[Cite as State v. Beard,
2025-Ohio-5521.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff- Appellee, :
No. 115019
v. :
DAVID D. BEARD, JR., :
Defendant-Appellant. :
_______________________________________
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 11, 2025
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-24-690536-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Brittany Stipich, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.
Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and
Francis Cavallo, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J.:
Defendant-appellant David D. Beard, Jr. (“Beard”) appeals from the
judgment of his convictions for one count of failure to comply, one count of having
weapons while under disability, and two counts of aggravating menacing. He
presents the following assigned errors for our review:
1. There was insufficient evidence produced at trial to support a
finding of guilt on the charge of failure to comply.
2. The jury lost their way by finding the defendant guilty of both
failure to comply and having a weapon while under disability, as
both verdicts were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Upon reviewing the record and the relevant law, we overrule Beard’s
two assignments of error.
I. Relevant Facts and Procedural History
A. Relevant Facts
In March 2023, Ms. Smith (“Smith”) and her friend Ms. Williams
(“Williams”) were headed to Ms. Smith’s grandmother’s house. Smith was 20 years
old, and Williams was 19 years old at the time. It was dark outside and they got off
the bus at the wrong bus stop.
The two women walked across the street to a gas station. In the
parking lot of the gas station, the women saw a man they had never met before, later
identified as Beard, a 70 year-old male, sitting in his car. Smith testified that
Williams looked at Beard and said to him “what the hell are you looking at.” Beard
asked Williams if she was lost and if she needed a ride, and Williams told him yes.1
Both women got into Beard’s car with the belief that Beard would give them a ride
1 Williams disputed this and testified that it was Smith who wanted to agree to Beard’s
offer to give them a ride.
to Smith’s grandmother’s house. Smith got into the back seat of Beard’s vehicle.
Williams sat in the front seat.
Rather than head to Smith’s grandmother’s house, Smith testified
that Beard drove them to a liquor store. When they got there, Beard gave Williams
40 dollars and asked her to go into the store and buy him some liquor. Williams
testified that when she got out of the car, Beard locked Smith’s door and said, “[Y]ou
go in there, your friend got to stay in the car.” Williams went into the store.
Williams testified that while in the store, she contacted the store’s
security guard because she believed that the man, Beard, was attempting to kidnap
her and Smith. She contacted security and told the security guard that there was
man that was “trying to kidnap us.” Williams stated the security guard came outside,
confronted Beard, and began speaking to him.
While the security guard was speaking with Beard, Williams testified
that she ran to the right side of Beard’s car and unlocked Smith’s door and the two
started to run away. Smith heard Beard say, “[B]itch, give me my money” and pulled
out his gun, pointed it at her, and began chasing them. As he chased them, Smith
stated that Beard was screaming, “[B]itch, give me my money” while shooting the
gun. Smith stated that she never saw Beard shoot the firearm but that she heard the
shots. Williams testified that as she was running, Beard shot the gun one time. She
got scared and stopped. She then heard Beard shoot the gun a second time.
Smith and Williams both stated that they ran to a McDonald’s where
they saw a man in his vehicle at the drive-through with his son in the front seat.
Williams testified that she told the man in the drive-through that a man was trying
to get them. The man in the drive-through let the women in his car and drove off.
The man gave the women a ride to Smith’s grandmother’s house.
When they arrived at Smith’s grandmother’s house, Smith testified
that she exited the car and went to the house. Williams was still in the car. Smith
stated that Beard must have followed them because when she told Williams to get
out of the car, she saw Beard pointing a gun at Williams. Smith stated that Beard
“clocked [the gun] back” and told Williams to “give me my money.” Williams
testified that the whole time this was happening, she was calling the police. Williams
stated that when Beard heard the police coming, he got into his car and “zoomed
off.”
While inside her grandmother’s house, Smith stated that she used her
grandmother’s phone to call the police. The police came to her grandmother’s house
where she provided a statement.
Officer Wanda Wright (“Officer Wright”) spoke to Smith and
Williams when she arrived on scene. She was able to get a description of the suspect
and a description of the vehicle. She put the description of the suspect and the
suspect’s vehicle over the radio to make assisting patrol cars aware so they could
help in locating the suspect and the suspect vehicle.
Officer Joshua Brogan (“Officer Brogan”) was working patrol that
night with his partner. He testified that he was given instructions to tour the area
for a vehicle matching the description involved in the incident. Officer Brogan stated
that the vehicle had been described as a red Chevy sedan, possibly a Chevy Cruz.
Officer Brogan eventually located the vehicle in a parking lot near the corner of
McBride and Broadway Avenue.
Officer Brogan stated that when the officers located the vehicle, they
pulled up behind the vehicle and activated their overhead lights. Officer Brogan
testified that he got out of his vehicle and approached the vehicle from the passenger
side to speak with the driver. When he approached the vehicle, he stated that the
person in the vehicle matched the description of the suspect that had been provided.
Officer Brogan asked the man to shut off his vehicle. The man told Officer Brogan
“no.” Officer Brogan asked again, and the suspect responded with “hell no.” The
suspect then put the car in drive and “took off from the parking spot.” Officer Brogan
testified that he could not estimate how fast he drove off but he did note that there
were other vehicles parked in the parking lot at the time. This interaction was
recorded on Officer Brogan’s bodycam, a copy of which was introduced at trial as
State’s exhibit No. 4.
Officer Brogan testified that he attempted to follow the vehicle. He
ran back to his car, got in, and exited the parking lot. However, by that time, Officer
Brogan testified that they had lost sight of the vehicle.
B. Procedural History
On March 28, 2024, Beard was charged in a 15-count indictment. The
indictment charged Beard with the following offenses:
1. Kidnapping, in violation of R.C. 2905.01(B)(2), a felony of the
first degree, with one- and three-year firearm specifications
• Victim: [Williams]
2. Kidnapping, in violation of R.C. 2905.01(B)(2), a felony of the
first degree, with one- and three-year firearm specifications
• Victim: [Smith]
3. Felonious assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), a felony of
the second degree, with one- three- and five-year firearm
specifications
• Victim: [Williams]
4. Felonious assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), a felony of
the second degree, with one- three- and five-year firearm
specifications
• Victim: [Smith]
5. Discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises, in
violation of R.C. 2923.162(A)(3), a felony of the third degree,
with one- and three-year firearm specifications
6. Aggravated Robbery, in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), a felony
of the first degree, with one- and three-year firearm
specifications
• Victim: [Williams]
7. Aggravated Robbery, in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), a felony
of the first degree, with one- and three-year firearm
specifications
• Victim: [Smith]
8. Robbery, in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(2), a felony of the
second degree, with one- three- and five-year firearm
specifications
• Victim: [Williams]
9. Robbery, in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(2), a felony of the
second degree, with one- three- and five-year firearm
specifications
• Victim: [Smith]
10. Aggravated menacing, in violation of R.C. 2903.21(A), a first-degree misdemeanor
• Victim: [Williams]
11. Aggravated menacing, in violation of R.C. 2903.21(A), a first-degree misdemeanor
• Victim: [Smith]
12. Aggravated menacing, in violation of R.C. 2903.21(A), a first-degree misdemeanor
• Victim: [W.M.]
13. Impersonation of a peace officer or private police officer, in
violation of R.C. 2921.51(D), a first-degree misdemeanor
14. Failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer, in
violation of R.C. 2921.331(B), a felony of the third degree
• and did operate a motor vehicle so as willfully to elude or
flee a police officer after receiving a visible or audible
signal from a police officer o bring his motor vehicle to a
stop and the operation of the motor vehicle by the
offender caused a substantial risk of serious physical
harm to a person or property.
15. Having weapon while under disability, in violation of
R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), a felony of the third degree.
The case was tried by jury. After the State presented its case in chief,
Beard moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A). The State
conceded that the standard from Crim.R. 29 had not been met with respect to
Counts 6, 7, 8, and 9 in the indictment. The State also conceded that it had not met
its burden with respect to the five-year firearm specifications. As a result, the court
dismissed Counts 6, 7, 8, and 9, as well as all the five-year firearm specifications.
The trial court granted Beard’s motion with respect to Counts 12 and 13. Counts 1,
2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 14, and 15 remained.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty to two counts of aggravated
menacing, misdemeanors of the first degree, as originally charged in Counts 10 and
11 of the indictment; failure to comply, a felony of the third degree, as originally
charged in Count 14 of the indictment; and having weapons while under disability,
a felony of the third degree, as originally charged in Count 15 of the indictment. The
jury returned a verdict of not guilty on all remaining counts.
At sentencing, the trial court imposed an aggregate prison sentence
of 21 months. The trial court sentenced Beard to 9 months in prison for the failure-
to-comply offense; 12 months in prison for the having weapons while under
disability offense; and 180 days of local incarceration for aggravated menacing. The
prison sentences were ordered to run consecutively to one another.
II. Law and Analysis
First Assignment of Error – Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his first assigned error for review, Beard alleges that the State
presented insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that while committing
a failure to comply offense, Beard operated his vehicle in a manner that “caused a
substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons or property.” After a thorough
review of the record, we find that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s
finding on this felony-enhancement provision.
A. Standard of Review
“The test for sufficiency requires a determination of whether the
prosecution met its burden of production at trial.” State v. Wilborn,
2024-Ohio-5003, ¶ 37 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Cottingham, ¶ 32 (8th Dist.). In
reviewing a challenge based on sufficiency, we must “‘determine whether the
evidence, if believed, would convince the average person of the defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Webb,
2025-Ohio-456, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.), quoting
State v. Jenks,
61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. “The
relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jenks at paragraph two of the
syllabus. A sufficiency review “is not a factual determination, but a question of law.”
State v. Jackson,
2025-Ohio-109, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Thompkins,
78
Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997).
When reviewing the evidence, we must keep in mind that “[p]roof of
guilt may be supported ‘by circumstantial evidence, real evidence, and direct
evidence, or any combination of all three, and all three have equal probative value.’”
Wilborn at ¶ 38, quoting State v. Radano,
2017-Ohio-1034, ¶ 35 (8th Dist.). And
although each type of evidence has their obvious differences, “those differences are
irrelevant to the probative value of the evidence, and circumstantial evidence carries
the same weight as direct evidence.”
Id., citing State v. Cassano,
2012-Ohio-4047,
¶ 13 (8th Dist.). Our review of the evidence is not to determine “whether the state’s
evidence is to be believed, but whether, if believed, the evidence against a defendant
would support a conviction.” Thompkins at 390.
B. Analysis
Beard was convicted of failure to comply in violation of
R.C. 2921.331(B), which provides that “[n]o person shall operate a motor vehicle so
as willfully to elude or flee a police officer after receiving a visible or audible signal
from a police officer to bring the person's motor vehicle to a stop.” A violation under
division (B) of the statute is generally a felony of the fourth degree.
R.C. 2921.331(C)(3). However, a violation of this division of the statute is a felony
of the third degree if, while committing the offense, “[t]he operation of the motor
vehicle by the offender caused a substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons
or property.” R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(a)(ii).
Beard’s sufficiency argument does not challenge the core elements of
his failure-to-comply conviction. Rather, his challenge is limited to the felony-
enhancement provision of his conviction, alleging that the evidence was insufficient
to demonstrate that he caused a “substantial risk” of serious physical harm to
persons or property while operating his vehicle.
R.C. 2901.01(A)(8) defines “substantial risk” as “a strong possibility,
as contrasted with a remote or significant possibility, that a certain result may occur
or that certain circumstances exist.”
Beard argues that because Officer Brogan testified that he did not
know how fast Beard was going when he exited the parking lot, there was insufficient
evidence to support the jury’s finding on the felony enhancement. We recognize that
the speed that Beard was traveling is a factor that may be considered in support of
the jury’s finding, but it is not the dispositive factor. The determinative factor in
reviewing this enhanced-felony provision “is the risk of harm – not that actual harm
occurred.” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Moore, 2023-Ohio-1904, ¶ 36 (5th
Dist.), citing State v. Bason,
2005-Ohio-6492, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.) (stating “[t]hat no
serious harm occurred to persons or property does not overcome the evidence that
sufficiently established a substantial risk of it”). This court has recognized that when
an offender flees from police and leads them on a chase, it can create a substantial
risk of serious physical harm to persons or property, creating a strong possibility
that the offender could injure himself, the police chasing him, and other pedestrians
or drivers on the road. See State v. Scott,
2013-Ohio-4599, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.).
Here, Officer Brogan testified that when officers located Beard’s
vehicle parked in a parking lot near McBride and Broadway Avenue, they pulled up
behind Beard’s vehicle and activated their overhead lights. Officer Brogan
approached the vehicle from the passenger side while his partner approached the
driver side of the vehicle. Officer Brogan advised Beard to turn the vehicle off
multiple times. Beard refused, “put the car in drive[,] and then took off from the
parking spot.” Officer Brogan noted that there were other vehicles in the area when
Beard took off, including zone cars and civilian vehicles.
Officer Brogan stated that he attempted to follow Beard, ran back to
his zone car, and drove out of the parking lot attempting to locate Beard. Officer
Brogan testified that another zone car possibly gained sight of Beard’s vehicle before
officers lost it again.
Officer Brogan’s body camera was equipped and activated during this
encounter. A copy of the footage from the body camera was introduced at trial as
State’s exhibit No. 4. The body camera confirms Officer Brogan’s testimony. The
footage shows Officer Brogan approaching the passenger side of Beard’s vehicle in a
narrow space between Beard’s vehicle and a parked car immediately next to it.
Officer Brogan asks Beard multiple times to turn off the car. Beard responds saying
“for what” and “aw, nah” before putting the car in drive and quickly exiting the
parking spot. In doing so, the video shows Beard’s vehicle crossing the parking spot
across from it and enter the drive aisle of the parking lot without stopping to ensure
the path was clear to enter. It appears from the footage that Beard’s vehicle exits the
parking lot without making a complete stop at a stop sign.
The footage also shows that upon Beard’s exit, one of the officers
appears to quickly move away from Beard’s vehicle and officers quickly hurried to
their vehicles to pursue Beard. By the time officers were able to exit the parking lot
in pursuit, Beard had left the scene. Officers continued to search for him but were
unable to locate him after Beard’s quick exit from the parking lot.
For these reasons, we find that the evidence presented at trial is
sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Beard’s operation of his vehicle while
attempting to escape from police caused a substantial risk of harm to persons or
property. By fleeing the police in the way he did, a reasonable jury could conclude
that Beard could have injured himself, police, or any other pedestrians or vehicles
in the parking lot or on the road that night.
We find sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding on the felony-
enhancement provision of his failure-to-comply conviction. Accordingly, Beard’s
first assignment of error is overruled.
Second Assignment of Error – Manifest Weight
In his second assigned error for review, Beard claims that the jury’s
findings on the felony-enhancement provision of his failure-to-comply conviction
and his conviction for having weapons while under disability are against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
A. Standard of Review
In contrast to a sufficiency challenge, a challenge with respect to the
weight of the evidence concerns “‘“the inclination of the greater amount of credible
evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other. . . .
Weight is not a question of mathematics, but depends on its effect in inducing
belief.”’” State v. Hughes-Davis, 2025-Ohio-3151, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.), quoting Eastley
v. Volkman,
2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 12, quoting Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387. The
Ohio Supreme Court has stated that when conducting a manifest-weight review, the
reviewing court “must weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider
the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the
evidence, the finder of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest
miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered.”
In re Z.C.,
2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 14, citing
Eastley at ¶ 20.
In conducting this review, the Ohio Supreme Court noted that we
must be mindful of the presumption in favor of the finder of fact, and “‘[i]f the
evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, the reviewing court is bound
to give it that interpretation which is consistent with the verdict and judgment, most
favorable to sustaining the verdict and judgment.’” Parma Hts. v. Brett, 2025-Ohio-
4, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.), quoting Z.C. at ¶ 14. As such, a judgment will be reversed as
against the manifest weight of the evidence “‘“only in the exceptional case in which
the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.”’” Jackson, 2025-Ohio-109, at ¶
25 (8th Dist.), quoting Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin,
20 Ohio App.3d
172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983).
B. Analysis
1. Failure to Comply
With respect to his failure-to-comply conviction, Beard renews his
challenge to the evidence presented in support of the felony-enhancement provision
of this offense. As discussed above, the State presented sufficient evidence to
support its finding. Beard does not offer any new arguments under this assignment
of error, apart from the ones raised above. Beard has failed to show that jury lost
its way in its finding on this provision. Absent such a showing, we will not
substitute our judgment for that of the jury’s.
2. Having Weapons While Under Disability
Beard was convicted of having weapons while under disability in
violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), which provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o person
shall knowingly acquire, have, carry, or use any firearm or dangerous ordnance, if
. . . [t]he person is under indictment for or has been convicted of any felony offense
of violence or has been adjudicated a delinquent child for the commission of an
offense that, if committed by an adult, would have been a felony offense of violence.”
Beard argues that the jury’s determination that he possessed a
firearm that night was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Beard argues
that the only evidence establishing he possessed a firearm was the testimony of
Smith and Williams. Both women testified that they saw Beard with a firearm that
night, both women testified that he chased them while firing the gun, and both
women testified that pointed the gun directly at Williams when they had arrived at
Smith’s grandmother’s house. Beard argues that neither women’s testimony is
credible.
It has been well recognized that “inconsistencies or contradictions in
a witness’s testimony do not entitle a defendant to a reversal of a trial.” State v.
Rentas, 2024-Ohio-732, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Solomon,
2021-Ohio-940,
¶ 62 (8th Dist.). Nor does the presence of conflicting testimony render a verdict
against the manifest weight of the evidence. State v. Pace,
2025-Ohio-2874, ¶ 62
(10th Dist.). As a result, “a jury is free to accept or reject any or all the testimony of
any witness.” State v. Cowen,
2012-Ohio-3682, ¶ 54 (8th Dist.), citing State v.
Smith,
2010-Ohio-4006, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.).
Here, Beard directs us to several details that the women failed to
remember during their testimony, such as whose house they were coming from or
what side of the road they were on when they were dropped off by the bus. He also
claims that the women’s testimony conflicted concerning whether they had
voluntarily entered Beard’s car and whether Smith was locked in Beard’s vehicle.2
Beard also argues that the women’s testimony conflicted with respect to whether
Beard went directly to the liquor store after entering his car. Beard also directs us
to Smith’s testimony that her phone’s battery was dead during the incident but failed
to tell the police that when they interviewed her, as well as her testimony that she
did not actually see Beard fire the gun but only heard the gunshots.
None of these moments of forgetfulness or inconsistencies
demonstrate that the jury lost its way in determining that Beard was in possession
of a firearm that night. As such, we cannot say that this is one of those rare cases in
which the conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Accordingly, Beard’s second assignment of error is overruled.
III. Conclusion
We find that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support
the jury’s finding that Beard created a substantial risk of serious physical harm to
persons or property in support of the felony-enhancement provision of the failure-
to-comply offense. We also find that his convictions were not against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
2 With respect to this testimony, it must be noted that the jury returned a verdict of not
guilty with respect to the kidnapping charges.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s
conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case
remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
_________________________________
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, PRESIDING JUDGE
LISA B. FORBES, J., and
DEENA R. CALABRESE, J., CONCUR
