[Cite as State v. Burchfield,
2025-Ohio-867.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ATHENS COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : CASE NO. 23CA17
v. :
BRADLEY BURCHFIELD, : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Defendant-Appellant. :
_________________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Bradley E. Burchfield, pro se.
Keller Blackburn, Athens County Prosecuting Attorney, and Merry M.
Saunders, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Athens, Ohio, for
appellee.
___________________________________________________________________
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT
DATE JOURNALIZED:3-6-25
ABELE, J.
{¶1} This is an appeal from an Athens County Common Pleas
Court judgment of conviction and sentence. Bradley Burchfield,
defendant below and appellant herein, pleaded no contest to one
count of having a weapon while under disability and assigns two
errors for review:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT.”
ATHENS, 23CA17
2
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACKNOWLEDGING THE
LAWS.”
{¶2} In January 2008, an Athens County Grand Jury returned an
indictment that charged appellant with one count of burglary in
violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(3), a third-degree felony (Case Number
08CR0145). On August 25, 2008, appellant entered a guilty plea and
the trial court sentenced him to serve a five-year community
control term and to pay costs. On December 22, 2008, the trial
court dismissed a second separate burglary indictment (Case Number
08CR0274) with prejudice.
{¶3} On December 8, 2013, after appellant’s 2008 conviction
for various felony crimes along with a prison sentence, the trial
court placed appellant on court-ordered supervision for five years.
On November 21, 2018, appellant’s supervising officer and
prosecuting attorney recommended that appellant “be successfully
discharged from supervision effective immediately and in accordance
with the power conferred by Section 2951.09 of the Revised Code,
restored to all civil rights.” The trial court ordered that
“Community Control supervision ordered pertaining to the above
named offender be unsuccessfully [sic.] terminated, from Community
Control supervision immediately and restored to all civil rights,
ATHENS, 23CA17
3
unless Prohibited by law.”
{¶4} On July 7, 2022, the trial court denied appellant’s pro
se petition for relief from weapons disability status. The court
stated, “[a]s Petitioner has been convicted of an offense of
domestic violence, the Court finds Petitioner is ineligible to
possess a firearm pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(G)(9). For that
reason and due to his criminal history, the Court finds that the
motion is not well taken and is denied.”
{¶5} In November 2022, an Athens County Grand Jury returned an
indictment that charged appellant with one count of having a weapon
while under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), a third-
degree felony. At the July 12, 2023 hearing, appellant pleaded no
contest to the charge. The trial court accepted appellant’s plea
and, relevant to this appeal, stated:
The Court’s understanding from the facts put forth by the
State where [sic.] that . . . Mr. Burchfield was spotted
by an APA officer who was aware of a previous criminal,
aware of disability for purposes of weapons under
disability thought he saw a side arm and as it turns out
that was not the case but Mr. Burchfield volunteered that
there was a muzzleloader in the house that belonged to his
girlfriend but he volunteered that information to the
officers.
When asked if he wished to speak at sentencing, appellant stated:
I just feel like this is wrong. I’m getting sentenced,
ATHENS, 23CA17
4
getting put on, being found guilty for a crime in my eyes,
I mean the law states that it doesn’t apply to the weapon
ordinance so how can you be charged for it but I mean
whatever. Whatever is good for the goose is good for the
gander I guess so I’m just going to let it go.
{¶6} The trial court then weighed the R.C. 2929.11 purposes
and principles of sentencing, the R.C. 2929.12 seriousness and
recidivism factors, and the guidance set forth in R.C. 2929.13.
The court sentenced appellant to (1) serve a one-year community
control term, subject to the Adult Parole Authority’s terms and
conditions, (2) abide by the minimum general probation conditions
journalized on March 16, 2023, (3) report to the APA, (4) not
consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs or enter such
establishments, (5) be subject to random substance abuse
monitoring, (6) pay court costs, (7) remain in Ohio unless given
permission from the court or supervising officer, (8) remain a law
abiding citizen during supervision, (9) be aware that his
supervising officer may choose to add conditions of supervision to
meet appellant’s individual needs, (10) 9-36 months reserved, and
(11) ordered a discretionary postrelease control term for up to two
years.
{¶7} On October 20, 2023, appellee filed a notice of violation
of community control. At the November 7, 2023 hearing, appellant
ATHENS, 23CA17
5
stipulated to a violation of his terms and conditions of community
control. This appeal followed.
I.
{¶8} In his first assignment of error, appellant asserts that
the “trial court erred in Prosecutorial Misconduct.” While not
exactly clear, it appears that appellant now contends that his no
contest plea for the charge concerning the weapon he possessed that
formed the basis of his July 2023 conviction is excluded from R.C.
2923.13(A)(2), the weapons under disability statute.
{¶9} Appellee, however, contends that appellant violated R.C.
2923.13(A)(2) when he possessed an operable 50-caliber
muzzleloader1. Appellee notes that appellant’s burglary conviction
(Case Number 08CR0145) disqualifies him from possessing a firearm.
Appellee points out that, after appellant served his sentence for
the burglary conviction, the trial court terminated his supervision
with a November 21, 2018 order that restored appellant to “all
1
According to Adm.Code, 1501:31-1-02(BBBB), “ ‘Muzzleloading
rifle’ and ‘muzzleloading shotgun’ means a primitive weapon that
shoots a projectile or projectiles loaded exclusively from the
muzzle and that is incapable of firing modern-day ammunition.”
ATHENS, 23CA17
6
civil rights, unless otherwise Prohibited by law,” (emphasis added)
and the possession of an operable muzzleloader is “otherwise
prohibited by law.”
{¶10} Initially, we point out that appellant previously pleaded
no contest to the weapon under disability charge. Under Crim.R.
11(C)(2)(b), a trial court cannot accept a no-contest plea without
addressing the defendant and “[i]nforming the defendant of and
determining that the defendant understands the effect of the plea .
. . no contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea,
may proceed with judgment and sentence.” To inform the defendant
of the effect of a no-contest plea, the trial court must inform the
defendant that “[t]he plea of no contest is not an admission of
defendant’s guilt, but is an admission of the truth of the facts
alleged in the indictment . . . and the plea or admission shall not
be used against the defendant in any subsequent civil or criminal
proceeding.” Crim.R. 11(B)(2); State v. Jones, 2007-Ohio-6093, ¶
25.
{¶11} In the case sub judice, the record reveals that the trial
court properly complied with Crim.R. 11 when it explained
appellant’s constitutional rights that he waived with his no
contest plea and appellant does not contend otherwise. The trial
ATHENS, 23CA17
7
court explained the effect of the no contest plea:
So, with a plea of guilty, that would be you stating that
you are legally guilty of having committed this offense.
A plea of no contest works a little differently. So,
instead of you are not admitting to your guilt in this
charge. However, you are saying that the facts that the
state has alleged here, you are not contesting those facts.
You’re not saying those facts didn’t happen. You are
saying those facts did happen but you believe you are
legally guilty of the offense.
{¶12} Appellant acknowledged that he understood the
implications of a no contest plea and that his attorney had
answered his questions. The record also shows that the trial court
explained the charge, maximum penalties involved, and postrelease
control, and that appellant stated that he understood them.
Appellant acknowledged that he understood the trial court’s
explanations and stated that he had no questions. In addition,
appellant signed the written waiver form in which he acknowledged
that he understood the constitutional rights he waived and desired
to enter a no contest plea. Appellant cannot now undo his plea to
the underlying charge. The Supreme Court of Ohio has stated that
“where the indictment . . . contains sufficient allegations to
state a felony offense and the defendant pleads no contest, the
court must find the defendant guilty of the charged offense.”
ATHENS, 23CA17
8
State v. Bird, 81 Ohio St.3d 582, 584 (1998). An exception to this
rule provides that when the trial court asks for an explanation of
circumstances, and that explanation negates the existence of an
element of the offense, the trial court errs in finding the
defendant guilty. State v. Williams,
2016-Ohio-7777, (8th Dist.).
Although in the case at bar appellant appears to have questioned
whether a muzzleloader is excluded from the relevant statutes, he
concluded his sentencing statement with, “I’m just going to let it
go.”
{¶13} Despite his acknowledgments during the plea colloquy,
appellant now argues that the weapon he possessed does not violate
R.C. 2923.13(A)(2).2 However, as appellee points out and relevant
2
R.C. 2923.13, the weapon under disability statute, provides:
(A) Unless relieved from disability under operation of
law or legal process, no person shall knowingly acquire,
have, carry, or use any firearm or dangerous ordnance,
if any of the following apply:
. . .
(2) The person is under indictment for or has been
convicted of any felony offense of violence or has been
adjudicated a delinquent child for the commission of an
offense that, if committed by an adult, would have been
ATHENS, 23CA17
9
to the case at bar, “by pleading no contest to the indictment,” a
defendant “is foreclosed from challenging the factual merits of the
underlying charge.” Bird, supra. The essence of the no contest
plea is that the defendant cannot be heard in defense. State ex
rel. Stern v. Mascio,
75 Ohio St.3d 422, 424 (1996). “[T]he
defendant who pleads no contest waives the right to present
additional affirmative factual allegations to prove that he is not
guilty of the charged offense.”
Id.
{¶14} Moreover, appellant now apparently seeks to present
evidence outside of the record to establish that the rifle is not
prohibited under the statute. However, this is not appropriate in
a direct appeal. See State v. Day, 2019-Ohio-4816, ¶ 4 (4th
Dist.)(“To the extent Day is relying on evidence that is outside
the record to support her claim, postconviction relief—not direct
appeal—is the appropriate method to seek relief.”); State v.
Carver,
2022-Ohio-2653, ¶ 25 (4th Dist.)(direct appeal “limited to
only those matters contained within the trial record.”).
{¶15} Finally, appellant appears to be confused about the trial
a felony offense of violence.
ATHENS, 23CA17
10
court’s dismissal of the burglary indictment in Case Number
08CR0274. Appellant now appears to believe that, because the trial
court dismissed that particular indictment, the basis for his
disability now somehow ceased to exist. However, we again note
that, although the trial court dismissed the burglary indictment in
Case Number 08CR0274 with prejudice, appellant’s burglary
conviction in Case Number 08CR0145 is the basis for his disability
in the present case. As such, this argument is without merit.
{¶16} Once again, in the case sub judice appellant entered a no
contest plea. Crim.R. 11(B)(2) states that a “plea of no contest
is not an admission of defendant’s guilt, but is an admission of
the truth of the facts alleged in the indictment, information, or
complaint, and the plea or admission shall not be used against the
defendant in any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding.” Crim.R.
11(B). “A plea of no contest allows the trial court to enter a
finding of guilty to the charged offense following an explanation
of the circumstances by the [government].” State v. Montgomery,
2024-Ohio-2623, ¶ 15 (5th Dist.), citing Columbus v. Gullett,
1990
WL 93891 (July 12, 1990), citing R.C. 2937.07. “Such a plea
constitutes an admission of the facts alleged in the complaint.”
Id., citing Crim.R. 11(B)(2).
ATHENS, 23CA17
11
{¶17} “Being an admission of the truth of the facts on which
the charges against him are based, a no-contest plea forecloses a
defendant's right to challenge the truth of those facts in a
subsequent appeal from his resulting conviction and sentence.”
State v. Montgomery, 2024-Ohio-2623, ¶ 16 (5th Dist.); Cuyahoga
Falls v. Doskocil,
2013-Ohio-2074, ¶ 16 (9th Dist.) (where “the
State gave the court an explanation of the circumstances at the
plea hearing and, based upon the State's explanation, the court
found Doskocil guilty[,] ... he cannot challenge his conviction on
the basis that it is against the weight of the evidence”);
Streetsboro v. Ragle,
2024-Ohio-4755, ¶ 16 (11th Dist.)(no contest
plea waived claim that explanation of circumstances did not comport
with evidence); State v. Evans,
2007-Ohio-6587, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.)(no
contest plea forecloses right to challenge trial court's refusal to
disclose identity of State's confidential informant); State v.
Bird,
81 Ohio St.3d 582 (1998)(by pleading no contest to the
indictment, appellant is foreclosed from challenging factual merits
of underlying charge).
{¶18} Consequently, after our review in the case at bar we
believe that the trial court substantially complied with the
applicable rules, that appellant acknowledged that he understood
ATHENS, 23CA17
12
the ramifications of his plea, and the rights appellant would waive
through his no contest plea. Appellant, represented by counsel at
the plea hearing, did not assert his innocence and we find nothing
to suggest confusion or lack of understanding regarding the effect
of his plea. See Willoughby at ¶ 37.
{¶19} Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s first assignment of
error.
II.
{¶20} In his second assignment of error, appellant vaguely
asserts that the “trial court erred in acknowledging the laws.”
Once again, appellant appears to assert that the trial court did
not follow R.C. 2923.11(L) when it concluded that his operable
muzzleloader is a weapon prohibited from possession under the
weapon under disability statute, R.C. 2923.13(A)(2). Appellant
also again appears to contend that his burglary conviction may not
be used as the disability for the having weapons under disability
because the trial court dismissed it with prejudice. However, once
again appellant mistakenly refers to the second burglary indictment
that the court dismissed (Case Number 08CR0274). Appellee neglects
to recognize that the record shows appellant’s conviction for
burglary in Case Number 08CR0145 serves as the basis for the weapon
ATHENS, 23CA17
13
under disability conviction in the present case.
{¶21} Moreover, as we pointed out above, the trial court
properly informed appellant of the rights he waived with his no
contest plea and appellant knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily entered a no contest plea. When appellant entered his
no contest plea to the charge of having a weapon under a
disability, he admitted the truth of the allegations contained in
the indictment. See Bird at 585. Accordingly, for all of the
foregoing reasons, we overrule appellant’s second assignment of
error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
JU
DGMENT
AFFIRME
D.
ATHENS, 23CA17
14
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed. Appellee shall
recover of appellant the costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court
directing the Athens County Common Pleas Court to carry this
judgment into execution.
If a stay of execution of sentence and release upon bail has
been previously granted by the trial court or this court, it is
temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the
bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to
allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an
application for a stay during the pendency of the proceedings in
that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will
terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period, or
the failure of the appellant to file a notice of appeal with the
Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day appeal period pursuant to Rule
II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.
Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal
prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the
date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Smith, P.J. & Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion
For the Court
BY:_____________________________
Peter B. Abele, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a
ATHENS, 23CA17
15
final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal
commences from the date of filing with the clerk.
