[Cite as State v. Johnson,
2025-Ohio-5513.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 114874
v. :
CLARENCE JOHNSON, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 11, 2025
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case Nos. CR-23-687441-A and CR-23-687484-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Melissa Riley, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.
The Law Office of Jaye M. Schlachet, Jaye M. Schlachet,
and Eric M. Levy, for appellant.
LISA B. FORBES, J.:
Defendant-appellant Clarence Johnson (“Johnson”) appeals from a
judgment of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas convicting him of two
counts of sexual battery and two counts of abduction, following his guilty plea to the
charges. On appeal, Johnson argues that the trial court erred in accepting his guilty
plea because it was not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm Johnson’s convictions.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Johnson was indicted by a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury in two
separate cases involving two separate victims. In Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-23-687484-
A, Johnson was indicted on three counts of rape, three counts of sexual battery, and
one count of kidnapping, which would later be amended to one count of abduction.
In Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-23-687441-A, Johnson was indicted on one count of
kidnapping, one count of abduction, one count of menacing by stalking, and two
counts of having weapons while under disability.
On November 7, 2024, Johnson withdrew his plea of not guilty to the
charges and entered a negotiated plea in which he pleaded guilty to the abduction
charge and both sexual battery charges contained in CR-23-687484-A, as well as the
abduction charge contained in CR-23-687441-A, in exchange for the dismissal of the
remaining charges in both cases.
Following his guilty plea, Johnson was sentenced to 18 months in
prison for abduction in CR-23-687441-A, 36 months for abduction in CR-23-
687484-A, and 42 months for each count of sexual battery in CR-23-687484-A. The
trial court ordered that the prison terms be served concurrently, for a total of 42
months of incarceration.
On appeal, Johnson raises the following single assignment of error:
“The trial court failed to comply with Crim.R. 11 in accepting appellant’s guilty pleas
which were not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.”
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
Johnson raises two arguments under his single assignment of error.
First, he contends that the trial court erred in accepting his guilty pleas in violation
of Crim.R. 11 because his pleas were not entered into knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently. In support of this claim, Johnson notes that during the Crim.R. 11
colloquy he asked the court what the phrase “presumed innocent” meant, but the
court did not answer his question. Second, Johnson argues that he maintained his
innocence with regard to the crimes charged in CR-23-687441-A and that, as a
result, his plea to the abduction charge in that case should have been treated as an
Alford plea, requiring the court to follow specific procedural safeguards before
accepting it. We are not persuaded by either of Johnson’s arguments.
A. Crim.R. 11 Compliance
Since a guilty plea involves the waiver of constitutional rights, the
decision to enter the plea must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. See State v.
Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 10. “If the plea was not made knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily, enforcement of that plea is unconstitutional.”
Id.
Crim.R. 11 “outlines the procedures that trial courts are to follow
when accepting pleas.” Id. at ¶ 11. The rule “‘ensures an adequate record on review
by requiring the trial court to personally inform the defendant of his rights and the
consequences of his plea and determine if the plea is understandingly and
voluntarily made.’” Id., quoting State v. Stone, 43 Ohio St.2d 163, 168 (1975). As
part of the Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy, the trial court must inform the defendant of the
constitutional rights he is waiving by pleading guilty. These rights, which are set
forth in Crim.R. 11(A)(2)(c), are “the right to a jury trial, the right to confront one’s
accusers, the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to compulsory process to
obtain witnesses, and the right to require the state to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id. at ¶ 14. When a court fails to adequately inform a defendant of these
constitutional rights, it is presumed that the defendant did not enter the plea
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Id.
A trial court complies with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) when it “orally advises
the defendant in a manner reasonably intelligible to the defendant that the plea
waives the rights enumerated in the rule.” State v. Miller, 2020-Ohio-1420, ¶ 22. It
is important to note, however, that “a trial court can still convey the requisite
information on constitutional rights to the defendant even when the court does not
provide a word-for-word recitation of the criminal rule, so long as the trial court
actually explains the rights to the defendant.” State v. Veney,
2008-Ohio-5200, ¶ 8.
With this in mind, in reviewing a trial court’s Crim.R. 11 colloquy to ensure that a
defendant’s plea is knowing and voluntary, appellate courts focus on “whether the
dialogue between the court and the defendant demonstrates that the defendant
understood the consequences of his plea.”
Dangler at ¶ 12, citing
Veney at ¶ 15-16;
State v. Clark,
2008-Ohio-3748, ¶ 26;
Miller at ¶ 19. In reviewing a plea’s
compliance with Crim.R. 11(C), appellate courts apply a de novo standard of review.
See State v. Lebron,
2020-Ohio-1507, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.).
In this case, immediately after the trial court began the Crim.R. 11
colloquy the following exchange took place:
Court: Do you understand that you are presumed innocent, and that
by entering a plea of guilty to the amended indictment in each case that
you admit to the truth of those facts and your full guilt?
Johnson: I understand.
Court: Do you understand that you have a right to a trial; your choice
of a —
Johnson: The fact that —
Court: Pardon?
Johnson: Just because I don’t like not asking when I have something
on my mind, I just wanted you to define something.
Court: I’m sorry, I can’t hear you.
Johnson: Just because I don’t like not speaking my mind, could you
define presumed innocent, please? What that means?
Court: Well, I’m asking you a series of questions, you know, and your
opportunity to speak your mind is not —
Johnson: No, I’m just saying I don’t totally understand that. That’s
why I —
Court: Pardon me?
Defendant: Nothing, your Honor. Please continue.
Court: Are you having a problem here with this?
Defendant: No, sir.
Court: Alright. Are you having a problem understanding my
questions?
Defendant: Just the point I referenced, but I’m okay now.
Although it appears the trial court did not understand Johnson’s
request for clarification, and that the trial court did not answer Johnson’s question
regarding the meaning of “presumed innocent,” we conclude that, under the totality
of the circumstances it is evident that Johnson understood the consequences of his
plea and the rights he was waiving.
To begin, when the court asked Johnson for clarification about what
Johnson did not understand, Johnson abandoned his question altogether stating
that he was “okay now,” indicating that the trial court could move on. The trial court
then immediately engaged Johnson as follows:
Court: All right. Do you understand that you have the right to a trial,
your choice of either a jury trial or to the Court, at which time the State
must prove your guilt and you’re giving up this right?
Defendant: Yes, Sir.
Court: Do you understand that you have the right to have the State
prove you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial of your case and
that you are giving up that right in both cases?
Defendant: Yes, sir.
Importantly, Crim.R. 11 does not require the trial court to advise a defendant that he
is presumed innocent. See State v. McDonald, 2011-Ohio-1964, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.).
Instead, the rule requires that the defendant be informed that the State must prove
his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Although references to the “presumption of
innocence” may help explain the State’s burden in this regard, such language is not
required under Crim.R. 11 and is not necessary for a defendant to understand the
State’s obligation to establish guilt by the highest standard of proof.
Here, the court informed Johnson that the State bore the burden of
proving his guilt and that the burden was proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Johnson
stated that he understood this advisement and he did not ask any follow-up
questions. Based on the full exchange between the trial court and Johnson, we
conclude that the court complied with Crim.R. 11’s requirement to inform Johnson
of the State’s burden of establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court’s
compliance with Crim.R. 11, combined with Johnson’s lack of confusion or inquiry
regarding the burden of proof, leads us to determine that under the totality of the
circumstances Johnson’s plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made.
Our finding is further supported by the fact that prior to engaging Johnson in the
Crim.R. 11 colloquy, the trial court addressed Johnson’s counsel and asked if he had
discussed Johnson’s constitutional rights with him. Defense counsel confirmed that
he had advised Johnson of his rights and stated that Johnson “waive[s] them
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently of his own free will.” See State v. Singleton,
2012-Ohio-360, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.) (noting that defense counsel’s acknowledgment that
a defendant has been informed of constitutional rights and is waiving them is a
relevant factor in determining whether a plea is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent).
Accordingly, we find no merit to Johnson’s argument that his plea was not
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made because of the court’s failure to
answer his question with regard to the presumption of innocence.
B. Alford Plea
Johnson further contends that the court erred in accepting his plea
because he maintained that he was innocent as to the charges contained in CR-23-
687441-A. Accordingly, Johnson argues that the court should have followed the
procedures for accepting an Alford plea, which requires the court to examine the
factual basis of the plea to reconcile the defendant’s claim of innocence with his plea
of guilty. See State v. Johnson, 2016-Ohio-2840, ¶ 27 (8th Dist.). We find no merit
to this argument.
In order for a valid Alford plea to take place, the defendant must
protest innocence at the same time he enters his guilty plea. See id. Although
Johnson, through counsel, asserted his innocence during an initial pretrial hearing,
the transcript reflects that Johnson never asserted his innocence at the time he
entered his guilty pleas.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons we overrule the appellant’s single
assignment of error challenging his guilty plea and affirm his convictions.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The appellant’s
conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case
remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
______________________________
LISA B. FORBES, JUDGE
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, A.J., and
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR
