[Cite as State v. Lucas,
2025-Ohio-5303.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
OTTAWA COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. {62}OT-25-002
Appellee Trial Court No. 24 CR 173
v.
Dustin Lucas DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: November 25, 2025
…
James VanEerten, Ottawa County Prosecutor, and
Barbara Gallé, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Christopher Bazeley, for appellant.
…
DUHART, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Dustin Lucas, appeals from a judgment entered by the Ottawa
County Court of Common Pleas following his guilty plea to 35 counts of violating a
protection order. For the reasons that follow, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
Statement of the Case and of the Facts
{¶ 2} Between July 29, 2024 and August 6, 2024, Lucas violated the terms of a
protection order issued against him by making 35 calls to individuals protected under the
order. On August 7, 2024, Lucas was indicted on 35 counts of violating a protection
order, all felonies of the fifth degree pursuant to R.C. 2919.27(A)(1) and (B)(3)(a).
{¶ 3} The case proceeded to a jury trial on November 12, 2024. On the following
day, during a recess in the trial, Lucas decided to plead guilty to the indictment. A plea
colloquy directly ensued.
{¶ 4} At the outset of the plea colloquy, the trial court asked Lucas whether he
had enough time to talk to his attorney and whether his attorney had answered all of his
questions. Lucas answered in the affirmative. Next, the trial court asked Lucas whether
he had carefully read the four-page written plea agreement. Again, Lucas answered in the
affirmative. On the last page of the written plea agreement, which bears Lucas’s
signature, is the statement, “I know the Judge may either sentence me today or refer my
case for a pre-sentence report.”
{¶ 5} The trial court discussed with Lucas the nature of the charges and the
maximum penalty involved. In addition, the trial court advised Lucas of his right to a trial
and that by pleading guilty Lucas would be giving up that right and other constitutional
rights attendant to a trial. The trial court asked Lucas, “With all that in mind, are you
certain that you want to enter a guilty plea?” Lucas answered that he did.
2.
{¶ 6} The trial court asked Lucas whether he acknowledged the existence of a
temporary protection order that was in place against him and prohibited him from making
phone calls to certain protected parties. Lucas answered that he did. The trial court also
asked Lucas whether he had made phone calls to the protected parties. Again, Lucas
answered affirmatively. The State added to the facts acknowledged by Lucas, specifying
the dates on which the phone calls were made and asserting that Lucas had a prior
conviction from 2015 for violation of a protection order. Lucas confirmed that the State’s
facts were accurate and that “should [the] matter have continued through the conclusion
of the jury trial…the evidence would have shown beyond a reasonable doubt that Lucas,
on or about [the] date range of 7/29 through 8/6/2024, while in Ottawa County, after
having been served with a copy of the Protection Order, did recklessly violate that Order.
And did, in fact, have a prior conviction for Violation of a Protection Order.”
{¶ 7} The trial court, finding that Lucas had made a knowing, intelligent,
voluntary decision to enter a plea of guilty, proceeded immediately to sentencing,
overruling Lucas’s motion for a brief continuance to allow his family to return from the
lunch break. Lucas asked, “Oh, I’m being sentenced today?” The trial court asked if there
was an objection, and the State objected and asked to proceed immediately to sentencing.
Lucas asked, “No PSI? Why?” The trial court responded, “Well, for security reasons, it
may be better that we do this without a lot of spectators.”
{¶ 8} The trial court imposed six-month terms of incarceration on each of the 35
counts and ordered that they be served consecutively. Thus, Lucas was sentenced to an
3.
aggregate term of 17.5 years in prison. In addition, the trial court imposed two sentences
of 30 days in jail, each for an instance of direct contempt of court, to run concurrently
with Lucas’s prison sentence.
{¶ 9} On December 17, 2024, Lucas filed a motion to withdraw his plea pursuant
to Crim.R. 32.1 and a pro se notice of appeal. The State filed a response to Lucas’s
motion to withdraw his plea. And on January 3, 2025, the trial court denied the motion.
Also on January 3, 2025, this court dismissed Lucas’s appeal as untimely filed. On
February 3, 2025, Lucas filed a motion for leave to file a delayed appeal via appointed
counsel, and this motion was granted. This appeal followed.
Assignments of Error
{¶ 10} On appeal, Lucas asserts the following assignments of error:
I. Lucas’ plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily made because the trial court failed to orally
advise him of his rights under Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b).
II. The trial court erred when it overruled Lucas’ motion
to withdraw his guilty plea.
Law and Analysis
First Assignment of Error
{¶ 11} Lucas argues in his first assignment of error that his plea was not
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made because the trial court failed to orally
advise him of his rights under Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b).
4.
{¶ 12} “Due process requires that a defendant’s plea be made knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily; otherwise, the defendant’s plea is invalid.” State v. Bishop,
2018-Ohio-5132, ¶ 10 (lead opinion), citing State v. Clark,
2008-Ohio-3748, ¶ 25.
“Crim.R. 11(C)(2) governs the process that a trial court must follow before accepting a
plea of guilty to a felony charge.” State v. Brinkman,
2021-Ohio-2473, ¶ 11, citing
Bishop at ¶ 11. Relevant here, Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b), requires the court to advise the
defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands: (1) the effect of the guilty
plea; and (2) the fact that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with
judgment and sentence. To satisfy the effect-of-plea requirement of Crim.R. (C)(2)(b),
the trial court must inform the defendant that “[t]he plea of guilty is a complete admission
of the defendant’s guilt.” Crim.R. 11(B)(1).
{¶ 13} When an appellant seeks to vacate his plea on appeal because the plea was
not entered in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary matter due to the trial court’s failure
to comply with Crim.R. 11, “‘“the questions to be answered are simply: (1) has the trial
court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the court has not complied
fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that excuses [an appellant] from the
burden of demonstrating prejudice? And (3) if a showing of prejudice is required, has the
[appellant] met that burden?”’” State v. Johnson, 2023-Ohio-2008, ¶ 14 (6th Dist.),
quoting State v. Morgan,
2021-Ohio-3996, ¶ 15 (6th Dist.), quoting State v. Dangler,
2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 17. “Unless the trial court fails to explain a constitutional right in
Crim.R. (C)(2)(c) or completely fails to comply with a portion of Crim.R. 11(C) – e.g.,
5.
by failing to mention mandatory postrelease control, State v. Sarkozy,
2008-Ohio-509, ¶
22 – the appellant is required to show prejudice to have his plea vacated.”
Id., citing State
v. Dangler,
2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 13-16. “The test for prejudice is ‘“whether the plea would
have otherwise been made.”’” Id. at ¶ 17, quoting
Dangler at ¶ 16, quoting State v. Nero,
56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 (1990).
{¶ 14} In challenging the validity of his plea, Lucas argues that the trial court
completely failed to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b), and so he was not required to
make a showing of prejudice. Turning to the record, we find it is true that the trial court
did not use the exact phrasing of Crim.R. 11(B)(1) and inform Lucas that his guilty plea
was a “complete admission of guilt.” But as the Ohio Supreme Court has held, the focus
in reviewing pleas has not been on whether the trial judge has ‘[incanted] the precise
verbiage’ of the rule ... but on whether the dialogue between the court and the defendant
demonstrates that the defendant understood the consequences of his plea. (Citations
omitted.) (Internally quoted bracketed text in original.) Dangler at ¶ 12. Here, Lucas
clearly admitted his guilt in response to the trial court’s questioning. The Ohio Supreme
Court has held that “a defendant who has entered a guilty plea without asserting actual
innocence is presumed to understand that he has completely admitted his guilt.” State v.
Griggs,
2004-Ohio-4415, ¶ 19. Accord State v. Fontanez,
2024-Ohio-1590, ¶ 18-19 (8th
Dist.); State v. Blair,
2022-Ohio-2572, ¶ 12-15 (5th Dist.); State v. Krieger, 2020-Ohio-
6964, ¶ 19 (7th Dist.).
6.
{¶ 15} The dialogue between the court and Lucas indicates that the trial court
sufficiently conveyed to Lucas that a guilty plea was a complete admission of guilt and,
further, could determine that Lucas understood this to be the case. We note that there is
nothing in the record, nor any allegation by Lucas, to suggest that Lucas’s plea was less
than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary based on the lack of an explicit discussion of the
“complete admission of guilt” language.
{¶ 16} Next we consider the trial court’s failure to specifically inform Lucas about
its ability to proceed with sentencing. According to Lucas, this failure alone constitutes a
“complete failure” to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b).
{¶ 17} In State v. Barker, 2011-Ohio-4130, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that
“an alleged ambiguity during a Crim.R. 11 oral plea colloquy may be clarified by
reference to other portions of the record, including the written plea, in determining
whether the defendant was fully informed of the right in question.” Id. at ¶ 25. Applying
this principle to the instant case, we find that while ambiguity may indeed have resulted
during the Crim.R. 11 oral plea colloquy -- where the trial court adequately explained the
effect of a guilty plea and fully discussed the potential sentences involved, yet failed to
explain that the trial court could, upon acceptance of the plea, immediately proceed with
judgment and sentence -- the terms of Lucas’s plea agreement served to clarify that
ambiguity. Here, the terms of the plea agreement expressly informed Lucas that he could
be sentenced on the day the plea agreement was reached or following a pre-sentence
report, thereby clarifying any ambiguity as to when the otherwise-fully-discussed
7.
potential sentences might be imposed. Lucas himself acknowledged that he had read over
the plea agreement carefully before he signed it, that the plea agreement contained the
advisement that the trial court could immediately proceed to sentencing, and that to the
extent he had questions, he had an opportunity to ask his attorney about those questions.
See State v. Phipps,
2021-Ohio-258, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.) (trial court did not completely fail to
comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b) where a statement in the signed plea agreement
indicating that the judge could immediately sentence the appellant clarified an alleged
ambiguity that occurred during Crim.R. 11 oral plea colloquy where the trial court failed
to explain that it could, upon acceptance of the plea, proceed with judgment and
sentence); State v. Miller,
2017-Ohio-478, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.) (finding substantial compliance
with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b) where plea form contained the specific Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b)
advisement that was omitted during the plea colloquy (i.e., that the trial court could
proceed with judgment and sentence upon accepting the guilty plea) and where the
appellant indicated that he had read and understood the plea form prior to signing it);
State v. Sheppeard,
2023-Ohio-3278, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.) (“We have found substantial
compliance with Crim.R.11(C)(2)(b) when the plea form includes the required
advisements and the defendant indicates at the plea hearing that he or she has read and
understood the plea form.”) Therefore, under the circumstances of this case, where the
plea form contained the specific Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b) advisement that was omitted during
the Crim.R. 11 oral plea colloquy, thereby clarifying an ambiguity that occurred during
the colloquy, and where Lucas read that specific advisement and presumably understood
8.
that the trial court could immediately proceed with judgment and sentence upon
accepting his guilty plea, we find that the trial court did not completely fail to comply
with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b).
{¶ 18} Because the trial court did not completely fail to comply with the ability-to-
proceed-with-sentencing requirement of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b), Lucas is not entitled to
have his plea vacated unless he demonstrates prejudice. See Dangler at ¶ 13-16. Lucas
claims that “[b]ecause the [ability-to-proceed-with-sentencing] advisement contains two
options,” he “reasonably believed the issue would be discussed at the conclusion of the
plea hearing.” This statement supports the notion that Lucas was aware of the options,
including that the trial court could proceed to sentencing. It also suggests that Lucas was
expecting the conversation about the timing of sentencing to occur at the end of the plea
hearing, after he had already pleaded guilty. Thus, the timing of the sentencing was not a
determinative factor in whether he pleaded guilty. Lucas also claims that the trial court’s
decision to proceed to sentencing “took him by surprise and denied him the opportunity
to see his family before” serving his sentence. Lucas may have been surprised that the
trial court chose the option of proceeding directly to sentencing, but Lucas has not shown,
or even alleged, that he would not have pleaded guilty if he had known that the trial court
would be proceeding immediately to sentencing. Because Lucas has failed to establish
that his plea was less than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary based on the trial court's
failure to explicitly tell him that it could proceed to sentencing immediately upon his
9.
entry of a guilty plea, he fails to establish prejudice, and so we find his first assignment of
error not well-taken.
Second Assignment of Error
{¶ 19} Lucas argues in his second assignment of error that the trial court erred
when it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. “An appellate court reviews a trial
court’s decision on a motion to withdraw a plea under an abuse-of-discretion standard.”
State v. Francis, 2004-Ohio-6894, ¶ 32 (citations omitted). “Abuse of discretion means
that the trial court’s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” State v.
Freiss,
2023-Ohio-3409, ¶ 98 (6th Dist.), citing State ex rel. Askew v. Goldhart,
75 Ohio
St.3d 608, 610 (1996).
{¶ 20} Crim.R. 32.1 provides that “[a] motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no
contest may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice
the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the
defendant to withdraw his or her plea.” “A manifest injustice is defined as a ‘clear or
openly unjust act.’ Manifest injustice is an extremely high standard, and a defendant may
only withdraw his guilty plea in extraordinary cases.” State v. Johnson, 2012-Ohio-4866,
¶ 9 (6th Dist.), quoting State v. Harmon,
2011-Ohio-5035, ¶ 12 (6th Dist.) (citations
omitted), “A guilty plea that was not entered knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily,
creates a manifest injustice that would entitle a defendant to withdraw a plea.” State v.
Williams,
2024-Ohio-6123, ¶ 5 (10th Dist.) (citation omitted).
10.
{¶ 21} Lucas claims that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
given because the trial court failed to advise him of his rights under Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b)
and, therefore, there was a manifest injustice entitling him to withdraw his guilty plea. As
discussed above, however, Lucas’s plea was made knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily. Thus, there was no manifest injustice, and the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it denied Lucas’s motion to withdraw his plea. Lucas’s second
assignment of error is found not well-taken.
Conclusion
{¶ 22} The judgment of the Ottawa County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Thomas J. Osowik, J.
JUDGE
Christine E. Mayle, J.
JUDGE
Myron C. Duhart, J.
CONCUR. JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
11.
