State v. Berry

[Cite as State v. Berry, 

.]


                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                    TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio,                                   :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,             :
                                                                     No. 23AP-149
v.                                               :                (C.P.C. No. 04CR-5651)

Chanz Berry,                                     :            (REGULAR CALENDAR)

                 Defendant-Appellant.            :



                                           D E C I S I O N

                                      Rendered on March 4, 2025


                 On brief: [Shayla D. Favor], Prosecuting Attorney, and
                 Kimberly M. Bond, for appellee. Argued: Kimberly M. Bond.

                 On brief: Mitchell A. Williams, Public Defender, and
                 Robert D. Essex, for appellant. Argued: Robert D. Essex.


                  APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

EDELSTEIN, J.

        {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Chanz Berry, appeals from the February 10, 2023
judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas denying his motion to vacate the
December 19, 2005 judgment of convictions for murder, attempted murder, and weapons
under disability as void.          Specifically, Mr. Berry contends that because an indicted
aggravated murder count alleging he acted with prior calculation and design (for which he
was not convicted) was not presented to the juvenile court at a probable cause hearing and
was not included in the juvenile court’s entry binding the matter over to adult court, the
adult court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to enter any judgment of conviction
against him in that case. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment below.
No. 23AP-149                                                                                             2

I.   FACTS AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW
        {¶ 2} On April 28, 2004, a complaint was filed in the Franklin County Juvenile
Court (“juvenile court”) alleging Mr. Berry, then age 16, purposely caused the shooting
death of F.F. and purposely attempted to cause the death of D.G. by means of a firearm on
April 24, 2004. The juvenile-court complaint charged Mr. Berry with murder, attempted
murder, and attendant firearm specifications.
        {¶ 3} Pursuant to R.C. 2152.10(A)(1)(a) and 2152.12(A), in May 2004, the state
sought mandatory bindover of the case to the general division of the common pleas court
(“adult court”) for prosecution of Mr. Berry as an adult. The juvenile court held a probable
cause hearing on that motion in August 2004. In entries dated August 25, 2004 and
September 7, 2004, the juvenile court found Mr. Berry was subject to mandatory bindover
and the state had established probable cause to believe Mr. Berry had committed the
charged offenses with a firearm. Based on these findings, the juvenile court relinquished
its jurisdiction and transferred the matter to adult court.
        {¶ 4} In adult court, Mr. Berry was indicted on five felony counts: having weapons
while under disability, in violation of R.C. 2923.13, a third-degree felony (Count 1);
aggravated robbery, in violation of R.C. 2911.01, a first-degree felony (Count 2); attempted
aggravated murder, in violation of R.C. 2923.02 and 2903.01(A), a first-degree felony
(Count 3); aggravated murder (with prior calculation and design), in violation of R.C.
2903.01(A), an unspecified felony (Count 4); and aggravated murder (in connection with
the aggravated robbery), in violation of R.C. 2903.01(B), an unspecified felony (Count 5).
Counts 2 through 5 included firearm specifications, and Counts 4 and 5 were also indicted
with capital specifications1. Thus, Mr. Berry, who was by this time 17 years old, was facing
the possibility of imprisonment for life without parole. See former R.C. 2929.02(A).2
        {¶ 5} Trial commenced in October 2005. Mr. Berry waived his right to a jury on
the weapons under disability count (Count 1), and the remaining four counts (Counts 2-5)
were tried to the jury. Following the presentation of evidence, the trial court granted Mr.


1 Because Mr. Berry was under 18 years of age at the time of the offense, he was not eligible for the death

penalty. See R.C. 2929.02(A).

2 Under the current version of R.C. 2929.02(A), persons convicted of aggravated murder who are found to be

under the age of 18 at the time the offense was committed are ineligible for a life-without-parole prison
sentence.
No. 23AP-149                                                                                3

Berry’s motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29 as to the aggravated
robbery offense (Count 2) and one of the aggravated murder counts (Count 5). (See Dec. 7,
2005 Entry.) The jury found Mr. Berry guilty of the stipulated lesser-included offense of
attempted murder (Count 3), the stipulated lesser-included offense of murder (Count 4),
and their corresponding firearm specifications. The weapons under disability count (Count
1) was then tried to the bench, and the trial court found Mr. Berry guilty of that count.
       {¶ 6} At the December 9, 2005 sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an
aggregate sentence of 24 years to life imprisonment. Mr. Berry’s convictions and sentence
were memorialized in the trial court’s December 19, 2005 judgment entry. Mr. Berry timely
appealed from that judgment, arguing on direct appeal that his convictions were not
supported by sufficient evidence and were against the manifest weight of the evidence. On
review, we overruled Mr. Berry’s assignment of error and affirmed his convictions on
November 7, 2006. See State v. Berry, 

 (10th Dist.). The Supreme Court
of Ohio denied his motion for a delayed appeal on March 26, 2008. State v. Berry, 2008-
Ohio-1279.
       {¶ 7} In May 2022, Mr. Berry, acting pro se, filed a motion requesting the trial court
vacate his convictions for weapons under disability, murder, and attempted murder for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction. The motion was predicated on the then-recent Supreme
Court of Ohio decision in State v. Smith, 

, which held that an adult court
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over any act charged against a juvenile for which the
juvenile court, during bindover proceedings, did not find probable cause. Mr. Berry
asserted that because all five counts indicted in adult court were absent from both the
juvenile-court complaint and the bindover entry, the juvenile court could not have found
probable cause for these offenses. On the logic of Smith, Mr. Berry contended that, in the
absence of any probable-cause finding for these offenses in juvenile court, the adult court
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the entire case. (See May 25, 2022 Mot. at 3-7.)
Therefore, Mr. Berry argued, his convictions and sentence for weapons under disability,
attempted murder, and murder are void. He conceded, however, that the adult court would
have jurisdiction over the attempted murder and murder offenses had he been “properly
charged” with those offenses in the grand jury indictment. (See May 25, 2022 Mot. at 5-7.)
No. 23AP-149                                                                                4

       {¶ 8} On February 10, 2023, the trial court entered a judgment finding it had
jurisdiction over the five counts in the grand jury indictment and denying Mr. Berry’s
motion. Although acknowledging none of those five counts “were specifically charged in
[the] juvenile court complaint,” the trial court concluded that all five counts were “based on
conduct that occurred on April 24, 2004 that made up the juvenile complaint.” (Feb. 10,
2023 Decision and Entry at 3.) In the alternative, the trial court concluded that, even if it
construed Mr. Berry’s motion as a petition for postconviction relief, it would not be welltaken because he failed to comply with the procedural requirements of R.C. 2953.21 and
2953.23. (See Feb. 10, 2023 Decision and Entry at 4-5.)
       {¶ 9} Mr. Berry timely appealed from that decision and now asserts the following
sole assignment of error for our review:

              [MR. BERRY’S] RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW WAS
              VIOLATED WHEN HE WAS INDICTED AND TRIED FOR AN
              AGGRAVATED MURDER OFFENSE WHICH WAS NEVER
              PRESENTED TO THE JUVENILE COURT AND CARRIED A
              MORE SEVERE PENALTY THAN ANY OFFENSES
              PRESENTED TO THE JUVENILE COURT DURING THE
              BINDOVER PROCEEDINGS. THIS WAS ALL IN VIOLATION
              OF O.R.C. 2151.23(H), ARTICLE [I], SECTION 16[] OF THE
              OHIO    CONSTITUTION       AND     THE   FIFTH     AND
              FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES
              CONSTITUTION.
II. ANALYSIS
       {¶ 10} Mr. Berry contends the state’s prosecution of him in adult court was void
from its inception due to an alleged jurisdictional flaw in the juvenile-to-adult court
bindover process. Mr. Berry has clearly indicated in his briefing and at oral argument that,
unlike in the trial court, he is not challenging on appeal the inclusion of the weapons under
disability, aggravated robbery, or attempted murder charges in the grand jury indictment,
conceding “they were rooted in the acts that were the subject of the juvenile complaint.”
(Appellant’s Brief at 7, citing State v. Burns, 

.)
       {¶ 11} Rather, at the heart of Mr. Berry’s argument before this court is his claim that
he was indicted and tried in adult court on a higher degree offense—aggravated murder, an
unspecified felony—than the first-degree murder offense presented to the juvenile court.
Significantly, Mr. Berry was not convicted of this aggravated murder charge. The jury found
No. 23AP-149                                                                                                       5

him guilty of murder and attempted murder (as stipulated lesser-included offenses of
Counts 3 and 4), which were presented in the juvenile-court complaint, found to be
supported by probable cause, and included in the bindover entry.
        {¶ 12} Notwithstanding his acquittal on the aggravated murder charge, Mr. Berry
contends that subjecting him to charges in adult court that carry a more severe penalty than
charges the juvenile court found probable cause to support violated the plain language of
former R.C. 2151.23(H) and his constitutional due process rights. He also takes issue with
the fact that the “element of prior calculation and design” necessary to prove the aggravated
murder offense charged in Count 4 “was not presented to the [j]uvenile [c]ourt yet it was
indicted with that additional element by the grand jury.” (Appellant’s Brief at 8.)
        A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
        {¶ 13} Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s power to entertain and
adjudicate a particular class of cases on the merits.3 State v. Harper, 

,
¶ 23; Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 

, ¶ 19, citing Morrison v. Steiner, 

 (1972). Because a court is powerless to hear a case without subject-matter
jurisdiction, “ ‘[a] court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is determined without regard to the
rights of the individual parties involved in a particular case.’ ” Corder v. Ohio Edison Co.,

, ¶ 14, quoting Kuchta at ¶ 19. “Instead, ‘the focus is on whether the forum
itself is competent to hear the controversy.’ ” Id. at ¶ 14, quoting Harper at ¶ 23, citing 18A
Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, Section 4428, at 6 (3d Ed.2017)
(“Jurisdictional analysis should be confined to the rules that actually allocate judicial
authority among different courts.”).                  Simply put, the existence of subject-matter
jurisdiction is a “ ‘ “condition precedent to [any] court’s ability to hear the case. If a court
acts without jurisdiction, then any proclamation by that court is void.” ’ ” Harper at ¶ 23,
quoting Pratts v. Hurley, 

, ¶ 11, quoting State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster,

 (1998).



3 In comparison, “[a] court’s jurisdiction over a particular case refers to the court’s authority to proceed or rule

on a case that is within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.” Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 

,
¶ 19, citing Pratts v. Hurley, 

, ¶ 12. Unlike subject-matter jurisdiction, jurisdiction over a
particular case involves consideration of the rights of the parties. Id. at ¶ 19. “Personal jurisdiction” refers to a
court’s power to render a valid judgment against a particular individual. See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 2020-
Ohio-4784, ¶ 36.
No. 23AP-149                                                                                         6

       {¶ 14} An appellate court reviews the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction de novo.
Hulbert v. Buehrer, 

 (10th Dist.), quoting Klosterman v. TurnkeyOhio, L.L.C., 

, ¶ 19 (10th Dist.). See also Pointer v. Smith, 2021-Ohio-
2247, ¶ 8 (10th Dist.), citing Pankey v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 

(10th Dist.).

           B. Jurisdiction of Juvenile and Adult Courts Over Cases Involving
              Juveniles
       {¶ 15} Common pleas courts “have such original jurisdiction over all justiciable
matters . . . as may be provided by law.” Ohio Const., art. IV, § 4(B). “Article IV, Section
4(B) of the Ohio Constitution grants exclusive authority to the General Assembly to allocate
certain subject matters to the exclusive original jurisdiction of specified divisions of the
courts of common pleas.” State v. Aalim, 

. Thus, when a common
pleas court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to hear a case, “ ‘it is almost
always because a statute explicitly removed that jurisdiction.’ ” Schlegel v. Sweeney, 2022-
Ohio-3841, ¶ 14, quoting Ohio High School Athletic Assn. v. Ruehlman, 

.
       {¶ 16} R.C. 2151.07 establishes Ohio’s juvenile courts, and R.C. 2151.23(A) vests
them with “exclusive original jurisdiction” over matters “[c]oncerning any child who on or
about the date specified in the complaint . . . is alleged . . . to be . . . a delinquent . . . child.”
A “child” is defined as “a person who is under eighteen years of age.” R.C. 2152.02(C)(1).
       {¶ 17} R.C.     2151.23(A)(1)     grants    juvenile    courts    exclusive    subject-matter
jurisdiction over children alleged to be delinquent for committing acts that would constitute
crimes if committed by an adult. But, in some instances, a juvenile court must—or can—
relinquish its exclusive jurisdiction over a case involving a delinquent child and transfer the
case to the adult court for criminal prosecution.              See R.C. 2152.12(A) (addressing
mandatory transfer); R.C. 2152.12(B) (addressing discretionary transfer). For a case
involving a defendant who was 16 years old when he allegedly committed aggravated
murder, murder, attempted aggravated murder, or attempted murder, the juvenile court
must transfer the case to the adult court (i.e., bindover) if the juvenile court finds there is
probable cause to believe the juvenile “committed the act charged.”                               R.C.
No. 23AP-149                                                                                             7

2152.12(A)(1)(a)(i); Former R.C. 2152.02(BB)4 (defining category one offenses subject to
mandatory bindover).
        {¶ 18} Once a juvenile court relinquishes jurisdiction and transfers the case to adult
court, “[t]he transfer abates the jurisdiction of the juvenile court with respect to the
delinquent acts alleged in the complaint.” R.C. 2152.12(I)(2).“Upon the transfer, all further
proceedings pertaining to the act charged . . . shall be discontinued in the juvenile court . . .
[and] . . . the case then shall be within the jurisdiction of the court to which it is transferred.”
R.C. 2152.12(I)(2).
        {¶ 19} Former R.C. 2151.23(H), which was in effect when the offenses in this case
occurred, “sets forth the jurisdiction of the adult court by describing the adult court’s
‘jurisdiction subsequent to the transfer.’ ” Smith, 

 at ¶ 34, quoting former
R.C. 2151.23(H). That provision provides, in relevant part, as follows:

                The court to which the case is transferred for criminal
                prosecution pursuant to that section has jurisdiction
                subsequent to the transfer to hear and determine the case in
                the same manner as if the case originally had been commenced
                in that court . . . , including, but not limited to, jurisdiction to
                accept a plea of guilty or another plea authorized by Criminal
                Rule 11 or another section of the Revised Code and jurisdiction
                to accept a verdict and to enter a judgment of conviction
                pursuant to the Rules of Criminal Procedure against the child
                for the commission of the offense that was the basis of the
                transfer of the case for criminal prosecution, whether the
                conviction is for the same degree or a lesser degree of the
                offense charged, for the commission of a lesser-included
                offense, or for the commission of another offense that is
                different from the offense charged.

Former R.C. 2151.23(H). Pointedly, former R.C. 2151.23(H) permits a juvenile to be
convicted of an offense in adult court that is “different from the offense charged” in the
juvenile-court complaint.
        {¶ 20} Notwithstanding the broad statutory language of former R.C. 2151.23(H), the
Supreme Court held in Smith that an adult court lacked jurisdiction over charged offenses
when the juvenile court found no probable cause to believe the juvenile had committed


4 At the time of Mr. Berry’s 2004 juvenile bindover proceedings, category-one offenses were defined in R.C.

2152.02(BB). Today, they are specified in R.C. 2152.02(AA).
No. 23AP-149                                                                                             8

those offenses. Smith, 

 at ¶ 2, 44. In Burns, the court clarified its holding
in Smith, explaining that under R.C. 2151.23(H), a juvenile may be convicted in adult court
on charges not presented to the juvenile court but returned by the grand jury if the charges
were “rooted in the acts that were the subject of the juvenile complaint.”5 Burns, 2022-
Ohio-4606 at ¶ 13. See also State v. Williams, 

 (reaffirming Burns
based on the principle of stare decisis). But see State v. Macklin, 

 (Kennedy, C.J., concurring in judgment only in part and dissenting in part) (opining
that Smith and Burns should be overruled because both decisions “grafted new limits onto
the straightforward language” of Ohio’s former juvenile bindover statutes).
        {¶ 21} Most recently, in State v. Taylor, 

, the court concluded the
adult court had jurisdiction to convict a juvenile of felony murder even though the state
did not present that charge in the juvenile court, meaning there was no explicit finding of
probable cause (or lack thereof) regarding that offense by the juvenile court. Id. at ¶ 7, 14-
15. The juvenile-court complaint charged Taylor with purposely causing the shooting death
of another. See id. at ¶ 7, 14-15. The juvenile court found that, in light of evidence
suggesting Taylor provided the firearm found at the murder scene to another shooter, there
was probable cause to believe Taylor was complicit in the murder offense. See id. at ¶ 4-6,
16. However, the juvenile court did not find probable cause to believe Taylor actually
pulled the trigger that resulted in the victim’s death. Id. at ¶ 16.
        {¶ 22} Nonetheless, after the matter was transferred to adult court, Taylor was
indicted on aggravated murder, purposeful murder, and felony murder. Id. at ¶ 8. And, at
his trial, the state proceeded under alterative theories of guilt: Taylor either shot the victim
himself (i.e., was the principal offender) or was complicit in the victim’s death by providing
the firearm to the actual shooter. See id. at ¶ 16. A jury found Taylor guilty of felony murder,
but acquitted him of aggravated murder and purposeful murder. Id. at ¶ 9. Of note, the
jury verdict forms did not require the jury to specify whether it found Taylor guilty as the




5 After Smith and Burns were decided, the General Assembly amended the statutes providing for discretionary

and mandatory bindovers to adult court. See 2022 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 288, effective April 4, 2023. In those
amendments, the General Assembly effectively codified Smith and did not amend the language in R.C.
2151.23(H) that supports the court’s holding in Burns. Those amendments do not affect the bindover in this
case, which occurred in 2004.
No. 23AP-149                                                                                 9

principal offender or under a complicity theory, and Taylor’s trial counsel did not object to
the verdict forms at trial. Id. at ¶ 16-17.
       {¶ 23} Although the Taylor court held the state “could not and should not have
charged Taylor as a principal” after the juvenile court found no probable cause to believe
he was the actual shooter, it did not consider whether the jury’s finding of guilt was based
on a principal-offender theory given the ambiguous verdict forms and unclear record. Id.
at ¶ 16-17. Thus, presuming Taylor’s felony-murder conviction was based on a complicity
theory of guilt, the court found the felony-murder offense was “rooted in the same acts and
events” as the complicity-to-commit-purposeful-murder offense the juvenile court found
was supported by probable cause—namely, the fatal shooting of the victim. See id. at ¶ 15.
Because both charges relied “on the same set of facts that was present in the juvenile-court
complaint,” the Taylor court found the adult court had jurisdiction over the felony-murder
charge under former R.C. 2151.23(H), Smith, and Burns. See id. at ¶ 15, 18-20.
       C. Analysis
       {¶ 24} On appeal, Mr. Berry generally contends the adult court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the aggravated murder count alleging he purposely caused the
death of F.F. with prior calculation and design. (See Appellant’s Brief at v, 7; Reply Brief at
3-4.) He says his jurisdictional challenge is limited to the inclusion of that count in the
indictment. (See Appellant’s Brief at 7; Reply Brief at 3-4.) But he does not explain
precisely what he believes the appropriate remedy for that alleged error should be.
       {¶ 25} The wrinkle in attempting to apply Smith and Burns to this case in the
manner Mr. Berry suggests is that Mr. Berry was not convicted of aggravated murder.
Instead, the jury found him guilty of the stipulated lesser-included offense of purposeful
murder. Again, the juvenile court found probable cause existed to believe Mr. Berry
committed this offense (and the attempted murder of D.G.). And Mr. Berry asserts he “is
not arguing that there was error in the juvenile court proceedings” regarding the bindover
of the murder or attempted murder offenses. (See Reply Brief at 3.) Further, Mr. Berry
concedes that, given the court’s holding in Burns, it was not error to include the weapons
under disability, aggravated robbery, or attempted aggravated murder counts in this
indictment. (See Appellant’s Brief at 6-7.) Yet, Mr. Berry broadly asserts the trial court
No. 23AP-149                                                                                 10

erred in denying his motion to vacate, which argued the adult court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction over all five counts charged in adult court. (See Appellant’s Brief at 15.)
       {¶ 26} Given his inconsistent positions, the opaqueness in Mr. Berry’s arguments,
and lack of clarity in stating his sole assignment of error—which is actually framed as
alleging a due process violation, not voidness due to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction—it
is difficult to grasp exactly what error he intends to claim. Instructive on his position is Mr.
Berry’s statement of the issue presented in this case: “Did the trial court err in finding the
[adult] court had subject-matter jurisdiction over [Mr. Berry’s] Aggravated Murder
charge when the only lesser[-]included offense of Murder for the death of [F.F.] was heard
and bound over by the Juvenile Court?” (Emphasis added.) (Appellant’s Brief at v.) We
can easily conclude it did not.
       {¶ 27} The crux of Mr. Berry’s argument rests on the last sentence of former R.C.
2151.23(H). (See Appellant’s Brief at 12-14.) That provision states, in relevant part:

              The court to which the case is transferred for criminal
              prosecution pursuant to that section has jurisdiction
              subsequent to the transfer to hear and determine the case in
              the same manner as if the case originally had been commenced
              in that court, including, but not limited to, jurisdiction to
              accept a plea of guilty or another plea authorized by Criminal
              Rule 11 or another section of the Revised Code and
              jurisdiction to accept a verdict and to enter a
              judgment of conviction pursuant to the Rules of Criminal
              Procedure against the child for the commission of the
              offense that was the basis of the transfer of the case
              for criminal prosecution, whether the conviction is for the
              same degree or a lesser degree of the offense charged, for the
              commission of a lesser-included offense, or for the
              commission of another offense that is different from
              the offense charged.

(Emphasis added.) Former R.C. 2151.23(H).
       {¶ 28} Mr. Berry posits that this provision “precludes the indictment and conviction
for a higher degree of a charge that was presented to the Juvenile Court” because aggravated
murder (1) is not the same or lesser degree of the murder offense charged, (2) is not a lesser-included offense, and (3) is not, according to Mr. Berry, “another offense that is different”
from murder based on the Smith court’s interpretation of that provision. (See Appellant’s
Brief at 12-13.) Specifically, Mr. Berry points to the Smith court’s observation that the
No. 23AP-149                                                                              11

language in former R.C. 2151.23(H) “gives adult courts flexibility in resolving cases by
allowing them to accept a plea to or convict the defendant of an offense that is either a
lesser degree of, a lesser included offense of, or an offense different from the offense
charged that was rooted in the offense that was the basis of the transfer.” (Emphasis
added.) (Appellant’s Brief at 13, quoting Smith, 

 at ¶ 33-35.)
       {¶ 29} But fatal to Mr. Berry’s position is the fact that he was not convicted of
aggravated murder. He argues that “[n]othing in [former] R.C. 2151.23(H) or the passage
from Smith above authorizes an adult court to enter a judgment on a higher
degree/more severe offense than the offense that was the basis of the transfer.” (Appellant’s
Brief at 13-14.) But, even assuming he was correct—though, we do not hold that he is—the
adult court in this case did not enter a judgment of conviction against him on a higher-degree or more severe offense than the one that was the basis of the transfer. And, we do
not read former R.C. 2151.23(H) or understand Smith and its progeny as imposing a
jurisdictional bar on an adult court’s ability to preside over an entire case merely because
the indictment included charges for offenses that were not properly before it. Indeed,
despite vacating the defendant’s conviction for an offense the juvenile court had previously
determined was not supported by probable cause, the Burns court still affirmed the
defendant’s convictions for other offenses, most of which had not been presented to the
juvenile court. See Burns, 

. Similarity, in Taylor, the court
affirmed the defendant’s felony-murder conviction (predicated on, it presumed, a
complicity theory) notwithstanding its determination that “the state could not and should
not have charged [him] as a principal” since the juvenile court found no probable cause to
believe he was the principal offender. See Taylor, 

.
       {¶ 30} We recognize that because Mr. Berry was indicted with aggravated murder,
he faced the possibility of harsher penalties than he would have faced had the indictment
merely charged him with murder.        And we acknowledge that the element of “prior
calculation and design” required for the aggravated murder charge alleged in Count 4 of the
indictment was not presented to the juvenile court. But former R.C. 2151.23(H) only
pertains to an adult court’s jurisdiction to “accept a plea of guilty or another plea
authorized” by Crim.R. 11 and “to accept a verdict and to enter a judgment of conviction.”
Because Mr. Berry was not convicted of aggravated murder, we therefore decline to address
No. 23AP-149                                                                                12

whether, had Mr. Berry been convicted of aggravated murder under the facts and
circumstances of this case, the trial court would have had jurisdiction to sentence Mr. Berry
for that offense. Any opinion would be merely advisory.
       {¶ 31} “ ‘[I]t is the duty of every judicial tribunal to decide actual controversies
between parties legitimately affected by specific facts and to render judgments which can
be carried into effect.’ ” State v. Maddox, 

, quoting Fortner v. Thomas,

 (1970). As a result, we decide actual controversies and will not render
advisory opinions. See, e.g., Cascioli v. Cent. Mut. Ins. Co., 

 (1983);
Armco, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 

 (1982); 

.
       {¶ 32} Based on the foregoing, we find the jurisdictional issue raised in this appeal
is not justiciable. We further find that because the juvenile court found probable cause to
believe that Mr. Berry had committed the purposeful murder of F.F. and attempted murder
of D.G. with firearm specifications before the case were transferred, the adult court had
jurisdiction to “accept a verdict and to enter a judgment of conviction” for those offenses
and their attendant firearm specifications. See former R.C. 2151.23(H); Burns, 2022-Ohio-
4606 at ¶ 14. And, there is no dispute that the weapons under disability offense for which
Mr. Burns was also found guilty by the trial court was “rooted in the acts that were the
subject of the juvenile complaint but were not specifically named in the individual acts
transferred.” 

, citing State v. Weaver, 

 (6th Dist.), and
Smith, 

 at ¶ 35. Thus, we find the adult court had jurisdiction “to enter a
judgment of conviction” against Mr. Berry for that third-degree felony offense, as it was “a
lesser degree of the offense[s] charged” in the juvenile-court complaint. See former R.C.
2151.23(H).
       {¶ 33} Having found no jurisdictional defect in the bindover process, the trial court
did not err in construing Mr. Berry’s motion to vacate as a petition for postconviction relief.
Postconviction proceedings in Ohio constitute “a collateral civil attack on the judgment.”
State v. Calhoun, 

 (1999). The statutory framework governing
postconviction proceedings provides a structured system for postconviction relief. Found
in R.C. 2953.21 and 2953.23, Ohio’s statutory scheme permits individuals convicted of
criminal offenses to petition for postconviction relief if they fall within one of four
statutorily defined categories. State v. Miller, 

 (Kennedy, C.J.,
No. 23AP-149                                                                                13

concurring in judgment only), citing R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(a)(i) through (iv).          But this
statutory scheme imposes significant limitations. Petitioners are generally restricted to a
single petition, and strict time constraints apply for filing. State v. Johnson, 2024-Ohio-
134, ¶ 1, citing R.C. 2953.23 and 2953.21(A)(2).
       {¶ 34} In this case, Mr. Berry’s motion to vacate his conviction is a collateral attack
on his judgment of conviction, but it does not fall under any of the four statutory categories
for postconviction relief. In any event, it is untimely—by nearly two decades—under R.C.
2953.21(A)(2), and Mr. Berry did not argue that either of the exceptions in R.C. 2953.23(A)
that permit untimely postconviction petitions applied. Thus, we conclude the trial court
properly found that, pursuant to R.C. 2953.23(A) and 2953.21(D), it lacked authority to
consider Mr. Berry’s untimely postconviction petition.
       {¶ 35} Finally, we note that although Mr. Berry alleges a due process violation in his
sole assignment of error, he does not present any arguments or cite to any authority in
support of such contention, as required by App.R. 16(A). And Mr. Berry did not argue in
the court below that indicting a juvenile in adult court on a higher-degree offense than was
presented to the juvenile court violates his right to the due course of law under Article I,
Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution or due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. We therefore decline to address, in the
first instance, his unargued and unsupported due-process claim. See, e.g., Atlantica, LLC
v. Salahuddin, 

 (10th Dist.); State v. R.L.W., 

(10th Dist.).
       {¶ 36} For all of these reasons, we overrule Mr. Berry’s sole assignment of error.

III. CONCLUSION
       {¶ 37} Having overruled Mr. Berry’s sole assignment of error, we affirm the
February 10, 2023 judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.

                                                                        Judgment affirmed.
                               DORRIAN, J., concurs.
                        JAMISON, P.J., concurs in judgment only.