[Cite as Lowe v. Morse,
2025-Ohio-548.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
TONYA LOWE, :
Plaintiff-Appellant, :
No. 113948
v. :
PAM MORSE, ET AL., :
Defendants-Appellees. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 20, 2025
Administrative Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CV-24-993764
Appearances:
Tonya Lowe, pro se.
Wiles Richards and Stephanie E. Landgraf, for appellees
Pamela Morse and Patti Boring.
Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General, and Wayne D.
Williams, Principal Assistant Attorney General, Civil
Rights Section, for appellee Ohio Civil Rights
Commission.
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J.:
Appellant Tonya Lowe (“Lowe”) appeals the judgment of the common
pleas court dismissing her administrative appeal against appellees the Ohio Civil
Rights Commission (“OCRC”), Pamela Morse (“Morse”) and Patti Boring
(“Boring”), finding that her appeal was untimely. After a careful review of the
applicable law and facts, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I. Factual and Procedural History
In April 2023, Lowe filed an affidavit with the Ohio Civil Rights
Commission (“OCRC”) alleging that Morse and Boring had discriminated against
her based upon her race and disability. Morse was one of the owners of the
apartment complex in which Lowe resided in Perry, Lake County, Ohio. Boring was
an employee of the company that managed the apartment complex and was alleged
to have been Morse’s agent.
On January 11, 2024, the OCRC issued a “Letter of Determination”
dismissing Lowe’s appeal. In the written decision that was mailed to all parties, the
OCRC determined that, after conducting an investigation into Lowe’s allegations, it
was “not probable” that Morse and Boring had engaged in an unlawful
discriminatory practice in violation of R.C. Ch. 4112.
Lowed filed a notice of appeal of the decision in the Cuyahoga County
Court of Common Pleas on March 4, 2024.
Morse and Boring moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the trial
court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because Lowe’s appeal had not been timely
filed under R.C. 4112.06. Morse and Boring further argued that the court lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction because Lowe was required to bring her appeal in the
county where the unlawful discriminatory practice was alleged to have been
committed — in this case, Lake County. The OCRC also filed its own motion to
dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(1), arguing that the appeal was untimely, which deprived
the common pleas court of jurisdiction.
Lowe then filed the instant appeal, essentially arguing that the trial
court erred in dismissing her case for being untimely.
II. Law and Analysis
We review a Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction de novo. Rheinhold v. Reichek, 2014-Ohio-31, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.). When
ruling on a Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motion, the trial court must determine whether a plaintiff
has alleged any cause of action that the court has authority to decide.
Id. In a de
novo review, we apply the same standards as the trial court. Muhammad v. Ohio
Civ. Rights Comm.
2013-Ohio-3730, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.), citing GNFH, Inc. v. W. Am.
Ins. Co.,
2007-Ohio-2722, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.).
“The right of appeal from an administrative order is not an inherent
right; rather, it is a right conferred by statute.” Hous. Advocates, Inc. v. Farmers
Ins. Co. of Columbus, 2006-Ohio-2467, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.), citing Mudgett v. Ohio State
Bd. of Emergency Med. Servs.,
2005-Ohio-6171 (3d Dist.), citing Arndt v. Scott,
1955 Ohio App. LEXIS 744 (2d Dist. 1955). “Where a statute confers a right of
appeal, the appealing party must strictly adhere to the statutory conditions.”
Id.,
citing Holmes v. Union Gospel Press,
64 Ohio St.2d 187, 188 (1980).
R.C. 4112.06 governs appeals to the common pleas court of a decision
of the OCRC and provides, in pertinent part:
(H) If no proceeding to obtain judicial review is instituted by a
complainant, or respondent within thirty days from the service of order
of the commission pursuant to this section, the commission may obtain
a decree of the court for the enforcement of such order upon showing
that respondent is subject to the commission’s jurisdiction and resides
or transacts business within the county in which the petition for
enforcement is brought.
In analyzing the above, the Supreme Court of Ohio has noted that the
statute “does not literally state that an action must be filed within thirty days of
service of a commission order. However, such an interpretation necessarily follows
from the practical operation of the statute.” Ramsdell v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm.,
56 Ohio St.3d 24, 25 (1990).
Ohio Adm.Code 4112-1-09 provides that “[s]ervice by mail or
electronic mail shall be deemed completed upon mailing.” The Ramsdell Court held
that a party has 30 days after the mailing of a final order of the OCRC to file a petition
for review with the court of common pleas. Id.
In the case sub judice, the order of the OCRC was mailed on January
11, 2024. Thirty days from the date of mailing was February 10, 2024; however, that
day was a Saturday, so the deadline was extended until the following Monday, which
was February 12, 2024. Lowe did not file her appeal until March 4, 2024.
In her appellate brief, Lowe does not address why the court erred in
dismissing her untimely appeal nor does she offer any argument as to why the filing
deadline should not apply. Her brief does not cite any statutes, rules, or case law
and simply reiterates that her claim against Morse and Boring is for discrimination
and that she is seeking damages.
While we acknowledge that Lowe has been pro se during the lower
court proceedings and in the current appeal, “‘pro se litigants are presumed to have
knowledge of the law and legal procedures and . . . they are held to the same standard
as litigants who are represented by counsel.’” State ex rel. Fuller v. Mengel, 2003-
Ohio-6448, ¶ 10, quoting Sabouri v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 145 Ohio
App.3d 651, 654 (10th Dist. 2001). “‘Pro se litigants are not entitled to greater rights,
and they must accept the results of their own mistakes.’” Fazio v. Gruttadauria,
2008-Ohio-4586, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.), quoting Williams v. Lo,
2008-Ohio-2804, ¶ 18
(10th Dist.).
Lowe does state in her brief that she “filed a motion to extend time,”
but the extension she appears to be referring to was sought in the instant appeal, not
the administrative appeal below. Regardless, even if she had moved for an extension
of time to file her administrative appeal, the trial court was not authorized to grant
an extension of the statutory timeframe. The timing requirements of R.C. 4112.06
are jurisdictional and cannot be extended. Ramsdell, 56 Ohio St.3d at 27-28; see
also Mayo v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm.,
2017-Ohio-2892, ¶ 2 (4th Dist.) (noting that
even civil and administrative rules cannot expand a court’s jurisdiction beyond the
bounds set by statute).
Accordingly, to properly commence an appeal under R.C. 4112.06,
Lowe had to file her appeal with the common pleas court within 30 days of service
of the OCRC’s decision. In this case, the decision was mailed on January 11, 2024.
Lowe’s appeal was not filed with the common pleas court until March 4, 2024, which
was after the 30-day time period. The common pleas court lacked jurisdiction and
properly dismissed her appeal.
Lowe’s sole assignment of error is overruled, and the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed.
It is ordered that appellees recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., and
WILLIAM A. KLATT, J.,* CONCUR
(*Sitting by assignment: William A. Klatt, J., retired, of the Tenth District Court of
Appeals.)
