[Cite as State v. Bode,
2025-Ohio-850.]
COURT OF APPEALS
DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO, : JUDGES:
: Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, P.J.
Plaintiff - Appellee : Hon. Michael D. Hess, J.
: Hon. Jason P. Smith, J.
:
: Judges Hess and Smith Sitting by
: Assignment by the Supreme Court of
: Ohio
-vs- :
:
SCOTT BODE, : Case No. 24 CAA 06 0038
:
Defendant - Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Delaware County
Court of Common Pleas, Case No.
23 CRI 120740
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: March 10, 2025
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
MELISSA A. SCHIFFEL APRIL CAMPBELL
Prosecuting Attorney Campbell Law, LLC
545 Metro Place South, Suite 100
By: KATHERYN L. MUNGER Dublin, Ohio 43017
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
Delaware County Prosecutor’s Office
145 North Union Street, 3rd Floor
Delaware, Ohio 43015
Baldwin, P.J.
{¶1} The appellant, Scott Bode, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to
suppress. Appellee is the State of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND THE CASE
{¶2} On February 8, 2024, the Delaware County Grand Jury indicted the
appellant for Aggravated Possession of Drugs in violation of R.C. §2925.11(A) with a
firearm specification pursuant to R.C. §2941.141(A) and a major drug offender
specification pursuant to R.C. §2941.1410(A), Possession of a Fentanyl-Related
Compound in violation of R.C. §2925.11(A) with a firearm specification pursuant to R.C.
§2941.141(A) and a major drug offender specification pursuant to R.C. §2941.1410(B),
Aggravated Possession of Drugs in violation of R.C. §2925.11(A) with a firearm
specification pursuant to R.C. §2941.141(A) and a major drug offender specification
pursuant to R.C. §2941.1410(A), and Receiving Stolen Property in violation of R.C.
§2913.51(A) with a firearm specification pursuant to R.C. §2941.141(A).
{¶3} On February 26, 2024, the appellant filed a Motion to Suppress, challenging
the sufficiency of the warrant’s affidavit.
{¶4} On March 19, 2024, the trial court held a suppression hearing.
{¶5} At the hearing, Joshua Wright of the Columbus Division of Police testified
that he works for an ATF task force. He typically investigates violent crimes involving
federal firearms offenses and narcotics trafficking.
{¶6} He continued that on December 12, 2023, he was contacted by the
Delaware County Sheriff’s Department when they discovered a stolen firearm at a traffic
stop. The firearm was stolen from a Federal Firearm Licensee during a burglary where
over 100 firearms were stolen.
{¶7} The occupant of the vehicle told officers she obtained the stolen firearm
from a man named “Scott” staying at the Holiday Inn Express on Hutchinson Avenue in
Columbus, Ohio. When investigators arrived at the hotel, they obtained information via
subpoena that the appellant had rented a room at the hotel. The appellant had checked
out of the hotel, and the room he was staying in was abandoned. Hotel management
consented to a search of the room in which the appellant had been staying. Inside the
room, officers found drug paraphernalia, including torn wrappers, kilo-sized wrappers,
glass pipes, Naloxone, and torn baggies consistent with narcotics trafficking. In addition
to the drug paraphernalia, the officers obtained mail addressed to the individual from the
traffic stop and items addressed to the appellant.
{¶8} Officer Wright said that on December 14, 2023, management from the hotel
contacted law enforcement. They said the appellant came to retrieve some of his
belongings and disclosed he had relocated to Candlewood Suites on Polaris.
{¶9} The officer continued that on December 15, 2023, the investigators went to
Candlewood Suites and spoke with staff. They confirmed the appellant had checked in
with a large amount of luggage. The appellant had checked in the same day that
investigators recovered the firearm at the traffic stop.
{¶10} Officer Wright then drafted a search warrant for the appellant’s room at
Candlewood Suites in Delaware County, looking for approximately eighty-eight firearms
from the burglary and a large amount of narcotics based on information obtained at the
traffic stop and the Holiday Inn Express. The judge agreed that enough probable cause
existed and signed the search warrant.
{¶11} After Joshua Wright’s testimony, the State rested. The appellant did not call
any witnesses.
{¶12} On April 11, 2024, the appellant filed a Post Hearing Memorandum in
Support of Defendant’s Motion to Suppress.
{¶13} On May 24, 2024, the trial court denied the appellant’s Motion to Suppress.
{¶14} On June 4, 2024, the appellant entered a plea of no contest to Possession
of a Fentanyl-Related Compound in violation of R.C. §2925.11(A) with a firearm
specification pursuant to R.C. §2941.141(A) and a major drug offender specification
pursuant to R.C. §29410(B). The trial court found the appellant guilty and sentenced him
to eleven years in prison, with one consecutive year for the firearm specification and six
consecutive years for the major drug offender specification.
{¶15} The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and herein raised the following
two assignments of error:
{¶16} “I. THE EVIDENCE AGAINST BODE SHOULD HAVE BEEN
SUPPRESSED, BECAUSE THE AFFIDAVIT SUPPORTING THE SEARCH OF THE
CANDLEWOOD SUITES HOTEL ROOM WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE
CAUSE: THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY THERE.”
{¶17} “II. THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY: AN OFFICER
CANNOT REASONABLY PRESUME A WARRANT TO SEARCH A HOTEL ROOM IS
VALID, WHEN THE AFFIDAVIT SUPPORTING THE WARRANT ONLY STATES THAT
THE POLICE “MAY” FIND EVIDENCE, WITHOUT EVIDENCE LINKING THE HOTEL
ROOM TO CRIMINAL ACTIVITY.”
I.
{¶18} In the appellant’s first assignment of error, the appellant argues that the
warrant to search the appellant’s hotel room at Candlewood Suites was not supported by
probable cause. We disagree.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶19} An appellate review of a trial court’s decision to deny a motion to suppress
involves a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Long, 127 Ohio App.3d 328, 332 (4th
Dist.1998). During a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact
and, as such, is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to evaluate witness
credibility. State v. Brooks,
1996-Ohio-134. A reviewing court is bound to accept the trial
court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v.
Medcalf,
111 Ohio App.3d 142 (4th Dist.1996). Accepting these facts as true, the appellate
court must independently determine, as a matter of law, without deference to the trial
court’s conclusion, whether the trial court’s decision meets the applicable legal standard.
State v. Williams,
86 Ohio App.3d 37 (4th Dist.1993), overruled on other grounds.
{¶20} There are three methods of challenging a trial court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress on appeal. First, an appellant may challenge the trial court’s finding of fact. In
reviewing a challenge of this nature, an appellate court must determine whether the trial
court’s findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence. See State v.
Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19 (1982); State v. Klein,
73 Ohio App.3d 486 (4th Dist.1991).
Second, an appellant may argue the trial court failed to apply the appropriate test or
correct law to the findings of fact. In that case, an appellate court can reverse the trial
court for committing an error of law. See
Williams, supra. Finally, an appellant may argue
the trial court has incorrectly decided the ultimate issue or final issues raised in a motion
to suppress. When reviewing this type of claim, an appellate court must independently
determine, without deference to the trial court’s conclusion, whether the facts meet the
appropriate legal standard in any given case. State v. Curry,
95 Ohio App.3d 93, 96 (8th
Dist.1994).
{¶21} The appellant is not challenging the trial court’s findings of fact but whether
the trial court decided the ultimate issue correctly. We, therefore, must determine whether
the facts satisfy the applicable standard.
{¶22} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, “The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrant shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” For a search or seizure
to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, it must be based upon probable cause
and executed pursuant to a warrant. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357,
88 S.Ct.
507, 514,
19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); State v. Brown,
63 Ohio St.3d 349, 350,
588 N.E.2d
113 (1992), overruled on other grounds by State v. Murrell,
2002-Ohio-1483.
{¶23} The issue in this case is whether probable cause existed to support the
issuance of the warrant. State v. Sellards, 2006-Ohio-3924 (5th Dist.), ¶¶13-14. In
determining whether probable cause exists, the proper test is the “totality of the
circumstances.” Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213,
103 S.Ct. 2317,
76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).
Probable cause exists when there is a fair probability, given the totality of the
circumstances, contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Id.;
State v. Kadri,
2017-Ohio-604 (5th Dist.), ¶24. The Ohio Supreme Court held in State v.
George,
45 Ohio St.3d 325 (1989):
{¶24} The totality-of-the-circumstances test of Illinois v. Gates, supra, is concisely
set forth in that decision at 238-239,
103 S.Ct. at 2332:
… The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-
sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit
before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons
supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a
reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a ‘substantial
basis for … conclud[ing]’ that probable cause existed. Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. at 271, 80 S.Ct. 725, 736, 4 L.Ed.2d ….
ANALYSIS
{¶25} The appellant argues the warrant to search the appellant’s room at
Candlewood Suites is not supported by probable cause. Specifically, the warrant failed to
demonstrate a nexus between the hotel room and the appellant’s criminal activity. We
disagree.
{¶26} Probable cause for a search warrant requires some “nexus between the
alleged crime, the objects to be seized, and the place to be searched.” State v.
Castagnola, 2015-Ohio-1565, ¶34. In order for a nexus to exist, the circumstances must
indicate why certain evidence of illegal activity will be found at the location noted in the
search warrant. State v. Young,
2019-Ohio-4639 (10th Dist.), ¶18, citing State v. Phillips,
2016-Ohio-5944 (10th Dist.), ¶14; United States v. Washington,
380 F.3d 236, 240 (6th
Cir.2004); United States v. Carpenter,
360 F.3d 591, 594 (6th Cir.2004).
{¶27} The warrant affidavit shows that law enforcement recovered a stolen firearm
from a woman at a traffic stop. The woman told officers that she obtained it from a “Scott”
staying at the Holiday Inn Express. Hotel management confirmed the appellant had
reserved a room but had checked out. Law enforcement officers found mail belonging to
the woman who obtained the stolen firearm from the appellant, mail belonging to the
appellant, and drug paraphernalia, including a glass pipe and a large amount of drug
packaging material at the appellant’s abandoned room at the Holiday Inn Express. The
appellant returned to the Holiday Inn Express to retrieve leftover items. He told
management he is currently staying at Candlewood Suites, another hotel nearby. Video
footage showed the appellant checking into Candlewood Suites with a large amount of
luggage. The appellant left the Holiday Inn Express the same day law enforcement
recovered the stolen firearm. Only three days had passed between the traffic stop and
warrant application for the Candlewood Suites hotel room.
{¶28} Based on the information contained in the affidavit, we find that the totality
of the circumstances establishes probable cause that evidence of the appellant’s drug
trafficking and possession of stolen firearms would be found in his hotel room at
Candlewood Suites.
{¶29} Accordingly, the appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled.
II.
{¶30} Based on our disposition in the appellant’s first assignment of error, we
decline to address the appellant’s second assignment of error.
CONCLUSION
{¶31} Based upon the forgoing, the decision of the Delaware County Court of
Common Pleas is, hereby, affirmed.
By: Baldwin, P.J.
Hess, J. and
Smith, J. concur.
