448, ¶ 49, citing
Strickland
at 697.
E.B.’s counsel did not raise R.C. 2152.121 at his plea hearing or at
sentencing. Therefore, because of his counsel’s failure to raise the issue, E.B. has
had his sentence imposed and is serving that sentence in an adult prison instead of
having his case remanded to juvenile court where counsel could have argued that he
was amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile system. E.B.’s counsel “should
have known about R.C. 2152.121, which went into effect in 2011.” Abrams at ¶ 17.
Because E.B. was prejudiced by his counsel’s deficient performance, his second
assignment of error is sustained.
Judgment reversed, and the case is remanded for the trial court to
stay E.B.’s sentence and remand Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-24-694695-A and Cuyahoga
C.P. No. CR-24-694745-A to the juvenile court for further proceedings in
accordance with R.C. 2152.121.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
WILLIAM A. KLATT, JUDGE*
MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR
(*Sitting by assignment: William A. Klatt, J., retired, of the Tenth District Court of
Appeals.)
