[Cite as State v. Caudill,
2025-Ohio-787.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
SHELBY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
CASE NO. 17-24-08
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
JACQUELINE M. CAUDILL, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
STATE OF OHIO,
CASE NO. 17-24-09
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
JACQUELINE M. CAUDILL, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeals from Shelby County Common Pleas Court
Criminal Division
Trial Court Nos. 23CR000056 and 23CR000059
Judgments Affirmed
Date of Decision: March 10, 2025
APPEARANCES:
Michael J. Scarpelli for Appellant
Madison S. Brinkman for Appellee
Case Nos. 17-24-08, 17-24-09
MILLER, J.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Jacqueline M. Caudill (“Caudill”), appeals from
the June 26, 2024 judgments issued by the Shelby County Court of Common Pleas
in two criminal cases brought against her. Caudill argues her convictions for
obstructing justice, assault on a police officer, and resisting arrest were not
supported by sufficient evidence and were against the manifest weight of the
evidence. She also argues the trial court clearly erred by allowing allegedly
improper remarks during the State’s opening statement and closing argument. For
the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Indictments and Consolidation for Trial
{¶2} On February 16, 2023, in trial court case number 23-CR-56, the Shelby
County grand jury indicted Caudill on a single count of obstructing justice, in
violation of R.C. 2921.32(A)(1), a fifth-degree felony. This count arose from an
incident that occurred on January 26, 2023. Then, on March 2, 2023, in trial court
case number 23-CR-59, the Shelby County grand jury indicted Caudill on four
additional counts arising from separate incidents: (a) intimidation of a witness in a
criminal case, in violation of R.C. 2921.04(B)(1), a third-degree felony; (b)
obstructing justice, in violation of R.C. 2921.32(A)(6), a third-degree felony; (c)
assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A)(5), a fourth-degree felony; and (d) resisting
arrest, in violation of R.C. 2921.33(A), a second-degree misdemeanor.
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{¶3} On January 30, 2024, the trial court granted Caudill’s motion for
severance and separate trials. The trial court severed the first two counts in case
number 23-CR-59, and it consolidated the last two counts in case number 23-CR-
59 with the single count in case number 23-CR-56 for purposes of trial.
{¶4} On May 14-15, 2024, the case proceeded to a jury trial on those three
counts: (1) obstructing justice from case number 23-CR-56; (2) assault on a police
officer and (3) resisting arrest both from case number 23-CR-59. The assault and
resisting arrest charges arose together from a separate, but related, incident from the
obstructing justice charge. Both incidents were captured on multiple law
enforcement body cameras, and video clips from those cameras were played for the
jury and admitted into evidence at the trial. At the time of the incidents, Caudill
was the fiancé of Joseph Yelton (“Yelton”).
B. January 26, 2023
{¶5} The obstructing justice charge arose from an interaction between
Caudill and law enforcement on January 26, 2023 at Yelton’s mother’s residence.
The residence was one of three apartments in a one-level apartment building. It was
a very small apartment, with two bedrooms, two exterior doors (front and back), and
only three interior doors. That evening, law enforcement officers arrived to serve
Yelton with an arrest warrant. While one officer was stationed at the rear of the
apartment in case someone tried to exit, three other officers approached the front
door.
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{¶6} At 7:42 p.m., Caudill opened the front door in response to knocking by
an officer. Upon being asked if Yelton was at the house, Caudill responded “no.”
(State’s Exhibit 1). The officer explained to Caudill that the truck Yelton sometimes
drove was parked in front of the apartment and they were there to serve Yelton with
“paperwork.” Caudill engaged the officers in conversation for a few minutes,
during which she asked if they were going to arrest Yelton. The officer responded
that, if the paperwork was an arrest warrant then absolutely they would, to which
Caudill replied: “Well, that’s not gonna f****** happen.” (Id.). Caudill
subsequently told the officers multiple times that Yelton was not at the apartment.
When directly asked where Yelton was, Caudill responded that she did not know.
During the conversation, Caudill indicated that she either knew or highly suspected
that the officers were there to arrest Yelton. For example, she specifically asked
one officer, “What’s the f****** arrest for, Martin?” to which that officer
responded, “It’s more charges for what you are already aware of.” (Id.).
{¶7} After Caudill closed the door on them, the officers still believed Yelton
was actually in the apartment, so they stayed in the area to surveil. Two of the
officers went to an unmarked police vehicle on the street, between the apartment
and a nearby Marathon gas station. One officer testified that the apartment was so
close to that gas station that you could see the entire front of it from the gas station.
According to one of the surveilling officers, they watched the front of the apartment
and never saw anyone walking up or down the street or Yelton entering the
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apartment. A third officer, who also was conducting surveillance, parked on the
same street for a short period and drove up and down the street, before departing.
That officer likewise never saw anyone walking in the area.
{¶8} Only 21 minutes after Caudill had closed the door on the officers,
paramedics received a call to come to the apartment because Yelton’s mother was
having trouble breathing. Paramedics arrived at 8:18 p.m. and entered the residence.
One paramedic at the scene testified that Yelton emerged from a bedroom within
the apartment. Yelton was arrested in the living room shortly thereafter. At trial,
another body-camera video was played that depicted a portion of this scene.
{¶9} At trial, Yelton testified he was at his mother’s house that day and came
there with Caudill in the truck, but he could not recall when they had arrived.
According to Yelton, at one point he left to smoke a marijuana cigar and walk down
the street, but he again could not recall what time that happened. Yelton admitted
he has brain damage and that the marijuana cigar may have made it difficult for him
to remember what happened during this time. Yelton also testified that, when he
left to smoke, he went out the front door, walked around the parking lot in front of
the apartment while smoking, walked down the street to the Marathon gas station,
and—after finishing the cigar—walked back to the apartment and went in its front
door. Yelton said that he then fell asleep in one of the two bedrooms, and he woke
up to a siren and paramedics in the residence. The police soon arrived and arrested
him.
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{¶10} Yelton’s mother testified that she did not actually see Yelton leave the
residence that evening, but, when the officers first arrived, it had been “awhile”
since she had seen him. She thought he had left out the back door, but could not say
for certain.
{¶11} Finally, Caudill testified she and Yelton had arrived at the apartment
together that day. She said that Yelton left, but admitted she did not know if she
actually saw him leave or not. According to Caudill, she knew that Yelton had left
to smoke and claimed that he was not present because she had looked around the
residence—although she did not check in one of the two bedrooms. Caudill
acknowledged that Yelton testified he had returned to the residence through the
front door and that she was sitting in the living room—the very room into which the
front door opens. However, according to Caudill, she did not see Yelton until he
emerged from one of the two bedrooms when the paramedics arrived. She admitted
she “didn’t want law enforcement to arrest” Yelton, adding that “[n]obody wants
nobody to get arrested.” (Trial Tr. at 318).
C. February 24, 2023
{¶12} The assault on a police officer and resisting arrest charges arose from
an interaction between Caudill and law enforcement on February 24, 2023, while
law enforcement officers were in the process of searching her house pursuant to a
search warrant. Video from an officer’s body camera showed Caudill arriving at
her house during the search. She proceeded to have a conversation with Sidney
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Police Department officer Sean Martin (“Officer Martin”), during which Officer
Martin told Caudill to give the officers her cell phone.1 Caudill responded with a
refusal; Officer Martin told her, “Well, then I am going to arrest you and take your
cell phone”; Caudill retorted, “Oh really?”; and Officer Martin told her, “Yes.”
(State’s Exhibit 5; State’s Exhibit 6). Caudill then pulled a cell phone out of her
pocket and started touching it, put it back in her pocket, and told Officer Martin, “I
can f****** do whatever I want with my G** d*** phone.” (Id.). Caudill took the
phone out of her pocket and threw it at Officer Martin’s head. Officer Martin
testified the phone was heading toward his face when he blocked it with his arm.
At the time, Caudill was only about four feet from Officer Martin. Another officer,
who was standing just a few feet away at the time, corroborated Officer Martin’s
testimony that the phone would have hit him in his face.
{¶13} Immediately after Caudill threw the cell phone at Officer Martin, she
pushed an approaching officer, who was informing Caudill that she was being
arrested. Caudill responded, “No, I’m not. Get the f*** off me you piece of s***.”
(Id.). After warning the struggling Caudill—who kicked that officer—that she
could get stunned, Caudill replied: “I don’t give a f***. If you f****** stun me,
dude, I am gonna f****** kick in your mouth.” (Id.). Ultimately, Caudill was
subdued.
1
At trial, Officer Martin testified that Caudill’s cell phone was subject to the search warrant.
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{¶14} At trial, Caudill testified that she had taken her phone out of her pocket
in order to call her father, the officers came at her and were grabbing her, so she
threw her phone. Although she admitted she threw the cell phone with force, she
testified that she did not intend to hit anyone. She also testified that she did not hear
an officer tell her that she was under arrest, despite the body-camera video capturing
that statement and her responding to it. She admitted on cross-examination that the
video shows she was on the ground kicking and that she screamed and kicked one
of the officers while he was arresting her. For his part, Yelton testified that he was
in the back of the police cruiser when this incident happened and witnessed it. He
testified that Caudill “thr[e]w her phone up in the air” and it did not hit anyone.
(Trial Tr. at 150).
{¶15} The jury found Caudill guilty on all three counts. On June 26, 2024,
the trial court sentenced Caudill to five years of community control as to each count.
This appeal followed.
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶16} Caudill raises three assignments of error for our review:
First Assignment of Error
The trial court committed plain error by allowing the State’s improper
comments during opening statements and closing arguments.
Second Assignment of Error
Ms. Caudill’s convictions are not supported by sufficient evidence.
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Third Assignment of Error
Ms. Caudill’s convictions are against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
III. DISCUSSION
{¶17} We address the assignments of error out of order in a manner that
facilitates our analysis.
A. Second Assignment of Error
{¶18} In the second assignment of error, Caudill argues that the State failed
to present sufficient evidence to sustain the verdicts for any of the three counts.
1. Standard of Review
{¶19} Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict is a
question of law. State v. Dent, 2020-Ohio-6670, ¶ 15. Thus, our review is de novo.
Id. A sufficiency challenge disputes whether a party met its burden of production
at trial. State v. Messenger,
2022-Ohio-4562, ¶ 26. “In a sufficiency-of-the-
evidence inquiry, the question is whether the evidence presented, when viewed in a
light most favorable to the prosecution, would allow any rational trier of fact to find
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Dent at ¶ 15, citing
State v. Jenks,
61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. Thus, “[i]n
assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not resolve evidentiary conflicts or
assess the credibility of witnesses.” State v. Jackson,
2023-Ohio-2193, ¶ 26 (3d
Dist.); see also
Jenks at 279.
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2. Applicable Law and Analysis
i. Obstructing justice
{¶20} First, concerning the obstructing justice offense, Caudill argues “there
was substantial evidence to support the conclusion that Ms. Caudill truthfully told
the officers that Yelton had left the residence and she did not know his whereabouts
at the time.” (Appellant’s Brief at 11). She points to her own testimony that Yelton
had left the residence to smoke, as well as Yelton’s corroborating testimony that he
had gone outside to smoke marijuana and walk down the street.
{¶21} The obstructing justice statute provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o
person, with purpose to hinder the discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction,
or punishment of another for crime . . . shall . . . [h]arbor or conceal the other
person.” R.C. 2921.32(A)(1). We have explained that “the true heart of obstructing
justice pursuant to [R.C.] 2921.32(A)(1) is the defendant’s intent to hinder the
apprehension or discovery, etc. of a person believed to have committed a crime.”
State v. Blanton, 2015-Ohio-4620, ¶ 33 (3d Dist.). There is no requirement that the
defendant’s conduct actually hinder the police, and—unlike subdivision (A)(5) of
the statute—there is no requirement that the defendant make a misstatement or false
statement. Id. at ¶ 32-33; R.C. 2921.32(A)(5).
{¶22} With respect to the offense’s state-of-mind requirement, “[a] person
acts purposely when it is the person’s specific intention to cause a certain result, or,
when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against conduct of a certain nature,
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regardless of what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is the offender’s
specific intention to engage in conduct of that nature.” R.C. 2901.22(A). Intent lies
within the privacy of a person’s own thoughts. Blanton at ¶ 30 (affirming
obstructing justice conviction). “It is difficult to prove a person’s subjective mental
state through direct evidence.” State v. Baughman,
2010-Ohio-1259, ¶ 33 (3d Dist.).
“As a result, intent can be proven by the surrounding facts and circumstances of the
case.”
Blanton at ¶ 30; see also
Baughman at ¶ 33.
{¶23} We find the evidence presented, when viewed in a light most favorable
to the prosecution, would allow a rational trier of fact to find the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt—specifically, that Caudill concealed Yelton
with purpose to hinder his discovery or apprehension for crime. After learning the
police were there to arrest Yelton, Caudill told the officers she had arrived and been
with him at the apartment but denied multiple times that Yelton was there; Caudill
never mentioned to the police that Yelton had left the apartment to smoke, as she
claimed at trial; and, multiple police officers testified they surveilled the apartment
and surrounding area from the time they spoke with Caudill until Yelton was found
inside the very small apartment a mere 25 minutes later. Thus, there was sufficient
evidence to show Yelton had been in the apartment the entire time and to reasonably
infer from the surrounding facts and circumstances that Caudill knew that.
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ii. Assault on a police officer
{¶24} Turning to the assault-on-a-police-officer offense, Caudill attacks the
state-of-mind element. She specifically says “the jury clearly lost its way in finding
that Ms. Caudill knowingly caused or attempted to cause physical harm to a police
officer.” (Emphasis in original.) (Appellant’s Brief at 10). She relies on testimony
from Yelton, who witnessed the incident from the back of a police vehicle.
{¶25} Criminal assault occurs when a person knowingly causes, or attempts
to cause, physical harm to another. R.C. 2903.13(A). The assault is a fourth-degree
felony when the victim is a police officer. R.C. 2903.13(C)(5)(a). “A person acts
knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the person’s
conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature.”
R.C. 2901.22(B). The term “physical harm” means “any injury, illness, or other
physiological impairment, regardless of its gravity or duration.” R.C.
2901.01(A)(3).
{¶26} After examining the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, we conclude that the evidence was more than sufficient to prove
Caudill acted knowingly. The body-camera video showed that Officer Martin told
Caudill she was going to have to give the officers her cell phone, she refused and
pulled her cell phone out of her pocket, wound up with officers approaching her,
and threw the phone with force at Officer Martin’s face from only a few feet away—
only striking him in the arm instead of the face because he was able to deflect it.
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Body-camera videos and officer testimony demonstrate Caudill knowingly caused
or attempted to cause physical harm to a police officer when she threw her cell
phone—overhand with force—at Officer Martin and struck him. See State v.
Browne, 2024-Ohio-5758, ¶ 13-18 (3d Dist.) (evidence was sufficient to convict
defendant of assault on a police officer where the defendant shouted obscenities,
closed his fist, and flailed his arms, striking the officer).
iii. Resisting arrest
{¶27} Finally, regarding the resisting-arrest offense, Caudill once again
attacks the state-of-mind element. She contends “there was substantial evidence
negating the notion that Ms. Caudill either recklessly or forcibly interfered with her
own arrest.” (Appellant’s Brief at 11).
{¶28} The statute for resisting arrest provides that “[n]o person, recklessly or
by force, shall resist or interfere with a lawful arrest of the person or another.” R.C.
2921.33(A). “A person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the
consequences, the person disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
person’s conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a certain
nature.” R.C. 2901.22(C). The term “‘force’ means any violence, compulsion, or
constraint physically exerted by any means upon or against a person or thing.” R.C.
2901.01(A)(1); see also State v. Pierce, 2017-Ohio-4223, ¶ 19 (3d Dist.) (finding
sufficient evidence that defendant employed force against the police). An arrest is
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lawful if the surrounding circumstances would give a reasonable police officer cause
to believe that an offense has been or is being committed. Pierce at ¶ 21.
{¶29} After examining the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, we conclude that the evidence was more than sufficient to prove
Caudill acted either recklessly or by force in resisting or interfering with her arrest.
The body-camera footage admitted into evidence at trial showed that, immediately
after Caudill had thrown her cell phone at Officer Martin, she pushed an
approaching officer who was informing her that she was being arrested. Caudill
also kicked that officer in the ensuing struggle.
{¶30} Caudill’s second assignment of error is overruled.
B. Third Assignment of Error
{¶31} In the third assignment of error, Caudill asserts that the convictions for
each of the three counts were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
1. Standard of Review
{¶32} The “manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard of review applies to
the state’s burden of persuasion.” Messenger, 2022-Ohio-4562, at ¶ 26. “[W]e
review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider
the credibility of witnesses, and determine whether in resolving conflicts in the
evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest
miscarriage of justice that we must reverse the conviction and order a new trial.”
State v. Wilks,
2018-Ohio-1562, ¶ 168. Yet, “[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the
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evidence ‘weighs heavily against the conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn
the trial court’s judgment.” State v. Haller, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.), quoting
State v. Hunter,
2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119. To reverse a judgment from a jury trial on
the weight of the evidence, all three appellate judges must concur. Ohio Const., art.
IV, § 3(B)(3).
2. Analysis
{¶33} After reviewing the record, weighing the evidence and all reasonable
inferences, and considering the credibility of witnesses, we find that none of
Caudill’s convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence. In resolving
conflicts in the evidence, the jury did not clearly lose its way or create such a
manifest injustice that we must reverse the convictions. The jury was able to watch
videos of the incidents and hear testimony from virtually all the participants in the
events at issue.
{¶34} We note that the testimony upon which Caudill relies to support her
argument regarding the obstructing justice offense is internally conflicting. While
Yelton’s mother testified she thought Yelton had left through the back door (and
never actually saw him leave the apartment), Yelton testified that he both left and
returned through the front door when he went to smoke a marijuana cigar while
walking down to the gas station and back. The officers’ testimony concerning their
surveillance and never seeing Yelton reenter the apartment cast serious doubt as to
the truthfulness of Yelton’s testimony. Caudill’s trial testimony that Yelton left the
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apartment at some point to go smoke was incompatible with her failure to mention
this detail to the officers when they arrived looking for Yelton and she denied he
was in the apartment.
{¶35} Ultimately, despite being presented with two different scenarios
concerning Caudill’s mental state for each of the three offenses, the jury did not
clearly lose its way or create a manifest miscarriage of justice in resolving conflicts
in the evidence. See State v. Sergent, 2019-Ohio-4717, ¶ 32 (3d Dist.) (defendant’s
conviction for assaulting a police officer was “not against the manifest weight of the
evidence simply because the trier of fact believed the testimony of the prosecution’s
witnesses”); State v. Sepulveda,
2023-Ohio-3429, ¶ 23-25 (3d Dist.) (conviction for
resisting arrest was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, where officer’s
version of events was supported by body-camera footage and contradicted at least
some of defendant’s testimony). The evidence certainly does not weigh heavily
against the convictions.
{¶36} Caudill’s third assignment of error is overruled.
C. First Assignment of Error
{¶37} In the first assignment of error, Caudill argues that the trial court
committed plain error by allowing allegedly improper comments during the State’s
opening statement and closing argument. At the very beginning of his opening
statement, the prosecutor said:
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Case Nos. 17-24-08, 17-24-09
Defund the police, riots in Minneapolis, Chicago, Seattle. Massive
lack of respect for school teachers and administrators across the
nation. Even locally we’ve seen a massive uptick in people who don’t
show for jury duty. I think there was eight today. Unfortunately, our
society is gravitating more and more towards a disrespect for
authority, and that’s exactly what you’re gonna see in three separate
incidents from the Defendant.
(Trial Tr. at 97-98). At the end of his opening statement, the prosecutor returned to
the theme of disrespect for authority:
And I’ll suggest to you that [you] can use your common sense and you
will see that there’s – they’re even trying to disrespect the authority
here. They’re trying to convince you that those things didn’t happen
when they did. And so that’s something that we can’t stand for as
citizens of Shelby County. And at the conclusion of this case, we’re
gonna ask that you help deter this kind of behavior and that you find
the Defendant guilty of obstructing justice, assault on a law
enforcement officer, and resisting arrest. Thank you.
(Id. at 100-101). Finally, the prosecutor returned to the same theme at the very
beginning of the State’s closing argument:
Defund the police, rioting, disrespect of teachers and school officials,
cussing at law enforcement, lying to law enforcement, fighting
officers and resisting arrest, throwing items at a cop are all examples
of showing disrespect to authority. Over the last day and a half you’ve
heard testimony, you’ve heard testimony and observed the Defendant,
Jacqueline Caudill, showing a disrespect for authority.
(Id. at 342).
{¶38} Caudill asserts that these comments “were improper and prejudicial to
Mrs. Caudill’s constitutional rights, notwithstanding the lack of contemporaneous
objection from her trial counsel,” so her convictions must be reversed. (Appellant’s
Brief at 6).
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1. Applicable Law
{¶39} The test regarding prosecutorial misconduct in opening statements or
closing arguments is whether the conduct or remarks were improper and, if so,
whether they prejudicially affected substantial rights of the defendant. State v.
Smith, 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14 (1984) (involving closing argument); State v. Nicholson,
2024-Ohio-604, ¶ 266, 281-282 (involving opening statement). “[I]t is not enough
that there be sufficient other evidence to sustain a conviction in order to excuse the
prosecution’s improper remarks.”
Smith at 15. “Instead, it must be clear beyond a
reasonable doubt that, absent the prosecutor’s comments, the jury would have found
[the] defendant guilty.” Id.; State v. Knuff,
2024-Ohio-902, ¶ 238 (a conviction may
be upheld in the face of a prosecutor’s improper remarks when it is clear beyond a
reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a guilty verdict regardless of the
comment).
{¶40} However, when there is no objection at trial to the alleged
prosecutorial misconduct, we review the issue for plain error. Nicholson at ¶ 281
(opening statements); State v. Ballew,
76 Ohio St.3d 244, 254-255,
1996-Ohio-81
(1996) (closing arguments); Crim.R. 52(B). “To qualify for plain-error relief, the
appellant must establish: (1) occurrence of an error, i.e., a deviation from a legal
rule; (2) the error was plain, i.e., it was an obvious defect in the trial proceedings;
and (3) the error affected the appellant’s substantial rights, meaning the error ‘must
have affected the outcome of the trial.’” State v. Cass,
2024-Ohio-2614, ¶ 57 (3d
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Dist.), quoting State v. Morgan, 2017-Ohio-7565, ¶ 36. Additionally, the decision
to correct a plain error is discretionary and should be made with the utmost caution,
under exceptional circumstances, and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of
justice. State v. Noling,
2002-Ohio-7044, ¶ 62.
{¶41} “Opening statements serve to inform the jury about the nature of the
case and to outline the facts that each party intends to prove.” (Emphasis deleted.)
Nicholson at ¶ 282. “And unless it appears that counsel ‘deliberately attempt[ed] to
influence and sway the jury by a recital of matters foreign to the case,’ remarks
made during opening statements cannot form the basis of a misconduct claim.”
Id.,
quoting Maggio v. Cleveland,
151 Ohio St. 136 (1949), paragraph two of the
syllabus.
{¶42} In closing arguments, “[t]he prosecution is normally entitled to a
certain degree of latitude.” Smith, 14 Ohio St.3d at 13-14 (identifying types of
remarks to be avoided). A prosecutor may comment upon the evidence and suggest
the conclusion to be drawn from it. State v. Stevens,
2016-Ohio-446, ¶ 71 (3d Dist.).
However, “[a] closing argument that goes beyond the record may constitute
prejudicial error,” “particularly where the remarks call for the jury to convict to meet
a public demand.” State v. Moritz,
63 Ohio St.2d 150, 157 (1980). “The closing
argument must, however, be reviewed in its entirety to determine if the prosecutor’s
remarks were prejudicial.”
Id.
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2. Analysis
{¶43} The State’s theme during its opening statement and closing argument
was disrespect for authority—something that certainly related to all three offenses
at issue and the nature of the case. It is also clear that, in establishing this theme,
the State referred to events unrelated to the case, such as the Defund the Police
movement, rioting in other cities, and “lack of respect for school teachers and
administrators across the nation.” However, the defense did not object to either the
opening statement or closing argument at trial. Therefore, we review the issue only
for plain error.
{¶44} Caudill has not established that she qualifies for plain-error relief.
This is because, even assuming the prosecutor’s comments were inappropriate,
Caudill has not shown a reasonable probability exists that, but for those comments,
the result of the trial would have been different. See Stevens, 2016-Ohio-446, at ¶
75, 77 (3d Dist.); Knuff,
2024-Ohio-902, at ¶ 250 (although prosecutor’s reference
to a television show about a serial killer—that defendant alleged characterized him
as a serial killer—was irrelevant to the case, “the state’s single passing mention of
that show did not deny [defendant] a fair trial and does not amount to plain error”).
The body-camera footage, officers’ testimony, and even some of Yelton’s and
Caudill’s testimony provided strong evidence in support of the jury’s verdicts.
Thus, even assuming there was plain error in allowing the prosecutor’s comments,
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Case Nos. 17-24-08, 17-24-09
we find beyond a reasonable doubt that, absent the prosecutor’s comments, the jury
would have found Caudill guilty. Knuff, 2024-Ohio-902, at ¶ 238.
{¶45} Caudill’s third assignment of error is overruled.
IV. CONCLUSION
{¶46} For the foregoing reasons, Caudill’s assignments of error are
overruled. Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars
assigned and argued, we affirm the judgments of the Shelby County Court of
Common Pleas.
Judgments Affirmed
WALDICK, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.
/jlm
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