[Cite as State v. Lenoir,
2025-Ohio-563.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
CLARK COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Appellee : C.A. No. 2024-CA-24
:
v. : Trial Court Case Nos. 22-CR-0811; 22-
: CR-0633
JONATHAN LENOIR :
: (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
Appellant : Court)
:
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OPINION
Rendered on February 21, 2025
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JOHN A. FISCHER, Attorney for Appellant
ROBERT C. LOGSDON, Attorney for Appellee
.............
LEWIS, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Jonathan Lenoir appeals from two judgments of the
Clark County Common Pleas Court convicting him of trafficking in cocaine following his
guilty pleas. For the following reasons, we will affirm the judgments of the trial court.
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I. Facts and Course of Proceedings
{¶ 2} On August 2, 2022, a Clark County grand jury indicted Lenoir in Clark C.P.
No. 22 CR 633 on one count of trafficking in cocaine, a first-degree felony in violation of
R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), one count of possession of cocaine, a first-degree felony in violation
of R.C. 2925.11(A), and one count of having weapons while under disability, a third-
degree felony in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(3). Each count contained a forfeiture
specification. With regard to the trafficking in cocaine count, the grand jury further found
that Lenoir was a major drug offender, had a firearm on or about his person or under his
control while committing the offense, and committed the offense within the vicinity of a
school and/or in the vicinity of a juvenile. These three counts related to events that
allegedly took place on March 23, 2022. Lenoir pleaded not guilty to all the counts.
{¶ 3} On November 1, 2022, Lenoir was indicted by a Clark County grand jury in
Clark C.P. No. 22 CR 811 on one count of trafficking in cocaine, a first-degree felony in
violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), and one count of possession of cocaine, a first-degree
felony in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A). These counts related to events that allegedly took
place on August 16, 2022. Each count contained a forfeiture specification pursuant to
R.C. Chapter 2981. Lenoir pleaded not guilty to both counts.
{¶ 4} Lenoir filed a motion to suppress evidence in both of his cases. In Case No.
22 CR 633, the trial court overruled Lenoir’s motion to suppress. In Case No. 22 CR
811, the trial court granted Lenoir’s motion to suppress two statements that he made to
the police but overruled his request to suppress the cocaine found in his vehicle.
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{¶ 5} On May 16, 2023, while a jury was being selected for the trial in Case No. 22
CR 633, the parties informed the trial court that there was a plea agreement and Lenoir
desired to change his plea. Therefore, the trial court halted the trial and conducted a
plea hearing. The terms of the written plea agreement stated that (1) Lenoir would plead
guilty to count one of the indictment with a major drug offender specification and a one-
year firearm specification; (2) the State would move to dismiss the second and third
counts of the indictment; (3) the parties would recommend a sentence of 11 to 16 ½ years
on count one plus one year on the firearm specification; (4) Lenoir would agree to forfeit
his interest in the items listed in the forfeiture specification of the indictment; and (5) the
sentence would run consecutively to the sentence in Case No. 22 CR 811. The State
provided a factual statement relating to the charges contained in the August 2022
indictment. The trial court held a plea colloquy with Lenoir to determine whether his plea
was being made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The court explained the
constitutional rights that Lenoir was waiving by entering a plea of guilty, which Lenoir
stated he understood. There was no mention of appellate rights by anyone at the plea
hearing. However, the written guilty plea signed by Lenoir stated that he understood “my
rights to appeal a maximum sentence; my other limited appellate rights and that any
appeal must be filed within 30 days of my sentence.” The trial court accepted Lenoir’s
guilty plea and found him guilty of trafficking in cocaine. The court proceeded to
sentence Lenoir. During the sentencing hearing, there was no mention of appellate
rights.
{¶ 6} On May 17, 2023, the trial court filed its judgment entry in Case No. 22 CR
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633. The court sentenced Lenoir to an indefinite prison sentence of 11 to 16½ years for
trafficking in cocaine and to one year in prison for the firearm specification, which was
ordered to run consecutively to the indefinite prison sentence. The court ordered Lenoir
to pay the mandatory minimum $10,000 fine and ordered that the items set forth in the
forfeiture specification be forfeited to the State.
{¶ 7} Also on May 17, 2023, a plea hearing was held in Case No. 22 CR 811. The
parties presented the trial court with a written plea agreement. The plea agreement
stated that (1) Lenoir would plead guilty to count one of the indictment (trafficking); (2) the
State would dismiss count two of the indictment (possession); (3) the State would dismiss
Clark C.P. No. 23 CR 177;1 (4) the parties would recommend a sentence of 3 to 4½ years
that would run consecutively to the sentence in Case No. 22 CR 633; and (5) Lenoir would
agree to forfeit his interest in the items listed in the forfeiture specification of the
indictment. The State provided a factual statement relating to the charges contained in
the November 2022 indictment. The trial court conducted a plea colloquy with Lenoir to
determine whether his plea was being made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The
court explained the constitutional rights that Lenoir was waiving by entering a plea of
guilty, which Lenoir stated he understood. There was no mention of appellate rights by
anyone at the plea hearing. However, the plea agreement signed by Lenoir stated that
he understood “my rights to appeal a maximum sentence; my other limited appellate
rights and that any appeal must be filed within 30 days of my sentence” The trial court
1 Although our record does not contain the indictment or any filings from Case No. 23 CR
177, the trial court noted at the plea hearings that this case would be dismissed as part
of the plea agreements.
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accepted Lenoir’s guilty plea and found him guilty of trafficking in cocaine. During the
subsequent sentencing hearing, there was no mention of any appellate rights.
{¶ 8} On May 19, 2023, the trial court filed a judgment entry in Case No. 22 CR
811. The court sentenced Lenoir to an indefinite prison sentence of 3 to 4½ years and
ran that sentence consecutively to the sentence imposed in Case No. 22 CR 633. The
trial court also ordered $740 in currency forfeited to the State.
{¶ 9} On April 19, 2024, Lenoir filed a motion for leave to file a delayed appeal.
He explained, “Defense counsel told me I could not appeal because of a plea of guilty.
He would not file an appeal for me. When I entered London Correctional I went to the
law library and was instructed that I could appeal although I pled guilty. I immediately
filed this paperwork that I was given in the law library.” We granted Lenoir’s motion on
May 6, 2024. The parties have filed their respective appellate briefs. Lenoir raises two
assignments of error.
II. There Is No Evidence in the Record that Lenoir’s Guilty Pleas Were Less Than
Knowing, Intelligent, and Voluntary
{¶ 10} Lenoir’s first assignment of error states:
Mr. Lenoir’s Guilty Pleas Were Not Knowing, Voluntary, and
Intelligent.
{¶ 11} The first assignment of error concerns whether a trial court must inform a
defendant of the effect a guilty plea will have on his appellate rights prior to accepting his
guilty plea. Lenoir contends that the trial court’s failure to discuss his appellate rights
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along with his “subsequent conduct shows that he did not comprehend his appellate rights
and did not understand that a plea of guilty would foreclose appellate arguments
regarding his motions to suppress.” Appellant’s Brief, p. 4. Lenoir argues that his failure
to pursue an appeal within the time requirements of the appellate rules was evidence that
“he did not understand anything regarding his appellate rights.” Id. at 5. Lenoir points
to his motion to file a delayed appeal, which stated that his attorney had instructed him
that he could not appeal these cases because of his guilty pleas. Id. at 6. Lenoir
continues, “If that point is true (and this Court has only Mr. Lenoir’s statement regarding
this point), then this Court should presume that there was no discussion whatsoever
regarding the prohibition of a guilty plea on challenges to adverse decisions on pretrial
motions.” Id. Finally, Lenoir argues that the fact that he “had filed two motions to
suppress that were both mostly overruled” should have led the State and the trial court to
expect him to tender a no contest plea rather than a guilty plea. Lenoir contends that,
when he instead entered a guilty plea, the trial court and the State should have known
that Lenoir did not understand that his guilty plea waived his right to challenge the motion
to suppress decisions on appeal. Id. at 7.
{¶ 12} The State responds that a trial court is not required “to make a specific
inquiry into the defendant’s understanding of the effect of a guilty plea on the appealability
of adverse pre-trial rulings, where a defendant’s misunderstanding of that effect is not
apparent from the record.” Appellee’s Brief, p. 5, citing State v. Satterwhite, 2009-Ohio-
6593, ¶ 47 (2d Dist.). The State points out that Lenoir never raised this issue with the
trial court, and he stated on the record that he had reviewed and understood the guilty
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plea waiver form, which contained a statement that Lenoir understood his limited
appellate rights. Finally, the State notes that Lenoir failed to file a motion to withdraw his
guilty pleas.
{¶ 13} In order to comport with due process and be constitutionally valid, a guilty
plea must be entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. State v. Miller, 2017-Ohio-
478, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Bateman, 2011-Ohio-5808, ¶ 5 (2d Dist.), citing Boykin
v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238 (1969). To determine whether a particular plea met those
criteria, “ ‘an appellate court examines the totality of the circumstances through a de novo
review of the record to ensure that the trial court complied with constitutional and
procedural safeguards.’ ” State v. Redavide,
2015-Ohio-3056, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.), quoting
State v. Barner,
2012-Ohio-4584, ¶ 7 (4th Dist.). The failure to file a Crim.R. 32.1 motion
to withdraw a plea or otherwise challenge a guilty plea at the trial court level has been
held to constitute a waiver of the issue on appeal. See State v. Johnson, 2020-Ohio-
2826, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.). In such a case, we review for plain error or defects affecting
substantial rights under Crim.R. 52(B).
{¶ 14} “In order for a plea to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, the trial court
must comply with Crim.R. 11(C).” State v. Russell, 2011-Ohio-1738, ¶ 6 (2d Dist.), citing
State v. Greene,
2006-Ohio-480, ¶ 8 (2d Dist.). “Crim.R. 11(C) governs the process that
a trial court must use before accepting a felony plea of guilty or no contest.” State v.
Veney,
2008-Ohio-5200, ¶ 8. “By following this rule, a court ensures that the plea is
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” State v. Cole,
2015-Ohio-3793, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.), citing
Redavide at ¶ 12.
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{¶ 15} Crim.R. 11(C)(2) requires the trial court to address the defendant personally
and (a) determine that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with an understanding
of the nature of the charges and the maximum penalty, and, if applicable, that the
defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions;
(b) inform the defendant of and determine that the defendant understands the effect of
the plea and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and
sentencing; and (c) inform the defendant and determine that he or she understands that,
by entering the plea, the defendant is waiving the rights to a jury trial, to confront
witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses, and
to require the State to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which he or she
cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself. State v. Brown, 2007-Ohio-
6675, ¶ 3 (2d Dist.), citing Crim.R. 11(C)(2).
{¶ 16} A no contest plea does not preclude a defendant from raising on appeal the
trial court’s ruling on a pretrial motion, including a pretrial motion to suppress evidence.
Crim.R. 12(I). However, a guilty plea “ ‘operates as waiver of claimed errors of the trial
court in overruling pretrial motions.’ ” State v. Graves, 2005-Ohio-5579, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.),
quoting State v. Mastice,
1987 WL 12631, *1 (2d Dist. June 8, 1987). “Crim.R.
11(C)(2)(b) requires the trial court to inform the defendant of the effect of his plea, but the
defendant, as part of this discussion, does not have to be informed that by pleading guilty
he is waiving his right to appeal any pretrial rulings.” State v. Jones,
2018-Ohio-2219,
¶ 13 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Portis,
2014-Ohio-3641, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.), and Satterwhite,
2009-Ohio-6593 (2d Dist.). “The rationale for this conclusion is that ‘[t]he information
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that a guilty plea is a complete admission of guilt, along with the other information required
by Crim.R. 11, assures that defendants enter pleas with knowledge of the rights they
would forego and creates a record by which appellate courts can determine whether pleas
are entered voluntarily.’ ” Id., quoting State v. Griggs,
2004-Ohio-4415, ¶ 11.
“However, if the trial court says anything that could create confusion concerning the
defendant's appellate rights or if the defendant indicates such confusion, this, could, of
course, undermine the Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b) effect of plea discussion and render the plea
less than voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.” Id. at ¶ 14, citing
Portis at ¶ 12.
{¶ 17} During the plea hearing, the trial court explained the effect of Lenoir’s guilty
plea and what constitutional rights Lenoir was waiving by entering a guilty plea. The trial
court fully complied with Crim.R. 11(C). While the trial court did not discuss with Lenoir
his limited appellate rights, neither Lenoir nor his counsel made any statements to the
trial court alerting it that Lenoir was confused about his limited appellate rights. The
written plea form signed by Lenoir stated that he understood his limited appellate rights.
As noted above, a trial court is not required to discuss a defendant’s limited appellate
rights before accepting a guilty plea absent some statement or evidence in the record that
the defendant was confused about his limited appellate rights.2 Such evidence is absent
from the record before us. Notably, Lenoir did not alert the trial court to any confusion
by filing a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. On this record, we cannot conclude that
2 Although a trial court is not required to inform a criminal defendant that a guilty plea will
forfeit his ability to assign as error any claimed errors in pretrial rulings, we reiterate that
“it is good practice, in accepting a guilty plea, to ascertain that the defendant understands
this key distinction between guilty and no-contest pleas.” Satterwhite, 2009-Ohio-6593,
at ¶ 47 (2d Dist.).
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Lenoir’s guilty plea was less than knowing, voluntary, and intelligent solely because the
trial court did not orally inform him of his appellate rights prior to accepting the plea.
{¶ 18} The first assignment of error is overruled.
III. There Is No Evidence in the Record that Lenoir Received Ineffective Assistance
of Trial Counsel Relating to His Guilty Pleas
{¶ 19} Lenoir’s second assignment of error states:
Mr. Lenoir Was Denied the Effective Assistance of Counsel Due to
Counsel’s Failure to Advise Mr. Lenoir to Enter a No Contest Plea Rather
than a Guilty Plea.
{¶ 20} Lenoir contends that the fact that he “is attempting to pursue his appeal
shows that he would have rejected the plea offer if he had known that he could not appeal
the rulings on the motions to suppress.” Appellant’s Brief, p. 10. According to Lenoir,
“It is simply unfathomable that [he] would have given up his chance to appeal the trial
court’s decisions on the motions to suppress.” Id. at 11.
{¶ 21} The State responds that “[t]here is no evidence in the record that the State
would have agreed to a no-contest plea on the same terms as the guilty pleas in this case.
In fact, the State would not have done so.” Appellee’s Brief, p. 10. Further, the State
explains that there was a huge incentive for Lenoir to plead guilty rather than no contest
because he faced a maximum prison sentence of 29 to 34½ years if he had pled no
contest to all charges, which was reduced to a total prison term of 15 to 20½ years when
he entered guilty pleas pursuant to the plea agreements.
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{¶ 22} To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Lenoir must demonstrate
both that trial counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and
that the errors were serious enough to create a reasonable probability that, but for the
errors, the outcome of his trial would have been different. See Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984); State v. Bradley,
42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989). Trial counsel
is entitled to a strong presumption that his or her conduct fell within the wide range of
reasonable assistance.
Strickland at 689. “Hindsight is not permitted to distort the
assessment of what was reasonable in light of counsel's perspective at the time, and a
debatable decision concerning trial strategy cannot form the basis of a finding of
ineffective assistance of counsel.” State v. Frazier,
2016-Ohio-727, ¶ 45 (2d Dist.), citing
State v. Cook,
65 Ohio St.3d 516, 524-525 (1992), and State v. Rucker,
2012-Ohio-4860,
¶ 58 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 23} “A guilty plea waives the right to allege ineffective assistance of counsel,
except to the extent that the errors caused the plea to be less than knowing and
voluntary.” State v. Webb, 2015-Ohio-553, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Spates,
64
Ohio St.3d 269 (1992). “When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court
that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise
independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior
to the entry of the guilty plea.” Tollett v. Henderson,
411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). “He may
only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the
advice he received from counsel was not” within “ ‘the range of competence demanded
of attorneys in criminal cases.’ ”
Id. at 266-267, quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397
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U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
{¶ 24} In order to be successful on his claim that his counsel was ineffective for
allowing him to plead guilty rather than no contest, Lenoir must establish that “(1) the
State would have agreed to a no-contest plea on the same terms; (2) counsel failed to
advise the defendant that a no-contest plea, in contradistinction to a guilty plea, would
preserve the pretrial issue for appeal; and (3) had defendant been so advised, the
defendant would have rejected the plea offer.” Frazier at ¶ 82, citing State v. McGlown,
2013-Ohio-2762, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.). Lenoir did not establish any of these three
requirements, let alone all three.
{¶ 25} First, there is no evidence in the record that the State would have agreed to
a no-contest plea on the same terms as those ultimately agreed to in exchange for
Lenoir’s guilty pleas. As the State points out, Lenoir received a much shorter prison
sentence pursuant to the plea agreement than what he would have faced if he had pled
no contest to all of the charges and been sentenced on the additional charges that were
dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. Second, there is no evidence in the record
that Lenoir’s trial counsel failed to advise him of the distinction between a no contest and
a guilty plea, especially in terms of the effect of each type of plea on Lenoir’s appellate
rights. While Lenoir included a short, handwritten statement in his motion for leave to
file a delayed appeal stating that his attorney told him he could not file an appeal, that
statement is not part of the trial court’s record for purposes of reviewing this assignment
of error. Third, there is no evidence in the record that Lenoir would have rejected the
State’s plea offer if he had been informed of the difference between a no contest plea and
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a guilty plea in terms of its effect on his ability to appeal from the trial court’s rulings on
his motions to suppress. While Lenoir’s appellate brief includes statements and
inferences relating to the three requirements stated in Frazier, there is no evidence in the
record supporting his position on those requirements. “[T]he appropriate remedy for
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel is through a petition for post-conviction
relief when the allegations require the consideration of facts not appearing in the record.”
State v. Hoskins, 1998 WL 32565, *2 (2d Dist. Jan. 30, 1998), citing State v. Booker,
63
Ohio App.3d 459 (2d Dist. 1989). Further, we do not agree that the fact that Lenoir failed
to file a timely appeal from the trial court’s judgments necessarily supports the argument
that Lenoir’s counsel must not have informed him of the effect of pleading guilty versus
no contest. For example, if Lenoir’s counsel had fully informed him that a guilty plea
waived his right to appeal pretrial rulings, then there would have been no reason to file
an appeal from the trial court’s judgments relating to those pretrial rulings. In such a
context, the attorney would have been correct when he purportedly told Lenoir that he
could not appeal from his convictions.
{¶ 26} On the record before us, we cannot conclude Lenoir received ineffective
assistance of trial counsel that rendered his guilty pleas less than knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary. The second assignment of error is overruled.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 27} Having overruled both of Lenoir’s assignments of error, we will affirm the
judgments of the trial court.
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EPLEY, P.J. and HUFFMAN, J., concur.
