J-A21045-25
2025 PA Super 238
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ELIEZAR LAZU CARRASQUILLO :
:
Appellant : No. 1844 MDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 29, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-06-CR-0003522-2020
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., LANE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: OCTOBER 21, 2025
Appellant appeals from the March 29, 2022, judgment of sentence
entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County following conviction by
jury of two counts aggravated assault and two counts aggravated assault with
a deadly weapon. After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court set forth the relevant factual and procedural history as
follows:
[Appellant], represented by Catherine J. Nadirov, Esquire [("Trial
Counsel")], appeared for trial before the undersigned and a jury
on February 15, 2022[, c]harged with thirteen counts including
first degree murder, third degree murder, aggravated assault,
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and related conspiracy
charges for the killing of Brock Neely and injury to Jordan
Almodovar on June 11, 2014.
The Commonwealth presented evidence at trial that Neely died of
gunshot wounds to his lower back and right hip on June 11, 2014,
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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around 11th & Chestnut Streets in the City of Reading. Neely and
Almodovar were found still alive by officers in that area at
approximately 3:00 AM. Neely later succumbed to his injuries, but
Almodovar[,] who suffered a gunshot wound to his right thigh,
survived. Also present at the shooting was Gilbert Concepcion,
who testified at trial that the [Appellant], Eliezer Carrasquillo[,]
was armed with a gun in his right-side waistband when a group of
men, including Neely, Almodovar, and [Appellant], and his
brother, Xavier Carrasquillo, arrived at 11th & Chestnut Streets for
a fight between Xavier Carrasquillo and a man known as “Papa.”
In addition to cross examination of the Commonwealth's
witnesses, [Appellant] testified. On the night of the shooting
[Appellant] testified that he suggested the location for a
confrontation with Neely after his brother “had been disrespected”
by Neely at a bar earlier that evening. When Xavier Carrasquillo
said, “they got a gun” [Appellant] testified that he pulled out his
handgun and fired two rounds at the ground and then ten more
towards Neely and Almodovar.
At the same time, another man started firing from the opposite
side of the street, close to the alley, at the fleeing Almodovar and
Neely. After the shooting, [Appellant], his brother, and the second
shooter ran up the alley together, according to testimony by Mr.
Concepcion. Officer Craig Hawley testified that approximately ten
Winchester .45 caliber bullets were recovered from the side of the
alley where [Appellant] stood to fire and approximately fifteen
rounds were recovered from the location of the second shooter
across the street. No firearms were recovered at the scene.
On February 22, 2022, following the trial, the jury convicted
Appellant of two counts of aggravated assault and two counts of
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. On March 29, 2022,
this Court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of 99 to 210
months of imprisonment. Appellant appealed his judgment of
sentence on March 29, 2022. By opinion dated April 13, 2022,
the Superior Court affirmed judgment of sentence.
On September 13, 2023, Appellant filed a Petition pursuant to the
Post-Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46.
Appellant's Petition alleged the ineffective assistance of Trial
Counsel in failing to properly raise a challenge to the weight of the
evidence such that it could not be addressed in his original direct
appeal. After appointing Lara Hoffert, Esquire ("PCRA Counsel") to
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represent Appellant in the PCRA proceedings, and an Amended
Petition having been filed, this Court granted relief and reinstated
Appellant's post- sentence, and appellate rights limited to his
ability to raise the issue of a challenge to the weight of the
evidence. Appellant, through PCRA Counsel, filed post-sentence
motions challenging the weight of the evidence. After holding a
hearing, this Court denied Appellant's post-sentence motion on
November 18, 2024.
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal with the Superior Court on
December 17, 2024.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/18/25, at 1-2 (citations and footnotes omitted).
Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
A. Whether the Trial Court erred in denying Appellant's Post-Sentence Motion challenging the weight of the evidence where it
is clear from the record that the verdicts were contrary to the
evidence, shocking to one's sense of justice, and illogical to the
point of absurdity where the jury found Appellant guilty of
aggravated assault as to both victims - Brock Neely and Jordan
Almodovar – but acquitted him of any charge relating to Neely's
death, confirming that there was no cause for Neely's death
directly attributable to Appellant, to and including the alleged
action(s) underlying the charges of aggravated assault?
(Lower court answer in the negative.)
(Suggested answer in the affirmative.)
B. Whether the Trial Court erred in denying Appellant's Post-Sentence motion challenging the weight of the evidence where it
is clear from the record that the verdicts issued were rendered
unreliable, tainted, questionable, and contrary to the weight of the
evidence by the trial testimony of Commonwealth witness, Gilbert
Concepcion, where his testimony was replete with inconsistencies,
admitted lies, half-truths, contrary to his original statements to
law enforcement, and made with the hope of consideration for his
outstanding federal indictment, so as to render the entirety of his
testimony incredible?
(Lower court answer in the negative.)
(Suggested answer in the affirmative.)
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C. Whether the Trial Court erred in denying Appellant's Post-Sentence Motion challenging the weight of the evidence where it
is clear from the record that the verdicts issued were rendered
unreliable, tainted, questionable, and contrary to the weight of the
evidence by the trial testimony of Commonwealth witness, Jessica
Hudson, where her testimony was replete with inconsistencies,
lies, half-truths, directly contrary to other testimony received, and
complete uncorroborated by presented video evidence, so as to
render the entirety of her testimony incredible?
(Lower court answer in the negative.)
(Suggested answer in the affirmative.)
D. Whether the Trial Court erred in denying Appellant's Post-Sentence Motion challenging the weight of the evidence where it
is clear from the record that the verdict issued was rendered
unreliable, tainted, questionable, and contrary to the weight of the
evidence by the trial testimony of Commonwealth witness, Curtis
Peterson, where he had a crimen falsi record, his testimony largely
consisted of admitted lies and fabrications allegedly obtained
during prison discussions, his testimony was contrary to the
physical evidence presented at trial, and his testimony was made
with the hope of consideration from the Commonwealth for his
outstanding criminal charges, so as to render the entirety of his
testimony incredible?
(Lower court answer in the negative.)
(Suggested answer in the affirmative.)
Appellant’s Brief at 4-5.
When addressing challenges to the weight of the evidence, we observe
the following well-established standard of review:
[A]n appellate court's role is not to consider the underlying
question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence. Rather, appellate review is limited to whether the trial
court palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim.
Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 40 A.3d 1250, 1253 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation
omitted).
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Additionally, "the trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of
witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part
or none of the evidence." Commonwealth v. Andrulewicz, 2006 PA Super
309,
911 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa.Super. 2006) (citation omitted), appeal denied,
592 Pa. 778,
926 A.2d 972 (Pa. 2007).
Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see
the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest
consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial
judge when reviewing a trial court's determination that the verdict
is against the weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable
reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court's
conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of
the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the interest
of justice.
This does not mean that the exercise of discretion by the trial court
in granting or denying a motion for a new trial based on a
challenge to the weight of the evidence is unfettered. In
describing the limits of a trial court's discretion, we have
explained[:] [t]he term “discretion” imports the exercise of
judgment, wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate
conclusion within the framework of the law, and is not exercised
for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge. Discretion
must be exercised on the foundation of reason, as opposed to
prejudice, personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary actions.
Discretion is abused where the course pursued represents not
merely an error of judgment, but where the judgment is
manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where
the record shows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice,
bias or ill-will.
Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013) (citations and
emphasis omitted).
Further, we have previously observed that:
[I]nconsistent verdicts, [] under longstanding federal and state
law, are allowed to stand so long as the evidence is sufficient to
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support the conviction. See Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S.
390, 393,
52 S.Ct. 189,
76 L.Ed. 356 (1932) (holding that
"[c]onsistency in the verdict is not necessary" and refusing to
allow inconsistent verdicts to be upset by "speculation or inquiry"
into the possibility of compromise or mistake on the part of the
jury); United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 58,
105 S.Ct. 471,
83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984) (applying Dunn's rule, which the Court
explained as follows: "a criminal defendant convicted by a jury on
one count could not attack that conviction because it was
inconsistent with the jury's verdict of acquittal on another count").
In affirming a verdict of aggravated assault and battery, despite
the jury's acquittal of the accused on a separate count of assault
and battery, this Court reiterated that "[a]n acquittal cannot be
interpreted as a specific finding in relation to some of the
evidence." Commonwealth v. Carter, 444 Pa. 405,
282 A.2d
375, 376 (1971) (citation omitted). Rather, an acquittal of a
charge for which there was sufficient evidence for conviction is an
occasion of a “jury's assumption of a power which [it] had no right
to exercise, but to which [it was] disposed through lenity.” Id.
(citation omitted).
Commonwealth v. Miller, 613 Pa. 584,
35 A.3d 1206, 1208-09 (Pa.
2012)(emphasis added).
Here, Appellant’s first issue presents a challenge based upon
inconsistent verdicts framed as a challenge to the weight of the
evidence. However, as we have noted, inconsistent verdicts are
permissible so long as the evidence is sufficient to support the
conviction, while “[a] weight of the evidence claim concedes that the
evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict.” Commonwealth v.
Lyons, 622 Pa. 91,
79 A.3d 1053, 1067 (Pa. 2013). Thus, Appellant’s
argument as presented is incoherent. While we have previously
interpreted such claims as challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence
in order to allow for thorough appellate review, the sufficiency of the
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Commonwealth’s evidence in the case sub judice has already been
reviewed and affirmed by this Court in Appellant’s prior direct appeal.
See Commonwealth v. Bellon, 315 A.3d 91 (Pa. Super.
2024)(“Though phrased as a challenge to the weight of the evidence,
the question before us implicates the general issue of inconsistent
verdicts which are permissible so long as the evidence is sufficient to
support the conviction. Accordingly, we review Appellant's claim as a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence”)(internal quotation and
citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo,
297 A.3d 719 (Pa.
Super. 2023)(holding the evidence adduced by the Commonwealth “was
sufficient to support the aggravated assault and aggravated assault with
a deadly weapon convictions, as Carrasquillo attempted to cause serious
bodily injury to the victims and did so while he possessed a deadly
weapon”). Thus, we will not proceed to re-assess the sufficiency of the
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evidence; we hold that Appellant’s claim regarding the inconsistency of
the verdicts merits no relief.1
Appellant’s remaining claims are each predicated on the alleged
incredibility of various Commonwealth witnesses. As outlined above, we
do not consider the underlying question of whether the verdict is against
the weight of the evidence but rather we review the decision of the trial
court for palpable abuse of discretion in ruling on that claim. Shaffer,
supra. After careful review, we find well-supported the trial court’s
observation that “it is clear from the record that the complained of issues
that Appellant raises were presented in the testimony at trial and the
jury had the opportunity to hear about the witnesses’ criminal histories,
noted contradictions, and the inconsistencies in testimony and any
earlier statements, against the backdrop of the visual and video
evidence presented.” Trial Court Opinion 2/18/25, at 9, 10. We thus
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1 To the extent Appellant argues that he is entitled to relief pursuant to
Commonwealth v. Magliocco,
883 A.2d 479 (Pa. 2005), his argument fails.
In Magliocco, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed this Court’s
vacatur of Magliocco’s conviction for ethnic intimidation on the basis that the
jury acquitted Magliocco of terroristic threats. However, vital to this ruling is
the fact that the commission of the offense of terroristic threats is an element
of the offense of ethnic intimidation. Such is not the case here, where
Appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon, but not acquitted of any offenses the commission of which are
necessary elements of the crimes of which he was convicted. Said plainly,
murder is not an element of aggravated assault, and as such reliance on
Magliocco is entirely inapposite.
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discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to leave
undisturbed the verdicts of the jury.
For all the foregoing reasons, we find that Appellant has failed to
raise any claims meriting relief, and as such we affirm.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/21/2025
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