[Cite as State v. Boyle,
2025-Ohio-5160.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
GREENE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
: C.A. No. 2025-CA-10
Appellee :
: Trial Court Case No. 2024 CV 0971
v. :
: (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas
DAVID C. BOYLE : Court)
:
Appellant : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY &
: OPINION
...........
Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on November 14, 2025, the judgment
of the trial court is affirmed.
Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.
Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately
serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.
Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified
copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note
the service on the appellate docket.
For the court,
ROBERT G. HANSEMAN, JUDGE
EPLEY, P.J., and TUCKER, J., concur.
OPINION
GREENE C.A. No. 2025-CA-10
DAVID C. BOYLE, Appellant, Pro Se
MEGAN A. HAMMOND, Attorney for Appellee
HANSEMAN, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant David Boyle appeals pro se from an order granting a
default judgment against him and declaring him a vexatious litigator. According to Boyle, he
cannot be declared a vexatious litigator because our court recently reversed and remanded
a pending case he had filed in the trial court. For the reasons discussed below, Boyle’s
argument is without merit, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a default
judgment to the State of Ohio declaring Boyle to be a vexatious litigator. Accordingly, the
judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
I. General Background
{¶ 2} In 2014, we considered Boyle’s direct appeal. We noted that Boyle had originally
been charged with sixteen counts of rape of his daughter, had pled guilty to six rape counts
with the remaining counts dismissed, and had been sentenced to 40 years in prison, which
included both consecutive and concurrent terms. State v. Boyle, 2014-Ohio-1271, ¶ 2-6
(2d Dist.). After conducting a review under Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), we
found no arguable merit in Boyle’s claim that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive
sentences. Boyle at ¶ 7-12. We, therefore, affirmed the judgment. Id. at ¶ 13. Boyle failed to
appeal from our judgment.
{¶ 3} Since that time, Boyle has filed various postconviction claims in state court. In
June 2022, we summarized the history up to that point:
2
On June 16, 2014, Boyle filed a pro se application to reopen his appeal
pursuant to App.R. 26(B). We denied his application to reopen on September
29, 2014. Boyle filed additional applications to reopen in 2016, 2020, and 2021,
which were all denied by this Court.
On June 24, 2018, Boyle filed a “Motion to Dismiss Defective
Indictment,” in which he argued that the indictment violated his constitutional
right to due process because it contained numerous undifferentiated counts of
rape. Boyle claimed these “carbon-copy” counts failed to describe sufficiently
the charges, thereby preventing him from properly preparing his defense. The
State filed a memorandum in opposition. The trial court overruled the motion,
finding that Boyle’s guilty plea waived any error associated with the indictment
and that his claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Boyle appealed,
and we affirmed the judgment of the trial court. See State v. Boyle, 2d Dist.
Greene No. 2018-CA-12, 2018-Ohio-3284.
On September 19, 2018, Boyle filed a “Petition for an Evidentiary
Hearing,” in which he alleged Miranda violations, speedy trial violations,
insufficient evidence, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court
construed the motion as a petition for post-conviction relief and denied it as
untimely on October 23, 2018.
On November 2, 2021, Boyle filed a “Motion for Fraud Upon the Court
Pursuant to R.C. 2921.32(A).” The State filed a memorandum in opposition on
December 1, 2021. The trial court again construed the motion as a petition for
post-conviction relief and denied it as untimely on January 6, 2022.
State v. Boyle, 2022-Ohio-2165, ¶ 3-6 (2d Dist.).
3
{¶ 4} Our June 2022 opinion considered Boyle’s appeal of the trial court’s January 6,
2022 postconviction decision. We affirmed, finding Boyle’s postconviction petition was
successive and untimely. We also found that Boyle failed to establish any excuse for his
untimeliness under R.C. 2953.23(A). Id. at ¶ 16. Thus, by June 2022, we had found that
Boyle had pursued the following matters in state court: a direct appeal; four applications to
reopen his direct appeal: three trial court postconviction petitions, and two appeals resulting
from the trial court’s decisions on two of those petitions. (Boyle did not appeal from the
October 23, 2018 trial court decision).1
{¶ 5} Boyle appealed from our June 2022 judgment, but the Supreme Court of Ohio
declined review. See State v. Boyle, 2023-Ohio-86, filed on January 17, 2023. Previously,
Boyle had appealed from our 2018 judgment on the alleged defective indictment. However,
in that case, the Supreme Court of Ohio also declined to accept review. See State v. Boyle,
2018-Ohio-4496, issued on November 7, 2018. Consequently, in addition to the trial and
1
Many more than three postconviction petitions were filed in the trial court. According to the
exhibits the State filed with its complaint, Boyle began filing such motions in February 2016.
In that year alone, he filed six motions, including three petitions for a writ of mandamus.
However, Boyle failed to appeal from the court’s dismissal or denial of these motions and
petitions. Between October 2019 and 2021, Boyle also sought habeas relief in federal court.
See Boyle v. Warden, Chillicothe Corr. Inst.,
2019 WL 4861929, *1 (S.D.Ohio Oct. 2, 2019)
(magistrate judge recommended dismissal of petition with prejudice based on statute of
limitations bar); Boyle v. Warden, Chillicothe Corr. Inst,,
2019 WL 5260352, *1 (S.D.Ohio
Oct. 17, 2019) (judge returned case to magistrate judge to file supplemental report analyzing
objections); Boyle v. Warden, Chillicothe Corr. Inst.,
2019 WL 5265316, *3 (S.D.Ohio Oct.
17, 2019) (magistrate judge overruled objections and again recommended dismissal of
petition with prejudice based on statute of limitations); Boyle v. Warden, Chilicothe Corr.
Inst,,
2020 WL 209086, *1 (S.D.Ohio Jan. 14, 2020) (court overruled Boyle’s objections to
magistrate judge’s decision, dismissed habeas petition with prejudice, denied certificate of
appealability, and certified to Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals that appeal would be frivolous);
and Boyle v. Shoop,
2020 WL 4875322, *3 (6th Cir. June 29, 2020) (denying certificate of
appealability). Boyle’s petition for a writ of certiorari was denied in January 2021. See Boyle
v. Shoop,
141 S.Ct. 1101 (2021).
4
appellate court proceedings already mentioned, Boyle had prosecuted two appeals to the
Supreme Court of Ohio.
{¶ 6} State court litigation continued to occur in 2022. In February 2022, Boyle
appealed to our court from a decision denying his January 5, 2022 request to inspect his
presentence investigation report. We dismissed that appeal when Boyle failed to respond to
a show cause order. See State v. Boyle, No. 2022 CA 10 (2d Dist. Mar. 23, 2022). Boyle did
not appeal from this dismissal.
{¶ 7} In August 2022, we issued another opinion concerning Boyle’s trial court filings.
This time, it concerned Boyle’s January 27, 2022 motion to inspect “grand jury transcripts,
Miranda waivers, sworn affidavits from his defense attorneys, his own statements,
statements made by the victim and two other witnesses, text messages, Ohio Bureau of
Criminal Investigation (“BCI”) documents, and speedy trial time waivers.” State v. Boyle,
2022-Ohio-2887, ¶ 3 (2d Dist.). After excluding the request for review of grand jury
transcripts (because it was not final and appealable), we affirmed the trial court’s denial of
the motion (which the court had classified as a postconviction petition). As with the
June 2022 decision, we found Boyle’s postconviction petition was untimely and that he again
had failed to establish an exception to untimeliness under R.C. 2953.23(A). Id. at ¶ 6-20.
{¶ 8} Further, to the extent Boyle’s motion could have been construed as a public
records’ request, we found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s finding that “Boyle had
failed to demonstrate that the information sought in the public record was necessary to
support what appears to be a justiciable claim.” Id. at ¶ 18. Finally, the only documents that
were subject to disclosure under the Rules of Superintendence were Boyle’s speedy trial
time waivers. We agreed with the trial court that to obtain these documents, Boyle had to
request them from the Greene County Clerk of Courts and pay for the copies. Id. at ¶ 19-20.
5
Again, we affirmed the trial court’s decision. Our judgment was filed on August 19, 2022—
only a few months after the preceding decision we had rendered in Boyle’s appeals.
{¶ 9} On January 19, 2023, Boyle filed a motion in the trial court under Crim.R. 52(B)
asserting “plain error.” Boyle’s motion asserted 16 instances of plain error that he claimed
had occurred in his case. State v. Boyle, 2023-Ohio-3390, ¶ 5 (2d Dist.). The trial court
denied the motion on February 7, 2023, and Boyle again appealed to our court.
Id. Once
more, we affirmed, finding that “the trial court properly denied Boyle’s motion because:
(1) the plain-error standard in Crim.R. 52(B) is only available on direct appeal, and thus did
not apply to Boyle's motion; (2) to the extent that Boyle’s motion was a petition for
postconviction relief, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion due to its being
an untimely and successive petition for postconviction relief; and (3) the doctrine of res
judicata barred a majority of the claims raised in the motion.” Id. at ¶ 18. Our judgment was
filed on September 22, 2023, and Boyle did not further appeal.
{¶ 10} While the 2023 appellate case was pending, Boyle filed a petition for writ of
mandamus in our court on February 23, 2023. After Boyle failed to satisfy a show cause
order, we dismissed the petition. See State v. Boyle, No. 2023 CA 15 (2d Dist. Mar. 20,
2023). Again, Boyle did not appeal from our judgment. Subsequently, on October 23, 2023,
Boyle filed a notice in our court, seeking to file a “delayed notice of appeal.” This notice was
designated as an appeal from Boyle’s August 8, 2013 judgment of conviction. We dismissed
the appeal because Boyle had already pursued a direct appeal and was not entitled to a
second such appeal. See State v. Boyle, No. 2023 CA 56, 1-2 (2d Dist. Nov. 15, 2023).
Boyle then appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which again declined review in State v.
Boyle, 2024-Ohio-763. That decision was filed on March 5, 2024.
6
{¶ 11} On April 19, 2024, Boyle filed yet another motion in the trial court, seeking an
order voiding his sentence. After the court denied this motion on May 10, 2024, Boyle filed
a “notice” in our court on June 10, 2024, seeking to certify a conflict. We then issued a show
cause order, in which we noted that Boyle appeared to be attempting to appeal the court’s
May 10 order. However, Boyle had not filed a notice of appeal as required to provide us with
jurisdiction. When Boyle failed to respond to our show cause order, we dismissed the appeal.
See State v. Boyle, No. 2024 CA 38 (2d Dist. July 1, 2024). Boyle did not further appeal from
this decision.
{¶ 12} Before we dismissed the June 2024 appeal, Boyle filed a separate civil action
in the trial court on May 5, 2024, seeking a declaratory judgment against the State. After the
court granted the State’s motion to dismiss, Boyle appealed to our court. Again, we affirmed
the court’s judgment, finding that Boyle’s complaint for declaratory judgment was an
impermissible collateral attack on a prior valid order in a criminal case. See Boyle v. State,
No. 24 CA 46, 5-8 (2d Dist. Mar. 14, 2025).
{¶ 13} In August 2024, Boyle filed two more motions in the criminal case. One was a
motion for change of venue, and the other was a “‘manifest weight of the evidence motion.’”
State v. Boyle, 2025-Ohio-860, ¶ 6 (2d Dist.). We agreed with the trial court that these
motions were best construed as post-conviction motions. However, we disagreed that the
motions were “legal nullities,” meaning they were legally void or “‘something that had never
occurred,’” such as where non-attorneys file court actions or parties file trial court motions
for reconsideration of final judgments. Id. at ¶ 8-9. We, therefore, reversed the trial court
decision and remanded the case so the court could decide the motions’ merits. Id. at ¶ 10.
Our judgment was issued on March 25, 2025.
7
{¶ 14} As the State notes in its brief, after remand, the trial court filed a decision on
August 6, 2025, denying both motions. The court also later denied Boyle’s motion for leave
to appeal the decision, as by then it had declared Boyle a vexatious litigator. State v. Boyle,
Greene C.P. No. 2013 CR 0042 (Sept. 15, 2025). While these decisions occurred after the
current appeal was filed, we may take judicial notice of records and opinions that are
available on the internet. E.g., Heck v. Atakpu, 2024-Ohio-2733, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.). Here, the
records concerning all of Boyle’s cases are available on the clerk’s website and can be
considered.
{¶ 15} In the meantime, on December 10, 2024, the State filed a complaint asking
the trial court to declare Boyle a vexatious litigator. The State attached copies of voluminous
filings from: (1) the trial court criminal case (Exs. A-1 through A-18); (2) ten appeals in our
court (Exs. B-1 through B-18); (3) three appeals to the Supreme Court of Ohio (Exs. C-1
through C-6); and (4) a trial court civil case (Exs. D-1 through D-2). The complaint was
successfully served on Boyle on December 17, 2024.
{¶ 16} After Boyle failed to respond to the complaint, the State filed a motion for
default judgment on January 24, 2025. The State attached the same exhibits to the motion
but added Ex. E, which was a certified copy of documents indicating that certified mail
service was made on Boyle on December 17, 2024. Boyle also failed to respond to the
default judgment motion. Accordingly, the trial court granted the State a default judgment
and declared Boyle a vexatious litigator. See Judgment Granting Default Judgment (Feb. 11,
2025).
{¶ 17} Boyle then filed a request in our court for leave to appeal the default judgment.
At that point, we issued a show cause order informing Boyle that he needed to file a motion
for leave in the trial court. After receiving Boyle’s response, we granted him leave to appeal
8
conditioned on the requirement that he file a notice of appeal within 16 days after our order
was journalized. State v Boyle, No. 24 CA 10 (2d. Dist. Mar. 19, 2025). Subsequently, we
dismissed the appeal because Boyle failed to file a notice of appeal within the specified time.
On Boyle’s request for reconsideration, we vacated that decision and allowed the appeal to
proceed. State v. Boyle, No. 24 CA 10 (2d Dist. May 21, 2025). The parties filed briefs, and
this matter is ready for consideration.
II. Discussion
{¶ 18} Boyle’s brief, which is three handwritten pages, does not comply with
App.R. 16 in most respects. Among other issues, Boyle failed to comply with
App.R. 16(A)(3), which requires “[a] statement of the assignments of error presented for
review, with reference to the place in the record where each error is reflected.” In addition,
Boyle failed to comply with App.R. 16(A)(7), which mandates inclusion of “[a]n argument
containing the contentions of the appellant with respect to each assignment of error
presented for review and the reasons in support of the contentions, with citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which appellant relies.”
{¶ 19} Pro se litigants are held to the same procedures and standards as parties who
obtain counsel, and we may disregard briefs that fail to comply with App.R. 16(A). See
App.R. 12(A) and Holfinger v. Stonespring/Carespring, L.L.C., 2016-Ohio-7982, ¶ 27-31
(2d Dist.). Nonetheless, in the interests of justice, we consider Boyle’s brief rather than
striking it or summarily dismissing the appeal. State v. Bolton,
2017-Ohio-8903, ¶ 13
(2d Dist.).
{¶ 20} According to the brief, Boyle’s argument is that he cannot be considered a
vexatious litigator because we reversed and remanded one of his cases for the trial court to
consider the merits. The case in question is Boyle, 2025-Ohio-860 (2d Dist.), which involved
9
an August 2024 change of venue motion and a motion involving manifest weight of the
evidence. As we noted above, the trial court overruled those motions on remand in
August 2025. The fact that we asked the trial court to review the merits of the motions rather
than simply rejecting them as “legal nullities” does not mean the motions had merit or that
they were not frivolous. We simply found that the trial court rejected them for an incorrect
reason. Given the court's decision on remand, all state courts have now rejected every post-
conviction claim that Boyle has made.
{¶ 21} Furthermore, the status of a case as still pending is irrelevant. R.C. 2323.52(B)
provides that a complaint alleging that an individual is a vexatious litigator may be filed “while
the civil action or actions in which the habitual and persistent vexatious conduct occurred
are still pending.”
{¶ 22} In his reply brief, Boyle also alleges that he had sent the trial court an answer
to the vexatious litigator complaint, but it was not filed. The alleged pleading is not part of
the trial court record, and the trial court docket does not reflect that such a document was
ever received. Well-established law provides that “[a] reviewing court cannot add matter to
the record before it, which was not a part of the trial court’s proceedings, and then decide
the appeal on the basis of the new matter.” State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402 (1978),
paragraph one of the syllabus. Accord State ex rel. Jones v. Bd. of Education of Dayton Pub.
Schools,
2020-Ohio-4931, ¶ 66 (2d Dist.). Therefore, we cannot consider Boyle’s claim.
{¶ 23} Turning to the default judgment itself, Civ.R. 55(A) states that: “When a party
against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise
defend as provided by these rules, the party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply in
writing or orally to the court therefor.” “Typically, the entry of default judgment is proper
because the failure to appear or defend against the plaintiff’s claims is deemed a confession
10
of their veracity, and, therefore, an admission of liability.” Lane v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 2018-
Ohio-3140, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.), citing Ohio Valley Radiology Assoc., Inc. v. Ohio Valley Hosp.
Assn., 28 Ohio St.3d 118, 121 (1986). Accord Brookville Ents., Inc. v. Seibel, 2020-Ohio-
948, ¶ 23 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 24} We review decisions granting default judgments for abuse of discretion. Wright
State Univ. v. Williams, 2012-Ohio-5095, ¶ 5 (2d Dist.), citing In re Ball,
2012-Ohio-2095,
¶ 8 (2d Dist.). “An abuse of discretion implies that the trial court acted unreasonably,
arbitrarily, or unconscionably.” Backyard Rentals, LLC v. Brooks,
2020-Ohio-205, ¶ 11
(2d Dist.), citing Blakemore v. Blakemore,
5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). However, “most
instances of abuse of discretion will result in decisions that are simply unreasonable, rather
than decisions that are unconscionable or arbitrary.” AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place
Community Urban Redevelopment Corp.,
50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 (1990). Decisions are
unreasonable if they are not supported by sound reasoning.
Id.
{¶ 25} In its brief, the State argues that an abuse of discretion “‘connotes more than
an error of law.’” State’s Br., p. 6. This is incorrect, as we have said on numerous occasions.
E.g., State v. Bansobeza, 2025-Ohio-2704, ¶ 60-61 (2d Dist.). Several years ago, the
Supreme Court of Ohio stressed that “‘[n]o court—not a trial court, not an appellate court,
nor even a supreme court—has the authority, within its discretion, to commit an error of
law.’” Johnson v. Abdullah,
2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 38, quoting State v. Boles,
2010-Ohio-278,
¶ 26 (2d Dist.). In Johnson, the court also emphasized that “[t]his should be axiomatic: a
court does not have discretion to misapply the law.”
Id. “If courts do commit errors of law,
they are reviewed de novo.”
Bansobeza at ¶ 61.
{¶ 26} Having reviewed the trial court’s decision and the documents the State
submitted, we find no abuse of discretion in granting the default judgment. On the subject of
11
vexatious litigation, R.C. 2323.52(B) provides that “a prosecuting attorney . . . who has
defended against habitual and persistent vexatious conduct . . . in a court of appeals, court
of common pleas, municipal court, or county court may commence a civil action in a court
of common pleas with jurisdiction over the person who allegedly engaged in the habitual and
persistent vexatious conduct to have that person declared a vexatious litigator.”
{¶ 27} Under R.C. 2323.52(A)(3), a vexatious litigator is defined as “any person who
has habitually, persistently, and without reasonable grounds engaged in vexatious conduct
in a civil action or actions, whether in the court of claims or in a court of appeals, court of
common pleas, municipal court, or county court, whether the person or another person
instituted the civil action or actions, and whether the vexatious conduct was against the same
party or against different parties in the civil action or actions.” As relevant here,
R.C. 2323.52(A)(2) defines “vexatious conduct” as “conduct of a party in a civil action that
satisfies any of the following: (a) The conduct obviously serves merely to harass or
maliciously injure another party to the civil action” or “(b) The conduct is not warranted under
existing law and cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law.” The statute defines “conduct” to have “the same
meaning as in section 2323.51 of the Revised Code.” R.C. 2323.52(A)(1).
{¶ 28} Turning to R.C. 2323.51(A)(1)(b), “conduct” includes any of the following:
(a) The filing of a civil action, the assertion of a claim, defense, or other
position in connection with a civil action, the filing of a pleading, motion, or
other paper in a civil action, including, but not limited to, a motion or paper filed
for discovery purposes, or the taking of any other action in connection with a
civil action;
12
(b) The filing by an inmate of a civil action or appeal against a
government entity or employee, the assertion of a claim, defense or other
position in connection with a civil action of that nature or the assertion of issues
of law in an appeal of that nature, or the taking of any other action in connection
with a civil action or appeal of that nature.
{¶ 29} We have held that while a “criminal case is not ‘a civil action,’ . . . ‘[c]onduct in
a criminal case can also result in a vexatious litigator designation when said conduct is ‘civil
in nature.’” Heck v. Atakpu, 2024-Ohio-2733, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. West, 2022-
Ohio-2060, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.). “Such conduct may include post-conviction motions and other
filings by a defendant.”
Id., citing West at ¶ 17-23. “A postconviction proceeding is not an
appeal of a criminal conviction, but, rather, a collateral civil attack on the judgment.” State v.
Steffen,
70 Ohio St.3d 399, 410 (1994), citing State v. Crowder,
60 Ohio St.3d 151 (1991).
Here, most of Boyle’s claims were directly civil (such as the declaratory judgment action) or
civil in nature and were correctly classified as such.
{¶ 30} The purpose of “applying a broader understanding of the term ‘civil action’ as
used in R.C. 2323.52 comports with the purpose of the statute, which is to not only ‘prevent
abuse of the system by those persons who persistently and habitually file lawsuits without
reasonable grounds,’ but to also prevent abuse by those who ‘otherwise engage in frivolous
conduct in the trial courts of this state.’” West at ¶ 21, quoting Mayer v. Bristow, 91 Ohio
St.3d 3, 13 (2000). In Mayer, the Supreme Court explained that “vexatious litigators
oftentimes use litigation, with seemingly indefatigable resolve and prolificacy, to intimidate
public officials and employees or cause the emotional and financial decimation of their
targets.” Mayer at 13. The court further remarked that “[s]uch conduct, which employs court
processes as amusement or a weapon in itself, undermines the people’s faith in the legal
13
system, threatens the integrity of the judiciary, and casts a shadow upon the administration
of justice. Thus, the people, through their representatives, have a legitimate, indeed
compelling, interest in curbing the illegitimate activities of vexatious litigators.” Id.
{¶ 31} “Vexatious conduct is not assessed under the subjective opinion of the
vexatious litigator regarding his or her own intentions . . . . Rather, we examine the objective
character of the conduct.” Wiltz v. Miller, 2025-Ohio-1325, ¶ 40 (5th Dist.), citing Prime
Equip. Group, Inc. v. Schmidt,
2016-Ohio-3472, ¶ 41 (10th Dist.). Of course, in the situation
before us, by failing to file a timely answer, Boyle has admitted the veracity of the allegations
in the complaint. The issue, rather, is whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting
the default judgment. There is no indication that the court acted unreasonably. Boyle failed
to file an answer and also failed to respond to the default judgment motion.
{¶ 32} Even if we were considering the merits of the decision, the trial court correctly
found Boyle to be a vexatious litigator. In its decision, the court observed that over the last
10 years, Boyle had filed “countless motions” in the trial court, as well as 10 appeals in our
court, three appeals in the Supreme Court of Ohio, and a civil case. Default Judgment, p. 4.
The court further found that many of Boyle’s filings in the criminal case were civil in nature
because they had been construed as postconviction motions. Id. We agree. In addition, the
court remarked that all of Boyle’s filings, regardless of the forum, “have centered upon the
same allegations and arguments – insufficient evidence, defects in the indictment, Miranda
and speedy trial violations, ineffective assistance of counsel, errors in sentencing, etc.” Id.
at p. 4-5. Again, we agree.
{¶ 33} Having read all the decisions and cases involving Boyle’s post-conviction
claims and having reviewed the State’s exhibits, it is clear that Boyle has repeatedly raised
the same arguments ever since he filed a motion for discovery in the criminal case in
14
February 2016 and a motion to “vacate void conviction” in March 2016—more than nine
years ago. See Motion for Default Judgment, State’s Exs. A-1 and A-2. No matter how many
times courts at all levels have rejected Boyle’s claims, he continues to file more motions and
pleadings. Under the circumstances, the trial court properly declared Boyle to be a vexatious
litigator. Consequently, Boyle’s assignment of error, such that it is, is overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 34} Boyle’s assignment of error having been overruled, the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.
.............
EPLEY, P.J., and TUCKER, J., concur.
15
