J-A25018-24
2025 PA Super 20
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
TYREEK WALKER : No. 2445 EDA 2023
Appeal from the Order Entered September 6, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0007935-2021
BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
OPINION BY DUBOW, J.: FILED JANUARY 27, 2025
Appellant, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, appeals from the
September 6, 2023 order of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas
dismissing charges against Appellee, Tyreek Walker, based upon a violation
of Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. After careful consideration, we reverse.
A.
As this case involves application of Rule 600, we need not recite the
facts underlying the crimes charged. For purposes of this appeal, we note
that on August 29, 2021, the Commonwealth charged Appellee with, inter alia,
two violations of the Uniform Firearms Act (“VUFA”). 1 The court arraigned
Appellee on September 28, 2021, and marked discovery as complete on its
docket. The court scheduled Appellee’s waiver trial for January 14, 2022.
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1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6106 (Firearms Not to be Carried Without a License) and 6108
(Carrying Firearms in Philadelphia).
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Several delays ensued:
On January 14, 2022, the Commonwealth requested a continuance
because a necessary police officer was “Sick/IOD. [2]”
A March 4, 2022, docket entry reflects only that the trial court
granted a continuance.
On May 26, 2022, Appellee requested a continuance for further
investigation after the Commonwealth provided a Certificate of NonLicense and a body camera video to Appellee in court that day. The
court marked discovery as incomplete because the Commonwealth
had not yet provided Appellee with a testing report from the Firearms
Identification Unit. 3
On July 21, 2022, the parties held a pre-trial conference, and the
court again marked discovery as complete.
On August 3, 2022, the court continued the matter because the
defendant was not brought down from county custody.
On October 7, 2022, the Commonwealth requested a continuance
because a necessary police officer was “Sick/IOD.”
On December 23, 2022, Appellee requested a continuance for further
investigation. The court rescheduled the waiver trial to March 24,
2023.
On March 23, 2023, the Commonwealth filed a motion to amend the
bills of information to include an additional VUFA charge under 18
Pa.C.S. § 6105 (Possession of a Firearm Prohibited). The court
granted the Commonwealth’s motion the next day. As a result, the
court had to move the case to a “major trial courtroom” which
compelled a continuance.
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2 Injured on duty.
3 The Commonwealth avers in its brief that it had mistakenly ordered this
report because no firearm was recovered and no such report could have been
generated. Commonwealth’s Br. at 20-21. Therefore, the Commonwealth
could not have passed this report to Appellee. Id.
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On April 10, 2023, the parties held a pre-trial conference where
Appellee rejected the Commonwealth’s plea offer and requested a
waiver trial.
On July 14, 2023, the Commonwealth requested a continuance
because a necessary police officer, whom the Commonwealth had
subpoenaed, was out serving warrants and therefore, unavailable.
The court scheduled Appellee’s waiver trial for September 6, 2023. On
September 2, 2023, Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the charges pursuant
to Pa.R.Crim. P. 600. On September 6, 2023, the court heard argument on
the Rule 600 motion and granted Appellee’s motion after finding that the
Commonwealth had not been diligent over the life of the case.
The Commonwealth appealed and raised the following issue for our
review:
Did the lower court err by dismissing all charges under Rule 600,
where fewer than 365 days of incurable time passed between the
filing of the criminal complaint and the dismissal of charges?
Commonwealth’s Br. at 6.
B.
Appellate courts “review Rule 600 decisions for an abuse of discretion[.]”
Commonwealth v. Lear, 325 A.3d 552, 557 (Pa. 2024) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted). A trial court does not abuse its discretion when
it merely makes an error of judgment. Rather, a court abuses its discretion if
it misapplies the law or exercises judgment that is manifestly unreasonable or
the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will. Commonwealth v. Burno,
154 A.3d 764, 793 (Pa. 2017) (citation omitted). “Our scope of review is
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limited to the record evidence from the speedy trial hearing and the findings
of the lower court, reviewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing
party.” Id. (citation omitted).
Rule 600 mandates that trial commence within 365 days of the
Commonwealth’s filing of a written complaint against a defendant.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). In applying Rule 600, a court first calculates the
“‘mechanical run date,’ which is 365 days after the complaint was filed[.]”
Lear, 325 A.3d at 560. The court then accounts for and adds any excludable
time to the mechanical run date “to produce the ‘adjusted run date,’ which is
the deadline for the Commonwealth to bring the defendant to trial under Rule
600.” Id.
Rule 600(C)(1) addresses excludable time as follows:
For the purposes of paragraph (A), periods of delay at any stage
of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the
Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall be
included in the computation of the time within which trial must
commence. Any other periods of delay shall be excluded from the
computation.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1).
Our Supreme Court recently explained that the first sentence of Rule
600(C)(1) provides “the general rule” and establishes “two requirements that
must be met for delay to count toward the 365-day deadline: (1) the
Commonwealth caused the delay and (2) the Commonwealth failed to exercise
due diligence.” Lear, 325 A.3d at 560 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). The Lear Court clarified that “the causation analysis precedes the
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due diligence inquiry, and it is only when the Commonwealth both caused the
delay and lacked due diligence that the delay is properly included in the Rule
600 calculation.” Id. at 560 n.7. “Due diligence does not require perfect
vigilance and punctilious care, but rather a showing by the Commonwealth
that a reasonable effort has been put forth.” Commonwealth v. Hunt, 858
A.2d 1234, 1241-42 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc) (citation omitted).
Addressing the second sentence of Rule 600(C)(1), the Lear Court
explained that “‘any other periods of delay’ — meaning any periods of delay
not caused by the Commonwealth or not resulting from the Commonwealth’s
lack of due diligence — are ‘excludable’ and are removed from the
computation of the Rule 600 deadline.” Lear, 325 A.3d at 560.
Additionally, “any delay caused by the need to reschedule a trial because
of a continuance attributable to the defense constitutes excludable time, even
if the defendant was prepared to go to trial at an earlier date.”
Commonwealth v. Aaron, 804 A.2d 39, 43 (Pa. Super. 2002) (en banc).
However, “time attributable to the normal progression of the case simply is
not ‘delay’ for purposes of Rule 600[,]” and thus counts toward the 365-day
deadline. Commonwealth v. Mills,
162 A.3d 323, 325 (Pa. 2017).
A “limited exception to the general rule” applies in cases involving
“judicial delay.” Lear, 325 A.3d at 561. In such cases, the Commonwealth
must demonstrate “that it complied with the due diligence requirements of
Rule 600 at all relevant periods throughout the life of the case.” Lear, 325
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A.3d at 561-62 (quoting Commonwealth v. Harth, 252 A.3d 600, 603 (Pa.
2021)).
In Lear, the Court defined “judicial delay” as “delay caused by an
individual judge’s own congested calendar or other scheduling problems.” Id.
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). It explained that the Harth
exception, requiring the Commonwealth to show due diligence throughout the
life of the case, was applicable in cases involving a single judge’s scheduling
conflicts because in such cases a delay “could conceivably be averted if the
Commonwealth is ready to proceed, as the case could potentially be
reassigned to a different judge.” Id. at 563. In contrast, court closures during
a pandemic as well as other “medical-, weather-, and security-related
emergencies” constitute “other periods of delay” for which the Commonwealth
would not need to prove due diligence. Id. at 563 n.9. The Court found the
pandemic delays to be excludable time because “[n]o amount of due diligence
on the part of the Commonwealth could have possibly hastened [the
defendant]’s trial date.” Id. In other words, when delays occur as a result of
circumstances outside of the Commonwealth’s control, those delays are
excludable from the Rule 600 calculation.
C.
The Commonwealth argues that the trial court abused its discretion
when it granted Appellee’s motion to dismiss all charges pursuant to Rule 600
because the trial court improperly calculated the adjusted run date.
Commonwealth’s Br. at 14. We agree.
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*
On September 2, 2023, when Appellant filed his Rule 600 petition, 735
calendar days had passed since the Commonwealth filed the criminal
complaint on August 29, 2021. The parties and the trial court agree that 33
days of this time is excludable as court delay due to COVID-19 judicial
suspension orders. See Lear, 325 A.3d 563. Further, it is uncontested that
the 91-day period of delay between December 23, 2022, and March 24, 2023,
was caused by the defense’s request for a continuance and is excludable time.
See Aaron,
804 A.2d at 43. This results in an adjusted run date December
31, 2022.
*
At issue are two additional periods of delay which the Commonwealth
asserts are attributable to the defense and, thus, excludable: a 69-day period
between May 26, 2022, and August 3, 2022, and a 112-day period between
March 24, 2023, and July 14, 2023. Commonwealth’s Br. at 16-18. The 69-
day period of delay between May 26, 2022, and August 3, 2022, was due to
Appellee’s request for a continuance for “further investigation.” Docket Entry,
5/26/22. The trial court nevertheless attributed this time to the
Commonwealth because of its failure to “timely meet its discovery
obligations.” Trial Ct. Op., 11/27/23, at 6.
Lear makes clear that “the causation analysis precedes the due
diligence inquiry.” 325 A.3d 563 n.7. This means that the trial court must first
consider the cause of the delay before analyzing the Commonwealth’s
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diligence in meeting discovery obligations over the life of the case. Id. Here,
the cause of the delay was a defense request for a continuance for further
investigation, and, therefore, that delay must be excluded. Hunt,
858 A.2d at
1241 (“[T]he court must exclude from the time for commencement of trial .
. . any continuances the defendant requested[.]”) (emphasis added). The trial
court, thus, erred as a matter of law in attributing this delay to the
Commonwealth. This 69-day period constitutes excludable time.
*
The Commonwealth also argues that the trial court erred in attributing
the entire 112-day period between March 24, 2023, and July 14, 2023, to the
Commonwealth because “the defense requested to have the case spun out to
a major trial room” after the court granted the Commonwealth’s motion to
amend the bills of information to include an additional VUFA charge.
Commonwealth’s Br. at 17. The Commonwealth asserts that after the court
granted its motion to amend the complaint on March 24, 2023, the court
moved the case to a different administrative track for disposition and
scheduled a listing in the major trial Smart Room for April 10, 2023, where
“the defense rejected the Commonwealth’s offer and requested to have the
case spun out for a waiver trial.” Id. The Commonwealth contends, therefore,
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that the court erred in attributing the 17-day delay between March 24, 2023,
and April 10, 2023, to the Commonwealth. We agree. 4
After the court granted the Commonwealth’s motion to amend the bills
of information, the court assigned it to the “major felony” case track where
the first available date for trial was April 10, 2023. In attributing that period
of delay to the Commonwealth, the trial court asserted that the
Commonwealth’s decision to amend the bills of information “was a calculated
trial decision by the Commonwealth” and was “very much within the
Commonwealth’s control.” Tr. Ct. Op., at 7. We disagree with the court’s
reasoning as the procedures of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas
required that the case be moved to a different administrative track after the
court granted the motion to amend the information.
Lear defines judicial delay attributable to the Commonwealth when a
single judge’s scheduling conflicts or congested calendar “could conceivably
be averted if the Commonwealth is ready to proceed, as the case could
potentially be reassigned to a different judge.” 325 A.3d at 562. Here, the
Commonwealth had no control over the administrative requirement that the
case be moved to a different case track. This delay, therefore, is not “judicial
delay,” but rather “other period[] of delay” under Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1). As
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4 As we find that the trial court correctly attributed the period between April
10, 2023, and July 14, 2023, to the normal progression of the case, which
counts toward the 365-day deadline, we analyze only the 17-day period from
March 24, 2023, to April 10, 2023. See Trial Ct. Op. at 5.
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such, the Commonwealth is not required to prove due diligence. See id.
(“[T]he Commonwealth’s diligence is never relevant to the Rule 600 analysis
for ‘other periods of delay[.]’”).
Moreover, the trial court erred in attributing the period of delay to the
Commonwealth because the trial court believed that that the Commonwealth’s
decision to amend the bills of information at that time was a calculated trial
decision. The Commonwealth’s strategy for filing a motion to amend the bills
of information is irrelevant to determining whether a period of delay is
attributable to the Commonwealth. Rather, Rule 600 addresses the causes of,
and not the motives for, the delay. In granting the Commonwealth’s motion
to amend, the trial court determined that this amendment would not prejudice
Appellee.5 Therefore, having granted the motion to amend the bills of
information, the trial court erred in subsequently holding the Commonwealth
responsible for the unavoidable period of administrative delay caused by the
case track reassignment.
Accounting for these periods of excludable time brings the adjusted run
date to March 27, 2023.
D.
The Commonwealth next identifies three time periods of delay that it
avers were beyond its control and therefore excusable: a 49-day period
____________________________________________
5 Pa.R.Crim.P. 564 (“The court may allow an information to be amended []
provided that . . . the amended charges are not so materially different . . .
that the defendant would be unfairly prejudiced.”).
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between January 14, 2022, and March 4, 2022, and a 77-day period between
October 7, 2022, and December 23, 2022, where a necessary police officer
was “Sick/IOD”, and a 54-day period between July 14, 2023, and September
6, 2023, where a necessary police officer was subpoenaed but out serving
warrants and therefore unavailable. Commonwealth Br. at 18-19.
While the trial court found that the periods where a necessary officer
was “Sick/IOD” were excusable, the court did not excuse the delay where the
necessary officer was out serving warrants because the fact that “the officer
may have been out working elsewhere that morning did not thereby prove
that the failure to appear was despite the Commonwealth’s efforts.” Trial Ct.
Op. at 7.
The trial court erred in attributing this 54-day period to the
Commonwealth because the circumstances necessitating the delay were
beyond the Commonwealth’s control. See Hunt, 858 A.2d at 1241-42. This
Court has previously held that delay resulting from a necessary officer’s
unavailability is excusable if “the evidence of record establishes that there was
more than a mere assertion that the officer was unavailable.”
Commonwealth v. Peterson,
19 A.3d 1131, 1138 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en
banc). Here, the docket establishes that the Commonwealth subpoenaed the
necessary officer and that the officer was serving warrants and therefore
unavailable. Docket Entry, 7/14/23. Accordingly, the trial court erred in not
excluding this period of delay as an event outside of the control of the
Commonwealth.
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Excluding these three periods of excusable delay brings the adjusted run
date to September 25, 2023.6 Accordingly, Appellee’s Rule 600 motion filed
on September 2, 2023, was premature and the court erred in granting it and
dismissing the charges.
E.
In conclusion, the trial court erred in not extending the adjusted run
date to include the 69-day period between May 26, 2022, and August 3, 2022,
the 17-day period between March 24, 2023, and April 10, 2023, and the 54-
day period between July 14, 2023, and September 6, 2023. The adjusted run
date, at minimum, was September 25, 2023. Therefore, Appellee’s motion to
dismiss filed on September 2, 2023, was premature and the trial court abused
its discretion in granting the Rule 600 motion and dismissing this case.
Accordingly, we vacate the order granting the Rule 600 motion and remand
for further proceedings.7
Order vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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6 Since September 23, 2023, is a Saturday, the adjusted run date is the next
business day, Monday, September 25, 2023. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908.
7 In light of our disposition, we need not address the Commonwealth’s claims
regarding the trial court’s findings as to the Commonwealth’s diligence in
passing discovery and its potential impact on the March 4, 2022, continuance.
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Date: 1/27/2025
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