[Cite as State v. Belsar,
2025-Ohio-57.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Appellee : C.A. No. 30050
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. 2022 CR 01653
:
JOSHUA MICHAEL BELSAR : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
: Court)
Appellant :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on January 10, 2025
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MICHAEL O. MILLS, Attorney for Appellant
MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by MICHAEL P. ALLEN, Attorney for Appellee
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TUCKER, J.
{¶ 1} Joshua Michael Belsar appeals from his conviction following a jury trial on
one count of rape, a first-degree felony.
{¶ 2} Belsar challenges the legal sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence
to support his conviction. He also alleges that his attorney provided ineffective assistance.
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{¶ 3} We conclude that Belsar’s conviction was supported by legally sufficient
evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence. The record also does not
portray ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment will be
affirmed.
I. Background
{¶ 4} In June 2022, a grand jury indicted Belsar on one count of rape in violation
of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) for engaging in sexual conduct with a victim under 13 years of
age. He later pled guilty to a bill of information charging him with rape in violation of R.C.
2907.02(A)(1)(a), which involves administering an intoxicant to the victim. Belsar
subsequently withdrew his guilty plea. After the trial court overruled a suppression motion,
the case proceeded to a jury trial on the indicted charge.
{¶ 5} At trial, the State presented evidence that the 11-year-old victim had snuck
out of her house on March 4, 2022, and had met Belsar near the end of her street. The
victim entered Belsar’s car with the intention of going to a local park. Belsar instead
purchased alcohol at a gas station and drove the victim to his house. According to the
victim, he led her into the basement where he lived. He then forced her to drink alcohol
and to remove her clothes. The victim testified that Belsar subsequently engaged in
multiple acts of sexual conduct with her before driving her home. She stated that Belsar
threatened to harm her if she told anyone what had happened.
{¶ 6} The victim’s father called the police upon her return home in the early-
morning hours. Belsar was still sitting in his car near the victim’s house when officers
arrived. He denied engaging in inappropriate activity with the victim. For her part, the
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victim also told her father and a police officer that nothing had occurred. The following
day or shortly thereafter, the victim disclosed to her great-grandmother that Belsar had
engaged in sexual conduct with her. The victim did not undergo a medical examination
until June 2022. The examination produced no evidence of sexual activity.
{¶ 7} Following his arrest outside of a bowling alley, Belsar was interviewed by two
detectives. He initially denied the victim’s allegations but eventually admitted having
engaged in sexual intercourse with her.
{¶ 8} Based on the evidence presented, the jury found Belsar guilty. The trial court
sentenced him to life in prison with parole eligibility after 10 years. It also designated him
a Tier III sex offender. Belsar timely appealed, advancing two assignments of error.
II. Analysis
{¶ 9} The first assignment of error states:
THE STATE OF OHIO FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTION FOR R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) AND THE
APPELLANT’S CONVICTION WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT
OF THE EVIDENCE.
{¶ 10} Belsar challenges the legal sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence
to support his conviction. He cites the lack of DNA or other physical evidence establishing
sexual conduct with the victim. He also argues that the victim’s trial testimony lacked
credibility and that his own confession was false.
{¶ 11} “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to
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determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”
State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 12} Our analysis is different when reviewing a manifest-weight argument. When
a conviction is challenged on appeal as being against the weight of the evidence, an
appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable
inferences, consider witness credibility, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in
the evidence, the trier of fact “clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage
of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v.
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997). A judgment should be reversed as being
against the manifest weight of the evidence “only in the exceptional case in which the
evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” State v. Martin,
20 Ohio App.3d 172,
175 (1st Dist.1983).
{¶ 13} With the foregoing standards in mind, we reject Belsar’s legal-sufficiency
and manifest-weight challenges. The jury found him guilty of violating R.C.
2907.02(A)(1)(b), which provides: “No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another
when . . . [t]he other person is less than thirteen years of age, whether or not the offender
knows the age of the other person.”
{¶ 14} The 11-year-old victim testified that Belsar forced her to engage in sexual
intercourse in the basement of his residence. The State also introduced Belsar’s
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videotaped confession and testimony about his admission to engaging in sexual conduct
with the victim. Even standing alone, the victim’s testimony or Belsar’s admission, if
believed, was legally sufficient to support his conviction. State v. Whitfield, 2023-Ohio-
240, ¶ 34 (2d Dist.) (noting that the defendant’s admission was legally sufficient to support
a conviction); State v. Strong, 2011-Ohio-1024, ¶ 42 (10th Dist.) (recognizing that
testimony from one witness can be enough to support a conviction).
{¶ 15} With regard to the manifest-weight issue, Belsar stresses the lack of DNA
or other physical evidence establishing that sexual conduct occurred. He also asserts that
he falsely confessed after two hours of questioning while intoxicated. Finally, he contends
the victim’s trial testimony lacked credibility because she denied sexual activity shortly
after the incident.
{¶ 16} Upon review, we find Belsar’s arguments to be unpersuasive. The lack of
DNA or other physical evidence was unsurprising given that the victim was not medically
examined until more than three months had passed. Moreover, if the jury credited the
victim’s testimony or Belsar’s confession, the lack of physical evidence of sexual conduct
three months later was largely immaterial.
{¶ 17} As for the victim’s credibility, she explained that she felt uncomfortable
admitting what had happened in the presence of her father and a police officer on the day
of the incident. She felt more comfortable later confiding in her great-grandmother. On re-
direct examination, the victim added that she initially denied sexual activity because she
feared her parents might not believe her and Belsar had threatened to harm her. Pediatric
psychologist Brenda Miceli testified that children may delay disclosing sexual activity for
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various reasons, including fear of not being believed or as a result of threats from the
perpetrator. As the trier of fact, the jury was best positioned to assess the victim’s
credibility and to take into consideration her initial denial of sexual activity when deciding
whether to believe her trial testimony.
{¶ 18} Finally, the jury watched Belsar’s recorded interview with police. As the trier
of fact, the jury was charged with assessing the credibility of his confession and giving it
appropriate weight. Although Belsar claims he was drunk during the interview, detectives
testified that he did not appear to be impaired. The jury was entitled to credit this
testimony.
{¶ 19} Based upon our review of the record, the jury did not clearly lose its way
and create a manifest miscarriage of justice. This was not an exceptional case in which
the evidence weighed heavily against Belsar’s conviction. Accordingly, the first
assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 20} The second assignment of error states:
APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS
GUARANTEED BY ARTICLE 1, SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO
CONSTITUTION AND THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS.
{¶ 21} Belsar argues ineffective assistance of counsel based on his attorney’s
failure to raise the issue of a “false confession” through a motion to suppress or at trial.
He also alleges ineffective assistance based on his attorney’s failure to challenge Miceli’s
testimony on the basis of relevance and an improper foundation.
{¶ 22} We review ineffective-assistance claims under the two-prong analysis set
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forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and adopted by the Ohio Supreme
Court in State v. Bradley,
42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989). To prevail, a defendant must show
that trial counsel rendered deficient performance and that counsel’s deficient performance
prejudiced him. Strickland at paragraph two of the syllabus; Bradley at paragraph two of
the syllabus. Deficient performance is conduct that falls below an objective standard of
reasonable representation.
Strickland at 688. Prejudice exists when there is “a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the proceeding’s result would have
been different.” State v. Hale,
2008-Ohio-3426, ¶ 204, citing Strickland at 687-688 and
Bradley at paragraph two of the syllabus. “ ‘A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ”
Bradley at 142, quoting
Strickland
at 694.
{¶ 23} “[T]rial counsel is allowed wide latitude in formulating trial strategy[.]” State
v. Olsen, 2011-Ohio-3420, ¶ 121 (2d Dist.). When reviewing ineffective-assistance
claims, we may not second-guess strategic decisions.
Strickland at 689. “Debatable
strategic and tactical decisions may not form the basis of a claim for ineffective assistance
of counsel, even if, in hindsight, it looks as if a better strategy had been available.” State
v. Conley,
2015-Ohio-2553, ¶ 56 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Cook,
65 Ohio St.3d 516, 524-
525 (1992).
{¶ 24} Belsar first alleges ineffective assistance of counsel based on his attorney’s
failure to purse a false-confession argument. He asserts that the issue should have been
raised in his motion to suppress and at trial. Although defense counsel did file an
unsuccessful suppression motion, Belsar contends it “focused on whether or not alcohol
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impaired [his] ability to understand his Miranda advisory.” Counsel apparently raised that
issue in an attempt to invalidate Belsar’s Miranda waiver and obtain suppression of the
confession. On appeal, Belsar fails to explain how simply arguing the falseness of his
confession based on alleged intoxication could have led to suppression. He also fails to
cite any coercion by police that could have produced an involuntary confession. In short,
Belsar’s claim that his confession lacked credibility because he was drunk did not
constitute legal grounds for suppression. Therefore, defense counsel did not provide
ineffective assistance by failing to make the argument.
{¶ 25} Belsar was entitled to argue at trial that his confession lacked credibility. In
fact, defense counsel made that argument. His attorney elicited testimony about his
consumption of alcohol at the bowling alley prior to his arrest. Defense counsel also cross-
examined the two detectives who interviewed Belsar at the police station. Defense
counsel repeatedly asked one of them about Belsar’s alcohol consumption and suggested
that Belsar had exhibited signs of intoxication. Despite defense counsel’s efforts, both
detectives insisted that they detected no impairment.
{¶ 26} On appeal, Belsar alleges ineffective assistance based on his attorney’s
failure to seek an expert witness to testify about false confessions. Failure to call an expert
witness, however, generally constitutes trial strategy and will not be second-guessed on
appeal. State v. Blanton, 2023-Ohio-89, ¶ 80 (2d Dist.). Here Belsar suggests that an
expert could have testified about intoxication producing false confessions. But defense
counsel reasonably may have believed a jury could understand that possibility without
assistance from an expert. Moreover, expert testimony was not required for the jury to
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review the recorded interview itself and assess Belsar’s sobriety and his ability to respond
to the detectives’ questions.
{¶ 27} Belsar next alleges ineffective assistance based on his attorney’s failure to
object to Joyce Miceli’s testimony about delayed disclosures. He challenges her
testimony on the grounds of relevance and an improper foundation. In support, he asserts
that the victim’s disclosure of sexual conduct was not delayed at all, thereby obviating the
basis for Miceli’s testimony.
{¶ 28} While not testifying specifically about this case, Miceli opined that children
often do not disclose sexual abuse immediately. She explained that they frequently wait
to disclose the activity to someone they trust. On appeal, Belsar stresses that the duration
of the victim’s delay in the present case was brief, possibly only one day. But the fact
remains that the victim initially denied sexual activity and later reported it to a trusted
adult, thereby creating a delay of some duration. Defense counsel cross-examined Miceli
on this issue, presenting a hypothetical question about a one-day delay. Miceli responded
that such a delay still would be a “delayed disclosure,” albeit “a very short delay.” We see
no ineffective assistance of counsel arising from defense counsel’s failure to object to
Miceli’s testimony on the basis that there was no delayed disclosure. The second
assignment of error is overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 29} The judgment of the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
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EPLEY, P.J. and HUFFMAN, J., concur.
