J-A16013-25
2025 PA Super 243
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
TYLER NIKONOWICZ :
:
Appellant : No. 2708 EDA 2023
Appeal from the Order Entered September 13, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-23-CR-0004301-2023
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.
OPINION BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED OCTOBER 28, 2025
Tyler Nikonowicz appeals from the order, entered in the Court of
Common Pleas of Delaware County, deeming him incompetent to be tried and
involuntarily committing him to a facility for treatment. After careful review,
we reverse.
During the pendency of this appeal, the trial court granted the
Commonwealth’s request to nolle pros the underlying criminal charges. We,
therefore, simply note that the affidavit of probable cause alleged the following
events. On May 18, 2023, Media Borough Police Department officers stopped
Nikonowicz on the street after he called 911 approximately nine times in eight
minutes. Nikonowicz reported each time that he had been raped in his sleep
before abruptly ending the call. The dispatcher reported that Nikonowicz
sounded as if he were under the influence. Officers located Nikonowicz, who
acted aggressively and accused them of being pedophiles and rapists. The
J-A16013-25
officers believed that Nikonowicz may have been mentally ill and, ultimately,
arrested him for, among other crimes, false reports and resisting arrest.
On August 7, 2023, the Commonwealth filed a petition for involuntary
commitment pursuant to the Mental Health Procedures Act (MHPA), 50 P.S.
§§ 7101–7503. The petition stated that, on August 1, 2023, Marc Gramatges,
M.D., interviewed Nikonowicz at the local correctional facility. Doctor
Gramatges reported that Nikonowicz “lacked sufficient psychological and
cognitive capacity to proceed to trial and should be considered incompetent.”
Petition, 8/7/23, at ¶ 2. The trial court held a competency hearing on
September 12, 2023, with Dr. Gramatges testifying as an expert witness. The
trial court granted the petition and ordered Nikonowicz committed to a
psychiatric inpatient facility.
Nikonowicz filed a timely notice of appeal, asserting that the instant
order is appealable as of right pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313. Nikonowicz filed a
court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement errors complained of on
appeal. The trial court filed an opinion on December 14, 2023, and
transmitted the record to this Court. While this appeal was pending, the trial
court held a status hearing to review Nikonowicz’s treatment. On March 13,
2024, the trial court deemed Nikonowicz competent to proceed and the
criminal proceedings resumed. The Commonwealth filed a criminal
information on February 1, 2025. Ten days later, the Commonwealth
-2-
J-A16013-25
requested permission to nolle pros the charges, which the trial court granted.1
Nikonowicz raises two issues for our review.
1. Whether the procedure by which the competency evaluation
was ordered, and a finding of incompetence made, violated the
[MHPA] and [Nikonowicz]’s Due Process rights under the
United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions, inasmuch as the
competency evaluation was ordered by a magisterial district
judge in the absence of a hearing and the lower court exceeded
the time frame within which a determination of competency
could be made?
2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that
[Nikonowicz] was incompetent, such that the finding of
incompetence violated the [MHPA] and [Nikonowicz]’s Due
Process rights under the United States and Pennsylvania
Constitutions?
Appellant’s Brief, at 6.
We begin by addressing two threshold matters: whether this Court has
jurisdiction over this appeal and whether the termination of criminal charges
against Nikonwicz has mooted the issues. The two points are related, as the
Commonwealth maintains that the lack of a pending prosecution is relevant
to our jurisdiction. We begin with a brief statutory discussion of the pertinent
provisions of the MHPA.
Article IV of Chapter 15 of the MHPA applies to the examination and
treatment of persons charged with a crime. Treatment is authorized for
“incompetent defendants” who are defined as persons whom the trial court
determines “to be substantially unable to understand the nature or object of
____________________________________________
1 It is unknown if the order granting the Commonwealth’s motion barred the
Commonwealth from refiling charges.
-3-
J-A16013-25
the proceedings against [them] or to participate and assist in [their]
defense[.]” 50 P.S. § 7402(a) (section 402). Section 402(b) permits the
court to “order involuntary treatment of a person found incompetent to stand
trial but who is not severely mentally disabled, such involuntary treatment not
to exceed a specific period of 60 days.” Id. at § 7402(b). The court did so
here. See Order, 9/12/23 (“Pursuant to . . . [section 402(b)], [Nikonowicz]
is hereby committed . . . for treatment and evaluation for a period not to
exceed 60 days[.]”). In turn, this finding triggered “a stay of the prosecution
for so long as such incapacity persists[.]” 50 P.S. § 7403(b) (section 403).
An incompetent individual is entitled to counsel while charges are pending,
and “the person charged shall be reexamined not less than every 90 days by
a psychiatrist appointed by the court and a report of reexamination shall be
submitted to the court and to counsel.” Id. at § 7403(c). Notably, neither
section 402 nor 403 includes a mechanism for judicial review.
With that background in mind, we first address whether this Court has
jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. By rule, “an appeal may be taken as of
right from any final order of a government unit or trial court.” Pa.R.A.P. 341.
“Final orders are those that dispose of all claims and all parties, are explicitly
defined as final orders by statute, or are certified as final orders by the trial
court or other reviewing body.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 32 A.3d 243,
248 (Pa. 2011). The instant order is not a final order, as the prosecution
remained pending.
-4-
J-A16013-25
“In limited circumstances, however, we may consider interlocutory
appeals. One type of interlocutory appeal is that involving a collateral order.”
Commonwealth v. Schultz, 133 A.3d 294, 308 (Pa. Super. 2016). A
collateral order is defined as “an order separable from and collateral to the
main cause of action where the right involved is too important to be denied
review and the question presented is such that if review is postponed until
final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.” Pa.R.A.P.
313(b). “Whether an order is appealable under Rule 313 is a question of law.
As such, our review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Williams,
86 A.3d 771,
781 (Pa. 2014).
Our Supreme Court has directed that Rule 313 “is to be construed
narrowly, and we require every one of its three prongs be clearly present
before collateral appellate review is allowed.” Rae v. Pennsylvania Funeral
Dirs. Ass’n, 977 A.2d 1121, 1126 (Pa. 2009). We do so “to avoid ‘undue
corrosion of the final order rule,’ and to prevent delay resulting from
‘piecemeal review of trial court decisions.’” K.C. v. L.A.,
128 A.3d 774, 778
(Pa. 2015) (citations omitted). We do not apply a “whole order” approach.
Instead, following the lead of the United States Supreme Court, we apply an
“issue-by-issue approach” and restrict appeal to “those issues which
independently satisfy the collateral order test, rather than permitting whole
order review of an entire case once one issue crosses the collateral order
threshold.” Rae, 977 A.2d at 1128. In this case, the two issues present
identical considerations; thus, we will treat them as one overarching issue.
-5-
J-A16013-25
The Commonwealth agrees that the first prong is met, as “the court’s
determination of incompetence is separable from the underlying question of
criminal guilt.” Commonwealth’s Brief, at 11. It, however, disputes the
second and third prongs, citing as support for both arguments the absence of
an ongoing prosecution. Thus, in its view, the “right involved” is not important
because it “cannot be said to even impact [Nikonowicz]” since both his
commitment and the prosecution have ended. Id. at 12. Similarly,
addressing whether Nikonowicz’s claim will be forever lost, the Commonwealth
asserts that “his claims are already ‘lost’” since the charges have been
withdrawn. Id.
We disagree with the Commonwealth that events following the filing of
the notice of appeal bear on our analysis of the three prongs. For the sake of
uniformity, we conclude that the Rule 313 analysis must be tied to the moment
in time the notice of appeal was filed. The doctrine is framed in terms of
whether the order is “immediately appealable,” which textually suggests the
assessment is made at the time of appeal without reference to subsequent
events. K.C., supra at 777 (“Otherwise known as the collateral order
doctrine, Rule 313(b) provides that an interlocutory order is collateral and,
therefore, immediately appealable, if . . . .”). Furthermore, assessing the
circumstances as of the day of appeal is consistent with the fact that the
collateral order doctrine tends to employ a categorical approach with respect
to the discrete legal issue. See, e.g. Commonwealth v. Harris,
32 A.3d
243, 249 (Pa. 2011) (stating orders requiring disclosure of confidential
-6-
J-A16013-25
information generally qualify as collateral, as “[o]nce putatively privileged
material is in the open, the bell has been rung, and cannot be unrung by a
later appeal”). While that approach is “tempered by an appreciation that the
collateral order doctrine is to be narrowly construed in order to buttress the
final order doctrine,” Shearer v. Hafer, 177 A.3d 850, 858 (Pa. 2018), the
salient point is that the assessment of whether an interlocutory order qualifies
as a collateral order focuses on the substantive legal issue. In this respect,
the points raised by the Commonwealth fall under the rubric of justiciability,
not jurisdiction. See Town of McCandless v. McCandless Police Officers
Ass’n,
901 A.2d 991, 1002 (Pa. 2006) (“Mootness poses a question of
justiciability and is related to the concepts of standing and ripeness; all three
are concerned with the proper timing of litigation.”). The flaws with the
Commonwealth’s position are evident when one considers the fact that its
arguments suggest this order may have qualified as collateral had this Court
been able to review the claims on an expedited basis the day after the trial
court filed its opinion. The bench and bar would have little guidance on
whether an order qualifies as collateral if the “when” is analyzed instead of
the “what.”
We now analyze the three prongs of the collateral order doctrine.
Beginning with the first, we agree with the Commonwealth that the issue of
whether Nikonowicz was lawfully involuntarily committed is separable from
and collateral to the main cause of action, i.e., Nikonowicz’s culpability. In
Commonwealth v. Nuzzo, 284 A.3d 1243, 1249 (Pa. Super. 2022), counsel
-7-
J-A16013-25
for defendant Marc Nuzzo filed a petition for a competency determination but
sought to seal the petition. The trial court declined the request to seal on the
basis that the petition qualified as a public document. Nuzzo filed a notice of
appeal and asserted that appeal was as-of-right pursuant to Rule 313. We
agreed that the order qualified as collateral under Rule 313; with respect to
the first prong, we stated:
There is little dispute that [Nuzzo] raises a claim that is separable
from the main cause of action since the confidential status of the
competency petition is capable of review without consideration of
the main substantive issues in this criminal proceeding. More
specifically, we may adjudicate [Nuzzo]’s privacy interest in his
medical and mental health records without a determination of his
competency to stand trial or an adjudication of his criminal
responsibility for the alleged offenses, which are inquiries critical
to the pre-trial and trial phases of this case. As such, the instant
appeal is separable from the merits of the underlying criminal
prosecution, including the underlying issue of [Nuzzo]’s
culpability.
Id. at 1250.
Similarly, the legality of Nikonowicz’s involuntary commitment is
separable from his culpability and does not require any analysis of whether he
was guilty of the alleged crimes. Thus, the first prong is met.
Turning to the second prong—the importance of the interest involved—
“we weigh the interests implicated in the case against the costs of piecemeal
litigation.” Ben v. Schwartz, 729 A.2d 547, 552 (Pa. 1999). Nikonowicz
asserts a broad due process-based liberty interest in not being confined
without sufficient evidence of incompetency and strict compliance with
procedural protections. He also raises an interest in the existence of the
-8-
J-A16013-25
records generated as a result of the commitment. See Appellant’s Brief, at
22 (“[T]he finding of incompetency must be vacated, otherwise any future
examiner could inquire of the records from the September 12, 2023 order[.]”).
Involuntary commitment constitutes a serious deprivation of liberty, but
it is not clear that it qualifies as worthy of immediate review since “the rights
involved must implicate more than just the individual parties in the matter[]
and, instead, must be deeply rooted in public policy going beyond the
particular litigation at hand.” J.C.D. v. A.L.R., 303 A.3d 425, 431 (Pa. 2023)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). Criminal defendants routinely face
long periods of incarceration pending trial and must await final judgment to
appeal issues such as suppression of critical evidence. We, therefore, do not
agree that “commitment to an inpatient psychiatric facility is too important to
be denied review” based solely on the fact of commitment. Appellant’s Brief,
at 2. Concerns regarding an invalid commitment or lengthy suspension of
charges2 can be challenged via an “allowance of appeal from an interlocutory
order by permission, and we have concluded that [the] discretionary process
would be undermined by an overly permissive interpretation of Rule 313’s
limited grant of collateral appeals as of right.” Rae, 977 A.2d at 1126.
However, we agree that the records created due to the commitment
favor immediate review. As a preview of sorts concerning the mootness issue,
____________________________________________
2 The stay of criminal proceedings could have been extended, subject to the
required review every ninety days, up to the maximum sentence of
confinement or ten years, whichever is less. See 50 P.S. § 7403(f).
-9-
J-A16013-25
we have reviewed involuntary commitment orders despite their mootness on
the grounds that “a live controversy still exists since involuntary commitment
orders involve important liberty interests over which it behooves us to
maintain appellate vigilance[.]” In re S.O., 492 A.2d 727, 733 (Pa. Super.
1985). The liberty interest is partly rooted in the difficulty of adjudicating
such issues in a timely fashion, as “[a]ppeals from orders for involuntary
commitment rarely reach this Court” before the maximum period of
commitment expires. In re Ann S.,
421 A.2d 370, 372 n.2 (Pa. Super. 1980).
Beyond that difficulty, our Supreme Court has held that involuntary
commitment implicates reputational interests protected by the Pennsylvania
Constitution. See Wolfe v. Beal,
384 A.2d 1187, 1189 (Pa. 1978) (“[A]
person who has been unlawfully committed to a state mental hospital has a
right to the destruction of the hospital records which were created . . . . The
continued existence of the hospital records pose[s] a threat to [Wolfe]’s
reputation.”). Accordingly, the need to maintain “appellate vigilance” over
this constitutional right implicates an important policy beyond Nikonowicz’s
interest in the litigation. See Shearer,
177 A.3d at 859 (distinguishing, for
purposes of assessing whether a right involves an issue deeply rooted in public
policy, constitutional rights from mere rule-based rights). Relatedly, we
conclude that “the interests that would go unprotected without immediate
appeal are significant relative to the efficiency interests served by the final
order rule.” Williams,
86 A.3d at 782.
- 10 -
J-A16013-25
The final prong is whether the claim will irreparably be lost if review is
postponed until final judgment. A criminal defendant wishing to appeal a
determination that he or she is competent to proceed to trial does not satisfy
the criteria for an appeal as of right, because the defendant is free to challenge
the “determination of competence following trial.” Commonwealth v.
Reagan, 479 A.2d 621, 622 (Pa. Super. 1984). See also Commonwealth
v. Tizer,
684 A.2d 597, 601 (Pa. Super. 1996) (reviewing on direct appeal
claim that “the trial court erred by deeming him competent to stand trial”). It
stands to reason that this claim could be raised on direct appeal if the case
had proceeded to final judgment.
Nikonowicz argues that his claims will be irreparably lost if deferred to
final review because “the question of whether [he] was deemed incompetent
and committed in violation of his due process rights will never be definitively
answered.” Appellant’s Brief, at 3. We disagree. In cases that proceed to
final judgment, resolution will be significantly delayed but could still be
reviewed on appeal. Furthermore, as the Commonwealth highlights, these
claims were lost by its decision to terminate prosecution. A defendant’s claims
are definitionally “irreparably lost” any time a case is resolved without a
conviction.
However, the reputational interest involved here is unique and
implicates interests beyond the criminal matter. The fact that Nikonowicz
faced criminal charges is distinct from the commitment issue. Indeed, the
procedures under Chapter 15 of the MHPA are civil in nature. See 50 P.S. §
- 11 -
J-A16013-25
7401(a) (“Whenever a person who is charged with crime, or who is undergoing
sentence, is or becomes severely mentally disabled, proceedings may be
instituted for examination and treatment under the civil provisions of this act
in the same manner as if he were not so charged or sentenced.”).
Commitment proceedings “were never meant to supplant the operation of the
criminal system, but were structured as completely collateral proceedings
which could exist contemporaneously with criminal prosecution.”
Commonwealth v. Davis, 479 A.2d 1041, 1047 (Pa. Super. 1984), aff'd,
510 A.2d 722 (Pa. 1986). We deem that point dispositive because it appears
that, as a practical matter, an immediate appeal may be the only way to
guarantee that a defendant’s reputational interest is protected when he is
involuntarily committed while facing criminal charges. 3
Presently, the parties have not addressed the availability of another
mechanism to appeal the sufficiency of the evidence justifying the
incompetency finding or the associated procedural claims raised by
Nikonowicz. As previously noted, the applicable sections of the MHPA do not
supply a right to judicial review, and we have not found any case addressing
this issue. Typically, appellate review of involuntary commitments takes the
form of a direct appeal from a pure civil commitment or from petitions to
expunge records in connection with requests to obtain firearms as specifically
____________________________________________
3 The fact that Nikonowicz’s charges were dismissed following the appeal
illustrates the conundrum. However, our analysis would not have differed if
the prosecution remained ongoing.
- 12 -
J-A16013-25
authorized by statute. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111.1(g)(2) (allowing persons
involuntary committed by physician pursuant to 50 P.S. § 7302 to seek review
of sufficiency of evidence supporting commitment and expungement). As
Nikonowicz was committed under section 402, that statute does not apply.
Our Supreme Court’s decision in In re J.M.Y., 218 A.3d 404 (Pa. 2019),
suggests that Nikonowicz would have forfeited appellate review absent this
appeal. There, J.M.Y. was committed for involuntary treatment by a physician
pursuant to 50 P.S. § 7302 on September 22, 2012, after he attempted to
harm himself. Such commitments are valid for a maximum of 120 hours. His
attending psychiatrist applied to extend the commitment for twenty days, as
authorized by 50 P.S. § 7303(a). On November 24, 2014, J.M.Y. filed a
petition to vacate the commitment and expunge all records, raising various
due process challenges to the procedures resulting in his commitment.
Ultimately, our Supreme Court concluded that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The Court observed that J.M.Y.’s
continued commitment required the certification of a mental health officer.
Notably, section 303 permits judicial review of the hearing officer’s
certification.
(g) Petition to Common Pleas Court.--In all cases in which the
hearing was conducted by a mental health review officer, a person
made subject to treatment pursuant to this section shall have the
right to petition the court of common pleas for review of the
certification. A hearing shall be held within 72 hours after the
petition is filed unless a continuance is requested by the person’s
counsel. The hearing shall include a review of the certification and
such evidence as the court may receive or require. If the court
determines that further involuntary treatment is necessary and
- 13 -
J-A16013-25
that the procedures prescribed by this act have been followed, it
shall deny the petition. Otherwise, the person shall be discharged.
50 P.S. § 7303(g).
J.M.Y. did not challenge the certification under that procedure and, thus,
could not file an appeal to this Court. See also In re Ryan, 784 A.2d 803,
807 (Pa. Super. 2001) (addressing appeal from trial court’s review under 50
P.S. § 7303(g)). The J.M.Y. Court observed that J.M.Y. “seem[ed] to be
arguing that, because he is raising due process challenges to his [s]ection 303
commitment procedure, such challenges may be brought at any time, and in
the manner he chose. We reject such a notion.” Id. at 417.
J.M.Y. does not address the commitment procedures involved in this
appeal, but we are unaware of any statute that would permit a challenge to
the trial court’s decision at some later date. Accordingly, in the absence of
any overriding statutory language, the default appellate provisions of the
Judicial Code presumably apply. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5571(b) (“an appeal from
a tribunal or other government unit to a court . . . must be commenced within
30 days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken”). As an
immediate appeal is the only way to guarantee that Nikonowicz can appeal
the commitment order to vindicate his reputational interests, we find that the
third prong is met as well. Cf. Commonwealth v. Schultz, 133 A.3d 294,
310 (Pa. Super. 2016) (concluding claim would be irreparably lost if review
were postponed until trial “in light of the privilege issues in play and because
there is no effective mechanism” for raising the claim on direct appeal)
(emphasis added).
- 14 -
J-A16013-25
Having concluded that the order is appealable under Rule 313, we
readily dispose of the Commonwealth’s argument that this appeal is moot. As
set forth by our Supreme Court in Wolfe, a committed individual has a
reputational interest that extends beyond the period of commitment.
We now proceed to the issues raised on appeal. The first issue raises
two separate procedural claims concerning Nikonowicz’s commitment. For the
following reasons, we agree that the trial court’s failure to hold the hearing
within the mandated period requires reversal. Accordingly, we need not reach
the remaining issue.4
The key provision is set forth within section 402: “The determination of
the competency of a person who is detained under a criminal charge shall be
rendered by the court within 20 days after the receipt of the report of
examination unless the hearing was continued at the person’s request.”
50 P.S. § 7402(g) (emphasis added). The trial court and Commonwealth
agree that this provision was violated because the report was completed on
____________________________________________
4 Nikonowicz argues that there was no authority for Dr. Gramatges to conduct
the August 1, 2023 interview, as it was apparently prompted by a magisterial
district judge’s recommendation in connection with his/her bail determination.
The Commonwealth responds that this was merely a psychological evaluation
and not an incompetency examination. The Commonwealth’s argument
overlooks that its petition directly sought involuntary commitment, not an
incompetency examination. But see 50 P.S. § 7402(c) (“Application to the
court for an order directing an incompetency examination may be presented
by an attorney for the Commonwealth[.]”). We decline to address this
argument, as we conclude Nikonowicz is entitled to relief in any event.
Furthermore, it is not clear whether Nikonowicz preserved an objection. The
remaining claim argues that the evidence presented was insufficient to
establish that he was incompetent.
- 15 -
J-A16013-25
August 4, 2023, and the hearing took place more than one month later.
However, both suggest that Nikonowicz waived any complaint by requesting
a postponement.
We respectfully disagree. The competency hearing was initially
scheduled for August 22, 2023, which was within twenty days of the August
4, 2023, report. At the August 22 hearing, Nikonowicz argued that the trial
court could not grant the petition since Dr. Gramatges was not present. The
trial court then sua sponte rescheduled the hearing. In its opinion, the trial
court states that it “continued the hearing . . . based on defense counsel’s
objection[.]” Trial Court Opinion, 12/14/23, at 7.
We do not agree that Nikonowicz requested that the hearing be
rescheduled. His objection merely argued that the Commonwealth’s failure to
secure Dr. Gramatges’ appearance precluded the trial court from committing
him. The trial court did not have to accept this argument. 5 Thus, while it is
correct that Nikonowicz objected, in context that objection was to the
sufficiency of the evidence. The trial court was free to disagree with the
argument. Alternatively, the court could have ordered another evaluation.
Indeed, at the rescheduled commitment hearing, Nikonowicz reiterated his
procedural objection and argued that the trial court could remedy the violation
by ordering a new examination. He cited 50 P.S. § 7402(g) and stated, “We
have objected to this from the beginning. . . . . Now as far as the remedy for
____________________________________________
5 The Commonwealth argued, “You can make a finding that he is not
competent based on his presentation today.” N.T. Hearing, 8/22/23, at 7.
- 16 -
J-A16013-25
that. I think the only remedy is likely another evaluation,” followed by a
hearing within twenty days from the report. N.T. Competency Hearing,
9/12/23, at 41.6
We now address whether this procedural violation was fatal. As with
the collateral order analysis, we have not found any authority directly on point.
In In re A.J.N., 144 A.3d 130 (Pa. Super. 2016), we aptly summarized the
caselaw emphasizing the importance of strict compliance with other
procedural sections of the MHPA:
Our decision in In re Chiumento, [] 688 A.2d 217 ([Pa. Super.]
1997), likewise addressed the scenario where the specific due
process protections provided to a person under MHPA were
ignored. We stated, “[b]ecause the specific procedural
protections and mandates delineated in the MHPA were not
followed,” the involuntary commitment in question was improper,
the appellant had to be discharged, and the record of the
involuntary commitment had to expunged. Id. at 218. We
concluded that a mental health patient’s need for treatment
cannot trump compliance with the due process requirements
outlined in the MHPA, even when the due process violation
appears to be minimal. See Commonwealth v. C.B., [] 452 A.2d
1372 ([Pa. Super.] 1982) (C.B. was not given a copy of a petition
three days in advance of hearing held pursuant to § 7304 (relating
to court-ordered involuntary treatment not to exceed ninety
days), as required by MHPA; C.B. was entitled to expungement of
all records of commitment). See also In re Condry, [] 450 A.2d
136, 137 ([Pa. Super.] 1982) (vacating an order that upheld an
involuntary commitment because “the statutory requirements [of
the MHPA] were not strictly adhered to”); Cf. In re J.M., [] 726
A.2d 1041 ([Pa.] 1999) (holding proceedings valid where county
____________________________________________
6 Nikonowicz argued that a reexamination was particularly appropriate
because his condition had improved. In fact, on cross-examination, Dr.
Gramatges agreed that Nikonowicz “is doing a lot better today.” N.T.
Competency Examination, 9/12/23, at 24.
- 17 -
J-A16013-25
administrator issued warrant before person was taken to facility
for involuntary treatment and where warrant supported the
finding that there was a reasonable probability that patient was in
need of emergency involuntary commitment under [section] 302).
Thus, the case law uniformly mandates expungement and
destruction of records when the procedural, due process
requirements of the MHPA are violated during a commitment
proceeding.
Id. at 138–39.
We see no reason not to extend this same logic to the violation here. 7
The General Assembly mandated that the incompetency determination be
____________________________________________
7On this basis, alone, we conclude that Nikonowicz is entitled to relief.
However, we are compelled to note that it appears Nikonowicz’s commitment
was unlawfully extended.
The trial court committed Nikonowicz to Norristown State Hospital on
September 13, 2023, for 60 days, which, as previously noted, is the maximum
period allowed by statute. The docket reflects that Nikonowicz was
transported from Norristown to the county jail on January 26, 2024, which is
135 days from September 13, 2023. Accepting arguendo that additional
periods of involuntary treatment are authorized without resort to 50 P.S. §
7406, there is no indication on the public docket that any party sought to
extend the commitment. In this regard, section 7406 separately permits,
after a finding of incompetency under section 7403, an order directing
involuntary treatment under 50 P.S. § 7304. Again, nothing indicates that
this statute was invoked.
Finally, section 7403 requires a reexamination of any person deemed
incompetent “not less than every 90 days by a psychiatrist appointed by the
court[.]” 50 P.S. § 7403. It appears that the only review of Nikonowicz’s
commitment was sometime around February 15, 2024, when the trial court
ordered a competency evaluation, followed by the March 13, 2024 order
deeming Nikonowicz competent to proceed.
We believe that the Commonwealth and the trial court acted in good faith.
However, the restraints on Nikonowicz’s liberty are significant and we remind
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
- 18 -
J-A16013-25
made within twenty days of receipt of the report unless Nikonowicz requested
a postponement. Because he did not, the trial court violated his procedural
rights. Nikonowicz is, thus, entitled to expungement of all records since his
commitment was unlawful. Id.
Order reversed. Nikonowicz’s September 12, 2023, involuntary
commitment is to be expunged and all records of that commitment are to be
destroyed upon remand. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Date: 10/28/2025
____________________________________________
the parties and the trial court of the need to strictly follow the General
Assembly’s statutory directives.
- 19 -
