[Cite as State v. Andrews,
2025-Ohio-5178.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ASHTABULA COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2025-A-0005
CITY OF CONNEAUT,
Plaintiff-Appellee, Criminal Appeal from the
Conneaut Municipal Court
- vs -
TELLUS ANDREWS, SR., Trial Court No. 2024 CRB 00400
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Decided: November 17, 2025
Judgment: Affirmed
John D. Lewis, Law Director, City of Conneaut, 294 Main Street, Conneaut, OH 44030
(For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Margaret Brunarski, Ashtabula County Public Defender, and Phillip L. Heasley, Assistant
Public Defender, 22 East Jefferson Street, Jefferson, OH 44047 (For Defendant-Appellant).
ROBERT J. PATTON, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Tellus Andrews Sr. (“Andrews”), appeals from the
judgment of the Conneaut Municipal Court, sentencing him to two years of community
control sanctions as a result of Andrews’s conviction of violating a temporary protection
order, in violation of Section 537.15(a)(1) of the Codified Ordinances of the City of
Conneaut (“City Ordinances”).
{¶2} Andrews contends that the trial court abused its discretion by “failing to
consider the statutory factors under R.C. 2929.22” when sentencing him. Additionally,
[Cite as State v. Andrews, 2025-Ohio-5178.]
Andrews asserts that the lower court failed to inform him of the maximum penalties for
the conviction prior to sentencing. Andrews concedes that the trial court was “not
specifically required to do so.” Andrews further alleges that the terms of his community
control sanctions prohibiting him from purchasing, consuming, or possessing alcohol, and
from entering a bar or other liquor establishment “exceed the discretionary authority of
the court” because there is no evidence in the record that either alcohol or drugs were a
factor in the offense. Andrews did not object to the conditions of his community control at
sentencing.
{¶3} Upon review, we conclude the trial court complied with R.C. 2929.22 at
sentencing. Further, the conditions of Andrews’s community control sanctions do not rise
to the level of plain error. Accordingly, the judgment of the Conneaut Municipal Court is
affirmed.
Substantive and Procedural Facts
{¶4} A complaint was filed in the Conneaut Municipal Court on December 30, 2024.
The complaint charged Andrews with violating a temporary protection order, a
misdemeanor of the first degree, pursuant to Section 537.15(a)(1) of the City Ordinances.
Andrews entered a plea of not guilty at arraignment and bond was set at $15,000 cash or
surety. As conditions of his bond, Andrews was prohibited from consuming or possessing
alcohol or drugs, was subject to random chemical testing, and ordered to have no contact
with his ex-wife, B.A.
{¶5} On January 6, 2025, Andrews appeared with counsel and pleaded guilty to
the offense. The City of Conneaut (“City”) offered the following factual basis for the plea:
On December 29th . . . officers received a dispatch regarding
a third party call about a verbal domestic situation at 347
[Cite as State v. Andrews, 2025-Ohio-5178.]
Madison Street. The caller was aware that there was a
protection order in place against Mr. Andrews that does not
allow him to be at this residence or to have contact with [B.A.].
Dispatch confirmed the protection order. Units arrived and
found both [Andrews] and [B.A.] . . . together at the front door.
[O]fficers advised Mr. Andrews he was under arrest for
violating the protection order and placed him in handcuffs.
{¶6} The City further explained that Andrews and B.A. signed a consent protection
order in Ashtabula County Common Pleas Court in Case No. 2023 DR 027. The consent
protection order became effective February 22, 2023, expiring on January 19, 2028, and
remained in effect at the time of Andrews’s arrest.
{¶7} Upon accepting Andrews’s plea, the trial court proceeded directly to
sentencing. Andrews was sentenced to 180 days in jail. The trial court awarded eight days
of credit. The trial court then suspended the remaining 172 days and placed Andrews on
2 years of community control sanctions with the following condition: “Defendant shall not
purchase, possess, or consume any alcoholic beverage or drug of abuse or any
pseudoephedrine product, or go to any bar or liquor establishment for a period of two
years.” The no contact order imposed by the trial court at the arraignment in the underlying
case was lifted at B.A.’s request.1
{¶8} Andrews did not object at the hearing to any of the sentencing provisions or
conditions of his community control sanctions.
{¶9} Andrews filed a notice of appeal on January 22, 2025.
The Appeal
{¶10} Andrews raises one assignment of error for review:
[1.] The court abused its discretion in sentencing appellant in
the temporary protection order violation proceeding.
1. B.A. was also in the process of terminating the protection order in Ashtabula County Common Pleas
Court in Case No. 2023 DR 027.
[Cite as State v. Andrews, 2025-Ohio-5178.]
{¶11} Andrews asserts that the trial court failed to properly consider the factors set
forth in R.C. 2929.22 for misdemeanor sentencing.
{¶12} “Misdemeanor sentencing is evaluated under an abuse-of-discretion
standard of review.” State v. Petrovich, 2019-Ohio-3547, ¶ 23 (11th Dist.), citing State v.
Corbissero, 2012-Ohio-1449, ¶ 53 (11th Dist.). See Conneaut v. Pushic,
2025-Ohio-1783,
¶15 (11th Dist.).
{¶13} Sentencing considerations for misdemeanors are codified in R.C. 2929.21
which provides in relevant part:
(A) A court that sentences an offender for . . . any municipal
ordinance that is substantially similar to a misdemeanor or
minor misdemeanor violation of a provision of the Revised
Code, shall be guided by the overriding purposes of
misdemeanor sentencing. The overriding purposes of
misdemeanor sentencing are to protect the public from future
crime by the offender and others and to punish the offender.
To achieve those purposes, the sentencing court shall
consider the impact of the offense upon the victim and the
need for changing the offender’s behavior, rehabilitating the
offender, and making restitution to the victim of the offense,
the public, or the victim and the public.
(B) A sentence imposed for a misdemeanor or minor
misdemeanor violation . . . of a municipal ordinance that is
subject to division (A) of this section shall be reasonably
calculated to achieve the two overriding purposes of
misdemeanor sentencing set forth in division (A) of this
section, commensurate with and not demeaning to the
seriousness of the offender’s conduct and its impact upon the
victim, and consistent with sentences imposed for similar
offenses committed by similar offenders.
{¶14} “Unless a mandatory jail term is required to be imposed . . . a court that
imposes a sentence under this chapter upon an offender for a misdemeanor or minor
misdemeanor has discretion to determine the most effective way to achieve the purposes
[Cite as State v. Andrews, 2025-Ohio-5178.]
and principles of sentencing set forth in section 2929.21 of the Revised Code.” R.C.
2929.22(A). In determining the appropriate sentence for a misdemeanor, the trial court
shall consider all of the factors contained in R.C. 2929.22(B)(1)(a)-(g) and may consider
any other factors that are relevant to achieving the purposes and principles of sentencing
set forth in R.C. 2929.21. R.C. 2929.22(A).
{¶15} R.C. 2929.22(B)(1) provides:
In determining the appropriate sentence for a misdemeanor,
the court shall consider all of the following factors:
(a) The nature and circumstances of the offense or offenses;
(b) Whether the circumstances regarding the offender and the
offense or offenses indicate that the offender has a history
of persistent criminal activity and that the offender’s
character and condition reveal a substantial risk that the
offender will commit another offense;
(c) Whether the circumstances regarding the offender and the
offense or offenses indicate that the offender’s history,
character, and condition reveal a substantial risk that the
offender will be a danger to others and that the offender’s
conduct has been characterized by a pattern of repetitive,
compulsive, or aggressive behavior with heedless
indifference to the consequences;
(d) Whether the victim’s youth, age, disability, or other factor
made the victim particularly vulnerable to the offense or
made the impact of the offense more serious;
(e) Whether the offender is likely to commit future crimes in
general, in addition to the circumstances described in
divisions (B)(1)(b) and (c) of this section;
(f) Whether the offender has an emotional, mental, or
physical condition that is traceable to the offender’s
service in the armed forces of the United States and that
was a contributing factor in the offender’s commission of
the offense or offenses;
(g) The offender’s military service record.
[Cite as State v. Andrews, 2025-Ohio-5178.]
{¶16} R.C. 2929.22(C) further provides:
Before imposing a jail term as a sentence for a misdemeanor,
a court shall consider the appropriateness of imposing a
community control sanction or a combination of community
control sanctions under sections 2929.25, 2929.26, 2929.27,
and 2929.28 of the Revised Code. A court may impose the
longest jail term authorized under section 2929.24 of the
Revised Code only upon offenders who commit the worst
forms of the offense or upon offenders whose conduct and
response to prior sanctions for prior offenses demonstrate that
the imposition of the longest jail term is necessary to deter the
offender from committing a future criminal offense.
{¶17} R.C. 2929.22 does not “mandate that the record reveal the trial court’s
consideration of the statutory sentencing factors.” State v. Nuby, 2016-Ohio-8157, ¶ 13-
14 (7th Dist.), quoting State v. Nelson, 2007-Ohio-3459, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.). See State v.
Williams, 2016-Ohio-733, ¶ 23 (4th Dist.). A “reviewing court is to presume the trial judge
made the required considerations absent an affirmative showing to the contrary. (Citations
Omitted).” Id. Thus, “‘when a misdemeanor sentence is imposed within the statutory limits,
a reviewing court will presume that the judge followed the statutes, absent evidence to the
contrary.’ (Citations omitted.)” State v. Evans, 2025-Ohio-801, ¶ 34 (11th Dist.), quoting
State v. Coll, 2017-Ohio-7270 (6th Dist.); see State v. Walker, 2025-Ohio- 436, ¶ 8 (11th
Dist.).
{¶18} Andrews was convicted of a first-degree misdemeanor, in violation of Section
537.15(a)(1) of the City Ordinances. For a misdemeanor of the first degree, a trial court
must impose a definite jail term of “not more than one hundred eighty days.” R.C.
2929.24(A)(1). Andrews received a suspended sentence and was placed on two years of
community control. This sentence is within the statutory guidelines. Andrews does not
[Cite as State v. Andrews, 2025-Ohio-5178.]
point to anything in the record to suggest that the lower court failed to consider the R.C.
2929.22 factors.
{¶19} As to the terms of community control sanctions, Andrews did not object to
the conditions at sentencing, therefore, he has waived all but plain error. Crim.R. 52(B).
Conneaut v. Pushic, 2025-Ohio-1783, ¶ 25 (11th Dist.); see Conneaut v. Wick, 2024-
Ohio-4452, ¶ 8 (11th Dist.); State v. Bright, 2025-Ohio-725, ¶ 8 (5th Dist.). “An error ‘that
was not called to the attention of the trial court at a time when the error could have been
avoided or corrected by the trial court’ is deemed forfeited absent plain error.” Bright at ¶
7, quoting State v. Haudenschild,
2024-Ohio-407, ¶ 15 (5th Dist.).
{¶20} Plain errors or defects that were not raised in the court below can be noticed
under Crim.R. 52(B) when the errors or defects affect substantial rights. State v. Barnes,
2002-Ohio-68, ¶ 20. “To find plain error, we must conclude (1) there was an error, i.e., a
deviation from a legal rule, (2) the error was plain, i.e., an obvious defect in the
proceedings, and (3) the error affected substantial rights, i.e., the outcome of the
proceedings.” State v. Warfield, 2022-Ohio-1818, ¶ 55 (11th Dist.), citing
Barnes at ¶ 20.
“Even if a forfeited error satisfies these three prongs, however, Crim.R. 52(B) does not
demand that an appellate court correct it.” Barnes at ¶ 21.
Crim.R. 52(B) states only that a reviewing court “may” notice
plain forfeited errors; a court is not obliged to correct them. We
have acknowledged the discretionary aspect of Crim.R. 52(B)
by admonishing courts to notice plain error “with the utmost
caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent
a manifest miscarriage of justice.”
Id., quoting State v. Long,
53 Ohio St.2d 91, paragraph three of the syllabus (1978).
Therefore, we must determine if plain error exists and whether such error requires
reversal.
[Cite as State v. Andrews, 2025-Ohio-5178.]
{¶21} As noted above, misdemeanor sentencing is evaluated under an abuse-of-
discretion standard of review. “Generally, a court will not be found to have abused its
discretion in fashioning a community-control sanction as long as the condition is
reasonably related to the probationary goals of doing justice, rehabilitating the offender,
and insuring good behavior.” State v. Bourne, 2023-Ohio-2832, ¶ 19 (11th Dist.), citing
State v. Talty, 2004-Ohio-4888, ¶ 12. However, a condition “‘“cannot be overly broad so
as to unnecessarily impinge upon the probationer’s liberty.”’” Id., quoting
Talty at ¶ 13,
quoting State v. Jones, 49 Ohio St.3d 51, 52 (1990). While a trial court is granted broad
discretion in setting conditions of probation pursuant to R.C. 2951.02, a lower court’s
“discretion in imposing conditions of probation is not limitless.” Jones at 52.
{¶22} The Supreme Court of Ohio set out the relevant test in Jones, 49 Ohio St.3d
51 (1990), “which looks to whether a community-control condition reasonably relates to
the offense at issue, furthers the twin goals of rehabilitation and justice, and does not
cause a greater deprivation of liberty than is necessary to achieve those penological
goals.” State v. Chapman, 2020-Ohio-6730, ¶ 17, citing
Jones at 53.
In determining whether a community control sanction is
related to the three probationary goals above, courts must
“consider whether the condition (1) is reasonably related to
rehabilitating the offender, (2) has some relationship to the
crime of which the offender was convicted, and (3) relates to
conduct which is criminal or reasonably related to future
criminality and serves the statutory ends of probation.”
Bourne at ¶ 20, quoting
Jones at 53. “All three prongs must be satisfied for a reviewing
court to find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.” Id., citing State v. Cintron,
2022-Ohio-305, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.); State v. White,
2015-Ohio-3844, ¶ 10 (10th Dist.).
[Cite as State v. Andrews,
2025-Ohio-5178.]
{¶23} Recently, the Fifth District Court of Appeals reviewed a similar case where
there was no nexus between the defendant’s conduct and the no-alcohol and no-entry-
into bars restrictions imposed as conditions of her community control. State v. Bright,
2025-Ohio-725 (5th Dist.). In Bright, the defendant also failed to object at the time of
sentencing. The Fifth District Court of Appeals noted, “our review of the no-alcohol and
no-entry-into-bars supervision terms ‘must be conducted “with the understanding that the
court will act reasonably at a revocation hearing, aware of the practicalities and
fundamental goals of probation.”’” Id. at ¶ 15, quoting State v. Ice, 2024-Ohio-5341, ¶ 27
(7th Dist.), quoting Jones, 49 Ohio St.3d at 55 (1990). Despite no evidence in the record
establishing a nexus between the restrictions and the offense, the Fifth Appellate District
concluded that “the trial court’s decision to include the no-alcohol and no-entry-into-bars
restrictions in this assault case did not undercut defendant Bright’s substantial rights or
impose a manifest injustice on her, and this is surely not the kind of exceptional case that
calls out for corrective action on our part now. In short, we find no plain error here.” Bright
at ¶ 18.
{¶24} We adopted the Fifth District’s reasoning in Conneaut v. Pushic, 2025-Ohio-
1783 (11th Dist.), and declined to find plain error where a defendant did not object to
similar community control sanctions as presented here. While we recognized that there
was some evidence in the record which may have established a nexus between Pushic’s
conduct and the specific terms of community control, we did not conclude that such
evidence was required.
{¶25} Because Andrews failed to object in the court below, he has waived all but
plain error in this case. Like the Fifth Appellate District in Bright, and in line with our
[Cite as State v. Andrews, 2025-Ohio-5178.]
decision in Pushic, we decline to find plain error where a trial court imposes drug/alcohol
restrictions as conditions of community control sanctions without establishing the nexus
between the conduct and the restrictions on the record. Accordingly, Andrews’s sole
assignment of error is without merit.
{¶26} The judgment of the Conneaut Municipal Court is affirmed.
JOHN J. EKLUND, J., concurs.
MATT LYNCH, J., dissents with a Dissenting Opinion.
MATT LYNCH, J., dissents with a Dissenting Opinion.
{¶27} In State v Jones, 49 Ohio St.3d 51 (1990), the Supreme Court of Ohio set forth
the standard by which appellate courts are to determine whether a trial court has exceeded its
discretionary limits in imposing probationary, or community-control, conditions. State v. Talty,
2004-Ohio-4888, ¶ 11. The imposed conditions must (1) reasonably relate to rehabilitating the
offender, (2) have some relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, and (3)
relate to conduct that is criminal or reasonably related to future criminality. Jones at 53. This is
a conjunctive test, meaning that the conditions imposed must satisfy each prong of the test.
State v. Bourne, 2023-Ohio-2832, ¶ 20 (11th Dist.). Because each prong was not satisfied in
this case, I dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the condition imposed upon Andrews.
{¶28} Andrews pled guilty to and was convicted of violating a temporary protection
order, a first-degree misdemeanor, in violation of Conneaut City Ordinance 537.15(a)(1). The
trial court imposed a two-year term of supervised community control with a condition that
[Cite as State v. Andrews, 2025-Ohio-5178.]
Andrews is not permitted to purchase, possess, or consume any alcoholic beverage, or go to
any bar or liquor establishment, during that two-year period. However, nothing in the record
establishes that this strict “no-alcohol” condition has any relationship to Andrews’s violation of
the temporary protection order. Thus, the condition does not satisfy the second prong of the
Jones Test and should not be upheld. See, e.g., State v. Ballish, 2024-Ohio-1855, ¶ 13 (11th
Dist.); see also State v. Lynn, 2023-Ohio-4429, ¶ 48 (5th Dist.) (collecting cases).
{¶29} The majority quotes the mandate that “courts must consider whether the
condition . . . has some relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted” and
concludes that the trial court imposed the “no-alcohol” condition in this case “without establishing
the nexus between the conduct and the restrictions on the record,” yet they decline to find plain
error. Supra at ¶ 22, 25.
{¶30} The majority relies on State v. Bright, 2025-Ohio-725 (5th Dist.), an opinion that
this court is not bound to follow and with which I disagree for the same reason herein. The lack
of an objection does not equate to a lack of plain error. Where there is evidence of a relationship
between the use of alcohol and the crime, the trial court has discretion to impose a strict “no-
alcohol” condition or not to impose such a condition. However, where there is no evidence of a
relationship between the use of alcohol and the crime, the imposition of a strict “no-alcohol”
condition is plain error.
{¶31} I further disagree with the majority’s claim that we adopted the Fifth District’s
reasoning in Conneaut v. Pushic, 2025-Ohio-1783 (11th Dist.). We did not adopt Bright, we
distinguished Bright. Id. at ¶ 29 (“unlike Bright, there is some evidence that a nexus exists
between the defendant’s conduct and the no-alcohol and no-entry-into bars restrictions
imposed”). For that reason, I concurred with the majority’s holding in Pushic. The relationship
to the crime of which Pushic was convicted and the strict “no alcohol” community-control
[Cite as State v. Andrews, 2025-Ohio-5178.]
condition was a weak one, but it was there: i.e., the sentencing court inferred from the
circumstances that Pushic had been drinking and that was the reason he left the scene without
providing identifying information, in violation of the Conneaut City ordinance. Id. at ¶ 30
(describing that Pushic was leaving the Moose Club on the evening of the Fourth of July when
he struck two vehicles in the parking lot). It is on these facts that Pushic is also distinguishable
from the case sub judice.
{¶32} It is for these reasons that I dissent. The judgment entry of sentence should be
reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
[Cite as State v. Andrews, 2025-Ohio-5178.]
JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, appellant’s assignment of error
is without merit. It is the judgement and order of this court that the judgment of the
Conneaut Municipal Court is affirmed.
Costs to be taxed against appellant.
PRESIDING JUDGE ROBERT J. PATTON
JUDGE JOHN J. EKLUND,
concurs
JUDGE MATT LYNCH,
dissents with a Dissenting Opinion
THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.
