State v. Shay

[Cite as State v. Shay, 

.]




                       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                              CRAWFORD COUNTY




STATE OF OHIO,
                                                             CASE NO. 3-24-16
         PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

    v.

JEFFREY SHAY,                                                OPINION

         DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.



                   Appeal from Crawford County Municipal Court
                             Criminal/Traffic Division
                            Trial Court No. 23 TRC 3039

                                         Judgment Affirmed

                            Date of Decision: January 13, 2025



APPEARANCES:

         Howard A. Elliott for Appellant

         Thomas F. Meagher V for Appellee
Case No. 3-24-16




WILLAMOWSKI, J.

       {¶1} Defendant-appellant Jeffrey M. Shay (“Shay”) appeals the judgment of

the Crawford County Municipal Court, arguing that the trial court erred by denying

his motion to suppress and that his conviction for operating a vehicle under the

influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a combination of them (“OVI”) is not

supported by sufficient evidence and is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

For the reasons set forth below, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

                           Facts and Procedural History

       {¶2} At around 2:00 A.M. on September 23, 2023, Sergeant Andrew

Shellhouse (“Sergeant Shellhouse”) of the Ohio State Highway Patrol was stopped

at an intersection in his cruiser when he observed Shay’s vehicle across the roadway.

After Shay flashed his “brights” at this intersection, Sergeant Shellhouse began to

follow his vehicle. Sergeant Shellhouse testified that, as they approached an

intersection with a stop sign, he observed Shay’s vehicle cross the white stop bar

and pass into the crosswalk. Sergeant Shellhouse testified that, by the time Shay’s

vehicle came to a halt, “the rear tires were on the stop bar.” (Tr. 64).

       {¶3} After Shay turned right at the intersection, Sergeant Shellhouse initiated

a traffic stop. On approaching the vehicle, he observed that Shay’s “eyes were

bloodshot and glassy”; that Shay’s “speech was slow and slurred”; and that “there

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Case No. 3-24-16


was a six pack of Budweiser sitting on the passenger’s side of the vehicle” that only

contained five cans. (Tr. 68). During their conversation, Shay admitted that he had

several drinks that night and had been to a bar. Shortly after the traffic stop was

initiated, Trooper Sarah Kliesch (“Trooper Kliesch”) arrived at the scene to assist

Sergeant Shellhouse. She asked if Shay would be willing to take several field

sobriety tests.

       {¶4} Trooper Kliesch then administered a Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test

(“HGN Test”) and observed him display six of the six potential clues. She also

observed Shay stray from the marked line while taking the “walk and turn test.” (Tr.

96). After the field sobriety tests, Shay was placed into custody and taken to the

local State Highway Patrol Post where he voluntarily took two breath tests. The

Intoxilyzer 8000 gave blood alcohol readings of 0.116 and 0.118. During the

inventory search of Shay’s vehicle, law enforcement located an open beer can on

the floorboard and “some suspected marijuana ….” (Tr. 71-72).

       {¶5} On September 27, 2023, Shay was charged with one count of OVI in

violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), a first-degree misdemeanor; one count of OVI

in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(d), a first-degree misdemeanor; and one count

of failure to stop or yield at a stop sign in violation of R.C. 4511.43(A), a minor

misdemeanor. On December 5, 2023, Shay filed a motion to suppress, arguing that



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the police did not have legal grounds to conduct a traffic stop. The trial court denied

Shay’s motion to suppress.

       {¶6} A jury trial commenced on April 26, 2024. The recordings from

Sergeant Shellhouse’s dashboard and body cameras were introduced into evidence.

Shay was found guilty of all three charges. After the trial court concluded that his

two OVI convictions merged, Shay only received a sentence for his violation of

R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(d). The trial court issued its judgment entry of sentencing on

May 7, 2024.

       {¶7} Shay filed his notice of appeal on May 17, 2024. On appeal, he raises

the following two assignments of error:

                             First Assignment of Error

       The conviction of the Defendant, operating a motor vehicle under
       the influence of intoxicant was not supported by the manifest
       weight of the evidence nor the sufficiency of the evidence and must
       be reversed.

                           Second Assignment of Error

       The trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress of the
       Defendant/Appellant and barring the case of all the evidence
       flowing from the traffic stop, because the State failed to meet its
       burden of persuasion with respect to the motion to suppress.

We will consider the second assignment of error before we consider the first

assignment of error.



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                             Second Assignment of Error

        {¶8} Shay argues that that the trial court erred by denying his motion to

suppress because Sergeant Shellhouse did not have legal grounds to initiate a traffic

stop.

                                  Standard of Review

        {¶9} On appeal, “motions to suppress present ‘mixed questions of law and

fact.’” State v. Kerr, 

 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Yeaples,

 (3d Dist.).

        At a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role of trier of
        fact and, as such, is in the best position to evaluate the evidence and
        the credibility of witnesses. [State v. Burnside, 

, ¶ 8].
        … When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, deference is
        given to the trial court’s findings of fact so long as they are supported
        by competent, credible evidence. Burnside at ¶ 8 ….

(Citations omitted.) State v. Harpel, 

 (3d Dist.), quoting State

v. Sidey, 

 (3d Dist.).

        Accepting [the trial court’s findings of] fact[] as true, the appellate
        court must then independently determine, without deference to the
        conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable
        legal standard.

(Bracketed text in original.) State v. Ferguson, 

 (3d Dist.),

quoting 

.




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                                   Legal Standard

       {¶10} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees

“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures ….” U.S. Const., Amend. IV. The

Ohio Constitution offers a parallel provision to the Fourth Amendment of the

Federal Constitution that has been generally held to afford the same level of

protection as the United States Constitution. State v. Hoffman, 

. “[A] police stop of a motor vehicle and the resulting detention of its occupants

has been held to be a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.” Kerr, 2017-Ohio-

8516, at ¶ 13.

       {¶11} “In order to initiate a constitutionally permissible traffic stop, law

enforcement must, at a minimum, have a reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe

that a crime has been committed or is being committed.” State v. Smith, 2018-Ohio-

1444, ¶ 8 (3d Dist.).

       Reasonable suspicion entails some minimal level of objective
       justification for making a stop—that is, something more than an
       inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but less than the
       level of suspicion required for probable cause.

Harpel, 

, quoting State v. Jones, 

, 556-

557 (2d Dist. 1990). The circumstances surrounding a traffic stop “are to be viewed

through the eyes of the reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must


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Case No. 3-24-16


react to events as they unfold.” State v. Andrews, 

 (1991).

In this process, “[a] court reviewing the officer’s actions must give due weight to

his experience and training ….” 

.

       {¶12} “A police officer may initiate a traffic stop after witnessing a traffic

violation.” Smith, 

. In turn, R.C. 4511.43(A) requires the

following:

       Except when directed to proceed by a law enforcement officer, every
       driver of a vehicle … approaching a stop sign shall stop at a clearly
       marked stop line, but if none, before entering the crosswalk on the
       near side of the intersection, or, if none, then at the point nearest the
       intersecting roadway where the driver has a view of approaching
       traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering it. …

“A driver’s failure to comply with a stop sign is a traffic violation that provides a

police officer with probable cause to initiate a traffic stop.” State v. Little, 2020-

Ohio-4097, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.).

       {¶13} “To deter Fourth Amendment violations, the Supreme Court of the

United States has adopted an exclusionary rule under which ‘any evidence that is

obtained during an unlawful search or seizure will be excluded from being used

against the defendant.’”      Kerr, 

, quoting State v.

Steinbrunner, 

 (3d Dist.). “For this reason, the appropriate

remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation is generally the suppression of any

illegally obtained evidence.” Little at ¶ 10.


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                                   Legal Analysis

       {¶14} At the suppression hearing, the State presented evidence that Sergeant

Shellhouse was driving behind Shay’s vehicle as he approached an intersection with

a stop sign. Sergeant Shellhouse testified that, at this intersection, Shay “came to a

complete stop past the white stop bar into the crosswalk.” (Feb. 26 Tr. 10). He

further testified that he could see that the “rear tires” of Shay’s vehicle went “past

that white solid stop bar.” (Id. at 14). Sergeant Shellhouse affirmed that he initiated

a traffic stop based on this traffic infraction. The State also played the footage of

this incident from the dashboard camera in Sergeant Shellhouse’s cruiser for the

trial court.

       {¶15} On appeal, Shay argues that it is hard to discern from the video footage

whether he stopped his vehicle before or after he reached the white stop bar at the

intersection. At the suppression hearing, Sergeant Shellhouse testified that, from

his vantage point, he could see where Shay’s vehicle was stopped in relation to the

stop bar. He also indicated that he had a better visual of what transpired from his

cruiser than what his dashboard camera was able to capture. After considering this

evidence, the trial court “f[ou]nd that the Defendant failed to stop behind the marked

stop bar” and that “[t]his finding is supported by both the arresting officer’s

testimony and the video of the traffic stop.” (Doc. 28). Since this finding is



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supported by some competent, credible evidence, we accept this factual

determination as true. See State v. Codeluppi, 

.

       {¶16} In turn, R.C. 4511.43(A) states that “every driver of a vehicle …

approaching a stop sign shall stop at a clearly marked stop line ….” In interpreting

this language, this Court has held “that it is unlawful to stop astride a clearly marked

stop line, and that a motorist must stop his or her vehicle prior to the point at which

the front-most portion of his or her vehicle will break the plane of the outermost

edge of that clearly marked stop line.” State v. Miller, 

 (3d

Dist.). State v. Levine, 

 (4th Dist.). But see State v. Drushal,

 (9th Dist.); State v. Scott, 

 (6th

Dist.) (examining the various positions of Ohio’s appellate districts on this issue).

       {¶17} Since Shay did not stop his vehicle before crossing the stop bar at the

intersection, he failed to comply with R.C. 4511.43(A). On observing this traffic

infraction, Sergeant Shellhouse had the requisite legal justification to initiate a

traffic stop of Shay’s vehicle. See State v. Carpenter, 

 (3d

Dist.); Findlay v. Frenzel, 

 (3d Dist.). Thus, we conclude that

Shay’s argument has failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred in denying his

motion to suppress. Accordingly, the second assignment of error is overruled.




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                             First Assignment of Error

       {¶18} Shay argues that his OVI conviction is not supported by sufficient

evidence and is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

                                   Legal Standard

       {¶19} “A sufficiency-of-the-evidence analysis examines whether the State

has carried its burden of production at trial.” State v. Reed, 

(3d Dist.). On review, an appellate court is not to consider whether the evidence at

trial should be believed but whether the evidence, if believed, could provide a legal

basis for the finder of fact to conclude that the defendant is guilty of the crime

charged. State v. Smith, 

 (3d Dist.). Accordingly, the

applicable standard “is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found that the

essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v.

Plott, 

 (3d Dist.).

       {¶20} In contrast, “[a] manifest-weight analysis examines whether the State

has carried its burden of persuasion at trial.” State v. Carroll, 

 (3d Dist.). On review, “an appellate court’s function … is to determine whether

the greater amount of credible evidence supports the verdict.” State v. Harvey,

 (3d Dist.), quoting 

.



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Case No. 3-24-16


       Appellate courts “must review the entire record, weigh the evidence
       and all of the reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of
       witnesses, and determine whether in resolving conflicts in the
       evidence, the factfinder ‘clearly lost its way and created such a
       manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed
       and a new trial ordered.’”

State v. Randle, 

 (3d Dist.), quoting 

, quoting State

v. Thompkins, 

 (1997).

       {¶21} In this analysis, “the credibility of witnesses is primarily a

determination for the trier of fact.” State v. Morris, 

 (3d Dist.),

quoting State v. Banks, 

 (8th Dist.). For this reason, deference

must be given to the trier of fact regarding the credibility of witnesses. State v.

Sullivan, 

 (3d Dist.). A trial court’s judgment should be

reversed “[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against

the conviction.’” State v. Hunter, 

, quoting 

.

       {¶22} To establish an OVI conviction in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(d),

the State must prove that the defendant “operate[d] any vehicle … within this

state” while “[t]he person has a concentration of eight-hundredths of one gram or

more but less than seventeen-hundredths of one gram by weight of alcohol per two

hundred ten liters of the person’s breath” R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(d).




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                                    Legal Analysis

       {¶23} At trial, Trooper Kleisch testified that, after Shay exited his vehicle,

she administered the HGN Test and observed Shay display six out of six potential

clues. She also testified that Shay voluntarily “blew into” an “Intoxilyzer 8000”

two times at the station. (Tr. 102). The resulting readings from these two tests were

0.116 and 0.118 when the legal limit is a blood alcohol content of 0.08. Having

examined the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we conclude that a

reasonable trier of fact could find from this evidence that Shay had committed a

violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(d).       Accordingly, Shay’s OVI conviction is

supported by sufficient evidence.

       {¶24} We turn now to Shay’s manifest weight challenge. At trial, Sergeant

Shellhouse testified that he observed that Shay’s eyes were bloodshot and glassy.

He also detected the odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from Shay’s person

and saw a six pack of beer with a missing can on the front seat of the vehicle. On

cross-examination, Trooper Shellhouse affirmed that he did not observe Shay

driving erratically by driving left of center or speeding. Defense counsel also asked

Trooper Kleish about the general accuracy of the field sobriety tests in detecting

intoxication. He also questioned her about the potential challenges that are involved

in completing these field sobriety tests at 2:00 A.M. on the side of a roadway.



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Case No. 3-24-16


       {¶25} Further, Shay testified in his own defense at trial. He stated that he

did not drink the beer from the opened beer can that was next to him in his vehicle.

He also affirmed that he did the field sobriety tests to the “best of [his] … ability.”

(Tr. 142). While he admitted that he had four beers earlier that evening, Shay stated

that he “wasn’t impaired until” they “got to the station with that, that Breathalyzer

test.” (Tr. 147). He also admitted to stopping at a bar called the “Crazy Fox” at

roughly 2:00 A.M. because he could not buy beer elsewhere at that time and wanted

“[t]o have beer at home.” (Tr. 151, 153).

       {¶26} Having examined the evidence in the record on the basis of its weight

and credibility, we find no indication that the jury lost its way and returned a verdict

that was against the manifest weight of the evidence.             Accordingly, the first

assignment of error is overruled.

                                       Conclusion

       {¶27} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars

assigned and argued, the judgment of the Crawford County Municipal Court is

affirmed.

                                                                    Judgment Affirmed

WALDICK, P.J., and MILLER, J., concur.

/hls



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