[Cite as State v. Purtee,
2025-Ohio-5257.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ADAMS COUNTY
State of Ohio, : Case No. 25CA1220
Plaintiff-Appellee, : DECISION AND
JUDGMENT ENTRY
v. :
Stanley Purtee, : RELEASED 11/17/2025
Defendant-Appellant. :
______________________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Brian T. Goldberg, Cincinnati, Ohio, for appellant.
Aaron E. Haslam, Adams County Prosecuting Attorney, West Union, Ohio, for appellee.
______________________________________________________________________
Hess, J.
{¶1} Stanley Purtee appeals the judgment of the Adams County Court of
Common Pleas convicting him of theft, a fifth-degree felony, following a guilty plea. Purtee
presents one assignment of error asserting that the trial court erred in accepting his guilty
plea that was not made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. He contends that the trial
court failed to advise him that the State had a duty to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt as required by Crim.R. 11(C). The State concedes that Purtee’s argument may
have merit, but in an abundance of caution, it is opposing Purtee’s contention rather than
conceding error and requesting a remand. The State argues that the trial court’s
advisement was given in a manner reasonably intelligible to Purtee.
Adams App. No. 25CA1220 2
{¶2} We find that the trial court failed to advise Purtee of the State’s duty to prove
his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the trial court omitted this advisement
entirely, the written plea document cannot be relied upon to explain this right. Thus,
Purtee’s plea was not made knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently and must be vacated.
We sustain Purtee’s sole assignment of error and remand the cause for a rehearing on
Purtee’s change of plea.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶3} In October 2024, an Adams County grand jury indicted Purtee of one count
of breaking and entering in violation of R.C. 2911.13(B) and one count of theft in violation
of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), both fifth-degree felonies. Initially Purtee pleaded not guilty, but
several months later Purtee and the State entered into a plea agreement under which
Purtee pleaded guilty to count two, theft. Count one, breaking and entering, was
dismissed. At the change of plea hearing the trial court advised Purtee under Crim.R.
11(C)(2) of the constitutional rights he was waiving by making a guilty plea. However,
when advising Purtee under Crim.R.11(C)(2)(c) of the right “to require the state to prove
the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial,” the trial court informed Purtee,
“You have the right to a speeding [sic] to public trial before a jury or before the court that
you would be presumed to be innocent, and the state would bear the entire burden of
proof.” There was no advisement that the State must prove his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Following the trial court’s colloquy, Purtee pleaded guilty. The trial court sentenced
him to a ten-month prison term.
II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶4} Purtee presents the following assignment of error:
Adams App. No. 25CA1220 3
I. The trial court erred to the prejudice of Mr. Purtee by accepting a plea of
guilty that was not made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Felony Guilty Plea
{¶5} Purtee contends that the trial court must strictly comply with the
requirements of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), which requires the trial court to address him and
inform him of certain constitutional rights he is waiving before it can accept his guilty plea.
He contends that the trial court failed to inform him of the right to have the State prove his
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. He notes that the written acknowledgement he signed
identifies this right, but that the written document cannot be used to “clarify ambiguity”
when there was no ambiguity because the right was entirely omitted from the trial court’s
verbal advisement.
{¶6} The State, while conceding Purtee’s argument may have merit, argues that
the trial court’s advisement that “the state would bear the entire burden of proof” was
“aligning with the core protection” of the State’s burden to prove Purtee’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. The State argues that this advisement satisfies the constitutional
requirement under Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) because it was “reasonably intelligible” to Purtee
that the State’s burden was to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
1. Standard of Review
{¶7} Appellate courts apply a de novo standard of review when evaluating a
plea's compliance with Crim.R. 11(C). State v. Blanton, 2025-Ohio-237, ¶ 18 (4th Dist.),
citing State v. Nero,
56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108-109 (1990).
Adams App. No. 25CA1220 4
2. Legal Analysis
{¶8} Crim.R. 11(C) governs the process that a trial court must use before
accepting a felony plea of guilty or no contest. With respect to the required colloquy,
Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) provides:
(2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a plea
of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest without first
addressing the defendant personally either in-person or by remote
contemporaneous video in conformity with Crim.R. 43(A) and doing all of
the following:
…
(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant
understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial,
to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in the defendant's favor, and to require the state to
prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the
defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.
{¶9} “[P]ursuant to the strict-compliance standard set forth in Ballard, the trial
court must orally inform the defendant of the rights set forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) during
the plea colloquy for the plea to be valid. Although the trial court may vary slightly from
the literal wording of the rule in the colloquy, the court cannot simply rely on other sources
to convey these rights to the defendant.” State v. Veney, 2008-Ohio-5200, ¶ 29.
“When the record confirms that the trial court failed to perform this duty, the defendant's
plea is constitutionally infirm, making it presumptively invalid.”
Id. (invalidating a guilty
plea where it was undisputed that the trial court plainly failed to orally inform Veney of his
constitutional right to require the State to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).
{¶10} The Ohio Supreme Court tempered slightly the strict compliance standard
if the alleged error involves an ambiguity in the plea colloquy. State v. Barker, 2011-Ohio-
Adams App. No. 25CA1220 5
4130, ¶ 25. In Barker, the issue was whether the trial court's use of the more commonly
understood phrase, “right to call witnesses on your behalf” to explain the constitutional
right of compulsory process of witnesses was sufficient to comply with Crim.R.
11(C)(2)(c). Id. at ¶ 1. The Barker court held that it was, because the notification was
“reasonably intelligible” to the defendant and a reviewing court may consider the totality
of the circumstances by looking at other evidence in the record to clarify the
ambiguity. Id. at ¶ 25-26. “[W]e hold that a trial court strictly complies with Crim.R.
11(C)(2)(c) when it orally advises the defendant in a manner reasonably intelligible to the
defendant that the plea waives the rights enumerated in the rule.” State v. Miller, 2020-
Ohio-1420, ¶ 22. “[A] trial court can still convey the requisite information on constitutional
rights to the defendant even when the court does not provide a word-for-word recitation
of the criminal rule, so long as the trial court actually explains the rights to
the defendant.” State v. Veney, 2008-Ohio-5200, ¶ 8.
{¶11} Here, the trial court advised Purtee that the State had the burden of proof,
but at no place in the colloquy did it explain that the State must prove his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. These facts are identical to those in State v. Moore, 2019-Ohio-2764
(9th Dist.) and State v. Phillips,
2016-Ohio-4687 (9th Dist.). In both Moore and Phillips,
the trial court advised the defendant that the State would bear the burden of proof at trial,
but did not inform the defendant that the State would have to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. In each instance, the appellate court found that the defendants did not
enter their pleas knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily and vacated the guilty pleas. The
appellate court found nothing ambiguous about the omission – the advisement that the
State’s burden was beyond a reasonable doubt was missing entirely. Therefore, even
Adams App. No. 25CA1220 6
though there was a written plea agreement that contained that information, the appellate
court held that the trial court “ ‘cannot simply rely on other sources to convey this right,’
nor can this Court consider the written plea agreement absent ambiguity in the plea
colloquy.”
Moore at ¶ 7, quoting
Veney at ¶ 29; Barker at ¶ 25.
{¶12} Similarly, we find the trial court’s failure to inform Purtee that the State had
to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt was an omission and not merely an
ambiguity. We find that “it would weaken the strict compliance standard to consider
this a mere ambiguity.” State v. Martin, 2019-Ohio-2792, ¶ 31 (12th Dist.) (trial court did
not strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) when it informed defendant that the defendant
had the right to prove all the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than the State
having that burden).
{¶13} We reject the State’s argument that the trial court’s advisement was made
in a manner reasonably intelligible to Purtee. The State cites no case authority with similar
facts to support its argument. Purtee’s situation differs significantly from cases like State
v. Elmore, 2009-Ohio-6400 (7th Dist.) and State v. Underwood,
2012-Ohio-4263 (7th
Dist.). In both Elmore and Underwood, the defendant contended that the trial court erred
in informing the defendant that the State had to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
In Elmore, the trial court advised that the jury could not convict “unless they were
unanimously convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the offense” and
in Underwood “where the jury would have to find her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
and the State would have the burden of proof in proving the elements of the offense.” In
both those cases, the appellate court held that, even though the trial court did not use the
exact language in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), the trial court explained this right in a manner
Adams App. No. 25CA1220 7
reasonably intelligible to that defendant. State v. Elmore,
2009-Ohio-6400, ¶ 12-14 (7th
Dist.); State v. Underwood,
2012-Ohio-4263, ¶ 12 (7th Dist.).
{¶14} Here, the trial court failed to strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), which
requires that it orally advise Purtee before accepting a felony plea that the plea waives
the right to require the State to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the
trial court failed to strictly comply with this duty, Purtee’s plea is invalid.
{¶15} We sustain Purtee’s sole assignment of error.
IV. CONCLUSION
{¶16} We sustain the sole assignment of error, vacate the trial court’s judgment,
and remand for further proceedings.
JUDGMENT VACATED AND CAUSE REMANDED.
Adams App. No. 25CA1220 8
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS VACATED AND CAUSE REMANDED and
that appellee shall pay the costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Adams
County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS
BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is
temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the bail previously posted.
The purpose of a continued stay is to allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of
Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay
is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day
period, or the failure of the appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of
Ohio in the 45-day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of
the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the
appeal prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such
dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Smith, P.J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court
BY: ________________________
Michael D. Hess, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment
entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with
the clerk.
