[Cite as In re C.E.,
2025-Ohio-5641.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
SCIOTO COUNTY
IN RE: C.E. JR. :
E.E.
L.E. : Case No. 25CA4134
P.E.
: DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Adjudicated Neglected/
Dependent Children.
_______________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Alana Van Gundy, Bellbrook, Ohio, for appellant.1
Shane A. Tieman, Scioto County Prosecuting Attorney, and S.
Andrew Sturgill, Scioto County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney,
Portsmouth, Ohio, for appellee.
________________________________________________________________
CIVIL CASE FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT, JUVENILE DIVISION
DATE JOURNALIZED:12-10-25
Abele, J.
{¶1} This is an appeal from a Scioto County Common Pleas
Court, Juvenile Division, judgment that granted Scioto County
Children Services, appellee herein, permanent custody of C.E.,
Jr., E.E., L.E., and P.E.
{¶2} Appellant, the children’s biological mother, raises
the following assignments of error for review:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
AGENCY MADE REASONABLE EFFORTS TO PREVENT
1
Different counsel represented appellant during the trial court
proceedings.
SCIOTO, 25CA4134 2
THE REMOVAL OF THE CHILDREN AND TO REUNIFY
THE FAMILY, DESPITE SUBSTANTIAL AND
UNJUSTIFIED DELAYS AND OMISSIONS IN SERVICE
PROVISION, AND WHERE THE AGENCY CASEWORKER
RELIED ON A SUBJECTIVE JUDGMENT THAT THE
MOTHER WAS MERELY CHECKING BOXES RATHER THAN
DEMONSTRATING BEHAVIORAL CHANGE.”
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
“THE JUVENILE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
PERMANENT CUSTODY WAS IN THE BEST INTEREST
OF THE CHILDREN, WHEN THAT FINDING WAS NOT
SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND WAS
AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE.”
{¶3} Appellee has been involved with the family since
January 2021, when the oldest child, C.E., Jr., was close to two
years of age, and the three younger children had yet to be born.
At the time, appellee’s primary concerns involved the home
environment. An agency caseworker reported that the home was
not sanitary and that C.E., Jr. had bite marks or rashes on his
extremities and face.
{¶4} Appellee subsequently filed a complaint that alleged
that C.E., Jr. was a “neglected/dependent child.” The complaint
requested the trial court to place the child in appellee’s
temporary custody. Appellee also asked the court for an
emergency ex parte order placing the child in its temporary
custody, which the trial court granted.
{¶5} The trial court later adjudicated C.E., Jr. a
“neglected/dependent” child.
{¶6} Shortly thereafter, on March 2, 2021, appellant gave
SCIOTO, 25CA4134 3
birth to E.E. Two days later, appellee filed a complaint that
alleged E.E. was a “neglected/dependent child.” Appellee
alleged that, when appellant was admitted to the hospital to
give birth, she tested positive for marijuana. Appellee further
stated that the living conditions of appellant’s home had
remained unchanged since C.E., Jr.’s removal. Appellee asked
the court to place E.E. in its temporary custody. The court
subsequently placed E.E. in appellee’s temporary custody pending
adjudication and disposition.
{¶7} Approximately two months later, the trial court
adjudicated E.E. a “neglected/dependent child.”
{¶8} On May 25, 2021, the court entered a dispositional
order that placed C.E., Jr. and E.E. in appellee’s temporary
custody. The court found that appellee had “made all reasonable
efforts to prevent” the children’s continued removal from the
home.
{¶9} In January 2022, the court held an annual review
hearing. The court found that appellee had used reasonable
efforts to implement the plan to return the children to the
parents’ custody and continued the children in appellee’s
temporary custody for six months.
{¶10} In March 2022, appellant gave birth to twins, L.E. and
P.E. The twins remained in the parents’ home while the two
older children’s cases progressed.
SCIOTO, 25CA4134 4
{¶11} By June 2022, the two older children had been visiting
the parents without any reported problems. The goal at that
point was to begin unsupervised visits at the family’s home, and
if those visits went well, appellee planned to allow the
children to be placed on an extended home visit.
{¶12} At the end of December 2022, appellee placed C.E., Jr.
and E.E. with the parents for a trial visit.
{¶13} On January 30, 2023, after an annual review hearing,
the court continued the children in appellee’s temporary
custody. The court stated that the children had been placed
with the parents for a trial home placement and indicated that
additional time was “needed to ensure placement is appropriate.”
The court further stated that “[b]arring a change of
circumstances, it is not [appellee]’s intention to file a Motion
for Permanent Custody.” The court found that appellee had used
reasonable efforts to return the children to the parents’
custody.
{¶14} The next day appellee filed complaints that alleged
that the twins were neglected and dependent children. The
complaint alleged that, on January 31, 2023, appellee learned
that the twins’ older sibling, E.E., tested positive for
marijuana and required emergency medical treatment. Appellee
requested the trial court to place the twins in its temporary
custody. The court subsequently entered an ex parte emergency
SCIOTO, 25CA4134 5
order that placed the children in appellee’s temporary custody.
{¶15} In April 2023, the GAL filed a report and
recommendation in which he noted that, after the parents
apparently had satisfied the case plan requirements set forth in
C.E., Jr.’s and E.E.’s cases, appellee had placed the two
children in the home for a trial visit. The GAL pointed out,
however, that the trial visit “failed miserably.” He
recommended that the court place the children in appellee’s
temporary custody.
{¶16} After E.E.’s medical emergency, appellee developed a
new case plan. This case plan stated that the parents needed to
demonstrate the ability to properly supervise the children and
to understand the necessity of keeping drugs and alcohol out of
the house. The case plan required the parents to complete
parenting classes, a drug and alcohol assessment and any
recommended treatment, a mental health assessment, and
individual counseling.
{¶17} On May 12, 2023, the court adjudicated the twins
dependent. Shortly thereafter, the court entered a
dispositional order that placed the twins in appellee’s
temporary custody.
{¶18} On December 20, 2023, appellee filed a motion to
modify the disposition to permanent custody. Appellee asserted
that the two older children had been in its temporary custody
SCIOTO, 25CA4134 6
for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period. The
agency further alleged that the four children could not be
placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not
be placed with either parent.
{¶19} A few months later, the agency filed an amended motion
to modify the disposition to permanent custody. The agency
alleged that the twins now had been in its temporary custody for
12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period. The agency
further alleged that the children cannot be placed with either
parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with
either parent.
{¶20} On July 15, 2024, the court held a hearing to consider
appellee’s permanent custody motion. Dr. Matthew Suer testified
that, on January 31, 2023, E.E. presented to the emergency
department at Nationwide Children’s Hospital with “severe
neurologic depression” and required intubation. Dr. Suer
explained that the child “was so sedated there were concerns
that he could not protect his airway.” The medical team
determined that the child had ingested and overdosed on
marijuana.
{¶21} The family’s caseworker, Jennifer Conley, testified
that she had worked with the family since March 2023. C.E., Jr.
was removed because the home environment was infested with
roaches and otherwise was unsanitary, and E.E. was removed at
SCIOTO, 25CA4134 7
birth due to the same concerns. Additionally, appellant had
tested positive for THC upon E.E.’s birth, and E.E.’s cord blood
tested positive for THC.
{¶22} In March 2022, when the twins were born, appellee did
not remove them from the parents. Instead, the twins remained
at the parents’ home, and appellee continued its efforts to
reunify C.E., Jr. and E.E. with the parents.
{¶23} In line with those efforts, at the end of December
2022, appellee placed C.E., Jr. and E.E. in the parents’ home
for a trial visit. About one month later, E.E. overdosed on
marijuana. As a result, appellee terminated the trial visit and
removed the twins from the parents’ custody. The children have
remained in appellee’s temporary custody since that time.
{¶24} Given E.E.’s overdose, appellee determined that the
parents would need to essentially start from the beginning and
“redo much of the things that they had to do in their previous
case plan,” such as mental health and drug and alcohol
assessments. Both parents initially completed assessments, and
appellant remained drug free for a large part of the case.
Appellant did not, however, immediately engage in mental health
treatment.
{¶25} In August 2023, Conley met with the parents to discuss
the case plan and appellee’s concerns. Appellant “was very
upset with the way that her case had been handled up to that
SCIOTO, 25CA4134 8
point. She was very confrontational, [and] somewhat aggressive
towards [Conley].” After the August 2023 meeting, however,
appellant “became more receptive to listening to” appellee’s
concerns. Conley explained that, during this August 2023
meeting, she had advised appellant that she needed to seek
treatment for her mental health issues.
{¶26} Conley did not believe that either appellant or the
children’s father had taken responsibility for their actions or
recognized that their improper supervision caused E.E.’s
overdose. Conley expressed concerns that the parents “were
completing the services on the case plan in an effort to check
off the box, rather than to utilize the service to try to change
the behaviors that we had encountered that prompted [appellee]
to remove the children from their care.” As an example, she
stated that, when appellee developed a case plan, appellee
expected the parents to complete a mental health assessment and
then follow any recommended treatment. The parents completed
assessments, but they did not follow through with treatment
recommendations. Appellant later reported to Conley that she
started taking mental health medications, but appellant
indicated that she started taking the medication “to make
[Conley] happy.”
{¶27} Conley also indicated that the parents did not
consistently maintain a clean home. She stated that the
SCIOTO, 25CA4134 9
caseworkers would visit the home on one occasion, and it would
be clean; but on subsequent visits, the home would not be clean.
Conley suggested that appellee was looking for a sustained
behavioral change rather than returning to the home and
observing the same concerns: “animal feces on the floor . . .,
trash all over the place . . ., [and] clothes all over the
place. . . .”
{¶28} Conley stated that she talked to the parents about
obtaining a lockbox for their THC products and attempted to
obtain funds to help them with the purchase of a lockbox. She
was unable to obtain approval for the purchase, however.
{¶29} Conley explained that she also had reviewed the
family’s case file. In doing so, she noticed that, in June
2019, the parents previously had another child, A.E., placed in
appellee’s permanent custody.
{¶30} In November 2023, caseworkers visited the parents at
their home. During the visit, appellant and the father tested
positive for THC. Up until that time, appellant had been drug
free. After the visit, appellee decided to seek permanent
custody of the children.
{¶31} Conley explained that appellee decided to seek
permanent custody of the children for some of the following
reasons: (1) both C.E., Jr. and E.E. had been in appellee’s
temporary custody for more than two years; (2) the parents only
SCIOTO, 25CA4134 10
recently started to display efforts to indicate “some kind of
sustained change that would make it so that their children would
remain safe when they are in their care”; and (3) appellee had
concerns about the “previous substantiated neglect and physical
abuse incidents” and whether these issues would recur without
appellee’s involvement.
{¶32} Conley stated that, before seeking permanent custody,
appellee had been attempting to reunify the two older children
with the parents and had placed them on a trial home visit for
that purpose. She explained that if E.E. had not overdosed on
marijuana, then appellee would have continued its attempt to
reunify the family. Instead, because E.E.’s overdose was
serious, appellee removed the twins from the home. The incident
caused appellee to become “very, very cautious about risking the
children’s safety further.” Appellee additionally had concerns
that the parents did not have any logical explanation for the
incident.
{¶33} The four children currently are placed in the same
foster home and are bonded to one another. The children are
“doing very well” and “thriving” in the foster home. The foster
family is interested in adopting the children.
{¶34} The children’s guardian ad litem (GAL) testified that
he did not believe that appellee had used reasonable efforts
earlier in the case to reunify the two older children with the
SCIOTO, 25CA4134 11
parents. The GAL did not think that returning the children to
the parents at the time of the permanent custody hearing would
be in their best interest, but he also did not believe that the
court should place the children in appellee’s permanent custody.
The GAL instead opined that appellee should work on reunifying
the family. In the meantime, he indicated that the children
should remain with the foster family.
{¶35} On April 23, 2025, the trial court granted appellee
permanent custody of the children. The court found that the
children had been in appellee’s temporary custody for 12 or more
months of a consecutive 22-month period. The court also
determined that the children cannot be placed with either parent
within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either
parent.
{¶36} The trial court noted that appellee attempted to
reunify the parents and the two older children, but appellee
terminated reunification efforts after E.E. overdosed on
marijuana during the trial home visit. The court also noted
that the parents had their parental rights terminated with
respect to the children’s older sibling. The court recognized
that the parents had made “some improvements and case plan
progress.” The court, however, shared the caseworker’s concern
that “the parents have demonstrated only a desire to complete
services, not long-term behavior changes.” The court concluded
SCIOTO, 25CA4134 12
that “the parents have failed to provide clear and convincing
evidence to prove that, notwithstanding the prior termination”
of their parental rights with respect to the children’s sibling,
they “can provide a legally secure permanent placement and
adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the
child[ren], pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(11).”
{¶37} The trial court next considered the children’s best
interest. The court stated that the parents’ relationship with
the children had “been partly maintained” through visitations.
The court further observed that the two older children had been
in appellee’s temporary custody for over three years and
remained in the same foster home for the majority of that time.
The twins have been in appellee’s temporary custody for more
than one year and have been placed in the same foster home with
their older siblings. The foster provider has been a
“consistent caretaker” for the children, and the children appear
“well-bonded with their foster parents and siblings outside of
their parents’ home.” The court additionally found that
maintaining the bond between the children is in their best
interest.
{¶38} The trial court noted that the GAL’s report had not
expressed the children’s wishes. The court further observed
that the children were under the age of five “and may be too
young to express their wishes.” The court nonetheless stated
SCIOTO, 25CA4134 13
that it had “considered the testimony in evaluating the
child[ren]’s wishes.”
{¶39} The trial court considered the children’s custodial
history and found that all four children had been in appellee’s
temporary custody for 12 or more months of 22-month period. The
court pointed out that C.E., Jr. has been in appellee’s
temporary custody since he was two years of age, and E.E. has
been in appellee’s temporary custody “his entire life.”
{¶40} The trial court also concluded that the children need
a legally secure permanent placement and that they cannot
achieve this type of placement without granting appellee
permanent custody. The court found that even though the
children have been in the agency’s temporary custody for a
significant period of time, the parents “have not prioritized
changing their own behavior and cannot demonstrate their ability
to care for all the children without [appellee’s] involvement.”
{¶41} The trial court noted that the foster provider “has
shown a willingness to adopt the children” and pointed out that
the children have experienced “the most stability together”
while in the foster home. The court acknowledged the GAL’s
recommendation but determined that the children could not be
returned to their parents. The court thus determined that
placing the children in appellee’s permanent custody would serve
their best interest.
SCIOTO, 25CA4134 14
{¶42} The trial court also concluded that R.C.
2151.414(D)(2) applied to the two older children. The court
stated that in accordance with that provision, it “must find
that permanent custody” is in their best interest. The court
therefore granted appellee permanent custody of the children.
This appeal followed.
I
{¶43} In her first assignment of error, appellant asserts
that the trial court erred by finding that appellee used
reasonable efforts to prevent the children’s removal and to
reunify the family. She contends that appellee did not
“initiate visitation between the child[ren] and the parents for
more than a year.” She states that appellee filed C.E., Jr.’s
complaint in January 2021, and E.E.’s complaint in March 2021,
yet as of April 27, 2022, visits still had not occurred.
Appellant argues that failing to permit visitation deprived her
“of critical opportunities to bond with the children, comply
with visitation objectives, and demonstrate parenting capacity.”
{¶44} Appellant additionally contends that the caseworker
“dismissed [her] progress as simply ‘checking the boxes’” and
did not believe that appellant had made “meaningful behavioral
changes.” Appellant argues that she “completed her case plan
multiple times and some components of the case plan—four times.”
She states that she (1) “had housing at multiple times,” (2)
SCIOTO, 25CA4134 15
“completed four assessments,” (3) “began taking her medicine,”
(4) “completed parenting classes,” (5) held a steady job, and
(6) “regularly attended visitation.” Appellant asserts that
appellee’s “failures to set up visitation in a timely manner
combined with a subjective, unsupported conclusion that
[appellant]’s efforts lacked sincerity do not satisfy the legal
requirement of reasonable efforts.”
{¶45} Appellant also faults appellee for failing “to provide
the parents with a drug lockbox.”
{¶46} When a trial court “removes a child from the child’s
home or continues the removal of a child from the child’s home,”
R.C. 2151.419(A)(1) requires a trial court to determine whether
a children services agency “made reasonable efforts to prevent
the removal of the child from the child’s home, to eliminate the
continued removal of the child from the child's home, or to make
it possible for the child to return safely home.” “In
determining whether reasonable efforts were made, the child’s
health and safety shall be paramount.” R.C. 2151.419(A)(1).
The agency bears the burden to prove that it has made reasonable
efforts. R.C. 2151.419(A)(1).
{¶47} However, R.C. 2151.419(A)(1) applies only at
“adjudicatory, emergency, detention, and temporary-disposition
hearings, and dispositional hearings for abused, neglected, or
dependent children . . . .” In re C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104, ¶ 41;
SCIOTO, 25CA4134 16
accord In re C.B.C.,
2016-Ohio-916, ¶ 72 (4th Dist.). Thus,
“‘[b]y its plain terms, the statute does not apply to motions
for permanent custody brought pursuant to R.C. 2151.413, or to
hearings held on such motions pursuant to R.C. 2151.414.’” C.F.
at ¶ 41, quoting In re A.C.,
2004-Ohio-5531, ¶ 30 (12th Dist.).
Nonetheless, “[t]his does not mean that the agency is relieved
of the duty to make reasonable efforts” before seeking permanent
custody. Id. at ¶ 42. Instead, at prior “stages of the child-
custody proceeding, the agency may be required under other
statutes to prove that it has made reasonable efforts toward
family reunification.” Id. Additionally, “[if] the agency has
not established that reasonable efforts have been made prior to
the hearing on a motion for permanent custody, then it must
demonstrate such efforts at that time.” Id. at ¶ 43.
{¶48} In the case sub judice, appellant’s appeal does not
originate from one of the types of hearings specifically listed
in R.C. 2151.419(A): “adjudicatory, emergency, detention, and
temporary-disposition hearings, and dispositional hearings for
abused, neglected, or dependent children.” Appellee, therefore,
did not have the burden to prove at the permanent custody
hearing that it used reasonable efforts to reunify the family,
unless it had not previously done so. Here, our review of the
record reflects that the trial court made multiple reasonable
efforts findings before the agency filed its permanent custody
SCIOTO, 25CA4134 17
motion. Thus, the court did not need to again find that the
agency used reasonable efforts before it could grant the agency
permanent custody of the children. E.g., In re M.H.–L.T., 2017-
Ohio-7825, ¶ 64 (4th Dist.); In re S.S., 2017-Ohio-2938, ¶ 168
(4th Dist.).
{¶49} Moreover, to the extent that appellant disagrees with
any of the trial court’s reasonable efforts findings made after
adjudication or disposition, we point out that she could have
appealed those findings when the trial court entered final
orders. Her failure to timely appeal the findings contained in
those orders means that they now are res judicata. See In re
Bil.I., 2023-Ohio-434, ¶ 30 (10th Dist.) (failing to timely
appeal reasonable efforts findings prevented parents from later
challenging those findings on appeal from permanent custody
judgment); In re B.F.,
2021-Ohio-4251, ¶ 21 (3d Dist.) (“because
[the parents] could have raised their challenges to the trial
court’s first four reasonable-efforts findings on appeal from
[the child]’s adjudication and initial disposition, res judicata
now precludes [the parents] from making these arguments”); see
also In re L.S.,
2020-Ohio-5516, ¶ 31 (4th Dist.) (res judicata
barred parents from challenging reasonable-efforts findings in
the trial court’s shelter-care order because “the parents could
have raised the issue in a direct appeal from the court’s
dispositional order”).
SCIOTO, 25CA4134 18
{¶50} We also observe that the evidence shows that appellant
had her parental rights involuntarily terminated with respect to
a sibling of the children. Thus, R.C. 2151.419(A)(2)(e)
relieved appellee of the duty to use reasonable efforts “to
prevent the removal of the child[ren] from [their] home,
eliminate the continued removal of the child[ren] from [their]
home, and return the child[ren] to [their] home.” See In re
C.J., 2017-Ohio-5782, ¶ 49 (4th Dist.).
{¶51} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we
overrule appellant’s first assignment of error.
II
{¶52} In her second assignment of error, appellant asserts
that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to support
the trial court’s finding that permanent custody is in the
children’s best interest and that its finding is against the
manifest weight of the evidence. She does not contest the
court’s finding that the children had been in the agency’s
temporary custody for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-
month period. Instead, appellant challenges the trial court’s
best interest finding. She argues that she completed her case
plan, had adequate housing, was employed, was receiving mental
health treatment, and “was willing to continue her medication.”
Appellant asserts that appellee failed to establish that she
“could not parent her [c]hildren” and “did not produce evidence
SCIOTO, 25CA4134 19
that [her] children continued to be at risk.”
A
{¶53} Generally, a reviewing court will not disturb a trial
court’s permanent custody judgment unless the judgment is
against the manifest weight of the evidence. E.g., In re B.E.,
2014-Ohio-3178, ¶ 27 (4th Dist.); In re R.S.,
2013-Ohio-5569, ¶
29 (4th Dist.); accord In re Z.C.,
2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 1.
“Weight of the evidence concerns ‘the inclination of the
greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial,
to support one side of the issue rather than the other.
It indicates clearly to the jury that the party having
the burden of proof will be entitled to their verdict,
if, on weighing the evidence in their minds, they shall
find the greater amount of credible evidence sustains
the issue which is to be established before them. Weight
is not a question of mathematics, but depends on its
effect in inducing belief.’”
Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 12, quoting State v.
Thompkins,
78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997), quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary 1594 (6th Ed.1990).
{¶54} When an appellate court reviews whether a trial
court’s permanent custody decision is against the manifest
weight of the evidence, the court “‘“weighs the evidence and all
reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses
and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence,
the [fact-finder] clearly lost its way and created such a
manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be
reversed and a new trial ordered.”’” Eastley, 2012-Ohio-2179,
SCIOTO, 25CA4134 20
at ¶ 20, quoting Tewarson v. Simon,
141 Ohio App.3d 103, 115
(9th Dist. 2001), quoting Thompkins,
78 Ohio St.3d at 387,
quoting State v. Martin,
20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.
1983); accord In re Pittman,
2002-Ohio-2208, ¶ 23-24 (9th
Dist.). We further observe, however, that issues that relate to
the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given the
evidence are primarily for the trier of fact. As the court
explained in Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland,
10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80
(1984):
The underlying rationale of giving deference to the
findings of the trial court rests with the knowledge
that the trial judge is best able to view the witnesses
and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice
inflections, and use these observations in weighing the
credibility of the proffered testimony.
Moreover, deferring to the trial court on matters of credibility
is “crucial in a child custody case, where there may be much
evident in the parties’ demeanor and attitude that does not
translate to the record well.” Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio
St.3d 415, 419 (1997); accord In re Christian,
2004-Ohio-3146, ¶
7 (4th Dist.).
{¶55} The question that an appellate court must resolve when
reviewing a permanent custody decision under the manifest weight
of the evidence standard is “whether the juvenile court’s
findings ... were supported by clear and convincing evidence.”
In re K.H., 2008-Ohio-4825, ¶ 43. “Clear and convincing
SCIOTO, 25CA4134 21
evidence” is
the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the
mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as
to the allegations sought to be established. It is
intermediate, being more than a mere preponderance, but
not to the extent of such certainty as required beyond
a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases. It does not
mean clear and unequivocal.
In re Estate of Haynes, 25 Ohio St.3d 101, 103-04 (1986). In
determining whether a trial court based its decision upon clear
and convincing evidence, “a reviewing court will examine the
record to determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient
evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of proof.”
State v. Schiebel,
55 Ohio St.3d 71, 74 (1990); accord In re
Holcomb,
18 Ohio St.3d 361, 368 (1985), citing Cross v. Ledford,
161 Ohio St. 469 (1954) (“Once the clear and convincing standard
has been met to the satisfaction of the [trial] court, the
reviewing court must examine the record and determine if the
trier of fact had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy this
burden of proof.”); In re Adoption of Lay,
25 Ohio St.3d 41, 42-
43 (1986); compare In re Adoption of Masa,
23 Ohio St.3d 163,
165 (1986) (whether a fact has been “proven by clear and
convincing evidence in a particular case is a determination for
the [trial] court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless
such determination is against the manifest weight of the
evidence”).
{¶56} Thus, if a children services agency presented
SCIOTO, 25CA4134 22
competent and credible evidence upon which the trier of fact
reasonably could have formed a firm belief that permanent
custody is warranted, the court’s decision is not against the
manifest weight of the evidence. In re R.M., 2013-Ohio-3588, ¶
62 (4th Dist.); see also In re R.L.,
2012-Ohio-6049, ¶ 17 (2d
Dist.), quoting In re A.U.,
2008-Ohio-187, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.) (“A
reviewing court will not overturn a court's grant of permanent
custody to the state as being contrary to the manifest weight of
the evidence ‘if the record contains competent, credible
evidence by which the court could have formed a firm belief or
conviction that the essential statutory elements . . . have been
established.’”).
{¶57} Once a reviewing court finishes its examination, the
judgment may be reversed only if it appears that the fact-
finder, when resolving the conflicts in evidence, “‘clearly lost
its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that
the [judgment] must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’”
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting Martin,
20 Ohio App.3d
at 175. A reviewing court should find a trial court’s permanent
custody judgment against the manifest weight of the evidence
only in the “‘exceptional case in which the evidence weighs
heavily against the [decision].’”
Id., quoting Martin,
20 Ohio
App.3d at 175; see Black’s (12th ed. 2024) (the phrase “manifest
weight of the evidence” “denotes a deferential standard of
SCIOTO, 25CA4134 23
review under which a verdict will be reversed or disregarded
only if another outcome is obviously correct and the verdict is
clearly unsupported by the evidence”).
{¶58} A reviewing court also may reverse a trial court’s
permanent custody judgment if the record does not contain
sufficient evidence to support it. See Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, at
¶ 1. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, our
inquiry focuses primarily upon the adequacy of the evidence;
that is, whether “the evidence is legally sufficient to support
the [judgment] as a matter of law.” See Thompkins,
78 Ohio
St.3d at 386. Additionally, as we have stated in previous
cases, a finding that a judgment is supported by the manifest
weight of the evidence is “also dispositive of the issue of
sufficiency.” State v. Waller,
2018-Ohio-2014, ¶ 30 (4th
Dist.); e.g., State v. McKinney,
2024-Ohio-4642, ¶ 63 (4th
Dist.) (“a determination that the weight of the evidence
supports a conviction also is dispositive of an insufficient-
evidence claim”). We therefore first consider the potentially
dispositive issue: whether the weight of the evidence supports
the trial court’s judgment.
B
{¶59} Courts must recognize that “parents’ interest in the
care, custody, and control of their children ‘is perhaps the
oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by th[e
SCIOTO, 25CA4134 24
United States Supreme] Court.’” In re B.C., 2014-Ohio-4558, ¶
19, quoting Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
Indeed, “the right to raise one’s children is an ‘essential’ and
‘basic’ civil right.” In re Murray,
52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157
(1990), quoting Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972);
accord In re Hayes,
79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48 (1997); see Santosky v.
Kramer,
455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (“natural parents have a
fundamental right to the care and custody of their children”).
Thus, “parents who are ‘suitable’ have a ‘paramount’ right to
the custody of their children.” B.C. at ¶ 19, quoting In re
Perales,
52 Ohio St.2d 89, 97 (1977), citing Clark v. Bayer,
32
Ohio St. 299, 310 (1877); Murray,
52 Ohio St.3d at 157.
{¶60} A parent’s rights, however, are not absolute. In re
D.A., 2007-Ohio-1105, ¶ 11. Rather, “‘it is plain that the
natural rights of a parent . . . are always subject to the
ultimate welfare of the child, which is the polestar or
controlling principle to be observed.’” In re Cunningham,
59
Ohio St.2d 100, 106 (1979), quoting In re R.J.C.,
300 So.2d 54,
58 (Fla. App. 1974). Thus, the State may terminate parental
rights when a child’s best interest demands such termination.
D.A. at ¶ 11.
{¶61} Before a court may award a children services agency
permanent custody of a child, R.C. 2151.414(A)(1) requires the
court to hold a hearing. The primary purpose of the hearing is
SCIOTO, 25CA4134 25
to allow the court to determine whether the child’s best
interests would be served by permanently terminating the
parental relationship and by awarding permanent custody to the
agency. Id. Additionally, when considering whether to grant a
children services agency permanent custody, a trial court should
consider the underlying purposes of R.C. Chapter 2151: “to care
for and protect children, ‘whenever possible, in a family
environment, separating the child from the child’s parents only
when necessary for the child’s welfare or in the interests of
public safety.’” In re C.F.,
2007-Ohio-1104, ¶ 29, quoting R.C.
2151.01(A).
C
{¶62} A children services agency may obtain permanent
custody of a child by (1) requesting it in the abuse, neglect,
or dependency complaint under R.C. 2151.353, or (2) filing a
motion under R.C. 2151.413 after obtaining temporary custody.
In this case, appellee sought permanent custody by filing a
motion under R.C. 2151.413. When an agency files a permanent
custody motion under R.C. 2151.413, R.C. 2151.414 applies. R.C.
2151.414(A).
{¶63} R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) permits a trial court to grant
permanent custody of a child to a children services agency if
the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
child’s best interest would be served by the award of permanent
SCIOTO, 25CA4134 26
custody and that, as relevant in the case sub judice, “[t]he
child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public
children services agencies ... for twelve or more months of a
consecutive twenty-two-month period. . . .” R.C.
2151.414(B)(1)(d).
{¶64} In the case at bar, the trial court found that the
children had been in appellee’s temporary custody for more than
12 months of a consecutive 22-month period. Appellant does not
challenge this finding on appeal. We therefore do not address
it.
D
{¶65} R.C. 2151.414(D) lists the factors that a trial court
considers when determining whether permanent custody will serve
a child’s best interest. The statute directs a trial court to
consider “all relevant factors,” as well as specific factors, to
determine whether a child’s best interest will be served by
granting a children services agency permanent custody. The
listed factors include: (1) the child’s interaction and
interrelationship with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives,
foster parents and out-of-home providers, and any other person
who may significantly affect the child; (2) the child’s wishes,
as expressed directly by the child or through the child’s
guardian ad litem, with due regard for the child’s maturity; (3)
the child’s custodial history; (4) the child’s need for a
SCIOTO, 25CA4134 27
legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of
placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody
to the agency; and (5) whether any factors listed under R.C.
2151.414(E)(7) to (11) apply.
{¶66} Courts that must determine whether a grant of
permanent custody to a children services agency will promote a
child’s best interest must consider “all relevant [best
interest] factors,” as well as the “five enumerated statutory
factors.” C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104, at ¶ 57, citing In re Schaefer,
2006-Ohio-5513, ¶ 56; accord In re C.G.,
2008-Ohio-3773, ¶ 28
(9th Dist.); In re N.W.,
2008-Ohio-297, ¶ 19 (10th Dist.).
However, none of the best interest factors is entitled to
“greater weight or heightened significance.” C.F. at ¶ 57.
Instead, the trial court considers the totality of the
circumstances when making its best interest determination. In
re K.M.S.,
2017-Ohio-142, ¶ 24 (3d Dist.); In re A.C., 2014-
Ohio-4918, ¶ 46 (9th Dist.). In general, “[a] child’s best
interest is served by placing the child in a permanent situation
that fosters growth, stability, and security.” In re C.B.C.,
2016-Ohio-916, ¶ 66 (4th Dist.), citing In re Adoption of
Ridenour,
61 Ohio St.3d 319, 324 (1991).
Children’s Interactions and Interrelationships
{¶67} The children are placed in the same foster home and
are bonded to one another. The foster family provides the
SCIOTO, 25CA4134 28
children with all of their essential needs. By all accounts,
the children are thriving in the foster home.
{¶68} Appellee did not present any evidence to suggest that,
during visitation, the parents failed to interact appropriately
with the children. Moreover, appellee did not seek to remove
the twins from the parents’ custody. Thus, on the surface, the
evidence tends to show that the parents interacted appropriately
with the children.
{¶69} However, when appellee placed the two oldest children
in the parents’ home for a trial visit, E.E. overdosed on
marijuana. Neither parent had a logical explanation for the
overdose. The parents’ lack of explanation for the overdose
caused appellee to be wary of returning the children to the
parents’ home and to question appellant’s protective capacities.
Children’s Wishes
{¶70} The children’s GAL did not believe that appellee had
exercised reasonable efforts to reunify the family and that the
court should give appellee time to gradually reintroduce the
children into the parents’ household.
{¶71} At the time of the permanent custody hearing, all of
the children were under the age of six. The trial court
determined that the children lacked sufficient maturity to be
able to directly express their wishes.
Custodial History
SCIOTO, 25CA4134 29
{¶72} C.E., Jr. lived with his parents until January 2021,
when he was almost two years of age. Since that time, he has
remained in appellee’s temporary custody. When appellee filed
its December 2023 permanent custody motion, C.E., Jr. had been
in appellee’s temporary custody for almost three years.
{¶73} Appellee removed E.E. from the parents’ custody in
March 2021, shortly after his birth. He since has remained in
appellee’s temporary custody. When appellee filed its December
2023 permanent custody motion, E.E. had been in appellee’s
temporary custody for almost three years.
{¶74} The twins lived with their parents for the first ten
months of their lives. After E.E.’s overdose, the twins were
removed from the parent’s custody and have remained in
appellee’s temporary custody since that time. When appellee
filed its amended 2024 permanent custody motion, the twins had
been in its temporary custody for more than 12 months.
{¶75} The children’s custodial history thus shows that they
have spent the majority of their young lives in appellee’s
temporary custody.
Legally Secure Permanent Placement
{¶76} “Although the Ohio Revised Code does not define the
term, ‘legally secure permanent placement,’ this court and
others have generally interpreted the phrase to mean a safe,
stable, consistent environment where a child’s needs will be
SCIOTO, 25CA4134 30
met.” In re M.B., 2016-Ohio-793, ¶ 56 (4th Dist.), citing In re
Dyal,
2001 WL 925423, *9 (4th Dist. Aug. 9, 2001) (“legally
secure permanent placement” means a “stable, safe, and nurturing
environment”); see also In re K.M.,
2015-Ohio-4682, ¶ 28 (10th
Dist.) (legally secure permanent placement requires more than a
stable home and income, but also requires an environment that
will provide for child’s needs); In re J.H.,
2013-Ohio-1293, ¶
95 (11th Dist.) (mother was unable to provide legally secure
permanent placement when she lacked physical and emotional
stability and father was unable to do so when he lacked grasp of
parenting concepts); In re J.W.,
2007-Ohio-2007, ¶ 34 (10th
Dist.) (Sadler, J., dissenting) (legally secure permanent
placement means “a placement that is stable and consistent”);
Black’s (6th Ed. 1990) (defining “secure” to mean, in part, “not
exposed to danger; safe; so strong, stable or firm as to insure
safety”);
id. (defining “permanent” to mean, in part,
“[c]ontinuing or enduring in the same state, status, place, or
the like without fundamental or marked change, not subject to
fluctuation, or alteration, fixed or intended to be fixed;
lasting; abiding; stable; not temporary or transient”). Thus,
“[a] legally secure permanent placement is more than a house
with four walls. Rather, it generally encompasses a stable
environment where a child will live in safety with one or more
dependable adults who will provide for the child’s needs.”
SCIOTO, 25CA4134 31
M.B.,
2016-Ohio-793, at ¶ 56 (4th Dist.).
{¶77} In the case at bar, we believe that the evidence
adduced at the hearing supports the trial court’s finding that
the children need a legally secure permanent placement and that
they cannot achieve that type of placement without granting the
agency permanent custody. Despite years of appellee’s
involvement and case planning efforts, appellant did not
consistently demonstrate that she could provide the children
with a legally secure permanent placement. We recognize and
commend appellant for her efforts to improve her situation.
Unfortunately, when appellee attempted to return C.E., Jr. and
E.E. to the home, E.E. overdosed on marijuana. Appellant did
not have a logical explanation for the overdose. The trial
court could have reasonably determined that a home in which a
child has the ability to overdose on marijuana, without any
logical explanation, is not an environment in which a child will
live in safety.
{¶78} Furthermore, even though appellant may have engaged in
the services that appellee requested of her, case plan
compliance is not necessarily dispositive on the issue of
reunification and does not preclude a grant of permanent custody
to a children’s services agency. In re W.C.J., 2014-Ohio-5841,
¶ 46 (4th Dist.) (“[s]ubstantial compliance with a case plan is
not necessarily dispositive on the issue of reunification and
SCIOTO, 25CA4134 32
does not preclude a grant of permanent custody to a children’s
services agency.”); see In re M.H.,
2017-Ohio-7365, ¶ 102 (4th
Dist.); In re S.S.,
2017-Ohio-2938, ¶ 164 (4th Dist.); In re
M.B.,
2016-Ohio-793, ¶ 59 (4th Dist.); In re N.L., 2015-Ohio-
4165, ¶ 35 (9th Dist.) (stating that substantial compliance with
a case plan, in and of itself, does not establish that a grant
of permanent custody to an agency is erroneous”); In re S.C.,
2015-Ohio-2280, ¶ 40 (8th Dist.) (“Compliance with a case plan
is not, in and of itself, dispositive of the issue of
reunification.”); In re West,
2003-Ohio-6299, ¶ 19 (4th Dist.).
Indeed, because the trial court’s primary focus in a permanent
custody proceeding is the child’s best interest, “it is entirely
possible that a parent could complete all of his/her case plan
goals and the trial court still appropriately terminate his/her
parental rights.” In re Gomer,
2004-Ohio-1723, ¶ 36 (3d Dist.);
accord In re A.S.,
2014-Ohio-3035, ¶ 32 (8th Dist.).
Consequently, even if appellant complied with all of the case
plan services, these actions do not necessarily demonstrate that
placing the children in her custody would serve the children’s
best interest.
R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) to (11)
{¶79} The trial court found that R.C. 2151.414(E)(11)
applied. The evidence shows that appellant had her parental
rights involuntarily terminated with respect to one of the
SCIOTO, 25CA4134 33
children’ siblings, and the trial court determined that
appellant “failed to provide clear and convincing evidence to
prove that, notwithstanding the prior termination, [she] can
provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care
for the health, welfare, and safety of the child[ren].” As we
explained above, the evidence supports the trial court’s finding
that appellant cannot provide the children with a legally secure
permanent placement.
{¶80} For all of the foregoing reasons, we do not agree with
appellant that the trial court’s judgment granting appellee
permanent custody of the children is against the manifest weight
of the evidence. The trial court could have formed a firm
belief that placing the children in appellee’s permanent custody
was in their best interest. We thus also conclude that the
record contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s
judgment.
{¶81} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we
overrule appellant’s second assignment of error and affirm the
trial court’s judgment.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
SCIOTO, 25CA4134 34
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed and that
appellee recover of appellant the costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this
appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this
Court directing the Scioto County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile
Division, to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that
mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Smith, P.J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion
For the Court
BY:__________________________
Peter B. Abele, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a
final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal
commences from the date of filing with the clerk.
