[Cite as State v. N.S.,
2025-Ohio-5166.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-250059
TRIAL NOS. 21/CRB/12607/A
Plaintiff-Appellee, : 21/CRB/12607/B
vs. : JUDGMENT ENTRY
N.S., :
Defendant-Appellant. :
This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, the briefs, and arguments.
For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgments of the
trial court are affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded.
Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal,
allows no penalty, and orders that costs be taxed to plaintiff-appellee.
The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the
Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial
court for execution under App.R. 27.
To the clerk:
Enter upon the journal of the court on 11/14/2025 per order of the court.
By:_______________________
Administrative Judge
[Cite as State v. N.S., 2025-Ohio-5166.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-250059
TRIAL NOS. 21/CRB/12607/A
Plaintiff-Appellee, : 21/CRB/12607/B
vs. :
OPINION
N.S., :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court
Judgments Appealed From Are: Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and Cause
Remanded
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: November 14, 2025
Emily Smart Woerner, City Solicitor, William T. Horsley, Chief Prosecuting Attorney,
Sean A. Witt, Joseph M. Cossins and Victoria Gooder, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorneys, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Sarah E. Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
MOORE, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant N.S. appeals the trial court’s judgments to the
extent they denied her applications for expungement. N.S. asserts that, while the trial
court granted her applications for record sealing, it failed to explain why her records
should not be expunged. The factors that a trial court must consider are the same for
both record sealing and expungement. The trial court found that N.S. met all the
requisite factors. Therefore, because the governing statute provides that an application
for expungement “shall” be granted if the factors listed in the statute are satisfied, and
they were here, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion by denying N.S.’s
applications for expungement. We, therefore, reverse the trial court’s judgments in
part and remand this cause to the trial court to grant N.S.’s applications for
expungement. We affirm the trial court’s judgments in all other respects.
I. Factual and Procedural History
{¶2} In December 2021, N.S. pleaded guilty to and was convicted of theft in
violation of R.C. 2913.02 in the case numbered 21/CRB/12607/B. A charge for
menacing under R.C. 2903.22 in the case numbered 21/CRB/12607/A—in which N.S.
was alleged to have threatened a Kroger employee—was dismissed in exchange for
N.S.’s guilty plea to the theft charge.
{¶3} In June 2024, N.S. filed two separate applications in each case, one to
seal her record and one to expunge her record.
{¶4} The State filed its objection to the applications. It generally argued
N.S.’s applications should be denied due to “the serious nature of this charge.”
{¶5} During the initial hearing on the applications, N.S. showed that she had
paid all outstanding costs and fines. Counsel explained that N.S. has five children, had
been working at Talbert House for two years, and hoped to obtain a promotion to
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
increase her income and buy a house for her family. The State objected on behalf of
the victim, who was not present at the hearing due to untimely notification. The State
asserted that denying the applications and maintaining the dismissed menacing
charge was necessary as the statement underlying the menacing charge was made by
N.S. toward the victim, who was employed at the Kroger location where the theft
occurred. The hearing on N.S.’s applications was continued so the State could notify
the victim.
{¶6} During the continued hearing on September 10, 2024, N.S. explained to
the court that she had been interviewed for a promotion at Talbert House and her
employer preferred that she have a clean record as the promotion would require her
to work with community members. N.S. expressed concern that maintaining her
criminal record would interfere with her ability to obtain an associate’s degree in social
work and a Pell Grant that she was pursuing.
{¶7} In response to the trial court’s questions, N.S. explained that she
ultimately served her entire jail sentence on the theft conviction because she had to
leave the program at Talbert House due to personal matters. She testified that she
entered the “Sober Living” treatment program when she was released from jail on
October 12, 2022. She stated that she began to work at Talbert House within one
month of completing the sober-living program, and she has participated in outpatient
treatment at Brightview Addiction Treatment Center and maintained her sobriety
since her arrest in 2021.
{¶8} The State asserted that it had an interest in maintaining N.S.’s criminal
record for public awareness of N.S.’s criminal history and submitted on its written
objection.
{¶9} The victim in the dismissed menacing case testified that she was
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
working at the Kroger location where N.S. committed the theft. The victim explained
that she did not interact with N.S. directly on that day except that, as N.S. was escorted
out of the store, she said to the victim, “when I get out of jail, I am coming back to beat
your ass.” The victim testified she did not have further contact with N.S. after the
incident. The victim transferred to a different Kroger store because she no longer felt
safe after the incident with N.S.
{¶10} Counsel for N.S. specifically asked the victim if she objected to N.S.’s
applications. The victim responded, “[B]ased on what I see now from three years ago,
I mean, I think she has changed. And hopefully what she wants to do is be on a certain
path and use that for her future and helping others from what she went through.”
{¶11} The trial court took the matter under advisement.
{¶12} On January 17, 2025, the trial court made an entry finding that the
charges were eligible for consideration, N.S. satisfied the applicable waiting period,
and N.S. had no further criminal charges. It also noted N.S.’s report that she had
maintained sobriety and was employed as a counselor at Talbert House.
{¶13} The trial court considered the State’s written objection but concluded
that no explanation was offered as to the “seriousness” of the crime that the State
mentioned, nor did the State “add any detail as to what makes the offense more serious
than another shoplifting offense or how government or law enforcement is served by
these records.” The court found that N.S.’s interest in having her record sealed
outweighed the State’s interest in maintaining the record.
{¶14} The entry reflected that the victim “ultimately concluded that [N.S. was]
‘not the same person that she was three years ago’” and “expressed no position as to
the application.” The entry explicitly granted N.S.’s applications for record sealing and
made no mention of the applications for expungement.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶15} The subsequently entered judgment on the judge’s sheets generally
stated, “Application Denied Per Entry,” and was followed by a nunc pro tunc entry
specifically granting N.S.’s applications to seal her records but, again, did not address
the expungement applications.
{¶16} This appeal followed.
II. Analysis
{¶17} On appeal, N.S. argues that the trial court implicitly denied her
applications for expungement by failing to address them. She asserts, in a single
assignment of error, that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to explain why
her records should not be expunged, noting that the State failed to argue a specific
basis for the trial court to grant the sealing of the records instead of expungement. The
State counters that, coupled with the judge’s sheets which initially only stated
“Application Denied Per Entry,” the trial court effectively denied the expungement
applications through its nunc pro tunc entries, which explicitly granted the
applications for sealing.
A. The applications for expungement should have been granted.
{¶18} We review a trial court’s decision to deny an application for
expungement for an abuse of discretion. In re L.B., 2024-Ohio-1255, ¶ 6 (1st Dist.). A
trial court abuses its discretion when “[it] exercis[es] its judgment, in an unwarranted
way, in regard to a matter over which it has discretionary authority.” State v. Lanxiang
Yu,
2024-Ohio-3083, ¶ 8 (1st Dist.). An abuse of discretion is more than an error of
law or judgment; it implies that the attitude of the trial court was “unreasonable,
arbitrary or unconscionable.” State v. Ofori,
2023-Ohio-1460, ¶ 14 (1st Dist.), quoting
Blakemore v. Blakemore,
5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). “[A]n abuse of discretion
occurs when a trial court’s judgment does not comport with reason or the record.”
Id.,
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
quoting State v. R.S., 2022-Ohio-1108, ¶ 8 (1st Dist.).
1. Expungement versus record sealing.
{¶19} Expungement and record sealing are both governed by R.C. 2953.32 but
provide different forms of relief. Expungement “results in deletion, making all case
records ‘permanently irretrievable.’” R.S. at ¶ 9, quoting State v. Aguirre, 2014-Ohio-
4603, ¶ 36, fn. 2. There is an exception to this permanent irretrievability; if the court
grants expungement, the bureau of criminal investigation is the only entity entitled to
maintain a record “for the limited purpose of determining an individual’s qualification
or disqualification for employment in law enforcement.” R.C. 2953.32(D)(5). Sealing
records, in contrast, “simply provides a shield from the public’s gaze [and limits]
inspection of sealed records of conviction to certain persons for certain purposes.” R.S.
at ¶ 9; see R.C. 2953.32(D).
{¶20} R.C. 2953.32(D)(1) requires a trial court to assess the same seven factors
before granting an application for record sealing or expungement. Upon the filing of
either application, the trial court is required to set a date for a hearing on the
application and to notify the prosecutor. State v. Murawski, 2014-Ohio-5438, ¶ 6
(1st Dist.); see R.C. 2953.32(B). The trial court is then required to determine whether
the applicant is an eligible offender and there are any pending criminal proceedings
against the applicant; if he or she is eligible, the court must determine whether the
applicant has been satisfactorily rehabilitated, consider any objections filed by the
prosecutor, and weigh the applicant’s interest in having the records sealed against the
State’s legitimate need to maintain those records. Id.; see R.C. 2953.32(C)(1)(a)-(e).
Although a trial court’s judgment cannot be based on the nature of the crime alone, a
trial court may consider the gravity of the crime in making its determination. See State
v. Dewey,
2021-Ohio-1005, ¶ 14-15 (11th Dist.). Because the sealing or expungement
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
of records of conviction is a privilege, not a right, it can be granted only when all seven
requirements for eligibility are met. State v. Sager, 2019-Ohio-135, ¶ 9 (1st Dist.); see
State v. Boykin,
2013-Ohio-4582, ¶ 11. However, if all seven requirements are met, the
statute mandates that the motion for sealing or expungement of records of conviction
must be granted, as explained below.
2. The denial of an expungement requires an analysis.
{¶21} N.S. asserts that, because an expungement is more favorable to the
applicant, given that the record is rendered “permanently irretrievable,” there should
be expressed findings as to why the court elected to grant sealing over expungement.
In support of this proposition, she cites State ex rel. Gains v. Rossi, 86 Ohio St.3d 620,
622 (1999) (remedial expungement provisions must be “liberally construed to
promote their purpose”). She further asserts that sealing should not be granted over
expungement unless there is an express finding by the trial court or an articulated need
by the State to inspect the record later.
{¶22} The State responds that the main issue addressed in Gaines was
whether R.C. 2953.32 conflicted with R.C. 2961.01, and there is no mention of whether
a court should express why either sealing or expungement is warranted. It further
argues that R.C. 2953.32(D) does not require a trial court to make explicit findings. In
State v. Lanxiang Yu, 2024-Ohio-3083 (1st Dist.), however, this court stated that “the
absence of an entry detailing the trial court’s analysis or a hearing transcript
explaining the trial court’s findings . . . is mere speculation as to the trial court’s
conclusions” and we held that the lack of analysis of the statutory factors in denying
the expungement application constituted an abuse of discretion. Id. at ¶ 21-22; see also
id. at ¶ 13 (“Where the trial court offers no reasons for its denial, we cannot blindly
defer to its unexplained exercise of discretion.”). This case obviously weighs against
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
the State’s argument.
{¶23} Like Lanxiang Yu, Ohio courts have consistently held that the record
must contain some analysis supporting the trial court’s denial of an application for
record sealing or expungement. See State v. S.D.F., 2025-Ohio-1832, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.)
(As a trial court cannot summarily deny a motion to seal or expunge convictions, the
matter was remanded to the trial court to state its findings and reasons for ruling on
the record.); State v. Wright,
2010-Ohio-6259, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.) (The trial court failed to
set forth the R.C. 2953.32(C) factors in its entry to indicate why the application was
denied.); State v. Gaines,
2019-Ohio-5003, ¶ 17 (6th Dist.) (A trial court cannot
categorically deny an application for expungement, rather, it must make the required
findings under R.C. 2953.32.).
{¶24} While it is apparent that the trial court abused its discretion by failing
to indicate why the applications for expungement were denied, the more significant
issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying said applications after
finding that each requisite statutory factor was met.
3. The expungement should have been granted per statute.
{¶25} N.S. asserts that the trial court’s denial of the applications for
expungement did not comport with reason or the record, and R.C. 2953.32(D)(2)(a)
required the court to grant the expungements because the findings that it made in
support of granting the sealing are the same findings required for granting an
application for expungement. R.C. 2953.32(D)(2)(a) provides, in part,
(2) If the court determines, after complying with division (D)(1) of this
section, that the offender is not pursuing sealing or expunging a
conviction of an offense that is prohibited under division (A) of this
section . . . that the application was made at the time specified in division
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
(B)(1)(a) or (b) or division (B)(2)(a) or (b) of this section that is
applicable with respect to the application and the subject offense, that
no criminal proceeding is pending against the applicant, that the
interests of the applicant in having the records pertaining to the
applicant’s conviction or bail forfeiture sealed or expunged are not
outweighed by any legitimate governmental needs to maintain those
records, and that the rehabilitation of the applicant has been attained to
the satisfaction of the court, both of the following apply:
(a) The court, except as provided in division (D)(4) or (5) of this section
or division (D), (F), or (G) of section 2953.34 of the Revised Code, shall
order all official records of the case that pertain to the conviction . . .
sealed if the application was for sealing or expunged if the application
was for expungement and, except as provided in division (C) of
section 2953.34 of the Revised Code, all index references to the case that
pertain to the conviction . . . deleted . . . .
(Emphasis added.) Id. The use of the word “shall” indicates that the trial court was
required to grant her application for expungement after finding that all the requisite
factors were met.
{¶26} Both the statute and case law support N.S.’s argument. While the trial
court concluded that the factors under R.C. 2953.32(C) were met in support of
granting the application for record sealing, it failed to indicate that there were any
factors that would provide a sufficient basis for denying N.S.’s application for
expungement. If all the requisite factors were met regarding the record sealing, and
the same factors apply to the expungement, then the trial court’s unexplained
judgment denying N.S.’s application for expungement does not comport with reason
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
or the record and was an abuse of discretion. We, therefore, sustain N.S.’s sole
assignment of error.
III. Conclusion
{¶27} Because we found reversible error, we reverse the trial court’s judgment
in part and remand the cause to the trial court to grant N.S.’s applications for
expungement of her records related to her theft conviction and the dismissal of her
menacing charge. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.
Judgments affirmed in part, reversed in part, and cause remanded.
CROUSE, J., concurs.
ZAYAS, P.J., concurs in part and concurs in judgment.
ZAYAS, Presiding Judge, concurring in part and concurring in judgment.
{¶28} I agree that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the request
for expungement. I write separately to delineate how, in this case, applying the law to
the findings made by the trial judge leads to the inevitable conclusion that denying the
expungement was unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.
{¶29} I emphasize that when an applicant contemporaneously requests to seal
and expunge a record, a trial court is not required to grant both. Expungement results
in an almost complete deletion of the records; only the bureau of criminal investigation
maintains a record to be used to determine qualifications for law-enforcement
employment. See State v. R.S., 2022-Ohio-1108, ¶ 9 (1st Dist.); R.C. 2953.32(D)(5).
In contrast, sealing results in a shield from public gaze, allowing some access of
records to limited people and purposes. See R.S. at ¶ 9; R.C. 2953.32(D)(2)(a); R.C.
2953.34(A)(1)-(13).
{¶30} Thus, each has a different implication on the State’s need to maintain
the record for public awareness or community safety. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 2009-
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Ohio-2380, ¶ 11-12 (8th Dist.) (holding that the trial court was in the best position to
determine whether the applicant was “dangerous” and found a “compelling public
interest” to maintain the records where serious charges were reduced after tens of
thousands of dollars in restitution were paid.); State v. Dewey, 2021-Ohio-1005, ¶ 17
(11th Dist.) (“In weighing the interests of the applicant in having the record sealed
against the legitimate needs of the government, the trial court found that future
employers (and the public at large) should have access to the record. The judge
underscored appellant violated the trust of her employer in committing the crime.”).
The Expungement Should Have Been Granted
{¶31} In this case, the trial court’s explicit findings in the entry granting the
sealing of the records require that the expungement be granted. The trial court made
a favorable determination on rehabilitation, finding that since the conviction N.S. “has
had no subsequent charges of any kind, anywhere, reports that she has maintained
sobriety, and now works as a counselor for the Talbert House.” The State did not
challenge N.S.’s rehabilitation. The trial court further found that the victim “expressed
no position” as to whether the applications should be granted and noted her statement
that N.S. “was not the same person she was three years ago.”
{¶32} While the state objected to expungement based on a need for public
access to the record, the trial court noted that the sole basis was the seriousness of the
charges, which is insufficient to justify the denial of both expungement and sealing.
See R.S., 2022-Ohio-1108, at ¶ 29 (1st Dist.) (Trial courts may not deny an application
to seal a conviction based solely on “the nature of the offense” where the General
Assembly has deemed the conviction an eligible offense.). Significantly, the court
noted that there was nothing presented to suggest that this shoplifting case was more
serious than any other shoplifting offense or how the government or law enforcement
12
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
is served by maintaining this record. We are bound by this finding by the court.
{¶33} Additionally, applicant N.S. presented employability interests in having
the records expunged, which were not challenged or contested. The State presented
no valid need to maintain the record, so there was nothing for the court to weigh
against N.S.’s interests. Consequently, this record does not support a different
outcome between an almost complete deletion of the record and shielding of the
records from public gaze.
{¶34} Accordingly, I would find that in this case, the court abused its
discretion. Given the limited objection expressed by the State and the findings of the
court, there was nothing to justify granting the sealing while denying the
expungement.
13
