State v. Mohler

[Cite as State v. Mohler, 

.]




                       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                LOGAN COUNTY




STATE OF OHIO,
                                                          CASE NO. 8-24-35
         PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

    v.

BRIANA K. MOHLER,                                         OPINION

         DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.




                  Appeal from Logan County Common Pleas Court
                                  General Division
                           Trial Court No. CR 24 02 0025

                                      Judgment Affirmed

                             Date of Decision: March 10, 2025




APPEARANCES:

         Alison Boggs for Appellant

         Eric C. Stewart for Appellee
Case No. 8-24-35



MILLER, J.

       {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Briana K. Mohler (“Mohler”), appeals the May

28, 2024 judgment of sentence of the Logan County Court of Common Pleas. For

the reasons that follow, we affirm.

                           Facts and Procedural History

       {¶2} This case stems from a January 25, 2024 vehicle collision that resulted

in the death of 17-year-old Chloe Hodges (“Hodges”). Mohler, who was under the

influence of multiple drugs, was driving northbound when she crossed the center

and veered completely into the opposite lane of travel, striking Hodges’s vehicle

head on. Several days later, Hodges died from the resulting injuries.

       {¶3} On February 13, 2024, Mohler was indicted on four counts: Count One

of operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse or a

combination of them (“OVI”) in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), (G)(1)(b), a

first-degree misdemeanor; Count Two of driving under suspension in violation of

R.C. 4510.111(A), (C)(1), an unclassified misdemeanor; Count Three of aggravated

vehicular homicide in violation of R.C. 2903.06(A)(1)(a), (B)(2)(b)(i), a first-degree

felony; and Count Four of involuntary manslaughter in violation of R.C.

2903.04(B), (C), (D), a third-degree felony. Mohler entered not-guilty pleas at the

arraignment hearing on February 13, 2024, and written not-guilty pleas were

subsequently filed by trial counsel.


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        {¶4} At a change-of-plea hearing on April 23, 2024, pursuant to a negotiated-

plea agreement, Mohler withdrew her not-guilty plea and entered guilty pleas to

Count One, Count Two, and Count Three. The trial court accepted her guilty pleas

and found her guilty thereof. In exchange, the State made an oral motion for the

dismissal of Count Four (involuntary manslaughter), which the trial court granted.

        {¶5} On May 28, 2024, Mohler appeared for sentencing. With respect to

Count Three, aggravated vehicular homicide, the trial court imposed an indefinite

prison term of 11 to 16 ½ years and a lifetime driver’s license suspension. The trial

court sentenced Mohler to serve 180 days in jail for Count One and zero days in jail

for Count Two.1 The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently for an

indefinite term of 11 to 16 ½ years. The judgment entry of sentence was filed that

same day.

        {¶6} Mohler filed a notice of appeal on June 20, 2024. She raises a single

assignment of error.

                                   Assignment of Error

        The trial court erred when it sentenced Appellant to the
        maximum sentence on the single felony count.

        {¶7} In her assignment of error, Mohler argues that the trial court erred by

sentencing her to the maximum sentence. Specifically, she argues that her sentence

with respect to Count Three (aggravated vehicular homicide) is contrary to law


1
  R.C. 4510.111(C)(1) only authorizes a fine and community service for an unclassified-misdemeanor
violation of R.C. 4510.111(A).

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because the trial court elevated the seriousness of the offense by considering the fact

of Hodges’s death when constructing her sentence. Mohler also contends that the

trial court erred by not articulating that it considered “each and every factor” before

fashioning the sentence, and did not properly weigh the mitigating factors when

determining her sentence. For the reasons that follow, we disagree.

                                 Standard of Review

       {¶8} Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may reverse a sentence

“only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not

support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is

otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Marcum, 

. Clear and

convincing evidence is that “‘which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a

firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’” Id. at ¶ 22,

quoting Cross v. Ledford, 

 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.

                                 Relevant Authority

       {¶9} “‘Trial courts have full discretion to impose any sentence within the

statutory range.’” State v. Smith, 

, quoting State v. Noble,

. A sentence imposed within the statutory range is generally

valid so long as the trial court considered the applicable sentencing policies that

apply to every felony sentencing, including those contained in R.C. 2929.11, and

the sentencing factors of 2929.12. See State v. Watts, 

, ¶ 10 and 14

(3d Dist.); State v. Maggette, 

 (3d Dist.).

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       {¶10} R.C. 2929.11 provides, in pertinent part, that the “overriding purposes

of felony sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and

others, to punish the offender, and to promote the effective rehabilitation of the

offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those

purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government

resources.”   R.C. 2929.11(A).     To achieve the overriding purposes of felony

sentencing, R.C. 2929.11 directs courts to “consider the need for incapacitating the

offender, deterring the offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the

offender, and making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, or both.”

 In addition, R.C. 2929.11(B) instructs that a sentence imposed for a felony “shall

be reasonably calculated to achieve the three overriding purposes of felony

sentencing . . ., commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the

offender’s conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with sentences

imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.”

       {¶11} “In accordance with these principles, the trial court must consider the

factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12(B)-(E) relating to the seriousness of the offender’s

conduct and the likelihood of the offender’s recidivism.” 

, citing R.C.

2929.12(A). In addition, the trial court must consider “the factors set forth in [R.C.

2929.12(F)] pertaining to the offender’s service in the armed forces of the United

States.” R.C. 2929.12(A). “‘A sentencing court has broad discretion to determine

the relative weight to assign the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12.’” Smith at ¶

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15, quoting State v. Brimacombe, 

, ¶ 18 (6th Dist.), citing State v.

Arnett, 

 (2000). Neither statute “requires a trial court to

make any specific factual findings on the record.” State v. Jones, 

; see also R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.

       {¶12} In considering R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 as they relate to felony-

sentencing appeals, the Supreme Court of Ohio has further limited appellate review

by holding that “R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) clearly does not provide a basis for an

appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence if it concludes that the record does

not support the sentence under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12,” and subdivision (b)

“does not provide a basis for an appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence based

on its view that the sentence is not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and

2929.12.” 

 (“an appellate court’s conclusion that the record

does not support a sentence under R.C. 2929.11 or 2929.12 is not the equivalent of

a conclusion that the sentence is ‘otherwise contrary to law’ as that term is used in

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b)”). Thus, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) does not allow “an appellate

court to independently weigh the evidence in the record and substitute its judgment

for that of the trial court concerning the sentence that best reflects compliance with

R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” Id. at 42; see also State v. Bryant, 

.   However, “when a trial court imposes a sentence based on factors or

considerations that are extraneous to those that are permitted by R.C. 2929.11 and

2929.12, that sentence is contrary to law,” and claims that raise those “types of

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issues are therefore reviewable.” 

 (finding the trial court increased

the sentence based on an impermissible consideration).

                                      Analysis

       {¶13} As an initial matter, we note that Mohler only challenges the sentence

imposed with respect to Count Three. The trial court sentenced Mohler to an

indefinite term of 11 to 16 ½ years in prison for her conviction for aggravated

vehicular homicide. This sentence is within the statutory range for felonies of the

first degree established by R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a).

       {¶14} The record reflects that the trial court considered R.C. 2929.11 and

2929.12 when fashioning Mohler’s sentence.           Specifically, at the sentencing

hearing, the trial court stated that it “considered the purposes and principles of

sentencing as set forth in Ohio Revised Code section[] 2929.11 and Ohio Revised

Code section 2929.12.” (May 28, 2024 Tr. at 64). Furthermore, the trial court

specified several sentencing factors in greater detail as they related to the instant

case. (Id. at 64-65). Moreover, in its judgment entry of sentencing, the trial court

stated that it considered “the principles and purposes of sentencing under R.C.

2929.11 and 2929.12.” (Doc. No. 27). Therefore, because Mohler’s prison sentence

is within the applicable statutory range and the record supports that the trial court

fulfilled its obligation of considering R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, Mohler’s sentence

is valid. See Watts, 

.



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        {¶15} Yet, Mohler argues her prison term for aggravated vehicular homicide

is not supported by the record or is contrary to law because the trial court did not

properly consider the principles and purposes of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 and

2929.12. Mohler contends that the trial court erred by referencing the victim’s death

in support of the finding that Mohler’s conduct was more serious than that normally

constituting the offense because the victim’s death is an element of the crime and,

therefore, could not be used to elevate the seriousness of the offense. See State v.

Polizzi, 

 (11th Dist.), quoting State v. Sims, 

 (4th Dist.) (“there is case law that indicates ‘[a] trial court may not elevate the

seriousness of an offense by pointing to a fact that is also an element of the offense

itself.’”).

        {¶16} However, at the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated “[w]ith

respect to the seriousness factors set forth in Ohio Revised Code section 2929.12(B)

and (C), I find that the victim suffered death and that the relatives and friends of the

victim have suffered unimaginable mental and emotional harm.” (May 28, 2025 Tr.

at 64). Viewing the trial court’s statement in the context of the entire sentencing

hearing, in which many of the victim’s family and friends gave victim impact

statements detailing the effect Hodges’s death at the young age of 17 had on them,

their family, their friends, and their community, we interpret the trial court’s

statement to refer principally to the mental and emotional harm suffered by the

victim’s family, friends, and community. Additionally, the record indicates that the

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victim sustained serious injuries in the vehicle accident and lived for several days

after the crash. See State v. Anthony, 

 (“the trial court’s

references to the victim suffering physical harm that resulted in his death and to

evidence indicating the victim may not have died immediately from his injuries

demonstrate it considered serious physical harm apart from the victim’s death to

elevate the seriousness of Mr. Anthony’s conduct.”). (Emphasis sic.) See State v.

Rutherford, 

 (11th Dist.) (noting that the finding in Polizzi was

limited to trial court’s consecutive-sentence findings and declining to apply that

argument to the appellant’s argument that the trial court’s findings with respect to

R.C. 2929.12 are not supported by the record).

       {¶17} Mohler also contends that the trial court erred by not specifically

denoting the facts it relied on when fashioning the sentence in the sentencing entry.

However, “neither R.C. 2929.11 nor 2929.12 requires a trial court to make any

specific factual findings on the record.” Jones, 

. “A trial

court’s statement that it considered the required statutory factors, without more, is

sufficient to fulfill its obligations under the sentencing statutes.” Maggette, 2016-

Ohio-5554, at ¶ 32 (3d Dist.).

       {¶18} Additionally, Mohler alleges that the trial court did not properly weigh

the mitigating factors when imposing her sentence. Specifically, Mohler argues that

her previous interactions with the court, as both a victim and an offender, and the

complexity of several elements of Mohler’s life, including a history of being a

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victim of abuse and her struggles with substance abuse, should have factored more

heavily into the trial court’s sentence and should have resulted in the imposition of

a lesser sentence. However, the record indicates that the trial court considered

Mohler’s background, including her struggles with substance abuse and her history

of being the victim of domestic abuse. (May 28, 2024 Tr. at 64-66). The trial court

also considered Mohler’s limited criminal history, but noted that she has

“demonstrated [a] pattern of drug and alcohol abuse related to the offense and

refus[ed] to acknowledge that pattern or to successfully complete treatment prior to

the offense.” (Id. at 64-65). The trial court also acknowledged that, at the time of

the incident, Mohler was out on bond in an aggravated-possession-of-drugs case,

and the trial court described its decision to permit her to remain out on bond as a

“mistake” for which it “will always be sorry.” (Id. at 67). Thus, the trial court did

consider the relevant mitigating factors when assessing Mohler’s sentence. We note

that when imposing a felony sentence, “it is ‘the trial court [that] determines the

weight afforded to any particular statutory factors, mitigating grounds, or other

relevant circumstances.’” State v. McKennelly, 

 (12th Dist.),

quoting State v. Steger, 

 (12th Dist.). “The fact that the trial

court chose to weigh various sentencing factors differently than how appellant

would have weighed them does not mean the trial court erred in imposing

appellant’s sentence.” 

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                                    Conclusion

       {¶19} For the foregoing reasons, Mohler’s assignment of error is overruled.

Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars assigned

and argued, we affirm the judgment of the Logan County Court of Common Pleas.



                                                                Judgment Affirmed



WALDICK, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.

/jlm




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