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2025 Ohio 5217

State v. Smith

Ohio Court of Appeals

Decided November 19, 2025

Ohio Court of Appeals · decided 2025-11-19

Where an appellant's brief does not cite to the record or cite any authorities in support of the appellant's position, the court of appeals can properly dismiss the appeal. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied a continuance request four days before a jury trial, and the appellant has not shown any error in the trial court's decision to admit video recordings as trial exhibits.

Relies on Blakemore v. Blakemore · Knapp v. Edwards Laboratories · State v. Unger

Decided 2025-11-19

[Cite as State v. Smith, 
2025-Ohio-5217
.]


                                        COURT OF APPEALS
                                      LICKING COUNTY, OHIO
                                    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

  STATE OF OHIO,                                Case No. 2025 CA 00035

      Plaintiff - Appellee                      Opinion & Judgment Entry

  -vs-                                          Appeal from the Licking County
                                                Municipal Court,
  TREVOR JACKSON SMITH,                         Case No. 24 TRC 02207

      Defendant - Appellant                     Judgment: Affirmed

                                                Date of Judgment: November 19, 2025


BEFORE: William B. Hoffman; Kevin W. Popham; David M. Gormley, Judges

APPEARANCES: Michael S. Cox Jr., Assistant Law Director, Newark, Ohio, for PlaintiffAppellee; Trevor J. Smith, Mead, Oklahoma, briefed the case on his own behalf as
Defendant-Appellant.


Gormley, J.

          {¶1}   Defendant Trevor Smith argues in this appeal that the trial court should have

given him more time to review discovery in his case and to subpoena witnesses for his

trial. He also alleges that the prosecution improperly tampered with a video recording

before it was shown to the jury at his trial. Because we agree with the trial court’s

decisions both to deny Smith’s continuance request and to admit the video recording, we

affirm.

The Key Facts

          {¶2}   On March 15, 2024, Smith was cited for operating a vehicle under the

influence of alcohol, operating a motor vehicle without a valid license, and disobeying the

instructions of a traffic-control device. He entered not-guilty pleas, and his retained
counsel requested and received discovery on April 29, 2024. After Smith failed to appear

for a change-of-plea hearing, an arrest warrant was issued. Once Smith had been

arrested on that warrant in August of that year, the trial court appointed new counsel for

him because his retained counsel withdrew from the case. Court-appointed counsel

again requested discovery, and it was delivered by the State on October 23, 2024.

       {¶3}   The trial court granted three of the six continuance motions filed on Smith’s

behalf during the year-long pendency of this matter. On March 24, 2025, Smith waived

his right to counsel following a colloquy with the trial court regarding the perils of self-

representation. On April 24, 2025 — four days before the scheduled starting date for his

jury trial — Smith requested another continuance, asserting that he needed additional

time to review discovery and to issue subpoenas. The trial court denied that request, and

the trial began as scheduled, with standby counsel present.

       {¶4}   A jury found Smith guilty of operating a vehicle under the influence of

alcohol, and the trial court found him guilty on the traffic-control charge while acquitting

him on the license-related charge. The trial court then sentenced Smith to ten days in

jail, a fine of $375, and a one-year license suspension.

Smith Has Not Complied with App.R. 16(A)

       {¶5}   We first note that Smith’s appellate brief in this court lacks references to the

record, contains no table of authorities or legal citations, and presents no substantive

argument.     In light of those shortcomings, Smith’s brief does not conform to the

requirements spelled out in App.R. 16(A), and we certainly could for that reason alone

dismiss his appeal. See Erdman v. Williams, 
2013-Ohio-979, ¶ 12
 (5th Dist.) (compliance

with App.R. 16 is mandatory, and deficiencies permit dismissal); Debt Recovery Solutions
of Ohio, Inc. v. Lemon, 
2009-Ohio-799
, ¶ 16-18 (5th Dist.) (an appellant bears the burden

of demonstrating error by reference to the record, and a failure to comply with briefing

requirements permits dismissal).

        {¶6}   Nevertheless, in the interest of justice and finality, we address the merits of

his claims after reviewing the record such as it is. (Smith has also filed no transcript from

his trial.)

The Trial Court Did Not Err When It Denied Smith’s Continuance Request

        {¶7}   We turn first to Smith’s claim that the trial court should have given him more

time to review discovery and to subpoena witnesses.

        {¶8}   The grant or denial of a continuance rests within the trial court’s sound

discretion. State v. Unger, 
67 Ohio St.2d 65, 67
 (1981). An abuse of discretion has

occurred when the trial court’s decision was “unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable”

and was not “merely an error of law or judgment.” State v. Thompson, 
2015-Ohio-92, ¶ 18
 (5th Dist.), citing Blakemore v. Blakemore, 
5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219
 (1983).

        {¶9}   In evaluating a defendant’s request for a continuance in a criminal case,

courts must balance the defendant’s interest in adequate preparation against the court’s

interest in controlling its docket and the public’s interest in prompt justice. 
Unger at 67
.

When evaluating whether a trial court abused its discretion when ruling on a continuance

request, we consider the length of delay requested; whether other continuances were

requested and received; any inconvenience to litigants, witnesses, counsel, and the court;

whether the requested delay was for legitimate reasons or was dilatory; whether the

defendant contributed to the circumstances necessitating the request; and other relevant

factors depending on the unique facts of each case. 
Id. at 67-68
.
       {¶10} The Supreme Court of Ohio has explained that a trial court’s decision

denying a continuance request cannot be viewed as an abuse of discretion when defense

counsel has sought additional time to interview witnesses and prepare but has presented

no facts indicating the identity of the witnesses, the materiality of their testimony, or the

reasonable likelihood that they could be found. State v. Sowders, 
4 Ohio St.3d 143, 145

(1983); see also State v. Prom, 
2005-Ohio-2272, ¶ 12
 (12th Dist.) (finding no abuse of

discretion by a trial court that denied a continuance request where a defendant

contributed to the circumstances requiring a continuance by waiting until the day of trial

to request the continuance and by failing to identify the witnesses or establish the

materiality of their testimony even though any witnesses “should have been easily

known”).

       {¶11} The record in our case demonstrates that the trial court properly exercised

its discretion. This misdemeanor case was pending before the court for more than a year,

during which time Smith was represented in succession by two attorneys who each

requested and received discovery. The trial court had already granted four continuances,

three of which Smith had requested, and he waived his right to counsel one month before

trial. Then just four days before the trial date, he requested a continuance, claiming that

he could not adequately prepare for trial without additional time to review the discovery

materials. He indicated, too, that he needed more time to issue subpoenas.

       {¶12} Smith’s motion included no relevant facts that might have supported his

request. He did not identify the discovery materials that he had not yet reviewed, how

much additional time he needed, or how any additional time would affect his preparation.

Further, he did not identify the defense witnesses he intended to subpoena or explain
how any additional time would have enabled him to locate and serve them. At no point

during the year-long pendency of this case did Smith disclose any potential defense

witnesses through either of his two attorneys.

       {¶13} Resolution of the case had already repeatedly been delayed. Another delay

would have inconvenienced the court and the State’s witnesses and would have

undermined the efficient administration of justice. The requested delay was neither for

legitimate reasons nor supported by relevant facts, and we see in the record no

justification for Smith’s decision to wait until four days before his trial to ask for more time

to prepare.

       {¶14} Smith’s self-representation does not warrant special treatment.               The

Supreme Court of Ohio has repeatedly explained that “‘pro se litigants . . . must follow the

same procedures as litigants represented by counsel.’” State ex rel. Neil v. French, 2018-

Ohio-2692, ¶ 10, quoting State ex rel. Gessner v. Vore, 
2009-Ohio-4150, ¶ 5
. Non-

attorney litigants who choose to represent themselves in court are also “‘presumed to

have knowledge of the law and legal procedures and . . . are held to the same standard

as litigants who are represented by counsel.’” State ex rel. Fuller v. Mengel, 2003-Ohio-

6448, ¶ 10, quoting Sabouri v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Serv., 
145 Ohio App.3d 651, 654
 (10th Dist. 2001).

       {¶15} The trial court soundly balanced the competing interests and chose not to

delay the trial. We see no abuse of discretion in that ruling. Smith’s first and second

assignments of error are overruled.
The Trial Court Properly Admitted the Video Evidence

       {¶16} Smith also challenges the trial court’s decision to admit as trial exhibits

some video footage from a law-enforcement officer’s dash camera and body camera.

Those recordings had been improperly altered by the State, Smith says, and he claims

that the jury’s consideration of them violated his constitutional rights. This claim fails for

two independent reasons.

       {¶17} First, as we noted above, Smith has failed to provide us with a trial

transcript. App.R. 9(B) obligates an appellant to ensure that necessary proceedings are

transcribed. When portions of the transcript necessary to resolve assigned errors are

omitted, a reviewing court must presume the validity of the lower court’s proceedings.

Walker v. Muskingum Watershed Conservancy Dist., 
2008-Ohio-6901, ¶ 16
 (5th Dist.);

State v. Myers, 
2004-Ohio-3715, ¶ 14
 (5th Dist.), citing Knapp v. Edwards Laboratories,

61 Ohio St.2d 197
 (1980).

       {¶18} Without a transcript of the trial — including any testimony establishing or

failing to establish a foundation for the recordings’ admission as exhibits and any

objections to them — we have no basis to conclude that the trial court abused its

discretion when it admitted the exhibits. We must presume regularity and affirm.

       {¶19} Second, we note that Smith’s bare assertion that the videos were “modified”

finds no support in the record. The State’s brief indicates that a law-enforcement officer

authenticated the recordings by testifying that he recognized them and that they were true

and accurate recordings of the traffic stop. Smith has identified nothing in the record that

casts doubt on that claim, and that kind of testimony would of course typically satisfy any

foundational requirements.     State v. Freeze, 
2012-Ohio-5840, ¶ 70
 (12th Dist.) (an
officer’s testimony that a video fairly and accurately depicted events is sufficient to

authenticate).

      {¶20} We have no reason to doubt that the trial court acted within its discretion

when it admitted the videos in question as exhibits. Smith’s third assignment of error is

overruled.

      {¶21} For the reasons explained above, the judgment of the Licking County

Municipal Court is affirmed. Costs are to be paid by Appellant Trevor Smith.


By: Gormley, J.;

Hoffman, P.J. and

Popham, J. concur.

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