[Cite as State v. Bahner,
2025-Ohio-5230.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 114940
v. :
JEREMY BAHNER, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 20, 2025
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-24-688051-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Jamielle Lamson-Buscho, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and
Michael V. Wilhelm, Assistant Public Defender, for
appellant.
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J.:
Defendant-appellant Jeremy Bahner appeals his convictions on two
counts of gross sexual imposition (Counts 1 and 4) and two counts of rape
(Counts 2 and 3). After a thorough review of the facts and pertinent law, we affirm.
Procedural History
In January 2024, Bahner was charged in a 17-count indictment with
sexually oriented offenses. The offenses were alleged to have been committed
against six victims; the alleged victims in Counts 1 through 11 and Counts 13 through
15 were alleged to have been under the age of 13. With the exception of Count 12
(endangering children), Counts 1 through 15 contained sexually violent predator
specifications. Count 16 charged illegal use of minor in nudity-oriented material or
performance and Count 17 charged possessing criminal tools, specifically, a cell
phone that was allegedly used to commit the crime charged in Count 16.
At issue in this appeal are Counts 1 through 4, which were relative to
one victim, M.A. All four counts charged that the crimes were committed on or
about January 1, 2018, through April 1, 2020, when M.A. was between four through
six years old.
Count 1 alleged that Bahner committed an act of gross sexual
imposition against M.A. The act was described in the indictment as the “[c]ouch
incident without penetration,” and more specifically alleged that Bahner touched
M.A.’s vagina. Count 2 charged that Bahner committed an act constituting rape
against M.A. The indictment described the act as the “[s]hower incident” and
alleged that Bahner digitally penetrated M.A.
Count 3 charged that Bahner committed an act constituting rape
against M.A. The indictment alleged digital penetration and described the act as the
“[i]ncident on second couch with penetration.” Count 4 alleged that Bahner
committed an act of gross sexual imposition against M.A. The indictment alleged
that Bahner touched M.A.’s vagina and described it as the “[s]econd couch incident.”
Defense counsel filed a motion for separate trials for the different
victims, which the trial court granted. The underlying charges of Counts 1 through
4 proceeded to a jury trial, and the sexually violent specifications were tried to the
bench. The jury returned guilty verdicts on Counts 1 through 4, and the trial court
found Bahner guilty of the sexually violent predator specifications.1 The trial court
sentenced Bahner to life without the possibility of parole on the two rape counts and
four years to life on the two gross-sexual-imposition counts. The trial court
designated Bahner as a Tier III sex offender.
Facts as Established at Trial
Background
During the relevant time period, Bahner, M.A., and M.A.’s family lived
in the same Parma, Ohio neighborhood. Included in M.A.’s family are two older
sisters who were elementary school aged during the relevant time period. M.A. and
her sisters were involved in cheerleading.
Bahner has two daughters, one of whom was friends with one of M.A.’s
sisters. Bahner’s daughters, M.A.’s siblings, and eventually M.A., attended the same
elementary school. Bahner had a pool in his backyard and a playroom in his
1 Bahner pleaded guilty to Counts 10 and 14, amended from gross sexual imposition
to aggravated assault, and Count 17, possessing criminal tools. The remaining counts of
the indictment were dismissed.
basement, and he frequently hosted parties and sleepovers for neighborhood
children, which often included M.A. and her sisters. In addition to the social aspect
of Bahner’s involvement with M.A. and her family, Bahner also provided child-care
services for M.A. and her siblings. M.A.’s mother testified about how that came
about.
The mother was a nurse, and for the 2017-2018 school year had to be at
work before her older children (not M.A.) left for school. The mother’s fiancé, who
lived with the family, also worked outside of the home. Therefore, the mother had
a nanny who came in the mornings to get the children ready for school and stayed
for the day to care for M.A.
M.A.’s mother testified that her earliest awareness of Bahner resulted
after he stopped by her house when she was not home and left a business card for
his auto repair shop with the nanny. The mother became more acquainted with
Bahner because he had constructed a wagon in which he would take his girls and
neighborhood children to school. The mother described the wagon as modeling an
1800s-covered wagon — it was made from a flatbed and was motorized. The
mother’s older children were invited and accepted rides in the wagon.
M.A. started kindergarten in 2019, and her mother determined that
the nanny’s services were no longer needed. M.A. joined her siblings in the wagon
rides to school. Generally, M.A.’s mother would be home in the afternoon by the
time the children arrived home from school, but on the few occasions she had to stay
late, Bahner offered to have the children come to his house; M.A.’s mother accepted
the invitation. The child-care arrangement with Bahner continued until March
2020, when the COVID-19 pandemic forced shutdowns and the mother’s fiancé
began working from home. In September 2020, M.A. and her family moved from
their home in Bahner’s neighborhood.
M.A.’s mother testified to two incidents that she believed, in hindsight,
should have been red flags about Bahner. One incident occurred on an occasion
when she went to Bahner’s house to get her girls. Upon arriving at the house, the
two older girls were in the backyard and M.A. was in the house. The mother knocked
on the door. When M.A. came out she was “sweaty”; Bahner followed shortly
thereafter, and he had the imprint of M.A.’s head on him. Tr. 406.
The second incident occurred when M.A. was around four or five years
of age, and she told her mother that she did not want to go to Bahner’s house
anymore. When the mother questioned M.A. as to why, M.A. told her that Bahner
had touched her thigh. M.A.’s mother admitted that, after that, if M.A. wanted to go
to Bahner’s house, she still allowed her.
M.A.’s mother also testified that she noticed a change in M.A.’s
demeanor after the last party M.A. attended at Bahner’s house. Cheerleading was
an important part of M.A.’s life, and M.A. had just learned that she made a “mini-
level two team,” which the mother described as “a huge accomplishment.” Id. at
407. M.A. was not excited, however. Her mother testified that M.A. “hated it,” “was
crying all the time,” and ultimately quit the team. Id. Around the same time, M.A.
also hated going to school.
The Disclosure and Investigation
As mentioned, M.A. and her sisters participated in cheerleading. On
May 30, 2023, M.A.’s mother was at the gym where her girls participated in
cheerleading and heard concerning talk about Bahner. Once at home, the mother
questioned her girls; M.A. made a disclosure. M.A.’s mother contacted the police.
Jordan Remi, a social worker from the Cuyahoga County Division of
Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS”), became involved with M.A.’s family in
June 2023. Remi worked in the specialized sex abuse unit and testified about the
State-mandated specialized training that employees in the sex abuse unit take. Remi
explained that questioning of suspected sex-abuse victims is open-ended so as to
gather as much information as possible and then make the appropriate referrals
based on what is learned.
Remi first conducted a home visit with M.A.’s mother, M.A., and her
siblings. Remi then conducted forensics interview of M.A. and her two sisters; the
interviews took place at a child advocacy center. The forensic interview of M.A. was
admitted into evidence at the trial as State’s exhibit No. 22. After Remi’s interview
of M.A. and her sisters, Remi gave M.A.’s mother referrals for counseling for the
girls.
Over the defense’s objection, the State questioned Remi about the
prevalence of delayed disclosures in sex-abuse cases. According to Remi, the
majority of the sex-abuse interviews she performed involved delayed disclosures.
Relative to disclosures involving younger children, Remi testified that delayed
disclosure is common because younger children often do not understand the nature
of sexual abuse when it is occurring and, to the extent they sense something was
inappropriate, may have a fear of getting in trouble.
The investigating detective on the case was Christy Cappelli, who
worked for the Parma Police Department in the sexual assault and juvenile units.
Detective Cappelli testified that she contacted M.A.’s mother on June 1, 2023,
regarding M.A.’s disclosure. Detective Cappelli was present for the forensic
interviews of the M.A. and her sisters. The detective explained that she did not make
a referral for M.A. to see a sexual assault nurse examiner (“SANE nurse”) because
such an examination is only useful if conducted within 72 hours of the alleged abuse.
Detective Cappelli testified that, in her training and experience, delayed disclosures
of sexual abuse are common.
The Inappropriate Sexual Contact and Conduct
M.A. testified that there was a couch in the playroom and one in the
living room and when Bahner had sleepovers some of the children would sleep on
the couches, while others would sleep on the floor. M.A. would often sleep on the
couch. She described the couch sleeping arrangement as follows: one child on one
end, one child in the middle, and one child on the other end.
M.A. testified about three inappropriate interactions Bahner had with
her. M.A. testified that one time when she was on the couch during the daytime,
Bahner was also on the couch and touched her “[w]here my bathing suit bottoms
go.” Tr. 434. M.A. elaborated that Bahner used his hand to touch her underneath
her clothes “where girls normally pee.” Id. at 435.
M.A. testified to another occasion at nighttime when she was on the
couch and Bahner touched her. M.A. described that it was like the first touch —
Bahner touched her “under where my bathing suit goes,” using his hand to go inside
her “private part.” Id. at 436-437. M.A. clarified that it was his fingers that went
inside her “private part.” Id. at 452.
The third incident happened on an occasion when M.A. spent two
consecutive nights at Bahner’s house and showered there. M.A. testified that while
she was in the shower, Bahner came into the bathroom to ask if she had washed her
“armpits,” “butt,” “private part,” and to see if she needed help. Id. at 441. M.A.
testified that Bahner opened the shower curtain and “did the same thing that he did
on the couch.” M.A. elaborated that Bahner put body wash on his hand and then
“put his hand in my private part.” Id. at 442. Like the second couch incident, M.A.
testified that Bahner used his fingers. Id. at 448. M.A. described that she felt
“uncomfortable” and “weird.” Id. at 442.
M.A.’s sisters also testified. According to one sister, when they were
at Bahner’s house he would sometimes ask the children there if they wanted to
“cuddle” with him. Id. at 469. The sister testified that she saw Bahner cuddling with
M.A. The other sister testified that she saw Bahner sleeping next to M.A. on a couch.
Assignments of Error
Bahner raises the following two assignments of error for our review:
I. The trial court allowed impermissible expert testimony over objection.
II. The conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Law and Analysis
CCDCFS’ Social Worker Provided Proper Lay Witness Testimony
In his first assignment of error, Bahner contends that, over the
defense’s objection, the trial court erred by allowing CCDCFS social worker Jordan
Remi to give impermissible expert testimony about delayed disclosures.
Specifically, Bahner challenges the testimony on the ground that Remi did not file
an expert report pursuant to Crim.R. 16(K), which requires expert witnesses
generate written reports and that those reports be disclosed to the opposing party
no later than 21 days before trial.
We initially address Bahner’s characterization of Remi’s testimony
about delayed disclosures as expert testimony. Evid.R. 702 governs expert opinion
testimony and provides in part as follows:
A witness may testify as an expert if the proponent demonstrates to the
court that it is more likely than not that all of the following apply:
(A) The witness’ testimony either relates to matters beyond the
knowledge or experience possessed by lay persons or dispels a
misconception common among lay persons;
(B) The witness is qualified as an expert by specialized knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education regarding the subject matter of the
testimony;
(C) The witness’ testimony is based on reliable scientific, technical, or
other specialized information and the expert’s opinion reflects a
reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the
case.
A review of the record shows that the State did not offer Remi as an
expert witness, the court did not qualify her as an expert witness, and she did not
testify as an expert witness. Rather, Remi testified as a lay witness.
Evid.R. 701 governs opinion testimony by lay witnesses and states as
follows: “If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’ testimony in the
form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are
(1) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (2) helpful to a clear
understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.”
This court has held that a State witness not presented as an expert can
properly testify under Evid.R. 701 when “(1) the testimony is based on the witness’s
training or experience, (2) the testimony relates to the witness’s personal
observations with the investigation, and (3) the testimony is helpful to determine a
fact at issue.” State v. Calhoun, 2017-Ohio-8488, ¶ 34 (8th Dist.), citing State v.
Wilkinson,
2014-Ohio-5791 (8th Dist.). Further, this court has held that “a trial
court may allow a social worker to testify to the general manner in which children
disclose sexual abuse so long as no opinion is offered as to the truth of the victim’s
statements.” State v. Peterson,
2024-Ohio-2903, ¶ 31 (8th Dist.).
Here, Remi testified about her relevant work experience, educational
background, and specialized training in conducting forensic interviews. Regarding
delayed disclosures in younger children, Remi testified that younger children often
are not aware of the exact nature of the abuse in the moment; that is “they typically
don’t understand what’s happening in the moment, and they don’t understand what
it is that happened may have not been okay, so they just keep quiet about it, their
fear of getting in trouble, they think they did something wrong . . . .” Tr. 496. Remi
further testified that it is common for forensic interviews to take place well after the
incident, as was the case with the majority of the interviews she conducted. Remi
did not offer an opinion as to the truth of M.A.’s disclosure.
Our review of the admission or exclusion of evidence by the trial court
is for an abuse of discretion. State v. Griffin, 2025-Ohio-1459, ¶ 32 (8th Dist.). An
abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises “its judgment, in an unwarranted
way, in regard to a matter over which it has discretionary authority.” Johnson v.
Abdullah,
2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35.
On this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing
Remi to testify as to her lay opinions about delayed disclosures. Her testimony was
based on her perceptions as a trained sexual-abuse investigator and were helpful for
the jury to understand why a sexual-abuse victim may delay disclosure. Moreover,
Detective Cappelli similarly testified that, in her training and experience, delayed
disclosures of sexual abuse are common. And neither Remi nor Detective Cappelli
offered their opinion about the truth of M.A.’s disclosure.
In State v. Belle, 2019-Ohio-787 (8th Dist.), and State v. Bright, 2024-
Ohio-2803 (8th Dist.), this court upheld the testimony of lay witnesses testifying as
to the manner of disclosure for sexual-assault victims when the State set forth the
necessary foundation.
In Belle, this court upheld a SANE nurse’s testimony about victims’
recollections of sexual assaults as permissible lay opinion testimony. The panel
noted that the State laid a foundation demonstrating that the nurse had a sufficient
amount of experience and training and her testimony was based on her personal
knowledge and experience. Therefore, this court held that the SANE nurse’s
“testimony fell within the ambit of Evid.R. 701’s requirement that the lay opinion be
rationally based on firsthand observations and helpful in determining a fact in
issue.” Id. at ¶ 48.
In upholding a social worker’s lay opinion testimony about stages of
disclosure, the Bright panel relied on State v. Mathis, 2019-Ohio-3654 (8th Dist.),
in which a defendant also argued that a sex-abuse social worker improperly
provided expert testimony regarding the manner in which sexually abused children
disclose their abuse. Prior to offering her opinion, the social worker provided a brief
summary of her education and credentials, which included specialized sexual-abuse
training in interviewing children. The Mathis Court found that the social worker’s
testimony was based on her firsthand experience, was helpful to determine a fact at
issue in the case and, therefore, was permissible lay witness testimony. Id. at ¶ 63.
At oral argument, defense counsel conceded that the controlling case
law allows a qualified lay witness, such as Remi, to testify that it is common for
victims to delay disclosing sexual abuse. However, counsel fine-tuned his argument
to state that a lay witness testifying as to why a victim would delay disclosure is
improper. We disagree.
To reiterate, lay opinion testimony is allowed when it is based on the
witness’s perceptions and experience and would assist the jury in the determination
of disputed issue of fact. Evid.R. 701; Calhoun, 2017-Ohio-8488, at ¶ 34 (8th Dist.),
citing Wilkinson,
2014-Ohio-5791 (8th Dist.). For example, it has been held that an
officer is permitted to give lay testimony regarding his or her perceptions of
behavioral and language patterns of people commonly observed on the streets.
State v. Harris,
2020-Ohio-5306, ¶ 83 (11th Dist.).
Similarly, in Mathis, 2019-Ohio-3654 (8th Dist.), this court made it
clear that a social worker can testify about the why of “long-term disclosure,” stating
that a social worker’s testimony “about the manner in which sexually abused
children disclose the nature of their abuse based on her experience with such cases,”
is admissible lay opinion testimony. Id. at ¶ 61, 63. The social worker’s testimony
in Mathis explained why “it is common” for child-sexual-abuse victims to give a
partial disclosure (and sometimes even denials) before giving a full disclosure. Id.
at ¶ 62. The social worker explained, and this court upheld, her testimony on why
long-term disclosures are common: “It doesn’t all come out at once. It’s like a child
feels free to say so much at one time, and then maybe another day, or later, the child
will say more about what happened. They’re processing it, and it is a long-term
disclosure.” Id.
It is true, as noted by this court in Mathis, that there can be a fine line
between expert opinion testimony and lay opinion testimony. See id. at ¶ 59. But
the Ohio Supreme Court has held that in cases such as this one, although lay opinion
testimony may be of a “technical nature,” it is nonetheless permissible because it is
“on a subject outside the realm of common knowledge” but still “within the ambit of
[Evid.R. 701’s] requirement that a lay witness’s opinion be rationally based on
firsthand observations and helpful in determining a fact in issue.” State v. McKee,
91 Ohio St.3d 292, 296-297 (2001); Mathis at
id.
Remi’s testimony conformed to the requirements set forth by
Evid.R. 701 and this court’s precedents. The first assignment of error is therefore
overruled.
The Convictions are Supported by the Weight of the Evidence
For his second assigned error, Bahner contends that his convictions
are against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.
When considering a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence challenge, this
court reviews the entire record and “‘weighs the evidence and all reasonable
inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in
resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a
manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed, and a new trial
ordered.’” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997), quoting State v.
Martin,
20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983).
The gravamen of Bahner’s weight-of-the-evidence challenge revolves
around M.A.’s credibility. For example, one area Bahner cites was M.A.’s inability
to testify as to exactly when the incidents occurred. That circumstance, along with
other alleged conflicts Bahner references, do not create such a manifest miscarriage
of justice that a new trial is necessitated.
Although we review witnesses’ credibility when considering the
manifest weight of the evidence, we are mindful that the credibility of witnesses is
primarily an initial determination for the trier of fact. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d
230 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. This is so because the trier of fact is best
able “to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice
inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered
testimony.” State v. Wilson,
2007-Ohio-2202, ¶ 24, citing Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v.
Cleveland,
10 Ohio St.3d 77 (1984).
We are also mindful that this court has consistently held that a
victim’s testimony alone is sufficient to support a rape conviction. State v. Smith,
2023-Ohio-1670, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.); State v. Roan, 2020-Ohio- 5179, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.);
State v. Blankenship,
2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 5520, *11 (8th Dist. Dec. 13, 2001).
“There is no requirement that a rape victim’s testimony be corroborated precedent
to conviction.” Roan at
id. Indeed, “[t]here are often no witnesses to the crimes of
rape or sexual molestation, as such acts typically take place behind closed doors.”
State v. Boyts,
1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 3143, *14 (9th Dist. July 24, 1996).
M.A.’s testimony was not so incredible so as to cast doubt on the
convictions and require a new trial. Further, although there were no witnesses to
the crimes Bahner committed against M.A., the State presented circumstantial
evidence corroborating M.A.’s disclosure. Specifically, M.A.’s mother testified about
M.A. previously telling her that Bahner had touched her thigh; M.A.’s mother
testified about a time when she went to get M.A. that she, in hindsight, thought could
have been a red flag; and M.A.’s sisters testified that they saw Bahner on the couch
with M.A., cuddling with her and sleeping next to her.
We further note that when sexual-assault victims are young children,
“it is reasonable that they [are] not able to remember exact times and dates of the
rapes. This is especially true where the crimes involve several instances of conduct
spread out over an extended period.” State v. Humfleet, 1985 Ohio App. LEXIS
8718, *7 (12th Dist. Sept. 9, 1985), citing State v. Madden,
15 Ohio App.3d 130, 132
(12th Dist. 1984); see also State v. Geboy,
145 Ohio App.3d 706, 724-725 (3d Dist.
2001), and State v. Henderson,
2006-Ohio-5567, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.), quoting State v.
Koelling,
1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 1056 (10th Dist. Mar. 21, 1995). (“‘It is well settled
that, particularly in cases involving sexual misconduct with a child, the precise times
and dates of the alleged offense or offenses oftentimes cannot be determined with
specificity.’”).
Although M.A. was unable to testify as to the exact dates when the
abuse occurred, she was able to testify with specificity about the illegal sexual
contact and conduct Bahner perpetrated on her. Specifically, M.A. testified about
three incidents where Bahner (1) used his hand to touch her underneath her clothes
“where girls normally pee” (Count 1, gross sexual imposition); (2) used his fingers
to go inside her “private part” (Counts 3 and 4, rape and gross sexual imposition,
respectively); and (3) put his hand, specifically, his fingers, in her “private part”
while she was showering (Count 2, rape).
We do not deem M.A.’s testimony so incredible so as to find that the
jury lost its way in resolving conflicts in her testimony and prior statements or that
this case is the exceptional case in which a manifest miscarriage of justice occurred.
The second assignment of error is therefore overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s
conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case
remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
________________________
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, JUDGE
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, A.J., and
DEENA R. CALABRESE, J., CONCUR
