[Cite as State v. Pubill,
2025-Ohio-5231.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 115018
v. :
OSWALD PUBILL, JR., :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 20, 2025
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-23-687543-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Nicholas Fink, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.
Gregory T. Stralka, for appellant.
DEENA R. CALABRESE, J.:
On March 11, 2025, a Cuyahoga County jury found defendant-appellant
Oswald Pubill, Jr. (“appellant”) guilty of one count of vandalism. The trial court
entered judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict and imposed a 12-month
prison term and two years of postrelease control. Appellant timely appealed,
arguing that the trial court erred by proceeding to trial without determining whether
he was competent. Finding no merit to the appeal, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Appellant does not dispute the facts underlying his conviction. On
December 8, 2023, he entered the Federal Reserve Bank located at 1455 East 6th
Street in Cleveland, Ohio, carrying a padlock placed in a sock. Without delay, and
in full view of federal law enforcement personnel and a security camera, appellant
swung the sock twice at an emergency door fitted with ballistic glass (commonly
referred to as bulletproof glass). A senior officer and his colleagues rapidly subdued
appellant, and Cleveland police arrested him. Appellant’s acts left marks on the
ballistic glass, which was later replaced at considerable expense.
On December 13, 2023, the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury returned a
one-count indictment charging appellant with vandalism in violation of R.C.
2909.05, a felony of the fifth degree.
Appellant posted bond and was released, but failed to appear for a
scheduled discovery hearing, leading to a capias and his subsequent arrest just over
five months later. He remained in custody thereafter. Additional pretrial discovery
and multiple pretrial conferences followed.
On October 9, 2024, the trial court held an attorney conference to
address appellant’s failure to cooperate in proceedings and his history of difficult
behavior. In a journal entry memorializing the attorney conference, the court wrote:
Defendant has thus far refused to be brought to court, and refused jail
and electronic visits with his attorney.
The court has reviewed previous cases and North Coast. Defendant has
a history of refusal, non-compliance, and courtroom misbehavior,
which North Coast found to be volitional and not related to any issue of
incompetence or mental health deficiencies.
The trial court formally addressed appellant’s competency at a hearing
conducted on October 17, 2024. Appellant was present with counsel. The trial court
reviewed appellant’s behavior in jail in connection with the present case and
appellant’s history of being found competent to stand trial. This included a review
of appellant’s most recent competency evaluation in 2022, which this court
referenced in State v. Pubill, 2023-Ohio-3875 (8th Dist.).
Sheriff’s Department Sergeant Jerman told the court that while
appellant was not combative, he was uncooperative, essentially going limp,
extending his middle finger, and refusing to cooperate with transport. An assistant
prosecutor recounted appellant’s behavior at his last trial, noting that “he refused to
dress or cooperate, similar to the fashion that he is now.” (Tr. 6.) The prosecutor
noted that “it’s the same behavior that you’re seeing today and that we’re hearing
about.” (Tr. 6.) Appellant’s counsel indicated that he tried to meet with appellant
at least five times without success, i.e., that appellant refused to meet with him.1
The trial court, on the record, then extensively reviewed appellant’s
long history of being found competent to stand trial, relying principally on the
1 With respect to these attempted jail visits, counsel suggested he was relying on
reports of jail staff that appellant was unwilling to meet, stating, for example, that
“[a]llegedly he refused” to meet or that appellant “supposedly refused” to meet. (Tr. 6-7.)
At least twice, however, counsel plainly stated that appellant “refused” to meet with him.
(Tr. 7.)
competency report dated June 22, 2022, prepared by Northcoast Behavioral Health
(“NBH”) in connection with Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-22-667981. The trial court
stated at the outset that upon its review of the report, it did not “believe that another
referral would be — produce anything different” and that it would “explain why.”
(Tr. 9.)
The June 2022 report, according to the trial court and our independent
review, noted that appellant underwent two separate competency evaluations in
2012, one in connection with Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-12-562768-A and another in
Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-12-562805, and that he was found competent in both
matters. Appellant had additional criminal cases in 2013 and 2015 where the issue
of competency was not raised. In 2016, 2019, and 2022, appellant was referred to
the court psychiatric clinic and then to NBH. He was found to be competent in each
case.
Still referencing the June 2022 report, the trial court noted that during
his 2019 admission at NBH, appellant reportedly expressed cynicism regarding the
court system. He demanded that staff make copies of paperwork for him and was
observed bullying other patients. The evaluating physician reviewed jail phone
records of four phone calls in which appellant “demonstrated organized thoughts
and speech[.]” (Tr. 12.) During his stay, he did not report any auditory
hallucinations or make any delusional statements. The evaluating physician did not
assign a psychiatric diagnosis and “opined that he could understand the nature and
objective of the court proceedings and of assisting in his defense.” (Tr. 13.)
According to the June 2022 report, as quoted or paraphrased by the
trial court, records relating to his December 2020 stay at Northwest Ohio
Psychiatric Hospital (“NOPH”) indicted he was uncooperative. He was “diagnosed
with unspecified mood disorder” and there was “concern that he may have cluster A
personality disorder.” (Tr. 13.)2 Generally, however, he was “appropriately
behaved,” at least up to the point where he refused to comply with COVID testing.
(Tr. 13-14.) “He was ultimately discharged back to jail.” (June 22, 2022 NBH report
at p. 6.)
In connection with the 2022 criminal proceeding, appellant refused to
cooperate with the court psychiatric clinic and was again admitted to NBH, this time
from June 1, 2022, to June 16, 2022. At the outset he was uncooperative, refusing
to exit the sheriff transport van and requiring “manual extraction.” (Tr. 14.) He was
likewise uncooperative with admission protocols and “repeatedly stated that he did
not consent to services.” (Tr. 14.) When he spoke, however, “he was organized and
logical in his thinking. He made no paranoid or delusional statements and did not
appear to be responding to hallucinations.” (Tr. 14.) He indicated to the evaluating
physician that he understood the doctor’s “general role” and “remembered being at
NBH in the past[.]” (Tr. 14-15.) Nevertheless, “[e]ach time [the doctor] approached
2 The report reads: “He was diagnosed with Unspecified Mood Disorder, but he
refused any medications. There was concern that he may have a Cluster A personality
disorder after he made odd statements about competency and called himself by a different
name in group.” (June 22, 2022 NBH report at p. 5.)
him he held up his hands and said no thank you and [that he] did not consent to
services.” (Tr. 15; June 22, 2022 NBH report at p. 6.)
Appellant told staff that “he had to stand [his] ground,” but he was
“competent and . . . ready to go.” (Tr. 15.) He told staff that he would not “act like
that anymore” and “would do whatever [they] need [him] to do,” which indicated to
the evaluating physician “that his behavior prior was volitional.” (Tr. 15.) He was
thereafter polite to staff and peers, though he continued to refuse to meet with the
physician for evaluation.
The evaluating physician indicated appellant was “able to advocate for
his own needs” by asking for toiletries and other items. He was able to attend to the
activities of daily living, including personal hygiene and dressing. Appellant spent
time “socializing with peers, playing board games and cards, and watching television
and movies[.]” (Tr. 16.) This indicated to the evaluator that he could concentrate
for extended periods. Appellant assisted with cleaning the common area.
Notably, appellant “provided advice to his peers about how to get
shortened sentences for charges by telling their psychiatrist that they could hear
voices.” (Tr. 16.)
Appellant was involved in only one verbal conflict with a peer. The
staff observed no other instances of aggression. “At no point was he observed to be
responding to hallucinations. He was not observed to make any delusional
statements or paranoid statements. He was consistently described as organized and
coherent.” (Tr. 17.)
On June 13, 2022, the evaluating physician approached appellant
during an activity and attempted to perform a competency evaluation. Appellant
told the physician “he knew who I was and that he did not consent to having a
competency assessment.” (Tr. 17.) According to appellant, “he had come into the
hospital competent and wanted to retain his competency.” (Tr. 17.) Appellant was
noted to exhibit organized thoughts, with no evidence of hallucinations or delusions.
“No present mental condition was the diagnosis.” (Tr. 17.)
The evaluating physician considered whether appellant “had a
psychotic disorder” based on a past diagnosis of “schizoaffective and bipolar
disorder.” (Tr. 17.) The physician rejected making a psychiatric diagnosis, however,
observing that “while he was at NBH unmedicated he had displayed no objective
signs of psychosis.” (Tr. 18.) As the trial court summarized:
So they went over absolutely all points and they summed up that you
did not demonstrate any behaviors, any behaviors while you were in
their presence and while you were at Northcoast that you had any
schizoaffective, bipolar, any other mental health issues.
(Tr. 18.)
The evaluating physician characterized appellant’s obstructionist
behavior as volitional and likely stemming from nonpsychotic reasons, “such as to
try to hold up court proceedings.” (Tr. 18.) His “lack of cooperation during this
admission was not a product of [a] mental condition and was a volitional choice.”
(Tr. 19.) Furthermore, as the court summarized:
It is that doctor’s opinion with a reasonable degree of certainty that you
do not have a present mental condition and you are able to understand
the nature and objective of the legal proceedings. Mr. Pubill has
participated in legal proceedings numerous times in the past. He has
engaged in plea bargaining multiple times. He indicates that he had
knowledge and experience with courtroom proceedings. There’s no
indication that he has experienced an event in the intervening time that
would cause him to lose that knowledge.
(Tr. 19.)
The evaluating physician opined, to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty, that appellant did not have a present mental condition and that he could
both understand the nature and objective of the legal proceedings against him and
was able to assist in his own defense.
Following its exhaustive summary, the trial court addressed appellant
directly:
[Y]our behavior is completely volitional and I’m just not going to
tolerate it. You can do what you want. You can sit there. You can try
to obstruct. You can try to delay the process. I’m just not going to
engage with it. Your history of this type of behavior is very well
documented, not just this — in this MHDD eligibility, but with the jail
staff, with the prosecutor’s office, and even defense attorneys that have
represented you and cases on appeal, the record in your other cases,
transcripts.
(Tr. 21-22.)
Defense counsel did not object to the trial court’s reliance on the June
2022 competency evaluation. Nor did counsel suggest that any intervening event
may have caused appellant to decompensate or that appellant exhibited new
behaviors that would support an additional evaluation. Appellant did not offer any
evidence or argument to rebut the presumption of competence or to suggest
incompetence, even after the trial court informed him it would instruct the jury that
his conduct was volitional and not the product of mental illness. While the record
indicates intransigence and displays of nonverbal disrespect, there is no indication
that appellant made any outbursts at the competency hearing.
The trial court asked defense counsel if he wanted to state anything
for the record. Counsel did not formally request a new competency evaluation.
Instead, counsel inquired: “Just for my clarity purposes, your Honor’s not willing to
entertain another competency evaluation and/or a 20-day stay at Northcoast?” (Tr.
24.) The trial court indicated it was “willing to do it,” but emphasized that the record
was “very, very clear.” (Tr. 24-25.) It also noted the manpower expended and safety
concerns in transporting appellant:
I mean, if — I think that anybody looking at this record can see that this
has been exhaustively — essentially this is what he wants. He wants to
go and do this every single time. He wants to delay the process. He’s
actually counseled other defendants to feign mental health conditions
to try to gain advantage in the system. I mean, that’s documented.
So my concern is at this point the safety of anybody at Northcoast, the
safety of the deputies in having to transport him. I mean, everything
that he’s done is volitional so if you would like a — I’m not going to deny
it, but, you know, maybe go over everything with — I know that you
have a lot of mental health experts, so to speak, or people that deal with
mental health on a daily basis. They can look it over and see if they
think it’s necessary. I don’t think that it’s necessary. We’re just going
to proceed as we are.
Mr. Pubill, I just — I’m not going to tolerate this. We’re just going to
keep going. You’re not going to have an opportunity to delay or use this
type of behavior to gain an advantage over the system. It’s been well
documented. We understand how you’ll proceed and how you attempt
to delay the system and it’s just not going to happen here.
(Tr. 25-26.)
The record does not indicate that appellant’s counsel requested any
further competency evaluation after the October 17, 2024 hearing.
The trial court held another hearing on January 8, 2025, after
appellant commenced a hunger strike in county jail and the trial court was required
to consider force-feeding him. The trial court began the hearing by describing
appellant’s demeanor: “[P]er your last appearance here, you’re doing the same thing
where you are keeping your head down and you are giving us the middle finger[.]”
(Tr. 27.) It noted that it had previously explained to appellant that medical and
mental-health professionals had reviewed his history, had evaluated him,
and have all agreed that this is just willfulness and obstinance and you
do not have any mental health issues that would prevent you from
understanding the nature of the offenses and participating in your own
defense. It’s just that you refuse, and it’s been well-documented
throughout multiple cases and multiple stays at Northcoast.
(Tr. 27-28.) The trial court was also advised that there was evidence appellant was
actually sneaking food; he had been caught smuggling a packet of peanut butter
tucked into his cheek.
Appellant had again refused to dress for the hearing, and the trial
court again found that appellant’s behavior was “obstructionist,” “willful,” and
“voluntary.” (Tr. 35.) It advised appellant that it planned to proceed to trial and
that if appellant wished to present himself to a jury in this manner, it was entirely
“by his choice.” (Tr. 38.) The court stated: “I am giving you an opportunity to weigh
in here and make a different decision, and you have raised your middle finger even
higher in response to that.” (Tr. 38.) The trial court ultimately ordered that
appellant could be fed by force if necessary. At no point did appellant request to be
heard further on competency.3
Trial commenced on March 10, 2025. The trial court stated that it had
reviewed the transcript of appellant’s 2022 trial as a “roadmap” for managing his
behavior. (Tr. 45.) After noting that appellant was again raising his middle finger
to the court, the trial court referenced the earlier trial transcript, where “the judge,
again, noted that he has his middle finger up.” (Tr. 45.) The trial court further
summarized competency issues in the 2022 case and how appellant’s behavior in
the present action paralleled those. This included his apparent “beliefs regarding
sovereign citizenship,” which this court had noted in its 2023 opinion and which
were reiterated in appellant’s letters to the trial court in the present action. (Tr. 47-
48.) The trial court noted his “long letters” with “quite good handwriting,” and
reiterated that it found appellant competent. (Tr. 48.) It also stated that in the 2022
case, the trial court “noted your behavior as we see right now at another point in
time was consistent except for when the jury came in. Mr. Pubill then started verbal
outbursts when the jury came in.” (Tr. 48.) The trial court emphasized that
“[t]here’s a noted history from trial transcripts that when juries come in that’s when
3 On the second day of trial, March 11, 2025, Mental Health Jail Liaison Specialist
Lottie Gray informed the trial court that jail medical staff had attempted to perform certain
medical checks not ordered by the court and that appellant had told the staff that such
procedures were not part of the court order. After further discussion on the record, the
court noted that appellant “was correct, so he was paying attention during a hearing and
those specific things were not included in the Court order.” (Tr. 173.) It remarked that
appellant “knew that, was able to correct the jail medical staff, and then the jail medical
staff realized he’s right.” (Tr. 173.) The trial court addressed appellant directly: “I think
you are high functioning, you have an intellect, and, again, this is your choice.” (Tr. 174.)
you tend to get verbal” and informed appellant that he would be removed in the
event of such outbursts. (Tr. 70.)
After the jury was selected and the trial court was releasing them for
the day, appellant began making “very loud, screaming noises” in their presence.
(Tr. 163-164.) The trial court remarked that it “was expecting this,” because “[t]his
is how you behaved last time as soon as, you know, the jury was in or started getting
moving because your whole thing has been to obstruct and delay and it’s been
documented over many, many, many, many instances of interaction.” (Tr. 164.) In
other words, as in the previous case, appellant “didn’t cause any disturbances until
right before [the trial court] was dismissing the jury.” (Tr. 164-165.)
When trial reconvened on March 11, 2025, the trial court warned
appellant that in the event of another outburst, he would be removed and would be
required to participate via Zoom videoconferencing. The trial court then brought
the jury into the courtroom, and appellant immediately “attempted to obstruct the
process by screaming again.” (Tr. 176.)
Following appellant’s removal from the courtroom, the trial
proceeded without incident and the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the single
count of vandalism. The trial court imposed a 12-month prison term and two years
of postrelease control. This timely appeal followed.
II. Assignment of Error
Appellant presents a single assignment of error for our review:
The trial court erred when it conducted a jury trial for the appellant
without first determining whether he was competent to stand trial.
Finding no merit to the assignment of error, we affirm.
III. Analysis
“The test for determining whether a defendant is competent to stand
trial is whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding — and whether he has a
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” (Cleaned
up.) State v. Pubill, 2023-Ohio-3875, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.). “A defendant is rebuttably
presumed to be competent to stand trial.” State v. Lawson,
2021-Ohio-3566, ¶ 48,
citing State v. Barton,
2006-Ohio-1324, ¶ 56.
R.C. 2945.37(G) provides not only that a defendant is presumed to be
competent, but also that it is the defendant’s burden to demonstrate, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that he is not. Pubill at ¶ 18, citing State v. Daniel,
2016-Ohio-5231, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Jordan,
2004-Ohio-783, ¶ 28.
Pursuant to the statute and governing case law, therefore, a defendant is presumed
competent “unless it is demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that due
to the defendant’s present mental condition, he is incapable of understanding the
nature and objective of the proceedings against him or of assisting in his defense.”
State v. McAlpine,
2024-Ohio-2455, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.).
“We review a trial court’s determination of competency under the
abuse of discretion standard.” Id. at ¶ 22. In light of that standard, “[a] trial court’s
finding that a defendant is competent to stand trial will not be disturbed when there
is some reliable and credible evidence supporting that finding.” Id. See also Daniel
at ¶ 20. Moreover, “[d]eference on these issues should be given ‘to those who see
and hear what goes on in the courtroom.’” Id. at ¶ 20, quoting State v. Cowans,
87
Ohio St.3d 68, 84 (1999). See also Pubill at ¶ 15.
Where the issue of competency is raised before trial, “‘there is no
question that . . . a competency hearing is mandatory.’” State v. Harris, 2015-Ohio-
5409, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Bock, 28 Ohio St.3d 108, 110 (1986). Even a
“brief colloquy,” however, may be sufficient to satisfy the hearing requirement.
State v. Lozada,
2020-Ohio-5008, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.).
The record in the present case, including but not limited to the
transcript, reflects a far more fulsome inquiry than in Lozada and contains ample
reliable, credible evidence of appellant’s competency. In addition to recounting
appellant’s history of being found competent, the trial court at various points
referenced appellant’s handwritten letters as indicative of his competency, as well as
his counseling of fellow patients to feign hearing voices and his accurate correction
of jail personnel with respect to the scope of a court order. In the second hearing
conducted on January 8, 2025, the trial court noted that appellant’s behavior was
“willful,” “voluntary,” and “obstructionist,” and gave appellant an opportunity to
respond. The trial court, observing appellant’s demeanor and behavior, noted for
the record that appellant “raised [his] middle finger even higher in response to that.”
(Tr. 38.) This exchange further supports the trial court’s finding that appellant
understood precisely what was happening in the courtroom and voluntarily chose to
be obstructive rather than assisting his attorney with his own defense.
The trial court revisited the competency issue at the time of trial,
noting appellant’s documented habit of silent, raised-middle-finger defiance in
proceedings outside the jury’s view followed by performative outbursts in the jury’s
presence. The trial court’s use of the previous trial transcript as a “roadmap” served
it well, given that appellant used the same playbook as in that trial. In that regard,
this court held in the previous action that his “outrageous courtroom behavior does
not undermine the trial court’s finding of his competence to stand trial.” Pubill,
2023-Ohio-3875, at ¶ 22 (8th Dist.). This is because “‘[i]ncompetency must not be
equated with mere mental or emotional instability or even outright insanity. A
defendant may be emotionally disturbed or even psychotic and still be capable of
understanding the charges against him and of assisting his counsel.’” Id. at ¶ 22,
quoting
Bock at 110. A trial court “‘may not find a defendant incompetent to stand
trial or plead guilty solely because he suffers from a mental illness or intellectual
disability.’” Pubill at ¶ 22, quoting State v. McMillan,
2017-Ohio-8872, ¶ 29 (8th
Dist.).
Moreover, the law is clear that “[a]n evaluation is not statutorily
required,” and that “the right to an evaluation does not rise to the level of being a
constitutional guarantee unless the record contains ‘“sufficient indicia of
incompetence,” such that the inquiry is necessary to ensure the defendant’s right to
a fair trial.”’ Lozada, 2020-Ohio-5008, at ¶ 11 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Johnson,
2006-Ohio-6404, ¶ 160, quoting State v. Skatzes,
2004-Ohio-6391, ¶ 156, and State
v. Berry,
72 Ohio St.3d 354, 359 (1995). Like the trial court, we are in the unique
position of addressing competency issues pertaining to an individual repeatedly
found to be willfully obstructionist, intractably stubborn, but both fully able to
understand the nature of the trial court proceedings and, if only he were willing, to
assist his attorney in defending him. This court’s earlier decision on appellant’s
competency rejected the claim that the trial court was required to order yet another
competency evaluation:
“It is within the trial court’s discretion to order a second evaluation.”
[State v.] McConnell, 5th Dist. Perry No. 20-CA-00005, 2021-Ohio-41,
¶ 24. R.C. 2945.371(A) states in pertinent part, “If the issue of a
defendant’s competence to stand trial is raised . . . , the court may order
one or more evaluations of the defendant’s present mental condition.”
“[T]he use of the word ‘may’ supports the conclusion that a trial court
is not required to order an evaluation of the defendant’s mental
condition every time he raises the issue. Instead, the wording of the
statute implies that the ordering of an examination is a matter within
the discretion of the trial court.” McConnell at ¶ 24, citing State v.
Bailey, 90 Ohio App.3d 58, 67,
627 N.E.2d 1078 (11th Dist.1992); State
v. Eick, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2010CA00267, 2011-Ohio-1498, ¶ 32.
(Emphasis added.) Pubill at ¶ 20.
In light of the statutory framework, the relevant case law, appellant’s
history, and the record, we reject appellant’s argument that the trial court here was
required to order a new competency evaluation. As noted above, appellant has not
updated his playbook: his behavior in the present action was neither new nor
different when compared to his previous obstructionist tactics, which align with his
apparent identification as a “sovereign citizen.” Pubill at ¶ 23-24. Self-identified
“sovereigns,” while deeply misinformed, are not necessarily incompetent to stand
trial; this court found in appellant’s previous appeal that his “behavior is indicative
of his belief that he is a sovereign citizen and not of incompetency.” Pubill at ¶ 24.
In a similar vein, the Seventh Circuit once wrote that “[s]ome people believe with
great fervor preposterous things that just happen to coincide with their self-
interest.” Coleman v. Commr., 791 F.2d 68, 69 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, C.J.).
“[M]erely believing in fringe views does not mean someone cannot cooperate with
his lawyer or understand the judicial proceedings around him.” United States v.
Gooch,
595 Fed.Appx. 524, 527 (6th Cir. 2014).
Moreover, as discussed in this court’s decision in his previous appeal,
appellant has a history of steadfastly refusing to participate in evaluations both in
jail and when transported for evaluation. “The trial court previously ordered two
competency evaluations, and Pubill refused to participate in both. We see no
evidence that Pubill would have participated in a third, given his prior refusal.”
(Emphasis added.) Pubill, 2023-Ohio-3875, at ¶ 25 (8th Dist.). We therefore agree
with the State that the trial court “reasonably concluded that a new assessment was
unnecessary” not only because of multiple previous findings of competency but
because of appellant’s “documented history of noncompliance during such
evaluations.” (State’s brief at p. 10.)4
Finally, appellant argues that the trial court erred in not ordering
further evaluation because of a purported conflict between a 2020 NOPH evaluation
and the 2022 NBH evaluation:
In the evaluations reviewed by the trial court, there were inconsistent
findings between the reports from Northcoast Behavioral Healthcenter
4 We further note that while the trial court expressed extreme skepticism that yet
another competency evaluation would have a different outcome, it did not decisively rule
out that option. Appellant did not formally request a competency evaluation.
and the Northwest Ohio Psychiatric Hospital. NBH determined that
Appellant was being obstructive and uncooperative on purpose, while
NOPH [diagnosed] the Appellant with an unspecified mood disorder
and a possible Cluster A personality disorder. The trial court did not
address this conflict[.]
...
Prior evaluations reached different conclusions in [diagnosing] the
Appellant and such conflicting reports were not addressed or
reconciled by the trial court prior to starting the jury trial.
(Appellant’s brief at p. 2 and p. 6.)
The conflict is illusory. It stems from the inaccurate suggestion that
the trial court was referencing, quoting, and considering separate 2020 and 2022
reports. The record contains only the June 2022 NBH report, which included a
review of appellant’s prior medical records. A comparison between the transcript
and the report reveal that the trial court’s reference to appellant’s NOPH evaluation
in 2020 is nothing more than a quotation from the 2022 NBH report, which
included the evaluator’s summary of her review of NOPH medical records from
2020. The 2020 NOPH diagnosis of “Unspecified Mood Disorder” and “concern
that he may have a Cluster A personality disorder” were therefore expressly raised
and considered in the NBH’s nine-page, single-spaced 2022 report. NBH
acknowledged NOPH’s earlier concerns but ultimately concluded that appellant
understood the nature and objective of the legal proceedings against him and was
capable of assisting in his defense.
NBH did not note any competency concerns in connection with its
review of the 2020 NOPH records. Even if there were a conflict relevant to
competency, appellant fails to explain why any further referral is required when any
issues arising from the medical records were considered and resolved in 2022. This
is especially true where, as the State notes, appellant’s trial counsel made no
arguments that appellant’s recent behavior was new or different in comparison to
his obstructionist tactics in 2022.
The record supports the trial court’s conclusion that appellant’s
behavior in the past was volitional and targeted to disrupt proceedings, that his
behavior in the present action was more of the same, and that none of this
demonstrated incompetency. Appellant’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s
conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case
remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
DEENA R. CALABRESE, JUDGE
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, P.J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR
