[Cite as State v. Compton,
2025-Ohio-5459.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
ALLEN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 1-25-17
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
CHRISTOPHER L. COMPTON, OPINION AND
JUDGMENT ENTRY
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Allen County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. CR 2024 0219
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: December 8, 2025
APPEARANCES:
Chima R. Ekeh for Appellant
John R. Willamowski, Jr. for Appellee
Case No. 1-25-17
ZIMMERMAN, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Christopher L. Compton (“Compton”), appeals
the April 10, 2025 judgment entry of sentence of the Allen County Court of
Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} This case stems from a domestic incident during which Compton
became angry with his wife for not answering her phone and initiated a physical
assault inside their home. During the assault, Compton forced the victim to the
ground to take her phone, struck her in the back, and then punched her in the face.
Compton’s actions resulted in a series of severe injuries—including broken ribs, a
collapsed lung requiring a chest tube for four days, a broken nose, and a split lip—
that required the victim to be in the hospital’s intensive care unit for five days.
During her hospitalization, the victim developed pneumonia, which necessitated her
transfer to another hospital for additional treatment.
{¶3} On November 14, 2024, the Allen County Grand Jury indicted
Compton on a single count of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1),
(D)(1)(a), a second-degree felony. On November 18, 2024, Compton filed a written
plea of not guilty to the indictment.
{¶4} The case proceeded to a jury trial on March 4-5, 2025. On March 5,
2025, the jury found Compton guilty of felonious assault as alleged in the
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indictment. On April 10, 2025, the trial court sentenced Compton to a minimum
term of five years to a maximum term of seven and a half years in prison.
{¶5} Compton filed his notice of appeal on May 8, 2025. He raises one
assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
Appellant’s Conviction For Felonious Assault Was Against The
Manifest Weight Of The Evidence (Tr. pg. 415)
{¶6} In his sole assignment of error, Compton argues that his felonious
assault conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In particular,
Compton contends that the jury lost its way by believing the inconsistent and
incredible testimony of the victim.
Standard of Review
{¶7} Manifest “weight of the evidence and sufficiency of the evidence are
clearly different legal concepts.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 389
(1997). In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record, “‘weigh[] the evidence
and all reasonable inferences, consider[] the credibility of witnesses and determine[]
whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way
and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
reversed and a new trial ordered.’”
Id. at 387, quoting State v. Martin,
20 Ohio
App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). A reviewing court must, however, allow the trier
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of fact appropriate discretion on matters relating to the weight of the evidence and
the credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967).
When applying the manifest-weight standard, “[o]nly in exceptional cases, where
the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the conviction,’ should an appellate court
overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State v. Haller,
2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.),
quoting State v. Hunter,
2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119.
Analysis
{¶8} Compton was convicted of felonious assault in violation of R.C.
2903.11, which provides, in its relevant part, that “[n]o person shall knowingly . . .
[c]ause serious physical harm to another . . . .” R.C. 2903.11(A)(1). “A person acts
knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the person’s
conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature.
A person has knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that such
circumstances probably exist.” R.C. 2901.22(B).
{¶9} “‘Serious physical harm to persons’ means,” as relevant to this case,
“[a]ny physical harm that carries a substantial risk of death”; “[a]ny physical harm
that involves some permanent incapacity, whether partial or total, or that involves
some temporary, substantial incapacity”; “[a]ny physical harm that involves some
permanent disfigurement or that involves some temporary, serious disfigurement”;
or “[a]ny physical harm that involves acute pain of such duration as to result in
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substantial suffering or that involves any degree of prolonged or intractable pain.”
R.C. 2901.01(A)(5)(b)-(e).
{¶10} On appeal, Compton contends that his felonious assault conviction is
against the manifest weight of the evidence because the victim’s testimony was not
believable. Specifically, Compton claims that her testimony was not credible and
inconsistent because (1) she gave contradictory statements to law enforcement as to
how her injuries occurred; (2) she lied to medical personnel and law enforcement
about her intoxication; (3) she provided inconsistent accounts of how Compton
allegedly struck her; and (4) her physical injuries were more consistent with her
initial story of an accidental fall while intoxicated than with the assault that she
described at trial.
{¶11} “Although we review credibility when considering the manifest
weight of the evidence, the credibility of witnesses is primarily a determination for
the trier of fact.” State v. Banks, 2011-Ohio-5671, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), citing DeHass,
10 Ohio St.2d at paragraph one of the syllabus. “The trier of fact is best able ‘to
view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures[,] and voice inflections,
and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.’”
Id., quoting State v. Wilson,
2007-Ohio-2202, ¶ 24, citing Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v.
Cleveland,
10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80-81 (1984).
{¶12} Notwithstanding the inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony that
Compton directs us to, the jury was able to judge those inconsistencies against the
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balance of the victim’s testimony and the remainder of the State’s evidence. Indeed,
despite the victim’s testimony, the jury also observed Compton’s testimony, “and
we are mindful of the jury’s ‘superior first-hand perspective in judging the
demeanor and credibility of witnesses.’” State v. Suffel, 2015-Ohio-222, ¶ 33 (3d
Dist.), quoting State v. Phillips,
2014-Ohio-5162, ¶ 125 (10th Dist.).
{¶13} Critically, the jury in this case was faced with conflicting narratives
and, as the trier of fact, it was “‘patently in the best position to gauge the truth.’”
State v. Chavez, 2020-Ohio-426, ¶ 46 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Smith, 2015-Ohio-
1610, ¶ 24 (5th Dist.). Specifically, the jury was able to assess the victim’s
testimony explaining her own conduct. In particular, the jury heard the victim’s
testimony that she initially lied to law enforcement, claiming that she tripped and
fell, because Compton had told her to do so and she was afraid of him. However,
once Compton was arrested and she was safely separated from him, the victim’s
detailed account of the assault remained consistent through her interviews with law
enforcement, medical staff, and her testimony at trial. The jury was also able to
review the victim’s testimony against the photographs and medical records
depicting the severity of the injuries that she sustained. Likewise, Compton’s trial
counsel explored the credibility issue at trial and thoroughly cross-examined the
victim regarding her initial statements to police and her level of intoxication.
Accord State v. Cartwright,
2024-Ohio-5638, ¶ 15 (3d Dist.).
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{¶14} Moreover, the jury was able to compare Compton’s version of
events—that the victim’s significant injuries resulted from an accidental fall—with
the State’s evidence presented at trial. While Compton emphasizes that the victim’s
intoxication, and evidence showed that her blood alcohol concentration upon arrival
at the hospital was .16, the law enforcement officers who responded to the scene
testified that she did not appear impaired. In particular Patrolman Nevan Stolly of
the Lima Police Department, who is trained in identifying impairment, noted what
he perceived as possible signs of intoxication but confirmed that he was able to
speak with her coherently about the incident. More definitively, Patrolman Dylan
Thiessen, also of the Lima Police Department, testified that he did not believe that
the victim was intoxicated, detected no odor of alcohol, and saw none of the classic
signs of impairment that would have prompted him to conduct a field sobriety test.
{¶15} Furthermore, the jury was able to weigh the credibility of Compton’s
narrative against his own contradictory statements, where he claimed both to have
been on the couch inside when he heard a thud and to have been outside when she
fell. Importantly, it was well within the province of the trier-of-fact to determine
the credibility of Compton’s and the victim’s testimony, including the prerogative
to find Compton’s version of events not to be truthful. See Chavez, 2020-Ohio-426,
at ¶ 46 (3d Dist.). Thus, this inconsistency supported the jury’s conclusion that the
victim’s extensive injuries were not the result of a simple fall, but of the violent
assault that she described at trial.
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{¶16} Ultimately, although there were inconsistencies, the jury weighed
them and found the victim’s version of events more credible than Compton’s
version. See id. at ¶ 47. Therefore, after weighing the evidence and evaluating the
credibility of the witnesses, with appropriate deference to the jury’s credibility
determination, we conclude that the jury did not clearly lose its way and create a
manifest miscarriage of justice. Accord id. Consequently, we are not persuaded
that Compton’s felonious-assault conviction must be reversed and a new trial
ordered.
{¶17} Compton’s assignment of error is overruled.
{¶18} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
WALDICK, P.J. and MILLER, J., concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignment of error is
overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby
rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the
judgment for costs.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s
judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.
27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the
proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.
William R. Zimmerman, Judge
Juergen A. Waldick, Judge
Mark C. Miller, Judge
DATED:
/hls
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