J-S30028-25
2025 PA Super 240
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
THOMAS SHIELDS :
:
Appellant : No. 2072 EDA 2024
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 10, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0001153-2013
BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. *
OPINION BY MURRAY, J.: FILED OCTOBER 24, 2025
Thomas Shields (Appellant) appeals from the order dismissing his timely
first petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). 1 This
case returns to us following our remand to the PCRA court for the filing of a
supplemental opinion. Commonwealth v. Shields, 323 A.3d 181, 544 EDA
2023 (Pa. Super. 2024) (unpublished memorandum) (“Shields III”). For the
first time in this appeal, Appellant, through new PCRA counsel, raises claims
of his prior PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness, pursuant to Commonwealth v.
Bradley,
261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021).2 After careful review, we vacate the order
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
2 Bradley held that “a PCRA petitioner may, after a PCRA court denies relief,
and after obtaining new counsel or acting pro se, raise claims of PCRA
counsel’s ineffectiveness at the first opportunity to do so, even if on appeal.”
Bradley, 261 A.3d at 401.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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dismissing the PCRA petition and remand for consideration of one of
Appellant’s newly-raised claims of prior PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness.
This Court previously summarized the facts underlying Appellant’s
convictions:
At approximately 1:40 p.m. on November 17, 2012, Dwayne
Walters [(“Mr. Walters” or “the victim”)] left his apartment to get
a haircut. As he was opening the door of his rental car, a white
Dodge, Lamar Roane [(Roane)] approached him and asked him
for a light. When Mr. Walters responded that he did not smoke,
Roane seized Mr. Walters’s arm. At that moment, Appellant and
his brother, Charles Shields [(Charles)],3 emerged from hiding,
and the three men surrounded Mr. Walters. Appellant pulled out
a chrome-colored handgun and thrust it into Mr. Walters’s
abdomen. Appellant attempted to force Mr. Walters into the white
Dodge, but Mr. Walters grabbed Appellant’s gun. The two briefly
wrestled until Charles [] brandished a black handgun and forced
Mr. Walters into the driver’s door of his white Dodge. Charles
shoved Mr. Walters over the center console to the passenger side
of the vehicle, and got behind the wheel of the car. Roane and
Appellant went around the car and entered the back seats.
Mr. Walters unlocked the passenger door and exited the car.
Roane grabbed Mr. Walters’s jacket, but Mr. Walters shed his
jacket and ran. When Mr. Walters looked back to see if Roane
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In Bradley, our Supreme Court addressed the dilemma of when a
defendant may raise claims of ineffective assistance of PCRA
counsel[,] and held that such claims may be raised for the first
time during an appeal from the denial of a timely filed first PCRA
petition where the PCRA counsel in question represented the
defendant until the appeal.
Commonwealth v. Stahl, 292 A.3d 1130, 1135 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citing
Bradley, 261 A.3d at 401-05).
3 The Commonwealth jointly tried Charles and Appellant as co-defendants at
their jury trial in May 2014. As we discuss infra, Charles’s appeal (2090 EDA
2024) is also before this panel.
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was in pursuit, he saw Appellant and Charles pointing guns at him.
Seconds later, a single bullet struck Mr. Walters in his back and
exited his chest.
A resident of Mr. Walters’[s] apartment complex,
Jennifer Boyle [(Ms. Boyle)], glanced out [of the] window [of her
second-story apartment,] as she heard men arguing outside. She
observed two men … fire their guns. 4 Ms. Boyle saw Mr. Walters
clutch his back and continue to run until he was out of her sight.
Bleeding profusely, Mr. Walters stopped running when he
came to a vehicle occupied by two women and a boy. He entered
the rear seat of that vehicle and pressed his back up against the
seat in an effort to stop the bleeding. One of the women panicked
and demanded that Mr. Walters leave. When he tried to stand,
he collapsed onto the nearby sidewalk. As he lay there, Mr.
Walters watched his white Dodge rental car leave the parking lot.
At approximately 1:39 p.m., Philadelphia Police received a
911 call reporting a shooting near 2607 Welsh Road, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. Officer Brandon Badey was first on the scene and
saw Mr. Walters on the ground, holding a blood-soaked towel to
his chest. Officer Badey knew Mr. Walters’s condition was critical
and, with the help of the second officer on scene, placed Mr.
Walters in the back of his patrol car and rushed him to the
hospital. Once at the hospital, Mr. Walters was taken directly to
surgery. He remained hospitalized for six weeks.
An investigation of the crime scene yielded two .45 caliber
bullet casings[,] along with a cell[ ]phone. The police
department’s ballistics expert determined that these two bullet
casings were fired from the same gun. The cellphone’s SIM card
contained videos and photos indicating it belonged to Appellant.
When investigators obtained a search warrant for Appellant’s
phone, they noticed three distinct [telephone] numbers that
Appellant called frequently in the days and hours leading up to the
shooting. Investigators acquired search warrants for the records
associated with those numbers and learned that they belonged to
[] Roane, Charles [], and Mr. Walters.
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4 At trial, Ms. Boyle testified that she “didn’t get a good look at the guys that
had th[e] guns” and fired at Mr. Walters. N.T., 5/8/14, at 20.
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Investigators showed Mr. Walters a photographic array and
he identified both Appellant and Charles. Police officers arrested
Appellant at 1758 East Washington Lane, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, and subsequently searched that residence. They
found one .45 caliber bullet with a casing that looked like the bullet
casings found at the crime scene.
Commonwealth v. Shields, 154 A.3d 857, 3446 EDA 2014 (Pa. Super.
2016) (unpublished memorandum at 1-4) (footnotes added).
On January 11, 2013, a grand jury indicted Appellant on one count each
of attempted murder, aggravated assault – serious bodily injury, possessing
instruments of crime, attempted kidnapping, persons not to possess firearms,
firearms not to be carried without a license, and criminal conspiracy. 5, 6 The
matter proceeded to a jury trial in May 2014,7 wherein Appellant and Charles
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5 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a) & 2502, 2702(a)(1), 907(a), 901(a) & 2901(a),
6105(a), 6106, 903(a).
6 The conspiracy charge is pertinent to the instant appeal. Regarding this
charge, the indictment stated, in relevant part, as follows:
[Appellant], on or about November 17, 2012, with the intent of
promoting or facilitating the commission of a crime, in this
case, the Attempted Murder and/or Aggravated Assault of
[Mr.] Walters, agreed with others that they would engage in conduct
that would constitute such a crime, and [Appellant] or another coconspirator acted in furtherance of that conspiracy.
Indictment, 1/11/13, at 2-3 (unpaginated) (emphasis added).
7 The PCRA court judge throughout the protracted proceedings, the Honorable
Edward Wright, also presided at Appellant’s trial.
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were jointly tried.8 Appellant was represented by Fred Harrison, Jr., Esquire
(trial counsel).
Following the close of evidence at trial, the trial court instructed the jury
on the law. The court instructed, inter alia, as follows regarding the conspiracy
charge:
The accused in this case are being charged with Conspiracy. The
Commonwealth is alleging that each defendant conspired with the
other and with [] Roane. The Commonwealth is alleging that the
crime of attempted murder, aggravated assault, and/or
attempted kidnap were the objects of the conspiracy.
N.T., 5/15/14, at 43 (emphasis added); see also id. at 42-44 (trial court’s
remaining instructions on conspiracy).
During the charging conference held on the prior day of trial, Charles’s
defense counsel, joined by trial counsel, argued that it would be inappropriate
to instruct on conspiracy to commit kidnapping; the trial court disagreed.
N.T., 5/14/14, at 3-4.9 Otherwise, trial counsel did not object to the trial
court’s instructions on conspiracy.
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8 Prior to trial, Roane pled guilty to certain crimes in connection with the
incident. Roane did not testify at trial.
9 During the charging conference, the following discussion occurred concerning
the conspiracy charge:
THE COURT: …. With respect to the issue of the conspiracy
charge. During our charging conference, it came to the [c]ourt’s
attention that the grand jury indictment [listed] conspiracy to
commit attempted murder, as well as conspiracy to commit
aggravated assault[;] it did not mention conspiracy to commit
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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On May 16, 2014, the jury found Appellant guilty of aggravated assault
– serious bodily injury, attempted kidnapping, and “Conspiracy”; it acquitted
Appellant of the remaining charges, including attempted murder. Verdict
Sheet, 5/16/14. Significantly, the verdict sheet provided the jury with
no interrogatory to render a finding regarding the underlying object
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kidnapping because [the] information didn’t mention conspiracy
to commit kidnapping. For the record, [Commonwealth,] your
argument is the Court should charge conspiracy related to
kidnapping?
[The prosecutor]: …. [T]he bills of information are the official
charging document and they do list, in fact, kidnapping as one of
the crimes for which the defendants are accused of conspiring to
commit. At this stage, there’s no reason not to charge that based
upon the evidence presented in the case and based on the bills of
information[.]
N.T., 5/14/14, at 2-3. Appellant counsel countered it would be inappropriate
to charge the jury on conspiracy to commit kidnapping, where the indictment,
i.e., “the actual charging instrument,” made no mention of conspiracy to
commit kidnapping. Id. at 3. The trial court ruled that
the [c]ourt is finding that the indictment comes first. The bills of
information are generated from that, but the defense was on
notice and there was documentation from the Commonwealth
indicating there was a conspiracy to commit kidnapping. There
was no motion to quash and there was testimony on the record
and reasonable inferences in the testimony to support an
attempted kidnapping whereby the [c]ourt will charge the jury
with respect to the conspiracy as related to kidnapping.
Id. at 4.
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of the conspiracy.10 Id. Moreover, when the jury delivered its guilty verdict,
in open court, on the conspiracy count, no object of the conspiracy was
specified. N.T., 5/16/14, at 5. Notwithstanding the jury’s general verdict on
the conspiracy charge, the trial court, immediately following the jury’s verdict,
completed a “Trial Disposition Form” indicating that the jury found Appellant
guilty of “Conspiracy – Aggravated Assault[.]” Trial Disposition Form,
5/16/14, at 2 (emphasis added).
On July 25, 2014, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate
term of 21 to 42 years of imprisonment. The trial court structured its sentence
as follows, and ordered each sentence to run consecutively:
Aggravated assault: 10 – 20 years in prison;
Attempted kidnapping: 5 – 10 years in prison;
“Conspiracy”: 6 – 12 years in prison.
Sentencing Order, 7/25/14, at 1 (unpaginated). Regarding conspiracy, the
sentencing order characterized Appellant’s conviction as follows: “18 § 903 §§
C - Conspiracy - Aggravated Assault (F1)[.]” Id. (emphasis added); see
also N.T., 7/25/14, at 53 (trial court imposing sentence in open court for
“conspiracy/aggravated assault”).
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10 However, regarding the aggravated assault charge, the verdict sheet posed
an interrogatory asking the jury to make a finding as to whether the evidence
established that Appellant caused the victim serious bodily injury. Verdict
Sheet, 5/16/14.
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Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion through new counsel,11
which the trial court denied. Thereafter, Appellant timely filed a direct appeal
challenging, inter alia, the sufficiency and weight of the evidence supporting
his convictions. This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence.
Commonwealth v. Shields, 154 A.3d 857, 3346 EDA 2014 (Pa. Super.
2016) (unpublished memorandum).12 Our Supreme Court subsequently
denied allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Shields,
160 A.3d 793 (Pa.
2016).
Prior PCRA History
The PCRA procedural history that ensued is tortured, spanning multiple
years. Appellant timely filed a pro se PCRA petition on February 12, 2018, his
first. The PCRA court appointed Appellant PCRA counsel, John Cotter, Esquire
(first PCRA counsel), who filed an amended PCRA petition on April 27, 2018.
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11 In his motion, titled
“Post-Verdict Motions,” Appellant did not challenge the
legality of his sentence imposed on the conspiracy conviction. Rather, he
asserted, inter alia, that the mandatory minimum sentence imposed for
aggravated assault was illegal, and also challenged his aggregate sentence as
being manifestly excessive. Post-Verdict Motions, 7/31/14, ¶¶ 5-9.
12On direct appeal, we stated “Appellant was convicted of conspiracy to
commit aggravated assault, not conspiracy to commit kidnapping.”
Shields, 154 A.3d 857 (unpublished memorandum at 15); see also id. at
15-16 (rejecting Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting this conviction).
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The amended petition asserted a claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, 13
where counsel “did not object to the prosecutorial misconduct of the
prosecutor in closing argument[,] who told the jury that it had to convict
[Appellant] to protect their children.” Amended PCRA Petition, 4/27/18, ¶
4(a).
First PCRA counsel filed supplemental amended PCRA petitions on
October 15 and 22, 2018. In the memorandum of law accompanying the
second supplemental amended petition, Appellant asserted, inter alia:
[Trial] counsel was ineffective because counsel did not object to a
vague, misleading and confusing charge to the jury on the offense
of conspiracy. [Appellant] was harmed by this failure to object
because when appellate [] counsel raised this issue on [direct]
appeal[,] it was deemed waived by the Superior Court because it
was not preserved by trial [] counsel.
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13 At the outset, we recognize the well-settled law regarding claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC):
To be entitled to relief on an [IAC] claim, a PCRA petitioner must
establish: (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no
reasonable basis existed for counsel’s action or failure to act; and
(3) he suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s error, with
prejudice measured by whether there is a reasonable probability
the result of the proceeding would have been different.
Commonwealth v. Treiber, 121 A.3d 435, 445 (Pa. 2015) (footnote
omitted; citations omitted). “The failure to satisfy any prong of the test for
ineffectiveness will cause the claim to fail.” Commonwealth v. Lawrence,
309 A.3d 152, 155 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation omitted).
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Memorandum of Law in Support of Second Supplemental Amended PCRA
Petition, 10/22/18, at 1 (unpaginated). The Commonwealth filed a motion to
dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition on May 29, 2019.
On September 19, 2019, the PCRA court entered an order summarily
granting Appellant’s PCRA petition, and awarding Appellant a new trial. 14 The
Commonwealth timely appealed.
This Court reversed the PCRA court on December 18, 2020. See
generally Commonwealth v. Shields, 245 A.3d 1083, 2990 EDA 2019 (Pa.
Super. 2019) (unpublished memorandum) (“Shields I”). The Shields I Court
concluded that the PCRA court erred, where it
did not indicate in its September 19, 2019[,] order the basis on
which it granted [Appellant’s] petition for PCRA relief. Nor did the
PCRA court provide in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion the reasons for
the rulings and errors complained of by the Commonwealth in its
[Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)] concise statement. Thus, our appellate review
of the issues raised by the Commonwealth is hampered by our
inability to determine which of [Appellant’s] ineffectiveness claims
the PCRA court found to be meritorious.
Id. (unpublished memorandum at 5-6). We thus remanded the matter to the
PCRA court, and retained jurisdiction, ordering the court to issue a revised
Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing the Commonwealth’s claims of error.
Id.
(unpublished memorandum at 6).
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14 The PCRA court neither conducted an evidentiary hearing prior to granting
relief nor specified which of Appellant’s multiple IAC claims merited relief.
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The PCRA court complied with the Shields I Court’s remand directive
and issued a revised opinion on April 7, 2021, and accompanying order, again
recommending that this Court affirm the grant of PCRA relief. 15 See
generally PCRA Court Opinion, 4/7/21.
This Court subsequently vacated the grant of PCRA relief and remanded
the matter for an evidentiary hearing on Appellant’s ineffectiveness claims
stating, in pertinent part, the following:
[B]ecause the PCRA court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing
to permit trial counsel to explain the bases for [counsel’s] legal
strategies, we cannot determine whether trial counsel had a
reasonable basis for not … objecting to comments made by the
prosecutor during closing argument or to the trial court’s jury
instructions. Without this critical evidence, it was improper for the
PCRA court to summarily conclude that counsel did not have a
reasonable basis for his actions.
…
Accordingly, we remand for the PCRA court to conduct an
evidentiary hearing to permit the introduction of evidence and
testimony relevant to the claims raised by [Appellant] in his PCRA
petition.
Commonwealth v. Shields, 260 A.3d 155, 2990 EDA 2019 (Pa. Super.
2021) (unpublished judgment order at 2-3) (“Shields II”).
In compliance with Shields II, the PCRA court held an evidentiary
hearing on September 15, 2022, and considered testimony from, inter alia,
trial counsel in relation to Appellant’s IAC claims. By an order (and
____________________________________________
15 The PCRA court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing on Appellant’s
claims.
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accompanying opinion) entered January 31, 2023, the PCRA court again
granted Appellant’s PCRA petition and awarded him a new trial.
This Court previously summarized the pertinent contents of the PCRA
court’s January 31, 2023, opinion:
The PCRA court … explained that the grant of [Appellant’s PCRA]
petition and award of a new trial was on the ground that trial
counsel was ineffective for not objecting to “claims” made in the
prosecutor’s summation. PCRA Court Opinion, [1/31/23, at] 7.
Specifically, the PCRA court ruled that there was arguable merit
[to Appellant’s claim] that trial counsel should have objected to
claims “such as” (1) trial counsel “was ‘purposefully trying to
mislead you [the jury]’” [;] or (2) “it’s about people like you… [the
jury], [w]ho live in apartment complexes like the people at the
Joshua Street Houses.” Id. at 7-8[] (brackets in PCRA court
opinion). See N.T.[,] 5/15/14, [at] 13, 24.
Shields III, 323 A.3d 181 (unpublished memorandum at 13-14). 16
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16The Shields III Court summarized the full context of the prosecutor’s
challenged comments as follows:
Now, the shooting happens right before 1:38[ ]p[.]m. Now,
how do we know that? Because there’s a 911 call, the 911
print out, that [the parties] all agreed to or stipulated to.
Showing the first 911 call at 1:37:52[ ]p[.]m. So the
shooting happened, what, a minute[] or two before. I don’t
know why [trial counsel] -- I don’t know why he’s
purposefully trying to mislead you.
[Defense counsel for Charles]: Objection.
[Prosecutor]: I would hope not, but the defendants, the
evidence, that they agreed to put the shooting at before
1:38, and 2 to 3 minutes after that shooting, [Appellant],
and at least [] Roane because we have his phone and are
driving [sic] away.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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The Commonwealth again appealed the PCRA court’s grant of relief.
“Notably, the PCRA court neither ordered a Rule 1925(b) Statement, nor filed
a revised opinion.” Id. at 15.
In Shields III, this Court initially addressed Appellant’s IAC claim
concerning the prosecutor’s remarks in her summation, and the PCRA court’s
grant of a new trial on this issue. See id. at 16-27. We reversed the PCRA
court’s grant of relief based on our conclusion that Appellant had failed to
establish the “prejudice prong” of the IAC test. See id. at 23-27; see also
Commonwealth v. King, 57 A.3d 607, 613 (Pa. 2012) (“To demonstrate
prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
We went on to observe that (1) “the written order of the PCRA court
grants [Appellant’s PCRA] petition (and all subsequent amendments) in total,
rather than in part”; and (2) “[Appellant] litigated fully before the PCRA court
a claim that trial counsel [was] ineffective for not objecting to the court’s
instructions on criminal attempt and criminal conspiracy in that [counsel] did
not clearly distinguish a substantial step from an overt act.” Id. at 27. We
emphasized that
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N.T.[,] 5/15/14, [at] 13.
Shields III, 323 A.3d 181 (unpublished memorandum at 18) (emphasis and
some brackets added).
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[t]he PCRA court did not enter a specific ruling on this claim, either
granting it or denying it. We also recognize that whether a
reasonable basis or actual prejudice was proven at the [PCRA
evidentiary] hearing may play out differently with a jury
instruction claim. Out of fairness to all of the parties, we therefore
remand the matter for the PCRA court to write a supplemental
opinion stating clearly its ruling on this claim, and its reasons
therefor, including a determination of whether the [jury]
instructions were confusing, whether [trial] counsel had a
reasonable basis to not object, and whether, in light of the strong
evidence supporting the verdict, there was actual prejudice from
[trial] counsel’s alleged failure. We will relinquish jurisdiction so
that the parties can, within 30 days of the entry of the
supplemental opinion and order, appeal the ruling if they so
choose.
Id. at 27-28 (internal citations to record and footnote omitted).
The Instant Appeal
On July 10, 2024, the PCRA court issued the dismissal order underlying
the instant appeal, which was accompanied by a supplemental opinion
(Supplemental Opinion).17 In the order, the PCRA court (1) initially
summarized the Shields III Court’s remand instructions in connection with
Appellant’s remaining IAC claim; and (2) “decreed that [Appellant’s] PCRA
claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the trial court’s
instructions on criminal attempt and criminal conspiracy is dismissed.” Order,
7/10/24 (emphasis omitted; some capitalization modified).
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17 The PCRA court held no evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing Appellant’s
PCRA petition.
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We need not discuss the Supplemental Opinion in detail, as its analysis
is not pertinent to the claims of error Appellant raises on appeal, 18 addressed
infra. In short, the PCRA court concluded that Appellant had failed to meet
his burden of proving any of the three prongs of the IAC test in connection
with his remaining IAC claim. See Supplemental Opinion, 7/10/24, at 2-6.19
Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal, through new PCRA counsel,20
within 30 days of the Supplemental Opinion and order.21 On August 15, 2024,
new PCRA counsel for Appellant, Michael Wiseman, Esquire (current PCRA
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18 Appellant concedes in his appellate brief that the “claim for relief presented
by [first] PCRA counsel,” i.e., trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to object
to the jury instructions, which “was addressed in the PCRA court’s
Supplemental Opinion and [] is the ostensible subject of this appeal, does not
have arguable merit. Accordingly, it will not be briefed [].” Appellant’s Brief
at 8 (italics omitted; emphasis added).
19 The PCRA court opined, “trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for not
objecting to the jury instruction on conspiracy since the instruction was correct
and trial counsel would have had no reasonable basis to object.”
Supplemental Opinion, 7/10/24, at 2 (bold omitted; some capitalization
modified). The PCRA court further determined that “there was no actual
prejudice [to Appellant,] considering the strong evidence in support of the
verdict[.]” Id. at 5 (bold omitted; some capitalization modified).
20 Appellant had numerous prior PCRA counsel, who we collectively refer to as
“prior PCRA counsel.”
21 The PCRA court did not direct Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal, nor did Appellant file one.
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counsel), entered his appearance in the PCRA court. 22 Current PCRA counsel
thereafter filed, in this Court, Appellant’s principal brief and reply brief. 23
On appeal, Appellant presents two issues for our review:
1. Did the Commonwealth violate due process of law when it failed
to provide trial [] counsel with discovery showing that an
eyewitness[] to the incident failed to select [Appellant] from a
pre-trial photo array? Was [prior] PCRA counsel ineffective for
failing to discover this fact through a review of the prosecutor’s
file, and litigate this due process violation?
2. Did Appellant’s consecutive terms of imprisonment for two
inchoate offenses violate 18 Pa.C.S. § 906, thus requiring
resentencing? Were all prior counsel, including [prior] PCRA
counsel, ineffective for failing to raise this claim and correct
Appellant’s illegal sentence?
Appellant’s Brief at 2 (issues reordered for ease of disposition).
We are mindful of our standard of review: “When reviewing the
[dismissal] of a PCRA petition, an appellate court must determine whether the
PCRA court’s order is supported by the record and free of legal error.”
Commonwealth v. Drummond, 285 A.3d 625, 633 (Pa. 2022) (citation,
footnote, and quotation marks omitted). “The scope of review is limited to
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22 Aside from his entry of appearance, current PCRA counsel did not submit
any filings in the PCRA court.
23 Current PCRA counsel also represents Charles in connection with Charles’s
appeal from a materially-identical July 10, 2024, Supplemental Opinion and
order that the PCRA court issued in Charles’s case. Charles’s appeal from that
order is also listed before this panel, docketed at 2090 EDA 2024. As current
PCRA counsel explains, the respective appellate briefs in Appellant’s and
Charles’s cases are “materially identical” and raise the same issues.
Appellant’s Brief at 2 n.2.
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the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA court level.”
Commonwealth v. Conforti, 303 A.3d 715, 725 (Pa. 2023) (citation
omitted).
In both of his issues, Appellant asserts prior PCRA counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to claim trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, in
relation to Appellant’s underlying claims of error. See Appellant’s Brief at 13-
17, 19. Where a petitioner “alleges multiple layers of ineffectiveness, he is
required to plead and prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, each of the
three prongs of [the IAC test] relevant to each layer of representation.”
Commonwealth v. Parrish, 273 A.3d 989, 1003 n.11 (Pa. 2022). “In
determining a layered claim of ineffectiveness, the critical inquiry is whether
the first attorney that the defendant asserts was ineffective did, in fact, render
ineffective assistance of counsel.” Commonwealth v. Burkett,
5 A.3d 1260,
1270 (Pa. Super. 2010). “Additionally, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective
for failing to raise a meritless claim.” Treiber,
121 A.3d at 445.
Instantly, Appellant concedes that he raises both of his issues for the first
time on appeal, but claims the issues are nevertheless reviewable under
Bradley, supra, and entitle him to collateral relief. Appellant’s Brief at 2, 15-
17, 19. The Commonwealth concedes that Appellant “appears to
satisfy [Bradley’s] procedural prerequisites.” Commonwealth Brief at 9.
However, the Commonwealth maintains, it is unnecessary to afford Appellant
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relief or again remand this matter for further proceedings, where (1)
Appellant’s underlying claims of error lack merit on their face (for reasons
explained infra); and (2) prior PCRA counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for
failing to raise meritless claims. See id. at 10-16.
We initially recognize that in Bradley, our Supreme Court acknowledged
that remand may be proper in certain cases where IAC claims are raised on
appeal in the first instance:
In some instances, the record before the appellate court will be
sufficient to allow for disposition of any newly-raised ineffectiveness
claims. However, in other cases, the appellate court may need to
remand to the PCRA court for further development of the record and
for the PCRA court to consider such claims as an initial
matter. Consistent with our prior case law, to advance a request for
remand, a petition[er] would be required to provide more than mere
boilerplate assertions of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness[]; however,
where there are material facts at issue concerning claims
challenging counsel’s stewardship and relief is not plainly
unavailable as a matter of law, the remand should be afforded[.]
Bradley, 261 A.3d at 402 (internal citations, quotation marks, brackets, and
footnote omitted; emphasis added); see also Parrish, 273 A.3d at 1002
(same). However, “Bradley did not guarantee a PCRA petitioner substantive
review of claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness, nor did it create an
absolute right to remand for development of those claims.” Lawrence, 309
A.3d at 155.
Instantly, the record demonstrates that Appellant’s first opportunity to
raise both of his claims asserting prior PCRA counsel’s IAC arose upon the
filing of Appellant’s appellate brief, through current PCRA counsel, on March
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7, 2025. Appellant also has undisputedly met the procedural prerequisites of
Bradley. Accordingly, we address Appellant’s issues to determine whether
they entitle him to collateral relief and/or a remand under Bradley.
In his first issue, Appellant argues the Commonwealth deprived him of
due process, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),24 “when
it failed to disclose the non-identification of Appellant during a photo array.”
Appellant’s Brief at 17 (capitalization modified). Appellant maintains that,
effective October 1, 2020, the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office has an
“open file” policy, permitting defense counsel to review and inspect the
Commonwealth’s case file.
Id. Appellant avers the case file “contains an
affidavit of probable cause that was presumably provided to trial counsel.” Id.
at 18. According to Appellant, current PCRA counsel’s review of the case file
disclosed that “there is nothing in the file showing that the [Commonwealth]
ever revealed to [trial] counsel the name” of an individual identified in the
affidavit of probable cause only as “Witness 1, who did not select Appellant
from [a photographic] array.” Id. (footnote omitted). Appellant maintains
the case file identified “Witness 1” as Ms. Boyle, i.e., the eyewitness to the
shooting who testified at trial; Ms. Boyle was not questioned regarding her
inability to identify Appellant from the photographic array. Id. Appellant
contends trial counsel’s failure to question Ms. Boyle concerning her inability
____________________________________________
24 Brady,
373 U.S. at 87 (holding that due process prohibits the prosecution
from suppressing evidence material to guilt or punishment).
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to identify Appellant from the array “itself constitutes some evidence that [Ms.
Boyle’s] name was not provided as having not made an identification.” Id.
Appellant thus argues that 1) the Commonwealth’s alleged failure to
disclose Ms. Boyle’s non-identification of Appellant in the photo array violated
his due process rights; and 2) “[prior] PCRA counsel [were] ineffective for
failing to avail [themselves] of the [Commonwealth’s] open file policy.” Id.
at 19. Appellant submits, however, that “the record before this Court does
not permit resolution” of his Brady claim, and that we should therefore
“remand for further development of [first] PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness and
prongs 2 and 3 of the Brady analysis” (discussed infra). Id.; see also id.
(“Appellant submits that there is sufficient facial merit to this claim to support
remand for ‘further development’ per Bradley.”).
The Commonwealth counters that “the existing record establishes that
the [non-identification] evidence is immaterial[,] … because Witness 1’s non-
identification of [Appellant] was fully consistent with [Ms.] Boyle’s non-
identification of [Appellant] in her out-of-court statement and in-court
testimony.” Commonwealth Brief at 14 (emphasis in original). Accordingly,
the Commonwealth concludes, “[Appellant’s] claim fails on its face,” and prior
PCRA counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless
claim of error. Id. at 16; see also id. (“[A] third remand for futile further
proceedings is not warranted.”).
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Initially, we recognize that a Brady claim “presents a question of law,
for which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is
plenary.” Commonwealth v. Bagnall, 235 A.3d 1075, 1084 (Pa. 2020).
Concerning alleged Brady violations, “[t]he defendant bears the burden of
demonstrating that the Commonwealth withheld or suppressed evidence.”
Commonwealth v. Smith,
17 A.3d 873, 887 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted).
“In the PCRA context, a petitioner must demonstrate that the alleged Brady
violation so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable
adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.” Commonwealth
v. Mickeals,
335 A.3d 13, 24 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citation omitted).
Our Supreme Court has recently reiterated that
to establish a Brady violation, the evidence at issue must be
favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or
because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been
suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and
prejudice must have ensued. Evidence is material and
must be disclosed if there is a reasonable probability that
the result of the proceedings would have been different
had it been disclosed. However, the mere possibility that
undisclosed evidence may have helped the defense or might have
affected the outcome of the trial does not establish materiality. In
evaluating whether a reasonable probability of a different outcome
has been demonstrated, the question is not whether the
defendant would more likely than not have received a different
verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received
a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of
confidence. As such, a defendant need not demonstrate there
would not have been enough left to convict after discounting the
inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence, but need
only show that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken
to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine
confidence in the verdict.
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Commonwealth v. Johnson, 335 A.3d 685, 717 (Pa. 2025) (quotation
marks, brackets, and citations omitted; emphasis added). Furthermore,
“Brady evidence may not be cumulative of other evidence, cannot have
been equally available to the defense, and cannot have been discoverable
through the exercise of reasonable diligence[.]” Commonwealth v.
Simpson,
66 A.3d 253, 264 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted; emphasis added).
Instantly, applying Bradley, we determine (1) Appellant has failed to
establish any “material facts at issue concerning claims challenging [prior
PCRA] counsel’s stewardship” in connection with Appellant’s Brady challenge;
and (2) relief on this challenge is “plainly unavailable as a matter of law[.]”
Bradley, 261 A.3d at 402. Our review discloses that, at trial, Ms. Boyle was
unable to identify the individuals who fired shots at the victim. Ms. Boyle
testified that she had met the victim approximately two or three months prior
to the incident. N.T., 5/18/14, at 40. Although Ms. Boyle testified she
recognized the victim, she explicitly stated, “I didn’t get a good look at the
guys that had th[e] guns,” while watching the incident unfold from her
vantage point in her second-floor apartment. Id. at 20; see also id. at 33
(Ms. Boyle denying that she had ever seen the victim’s assailants); id. at 77
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(Ms. Boyle agreeing that, when she observed the incident, she was focused
on the victim, and not his assailants).25
In his brief, Appellant makes no reference to Ms. Boyle’s above-
summarized testimony, nor does he make any effort to explain how the
alleged withholding of the fact that Ms. Boyle was unable to identify Appellant
in a photographic array caused him prejudice. See Commonwealth v.
Wholaver, 177 A.3d 136, 144 (Pa. 2018) (“A PCRA petitioner must address
each of [the IAC test] prongs on appeal.” (citing Commonwealth v.
Natividad,
938 A.2d 310, 322 (Pa. 2007) (explaining that “appellants
continue to bear the burden of pleading and proving each of the [IAC test
prongs] on appeal[.]”)); Commonwealth v. Lawrence,
313 A.3d 265, 278
n.3 (Pa. Super. 2024) (“It is well settled that this Court will not act as counsel
and will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant.” (citation, brackets,
and quotation marks omitted)). Because Ms. Boyle’s inability to identify
Appellant in a photographic array was plainly consistent with, and
cumulative of, her trial testimony, Appellant’s first issue is meritless on its
face, and requires no remand for an evidentiary hearing. See Simpson,
66
A.3d at 264; Bradley, 261 A.3d at 402.
____________________________________________
25 When pressed by the Commonwealth, Ms. Boyle was only able to recall that
the perpetrators “were black, medium build, they had dark clothing on …. I
believe they had facial hair as well[.]” N.T., 5/18/14, at 28; see also id. at
57.
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In his second issue, Appellant claims (1) the trial court illegally
sentenced him to the extent it imposed consecutive terms of imprisonment
for two inchoate offenses, i.e., attempted kidnapping and “Conspiracy”;26 and
(2) trial counsel, and prior PCRA counsel, were ineffective for failing to
challenge this error. See Appellant’s Brief at 9-17. Appellant cites section
906 of our Crimes Code, which provides “[a] person may not be convicted of
more than one of the inchoate crimes of criminal attempt, criminal solicitation
or criminal conspiracy for conduct designed to commit or to culminate in the
commission of the same crime.” Id. at 9-10 (quoting 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 906).
Appellant contends that
the trial court had no basis for assigning an object to the
conspiracy because there was no way to know whether the jury
found Appellant guilty of conspiracy with the object being
aggravated assault or attempt to kidnap. If the jury found the
latter, a consecutive sentence was prohibited by section 906.
Id. at 11.
Appellant emphasizes the trial court’s following instruction regarding the
objects of the conspiracy:
The accused in this case are being charged with
Conspiracy. The Commonwealth is alleging that each
defendant conspired with the other and with [] Roane.
The Commonwealth is alleging that the crime of
attempted murder, aggravated assault, and/or
attempted kidnap were the objects of the conspiracy.
____________________________________________
26 Appellant points out that the jury made no finding as to the underlying
object of the conspiracy in either its verdict sheet or in open court. Appellant’s
Brief at 11-12.
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N.T., 5/15/2014, at 43 [(emphasis added by Appellant)]…. [The
trial court’s] use of the disjunctive when describing the objects of
the conspiracy, “attempted murder, aggravated assault, and/or
attempted kidnap were the objects of the conspiracy” means that
the jury could have found the object of the conspiracy was to
commit kidnapping. The object of the conspiracy was not
specified when the jury delivered its verdict in open court[. ]N.T.,
5/16/2014, at 4… (jury delivered a guilty verdict on the conspiracy
count without specifying the object). Nor was the object of the
conspiracy [] specified on the verdict sheet. Rather, the verdict
sheet simply has a box with “Conspiracy” and no interrogatory
regarding the object of the conspiracy was given to the jury. FN8
FN8 The [trial] court posed an interrogatory for the
aggravated assault count, giving the jury a choice between
[whether the evidence supported that Appellant caused the
victim] serious bodily injury, or not.
Appellant’s Brief at 11-12 (footnote and emphasis in original; some record
citations omitted; citations modified).
Appellant claims he met his burden of proving all three prongs of the
IAC test, where “this sentencing claim has more than arguable merit and, if
accepted, it would result in a reduction of Appellant’s sentence. Therefore[,
Appellant’s claim] meets prongs (1) and (3)” of the IAC test. Appellant’s Brief
at 16. Appellant contends he also met the second, “reasonable basis” prong,
where
no lawyer would intentionally decide to not raise a claim that could
have resulted in a reduction of [Appellant’s] sentence by about a
third.FN11
FN11 Appellant was sentenced to 21-42 years [in prison].
If
the sentencing error is corrected, and his 6-12-year
consecutive sentence for conspiracy is removed, the new
sentence would be 15-30 years.
Id. at 16-17 (footnote in original).
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Finally, Appellant maintains no remand for further development of the
record under Bradley is necessary, as “[t]he facts underlying the substance
of the identified sentencing error are clear and [] based on the trial court
record.” Id. at 15. “Nor does Appellant believe that further development is
required regarding the underlying ineffectiveness claim.” Id. at 16.
Nevertheless, Appellant states he “would not object to [a] remand for
appropriate hearings” on this issue. Id. at 17.
The Commonwealth counters,
[Appellant’s] separate sentences for the inchoate offenses of
attempted kidnapping and conspiracy to commit aggravated
assault are legal because the record establishes the existence of
two conspiratorial agreements, separated by time, with different
criminal objectives in mind.
Commonwealth Brief at 13.
[Appellant] and his accomplices attempted to kidnap the victim by
shoving him into their car. That attempt failed when the victim
ran away. Only then did [Appellant] and Charles agree to assault
the victim by shooting him as he ran away.
Id. at 11 (internal citations to record omitted). The Commonwealth
emphasizes that the indictment charged Appellant with conspiracy to commit
aggravated assault and/or attempted murder. Id. at 13; Indictment,
1/11/13, at 2-3 (unpaginated). Moreover, according to the Commonwealth,
the jury asked the following question as to conspiratorial liability
during their deliberations: “If there is a conspiracy to commit
agg/assault, then if one of the conspirators is guilty of A/A, is the
other conspirator necessarily guilty of A/A too?”
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Id. at 6 (emphasis omitted).27 The Commonwealth suggests that the
conspiracy jury question indicates the jury intended to convict Appellant on
conspiracy to commit aggravated assault. Id. at 6, 13.
Contrary to the Commonwealth, Appellant asserts in his reply brief that
the fact that Appellant was indicted only for conspiracy to attempt
to commit murder or aggravated assault, does not shed light on
the object of the conspiracy that was actually argued to the jury 28
____________________________________________
27 We hereinafter refer to this jury question as the “conspiracy jury question,”
which was dated May 15, 2014, and purportedly signed by the jury foreperson.
The Commonwealth does not provide a record citation regarding the
conspiracy jury question; rather, it merely attached a copy of the document
to its appellate brief as an exhibit. Commonwealth Brief, Exhibit B. Our review
of the record discloses a copy of the conspiracy jury question is contained in
the trial exhibits of record, as the final document. Moreover, immediately
prior to the jury’s rendering its verdict on May 16, 2014, the trial court briefly
noted on the record that the jury had submitted three questions to the trial
court during deliberations. See N.T., 5/16/14, at 2. Significantly, however,
these three questions did not include the conspiracy jury question, and the
trial court made no mention of the conspiracy jury question. Id.
Immediately after the trial court responded to the jury’s three other questions,
the jury rendered its verdict. Id. at 3-5.
28 Appellant emphasizes the following statement, by the prosecutor, in her
closing argument:
The defendants are charged with 3 major crimes in this case.
They are charged with attempted murder, attempted kidnapping,
they’re charged with conspiracy. That’s the most important
charge for you to think about. Because conspiracy is what ties
[Appellant and Charles] together. ….
In this case, this entire incident, from the beginning to the end,
was a conspiracy.
N.T., 5/15/14, at 19-20; see also Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2-3. According
to Appellant,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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and upon which the jury was instructed. In the final analysis then,
it is irrelevant that Appellant was not charged by the Indictment
with a conspiracy to kidnap – that crime was argued to the jury
and the court instructed on it.
Appellant’s Reply Brief at 3 (footnote added).
Upon review, we determine Appellant’s issue meets all of Bradley’s
above-described requirements to entitle him to a remand for further
development of the record regarding this issue. Specifically, Appellant (1)
“provide[d] more than mere boilerplate assertions of [prior] PCRA counsel’s
ineffectiveness”; (2) established that “there are material facts at issue
concerning claims challenging [prior PCRA] counsel’s stewardship”; and (3)
demonstrated that “relief is not plainly unavailable as a matter of law.”
Bradley, 261 A.3d at 402 (emphasis added). As explained supra, the trial
court instructed the jury that the Commonwealth maintained “the objects of
the conspiracy” could include “attempted murder, aggravated assault, and/or
attempted kidnap[.]” N.T., 5/15/14, at 43. In rendering its verdict, the jury
at no time made a finding as to the underlying object of the conspiracy. See
Verdict Sheet, 5/16/14; N.T., 5/16/14, at 4. Nevertheless, the trial court
____________________________________________
[t]he prosecutor did not distinguish between conspiracy to commit
an attempt to kidnap or a conspiracy to attempt to commit murder
or aggravated assault. Rather, as the [trial] court did in its
instructions, [the prosecutor] referred to the entire incident as
encompassing two conspiracies, not just the one charged in the
indictment[.]
Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2.
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unilaterally assigned to Appellant’s conspiracy conviction the underlying object
of “Aggravated Assault.” Sentencing Order, 7/25/14, at 1 (unpaginated); Trial
Disposition Form, 5/16/14, at 2.
The PCRA court29 had no opportunity to substantively consider
Appellant’s newly-raised claim.30 Our Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v.
Greer, 316 A.3d 623 (Pa. 2024), emphasized “the role of the PCRA court as
the court of first impression[,]” stating that
[t]he PCRA court should have the first opportunity to address
factual and legal claims.FN4 See Commonwealth v. Scolieri, …
813 A.2d 672, 678 (Pa. 2002). An appellate court’s proper role is
to review the PCRA court’s decision for an error of law or an
abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Mason, … 130 A.3d
601, 617 (Pa. 2015).
FN4 This preference does not, however, contradict Bradley’s
observation that “[i]n some instances, the record before the
appellate court will be sufficient to allow for disposition of
any newly-raised ineffectiveness claims.” Bradley, 261
A.3d at 402. The preference applies only where there is any
question about the merit of the newly-raised
ineffectiveness claim.
Greer, 316 A.3d at 630-31 (footnote in original; emphasis added). As noted
in Bradley, our appellate courts are not “tasked with developing the record
____________________________________________
29 We reiterate that the PCRA judge also presided at Appellant’s trial.
30 As explained supra, in its Supplemental Opinion, the PCRA court recognized
it was “[c]onstrained” by the Shields III decision, which remanded for further
PCRA court analysis of Appellant’s now-abandoned IAC claim. Supplemental
Opinion, 7/10/24, at 1. The Supplemental Opinion pertained to only that
abandoned claim, see id. at 2-6, and in no way addressed Appellant’s claim
related to the legality of his sentence.
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or acting as a court of original jurisdiction”; rather, they “have the ability to
grant or deny relief on straightforward claims, as well as the power to
remand to the PCRA court for the development of the record.” Bradley, 261
A.3d at 402-03 (emphasis added); see also Commonwealth v. Shaw, 247
A.3d 1008, 1017 (Pa. 2021) (“[T]he PCRA court is ‘the appropriate—and,
indeed, the only—forum for the evidentiary and factual development’” of PCRA
claims (quoting Commonwealth v. Koehler,
229 A.3d 915, 937 (Pa.
2020)).
We are guided by our decision in Commonwealth v. Riley, 811 A.2d
610 (Pa. Super. 2002). In that case, the Commonwealth charged the
defendant with one count each of conspiracy, burglary, and theft by unlawful
taking or disposition.
Id. at 612. A jury found the defendant guilty of criminal
conspiracy, and not guilty of the remaining charges.
Id. Appellant filed a
post-trial motion for extraordinary relief, challenging the sufficiency and
weight of the evidence supporting his conviction.
Id. at 612-13. At a hearing
on the motion, the trial court “acknowledge[d] the existence of an ambiguity
in the jury’s verdict[.]”
Id. at 613. Specifically, the court stated that “[the
defendant] was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit either theft or
burglary. I’m not sure whether that was determined.”
Id. (emphasis added);
see also
id. (observing “that burglary is graded as a felony of the first degree
and theft is a felony of the third degree”). The trial court ruled that it was
“going to make a finding that this conviction is a felony of the first degree[,]”
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based upon its “belie[f] that the jury did find [the defendant] guilty of
conspiracy to commit both” burglary and theft. Id. (citation omitted).
The defendant filed a direct appeal, challenging the weight and
sufficiency of the evidence, as well as the trial court’s determination that the
jury found the defendant guilty of the more serious offense of conspiracy to
commit burglary, as opposed to theft. Id. at 613-14. This Court affirmed the
conviction and rejected Appellant’s weight and sufficiency challenges. See
id.
at 614-17. However, we held the trial court unlawfully sentenced the
defendant on conspiracy to commit burglary, where the jury’s general
conspiracy verdict was ambiguous:
[I]n the absence of clear evidence of the jury’s intent to the
contrary, a general conspiracy verdict must be resolved in
favor of the defendant, and may be construed only as a
conviction of conspiracy to commit the least serious underlying
offense for which the jury could properly have found the defendant
to have conspired to commit. Consequently, while the record here
supports a verdict of conspiracy to commit burglary or theft, the
jury’s ambiguous verdict must be resolved in [the defendant’s]
favor, and we must conclude that the trial court erred in
sentencing [the defendant] for the more serious offense of
conspiracy to commit burglary, and should have sentenced him
for conspiracy to commit theft by unlawful taking.
Id. at 620-21 (footnote omitted; emphasis added). Accordingly, we vacated
the defendant’s judgment of sentence and remanded for resentencing.
Id. at
621.
Instantly, the jury’s general conspiracy verdict was ambiguous as to the
underlying object of the conspiracy. Moreover, as discussed supra, the
Commonwealth maintains the jury, during its deliberations, submitted the
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conspiracy jury question to the trial court, which purportedly evinced its intent
to convict Appellant of conspiracy to commit aggravated assault. However,
the record regarding this matter is unclear, and the trial court made no
mention of the conspiracy jury question on the record, despite expressly
responding to three other questions that the jury had submitted. N.T.,
5/16/14, at 2.
In sum, and mindful of the unique procedural posture and irregularities
of this case,31 we conclude the most prudent course is to remand for the PCRA
court to consider, in the first instance, Appellant’s newly-raised IAC claim
related to the legality of his sentence on the conspiracy conviction. See
Lawrence, 309 A.3d at 156 (concluding remand was appropriate where the
PCRA petitioner raised, for the first time on appeal, an IAC claim regarding his
prior PCRA counsel pursuant to Bradley. Further stating, “because the PCRA
court did not explain its fact finding or basis for dismissing the claims that
were litigated before it, we find ourselves unable to conduct proper appellate
review.”); Parrish, 317 A.3d at 561-62 (where PCRA petitioner properly
raised, for the first time on appeal, claims pursuant to Bradley, “reluctantly[]
remand[ing] the matter to the PCRA court[,]” where it “needs to further
develop the record in this case and consider, in the first instance, Parrish’s
____________________________________________
31We reiterate that the PCRA court on multiple prior occasions, granted
Appellant PCRA relief.
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layered [IAC] claims, all alleging the ineffective assistance of initial PCRA
counsel[.]”).
On remand, we defer to the sound discretion of the PCRA court regarding
the extent and manner of the evidence to be adduced on Appellant’s claim.
However, the PCRA court must consider (1) the jury’s verdict on the
conspiracy charge and the legality of the sentence imposed thereon; (2)
whether the trial court, in delivering its jury charge on conspiracy, intended
to include kidnap or attempted kidnap as an object of the conspiracy; (3) the
significance of the conspiracy jury question purportedly submitted during
deliberations; and (4) whether there is merit to Appellant’s IAC claim related
to the legality of his sentence on the conspiracy conviction.
Based upon the foregoing, pursuant to Bradley and its progeny, we are
constrained to vacate the July 10, 2024, order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA
petition and remand this case for further proceedings on Appellant’s claim of
prior PCRA counsel’s IAC, in connection with the underlying legality of
sentence challenge.
Order vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
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Date: 10/24/2025
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