J-A08006-25
2025 PA Super 251
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
TERRANCE JOYNER : No. 644 EDA 2024
Appeal from the Order Dated February 5, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0001958-2023
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
OPINION BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED NOVEMBER 12, 2025
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the order, entered in
the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, granting Terrence Joyner’s
motion to suppress.1 After review, we reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
On January 10, 2023, the Commonwealth charged Joyner with
prohibited possession of a firearm,2 carrying a firearm without a license,3
carrying a firearm in public in Philadelphia, 4 and possession of a controlled
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1 The Commonwealth took this interlocutory appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
311(d), and certified that the trial court’s ruling terminates or substantially
handicaps the prosecution. See Commonwealth's Brief, at 1.
2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105.
3 Id. at § 6106.
4 Id. at § 6108.
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substance.5 On April 19, 2023, Joyner filed an omnibus pre-trial motion in
which he argued, inter alia, the police officers lacked reasonable suspicion to
seize him and, therefore, any physical evidence recovered through the
subsequent unconstitutional search was inadmissible. 6 See Appellee’s Pre-
Trial Omnibus Motion, 4/19/23, at ¶¶ 7-12. The court held a suppression
hearing on December 12, 2023. After the hearing, the trial court made the
following findings of fact:
On January 9, 2023, at approximately 3:00 p.m., [Philadelphia]
Police Officer Paul Moore[, who had been] assigned to the 22nd
District for his entire six-year career, was on routine patrol in the
area of 3200 West Cumberland Street. He was in uniform in a
marked police vehicle[,] and he was working with two [other
uniformed police officers,] Officers Grant and Whatley. [7]
[Officer Moore] described this particular area as notorious for
violent crime, including shootings, robberies, gun[ arrests,] and
drug[ arrests]. He [had previously] made at least five firearm
arrests in this area.
While driving eastbound on Cumberland Street, [Officer Moore]
observe[d Joyner] walking in the same direction. [Joyner’s] right
arm was allegedly pinned to his side as he walked with only his
left arm swinging. As Officer Moore passed [Joyner], he allegedly
saw what he described as a heavily weighted square object[,]
which he associated with being a gun. More specifically, Officer
Moore testified repeatedly during direct and cross-examination
that he knew [Joyner] was concealing a firearm.
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5 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16).
6 Joyner also argued his Miranda rights were violated.See Appellee’s Pre-Trial Omnibus Motion, 4/19/23, at ¶¶ 13-14; see also Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
7 The certified record does not include the full names of Officers Grant and
Whatley.
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Upon seeing the officers, [Joyner] turn[ed] around and [began] to
walk westbound on Cumberland Street. [Joyner] then walk[ed]
onto Natrona Street[.] Officer Moore [reversed course down
Cumberland Street and] pulled up to [Joyner at Natrona Steet.
Officer Moore then] asked [Joyner] if he was carrying a gun.
[Joyner] respond[ed] no. Officer Moore ask[ed] if [Joyner was]
sure and he [said no again and began walking away]. As Officer
Moore opened his door, [Joyner ran]. No lights or sirens had been
activated.
The body-worn camera video [did] not begin until after the chase
started. Officer Moore pursue[d Joyner in his vehicle and then]
on foot[,] and hear[d] the sound of metal hitting the ground.
[Joyner was] subdued and arrested after a brief chase. [A]
firearm [was] recovered by Officer Whatley. Also confiscated from
[Joyner’s] person [were] two prescription bottles of oxycodone.
N.T. Suppression Hearing (Day 2), 2/5/24, at 4-5. 8
On February 5, 2024, the trial court granted Joyner’s motion to suppress
and found that the officers’ interaction with Joyner constituted an
investigatory detention without reasonable suspicion. See Trial Court
Opinion, 4/1/24, at 12-13. Specifically, the trial court determined that the
officers lacked reasonable suspicion because the stop was solely based on
Officer Moore’s belief that Joyner possessed a concealed firearm, which alone,
under Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208 A.3d 916 (Pa. 2019), is insufficient to
support reasonable suspicion. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/1/24, at 10-11.
Further, relying on Commonwealth v. Barnett,
398 A.2d 1019 (Pa. 1979),
the trial court found that, in their attempt to stop Joyner without reasonable
suspicion, the police officers’ conduct was coercive and caused him to abandon
the firearm. Id. at 13-15. The trial court concluded that,
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8 Only Officer Moore testified at the suppression hearing.
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[t]his is a classic case of forced abandonment. The [c]ourt rejects
Officer Moore’s testimony that he knew [Joyner] had a gun in his
right pocket. . . . Officer Moore had no lawful basis to exit his
vehicle to pursue [Joyner]. That action forced [Joyner] to flee and
abandon the weapon.
N.T. Suppression Hearing (Day 2), 2/5/24, at 5-6.
The Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal. Both the
Commonwealth and the trial court complied with the requirements of Pa.R.A.P.
1925. The Commonwealth raises the following issue on appeal:
Did the [trial] court err by ordering suppression where [Joyner]
voluntarily discarded an illegal firearm while running unprovoked
from police because [Joyner] had not been seized before he took
flight, and even if he had been, ample reasonable suspicion of
illegal gun possession would have nonetheless justified a stop by
that time?
Commonwealth’s Brief, at 4.
The Commonwealth argues that the trial court erred in granting Joyner’s
motion to suppress because the interaction between the police and Joyner
constituted a mere encounter and did not rise to the level of an investigatory
detention. See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 13. The Commonwealth avers
there is no evidence of coercion by the police that caused Joyner to run during
the interaction. Id. at 14-15. The Commonwealth asserts that, because it
was a mere encounter, Joyner chose to run from the police, and his voluntary
discarding of the gun was not unlawfully forced. Therefore, the evidence
should not have been suppressed. Id. at 19.
Alternatively, the Commonwealth argues that “even if a seizure had
been initiated when Joyner took flight, the seizure was supported by
reasonable suspicion.” Id. Specifically, the Commonwealth asserts Hicks is
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not implicated here because “the officers had a factual basis for reasonable
suspicion not merely that [Joyner] was carrying a gun, but that he was
carrying it unlawfully.” Commonwealth’s Brief, at 21. The Commonwealth
lists various factors to support Officer Moore’s reasonable suspicion, including
that Officer Moore was on patrol in a neighborhood notorious for violent crime
and observed Joyner walking strangely with a “squared-off” heavy item in his
pocket, and that Joyner turned around and walked in the opposite direction
upon seeing the police vehicle. Id. We agree.
Our standard of review in addressing a trial court’s order granting
suppression is as follows:
When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order, we
follow a clearly defined standard of review and consider only the
evidence from the defendant’s witnesses[,] together with the
evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the
entire record, remains uncontradicted. The suppression court’s
findings of fact bind an appellate court if the record supports those
findings. The suppression court’s conclusions of law, however, are
not binding on an appellate court, whose duty is to determine if
the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.
Our standard of review is restricted to establishing whether the
record supports the suppression court’s factual findings; however,
we maintain de novo review over the suppression court’s legal
conclusions.
Commonwealth v. Coles, 317 A.3d 659, 663 (Pa. Super. 2024) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantee the right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and possessions from
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unreasonable searches and seizures. Commonwealth v. Morrison, 166
A.3d 357, 363-64 (Pa. Super. 2017).
We recognize three categories of warrantless interactions between
citizens and police officers.
The first [type of interaction] is a mere encounter, sometimes
referred to as a consensual encounter, which does not require the
officer to have any suspicion that the citizen is or has been
engaged in criminal activity. . . . The second type of interaction,
an investigative detention, is a temporary detention of a citizen.
This interaction constitutes a seizure of a person, and to be
constitutionally valid[,] police must have a reasonable suspicion
that criminal activity is afoot. The third, a custodial detention, is
the functional equivalent of an arrest and must be supported by
probable cause. . . .
No bright lines separate these types of encounters, but the United
States Supreme Court has established an objective test by which
courts may ascertain whether a seizure has occurred to elevate
the interaction beyond a mere encounter. The test, often referred
to as the “free to leave test,” requires the court to determine
whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding
the encounter, the police would have communicated to a
reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police
presence and go about his business. Whenever a police officer
accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he
has seized that person.
Commonwealth v. Anderson, 276 A.3d 282, 293-94 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en
banc), quoting Commonwealth v. Adams,
205 A.3d 1195, 1199-1200 (Pa.
2019) (internal citations omitted). In applying this “free to leave” test, the
focus is “whether the suspect has in some way been restrained by physical
force or show of coercive authority.” Commonwealth v. Parker,
161 A.3d
357, 363 (Pa. Super. 2017).
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In considering whether a seizure has occurred, or whether a reasonable
person would feel free to leave, courts may examine the following non-
exclusive list of factors: “[T]he number of officers present during the
interaction; whether the officer informs the citizen they are suspected of
criminal activity; the officer’s demeanor and tone of voice; the location and
timing of the interaction; the visible presence of weapons on the officer; and
the questions asked.” Id. (citation omitted). “Although no single factor
controls our analysis, ‘[b]oth the United States and Pennsylvania Supreme
Courts have held that the approach of a police officer followed by questioning
does not constitute a seizure.’” Commonwealth v. Young,
162 A.3d 524,
529 (Pa. Super. 2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Coleman,
19 A.3d 1111,
1116 (Pa. Super. 2011). The circumstances must present some level of
coercion, beyond the officer’s mere employment status, that conveys a
demand for compliance or threat of tangible consequences from refusal.
Young, supra.
Further, an investigatory detention “must be supported by a reasonable
and articulable suspicion that the person seized is engaged in criminal
activity[.]” Hicks, 208 A.3d at 927. “[T]he question of whether reasonable
suspicion existed at the time of an investigatory detention must be answered
by examining the totality of the circumstances to determine whether there
was a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the individual stopped
of criminal activity.” Commonwealth v. Thomas,
273 A.3d 1190, 1197 (Pa.
Super. 2022) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
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In making this determination, we must give due weight . . . to the
specific reasonable inferences the police officer is entitled to draw
from the facts in light of his experience. [T]he totality of the
circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an examination of
only those facts that clearly indicate criminal conduct. Rather,
even a combination of innocent facts, when taken together, may
warrant further investigation by the police officer.
Commonwealth v. Young, 904 A.2d 947, 957 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations,
brackets, and quotation marks omitted). Moreover, it is well-settled that
unprovoked flight by a defendant in a high crime area is sufficient to create a
reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop. See Commonwealth
v. McCoy,
154 A.3d 813, 819 (Pa. Super. 2017).
Additionally, under the Pennsylvania Constitution, when an officer’s
initial seizure is not justified by reasonable suspicion or probable cause, and
a citizen subsequently flees and discards contraband, the “abandonment” of
that contraband is deemed to be forced or coerced, and the item in question
must be suppressed. See Commonwealth v. Matos, 672 A.2d 769, 774
(Pa. 1996). Conversely, where the police possess reasonable suspicion to stop
a suspect, the officers may lawfully recover contraband abandoned by the
suspect during flight. See Commonwealth v. Cook,
735 A.2d 673, 675 (Pa.
1999).
Upon our review of the record, and based on the totality of the
circumstances, we conclude that the initial interaction between the police
officers and Joyner constituted a mere encounter. The interaction occurred in
broad daylight on a public street. See N.T. Suppression Hearing (Day 2),
2/5/24, at 4. When the officers first approached Joyner, they did not engage
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their vehicle’s sirens or lights, leave their vehicle, or brandish their weapons.
Id.; see also Parker, supra. Further, under the circumstances here, Officer
Moore’s questions of “do you have a gun” and “are you sure” did not escalate
the interaction from a mere encounter into an investigatory detention. See
N.T. Suppression Hearing (Day 2), 2/5/24, at 4; see also Commonwealth
v. Taylor,
2025 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1813 (Pa. Super. filed July 15, 2025)
(unpublished memorandum decision)9 (mere encounter where officers
suspected defendant of possession of concealed firearm, pulled up in police
vehicle, asked “if he had permit to carry,” officer opened door of patrol car
after defendant answered, at which point defendant fled); see also
Commonwealth v. Lindsay,
328 A.3d 531 (Pa. Super. 2024) (Table) (mere
encounter where police observed defendant with partially concealed weapon
and asked multiple times if he had permit); see also
Coleman, supra
(holding interaction was mere encounter when officer approached defendant
and asked if he had gun).10 There is no evidence that Officer Moore’s tone of
voice or demeanor communicated to Joyner that that he was not free to leave,
nor was there any evidence presented that Officer Moore positioned himself
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9See Pa.R.A.P. 126(a)-(b) (unpublished, non-precedential decisions of this
Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for persuasive value).
10 As the trial court noted, under Hicks, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
concluded that possession of a concealed firearm “alone is an insufficient basis
for reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Id. at 945, 951.
However, the Hicks Court explicitly limited its holding to seizures based upon
possession of a concealed firearm. Id. at 926, 934, 945. Here, the interaction
is a mere encounter and, thus, Hicks does not control.
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in a manner that obstructed Joyner’s ability to continue walking down the
street. In fact, Joyner continued walking after Officer Moore’s question. See
N.T. Suppression Hearing (Day 1), 12/12/23, at 13-14, 33. See also
Lindsay, supra.
Likewise, Officer Moore opening the vehicle door after the second
question did not escalate the interaction beyond a mere encounter. See
Young, 162 A.3d at 529 (approaching defendant and asking questions does
not automatically constitute an investigatory detention). Here, Officer Moore’s
actions, without more, were not a coercive show of authority to restrain
Joyner. See Taylor, supra; see also Lindsay, supra. Therefore, the
suppression court erred in concluding that the officers’ interaction with Joyner
constituted an investigative detention. See
Thomas, supra. As such, the
officers did not need reasonable suspicion to justify their initial interaction with
Joyner.
Furthermore, the record demonstrates that Officer Moore only began
chasing Joyner after Joyner ran, and the record supports a determination that
Officer Moore had reasonable suspicion to pursue Joyner at that point. Prior
to the chase, Officer Moore observed Joyner walking “strangely” in a high-
crime area with a “square-shaped” object that Officer Moore believed, based
on his experience, was a firearm. See N.T. Suppression Hearing (Day 2),
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2/5/24, at 4-5.11 He further observed Joyner turning around after seeing the
marked patrol car, and, upon interacting with the police officers, Joyner ran.
Id. See McCoy,
154 A.3d at 819 (defendant’s evasive behavior in high crime
area, in combination with other factors, contributed to police officer’s
reasonable suspicion). We agree with the trial court that mere observation of
a concealed weapon alone is not enough for reasonable suspicion. See
Hicks,
supra. However, as set forth above, by the time Officer Moore gave chase,
the police had observed more than mere suspected possession of a concealed
weapon. See Commonwealth v. Rice,
304 A.3d 1255, 1262-63 (Pa. Super.
2023) (concluding officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct investigative
detention where officers observed appellee in high crime area with “L” shaped
bulge in his waistband, and appellee turned and walked away from police when
asked to “come here”). Therefore, Joyner’s flight, in combination with other
factors, gave rise to reasonable suspicion.12 See
McCoy, supra; see also
Taylor, supra.
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11 While the trial court rejected Officer Moore’s testimony that he “knew
[Joyner] had a gun in his right pocket,” id. at 6 (emphasis added), the record
supports Officer Moore’s observation that he saw a “heavily weighted square
object which he associated with being a gun.” Id. at 4 (emphasis added);
see also N.T. Suppression Hearing (Day 1), 12/12/23, at 14 (Officer Moore
testifying that he “believed [the item] was a barrel [of a gun] outline[.]”).
12 We note that the instant case is factually distinct from Barnett.In Barnett,
two plain-clothed officers on patrol in an unmarked car observed the
defendant walking with his hands in his raincoat. Id. at 1020. The defendant
on two occasions looked in the direction of the officers and then ducked behind
a parked car as the officers’ car passed. Id. As the officers stopped and
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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In summary, we conclude that Officer Moore and Joyner were engaged
in a mere encounter until Joyner fled, unprovoked, and Officer Moore gave
chase. Once Officers Moore, Whatley, and Grant gave chase, the encounter
escalated to an investigatory detention, which was supported by reasonable
suspicion. Thus, the recovery of the firearm abandoned during the flight was
lawful. See Cook, supra. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s grant of
suppression and remand for further proceedings. 13
Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Date: 11/12/2025
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alighted from the car, the defendant ran. Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that the officers’ conduct of attempting to stop the defendant and
subsequently chasing him without reasonable suspicion amounted to a
coercive factor that was the main reason that the defendant abandoned his
firearm; therefore, the firearm was unlawfully recovered. Id. at 1021.
Conversely, here, as discussed, at the point that Joyner ran, Officer Moore
already had reasonable suspicion to pursue him.
13 The trial court did not rule on the portion of Joyner’s pre-trial motion that
argued his Miranda rights were violated. Therefore, it is not before us on
appeal. See Appellee’s Pre-Trial Omnibus Motion, 4/19/23, at ¶¶ 13-14.
Accordingly, our decision here does not preclude the parties and trial court
from addressing this issue in further proceedings.
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